



# THE OUTLINE OF KNOWLEDGE

EDITED BY  
JAMES A. RICHARDS

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## THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

By ARTHUR DONALD INNES

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**THE HISTORY OF THE  
WORLD**



# THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

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## THE MIDDLE AGES

*Continued from Volume IV*

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### CHAPTER XXII

THE League procured trading concessions for its members from the English Government, in spite of much opposition from the jealousy of English traders; and where it had to bargain directly with the foreign trade associations, it did so by granting to these associations corresponding facilities in its own cities. As concerned England, the Hanseatic League was simply a commercial union enjoying privileges of which the English wished to deprive it, while desiring to wring from it corresponding privileges within its own jurisdiction. On the Baltic, however, the Hansa acquired a political position, because it had to defend its trading interests not merely against the competition of foreign merchants, but also against Denmark, Sweden, and the Teutonic Knights—a process involving both military and naval activity. The League attained, perhaps, to its highest power in the fourteenth century; in the fifteenth the English Associations had become formidable competitors, and in the course of the following century the Hansa lost all its privileges in England, and the English were rivals with them on almost equal terms in the Baltic trade.

### *III.—Intellectual Conditions*

Intellectually as well as politically the Middle Ages form a clearly distinguishable, if not an exactly, defined period between the ancient and the modern, between civilization of the Roman world—the world known to and dominated by the Romans—and that of the modern world, since it began to expand over and to dominate the entire globe.

The Roman civilization was submerged in a great catastrophe—the conquering flood of barbarian races. The new civilization emerged only in the course of many centuries—a thousand years more or less. The Roman polity was shattered by the collision with barbarism; the intellectual standards of the Old World were shattered by the collision of three forces: intellectual paganism, Christianity, and barbaric paganism. Christianity, long persecuted and repressed, narrowed and hardened by its struggle for life, and then suddenly become dominant, rejected what was good as well as what was bad in Hellenism, and then found itself face to face with a primitive heathenism; while the destruction of the old political system destroyed also the conditions of security necessary to an ordered intellectual progress.

In the universal reign of force it was only the Church which assumed the function of endeavoring, with comparative consistency, to maintain standards of public morality. Lacking the sanction of physical force under its own control, it asserted its authority through its claim to spiritual powers intangible, but none the less awe-inspiring, and necessarily involving a claim that it was the sole and absolute repository of spiritual knowledge and the sole channel of Divine Grace. It followed that in the eyes of the Church whatsoever was derogatory to its supremacy, whatsoever seemed to detract from it absolute authority, was to be anathematized. The Hildebrandine papacy almost succeeded in extending that authority over the political sphere: the Church actually succeeded in extending it over the intellectual sphere. Whatsoever was not sanctioned by the Church was suppressed. For centuries art and literature found scope only so far as they were allied to the service of the Church, while all education was directed to the same object, and all intellectual employments were absorbed by churchmen.

Religion was conceived as being concerned primarily with the life after death; the life in this world, only as the preliminary to eternal salvation or damnation. The business of the Church was the salvation of souls, the business of the individual was the salvation of his own soul, to be attained most readily by escape from the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil—an escape to which the most obvious means was monachism in its original sense, the life of a solitary. While the Church was primarily organized for the salvation of souls as a pastorate, the life of the monk appealed to the individual seeking his own salvation.

The solitary, however, in separating himself from the temptations of the social life, cut himself off also from any kind of fellowship with other Christians. Recluses grouped together with other recluses, who were vowed like themselves to chastity and poverty, for the purposes of common worship, mutual edification, and common

labor. Grouping involves recognition of a common head and a common rule. The "cœnobitic" life, the common life of the monastery came into being when the recluses from the world joined themselves together as a community, subjecting themselves to the same vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience.

Monasticism, impracticable when Christianity was a persecuted religion, soon attracted large numbers when that religion became dominant. Originating in the Egyptian Thebaid, it spread over Christendom; from the borderlands monks went forth as missionaries among the heathen. In the sixth century monasticism was largely reorganized by Benedict of Nursia. The rule of St. Benedict became the archetype of all monastic regulation; the monasteries became the only centers where, separated from the turmoil of the world, which was in a perpetual state of material warfare, the individual could find encouragement in the pursuit of knowledge—such knowledge as his superiors judged to be lawful. Profane learning, poetry and emotional literature, philosophical speculation had all come almost exclusively from non-Christian sources. Philosophy had been independent of the Christian revelation; poetry was of the world and the flesh; science, which investigated hidden things, was of the devil. Consequently, the studies of the monastery were restricted in their scope, almost precluding scientific inquiry of familiarity with the profane treasures of antiquity. And philosophical speculation was confined by the condition that the sanctioned dogmas of Christianity were axiomatic truths, so that any speculations which could in any sort be regarded as running counter to any of them were *ipso facto* to be condemned. As with poetry, so with art. So far as painting and sculpture tended to the glorification of physical beauty, and above all the beauty of the flesh, they were of evil. Neither the craving for beauty nor the craving for knowledge could be altogether repressed; but the activity of both must be confined, if it were to be recognized as legitimate to the direct and manifest furtherance of ecclesiastical influence and the current ecclesiastical conceptions.

As a result, the intellectual activities of the Middle Ages down to the thirteenth century, appear to us to be singularly barren. Art, concentrated entirely upon ecclesiastical architecture and the decoration of works of devotion, achieved marvels in these two fields, but in no other. Science was a forbidden thing. Speculative inquiry was cribbed, cabined, and confined within the limits of those scholastic disputations which excited the contempt of later generations by reason of their apparent futility, and in spite of the consummate intellectual subtlety which they displayed. Scholasticism was in fact the expression of the irresistible desire of the keen intellect to escape

from the fetters imposed upon it, and while it was still struggling in its bonds the results were necessarily futile.

But if it may fairly be said, that the conclusions of the schoolmen led nowhither, nevertheless, they did in fact prepare the way for emancipation. Ostensibly from the eleventh century onwards their controversies raged round the great question between "nominalists" and "realists." The realists held—if we may endeavor to state a highly technical problem in a manner intelligible to the technically uninitiated—that, apart from the particular things that we see and hear and touch—this man, this dog, this table—the words "man," "dog," and "table" correspond to a type or idea which has an actual substantial objective existence. The nominalist held that such ideas or types have no substantial existence, but that "man," "dog," and "table" are merely names for mental abstractions. Ecclesiastical authority was disposed to the view that nominalism involved the negation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Actually, the endeavor of both nominalists and realists was professedly, at least, to attain to a rational demonstration of the Christian truths known by revelation and believed through faith. But such an attempt, made by a courageous thinker, was apt to involve a critical attitude towards those authoritative exponents of Christian doctrine whose expositions appeared to be incapable of logical reconciliation, and it is not easy to doubt that some of the most brilliant of the schoolmen were in fact seeking to substitute reason for authority as the ultimate guide to truth—most notably the famous Abelard.

While the Christians were engaged upon disputations rigorously limited by the demands of orthodoxy, Mohammedanism, which at this stage was far more latitudinarian in its tolerance of diverse opinions, was speculatively distinctly in advance of Western Europe; and it was at second hand, through the Arabians, that an acquaintance with Aristotle was revived in the thirteenth century. The resuscitation of Aristotle would seem to have been the impelling force which drove the greatest of the schoolmen, Thomas Aquinas, to maintain his fundamental doctrine that the subject matter of faith and reason, of revelation and demonstration, are absolutely distinct. The doctrine of Aquinas, a Dominican, demanded negation from the rival Order of the Franciscans; and in challenging him, Duns Scotus and his pupil, William of Occam, in effect destroyed the foundations of the whole system of Scholasticism.

Progress, in fact, owed a very great debt to St. Francis, and the Franciscans, and incidentally to Honorius III. the successor of the great Pope Innocent III., who definitely gave the papal sanction to the Franciscan movement. For the essential condition of progress is departure from conventions which have ceased to serve the purpose which brought them into being, and have become a hindrance instead

of a help. The whole Franciscan movement was a departure from established conventions, and as such was a challenge to conservatism and authority, although, in the first instance, it did not directly call authority in question. Much credit, therefore, is due to a pope who recognized it as a force to be encouraged, not crushed. Nevertheless, the outcome can hardly have been that which Honorius anticipated. The unconventional movement produced Roger Bacon, who might almost be called the founder of modern science, although authority did its best to extinguish him; and it produced those schoolmen who prepared the way for the substitution of reason for authority, whose task was made the easier by the transfer of the Papacy to Avignon. It is not without significance that we find William of Occam and the Franciscans championing Lewis of Bavaria against the Avignon popes. And it is of interest to note, in passing, that these islands gave birth to John Scotus Erigena, the precursor of the schoolmen in the ninth century, to Dun Scotus and William of Occam, as well as to Roger Bacon, and still later to John Wiclif.

The separation between the Eastern and the Western Empires entirely destroyed in the West the Hellenism which still survived at Byzantium. But not unnaturally the barbarian flood, which did not altogether sweep Latinism away in any part of the Western Roman Empire, except, perhaps, the British Isles, was least dominant in Italy; and it was in Italy that intellectual vitality first reasserted itself in the vivifying atmosphere of the city states, with their vigorous political life and their Latin traditions. It was in Italy and in the south of France that the old paganism, with its worship of beauty, was indigenous, as distinguished from the northern paganism with its worship of strength, beauty and strength being the two aspects of the fulness of physical life, while the fulness of physical life was precisely that with which the Church, as such, concerned itself least, since physical life was but a transitory phase of eternity, and the pursuit of physical well-being a snare to lead us astray from the pursuit of spiritual well-being in the life to come.

The note of the intellectual movement in Italy, which had its beginnings in the thirteenth century, was the revival of the old paganism, the revolt against the depreciation of physical life, a revolt which carried with it a tendency at least to the rejection of ethical standards based upon the expectation of a future life. At the same time, basing itself upon the wisdom of the ancients, while it was in itself ethically destructive, it provided a base for ethical reconstruction. There is no essential antagonism between even austere ethical standards and an exuberant physical vitality. The divorce between intellect and morals was peculiarly characteristic of Italy, but not of the greatest even of the Italians.

At the very outset we are confronted with the paradox that the

greatest of all the great names is that of a man who was himself essentially mediæval—not a rebel against mediævalism. In Dante the hitherto inarticulate soul of the Middle Ages found at last its sublime utterance—utterance which created Italian as a literary language when Latin was the only language of literature known, or rather when whatsoever was not written in Latin was not recognized as literature. Because Dante was the first literary creator the world had known for more than a thousand years; because his figure stands at the dawning of a great creative period after a long night; because his work gave an impulse, and in some respects an impress, to what followed, he belongs to the new day, but his spirit of the time that was passing away.

Again, we have said that the ethical sense and the religious sense were, in the main, discarded by the Italian intellectual movement, which is commonly called the Renaissance. Yet the delight in life, which was the essence of it, was precisely the quality which set Francis of Assisi apart from all other religious reformers. In the mediæval conception, the flesh, and what is of the flesh, is a thing in itself evil. In the conception of Francis it is a thing in itself beautiful, God-created, subordinate to the spirit—relatively negligible, but good in the eyes of God, like the whole creation. And, because this was essentially his teaching, St. Francis, though not a progenitor of the intellectual revival, gave to the religious emotion a capacity for informing with its own spirit the intellectual appeal of the reviving paganism. The arts of painting and sculpture had been dead. In their first revival they consciously dedicated the perception of beauty to the service of religion. In the main, no doubt, that was due to the fact that it was religion which requisitioned their services; but it is still true that in the best work throughout what is called the pre-Raphaelite period the spirit of devotion is visible from Cimabue and Giotto to Botticelli.

That spirit is not conspicuous in the literature. By common consent the name with which the new, it may be said the modern, literary era is introduced is that of Petrarch; and Petrarch's great work is primarily that of an artist giving personal expression to his own human emotions. Petrarch was followed by another artist whose medium was prose, Boccaccio, the consummate story-teller. The inspiration spread outside of Italy, and in England produced Chaucer, who, along with Wiclif, was the creator of literary English; and in another kind, the chronicles of Chaucer's French contemporary, Froissart, are the product of the same spirit—the spirit of a joyous delight in full-blooded life.

Petrarch, however, was not only the first of modern poets: he might also be called the first of the Humanists—the devotees of the “humane” culture of the ancient world. For him it is true that the

culture of the ancient world meant almost entirely the classical Latin authors. But Petrarch's life covered almost the first three-fourths of the fourteenth century, and before he died his soul was rejoiced by the possession of Homer. Knowledge of Greek was, indeed, still sadly deficient; but it was on the increase from the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century, and it received its final impulse with the Turkish advance in the Greek peninsula, the fall of Constantinople, and the dispersion of Greek scholars. Humanism tended, indeed, to militate against the development of national literature, through its insistence upon the superiority of the classical languages and its subservience to the classical form. But the spirit was stronger than the letter; the great men of old inspired the men of the new era with the ideas, which persisted in finding expression in new languages and new forms.

Finally, a mechanical invention provided the means for popularizing the written word. So long as books existed only in manuscript, the number of copies of any given work could only be multiplied by the writing out of single copies. Every copy was a work demanding much expert time and labor, and was proportionately costly. The introduction of wood blocks made possible the multiplication only of single leaves. Each block could produce a considerable number of impressions, but each page required first to be separately carved, and even the hardest wood was soon worn out. About 1440, however, Gutenberg devised movable types, each block representing a single letter, so that they could be combined and recombined; and when the types were made of hard metal instead of wood they could be used over and over again. The printing-press only came slowly into use; to the aristocracy of learning it appeared base and mechanical. But it made its way. Within forty years of Gutenberg's invention the first printing-press in England was set up at Westminster by William Caxton, marking an epoch, the moment of a revolution, very much as Watt's steam engine marked the moment of another revolution three hundred years later. The establishment of the printing-press was the death-blow of mediæval obscurantism, signaling the end of the Middle Ages.

#### *IV.—The Art of War*

In the art and organization of war, as in everything else, the struggle between the barbarians and the old Roman Empire wrought a complete revolution. The victory of the Greek over the Oriental had been primarily the victory of bodies of disciplined and heavily-armed infantry against masses of light-armed troops, mounted or on foot, of inferior discipline. The victories of the Romans had borne the same character; the legionaries were in the main a highly-drilled

infantry, bearing heavy defensive armor, with the heavy casting spear and the short stabbing sword for weapons of offence. The Romans also had developed the system of the fortified camp, which defied attack. The armies of the Roman Empire, moreover, were professional armies, and the Roman conquests were secured by the establishment of permanent garrisons of professional troops, linked together by military roads. Against the Celt as against the Oriental these methods proved invincible, and also against the Teuton, at least in defence, until the Teuton too learned to adopt defensive armor and cavalry tactics. Then the Roman legionary lost his predominance, the Roman foot soldier was beaten in the shock of battle, and the old Roman military system broke down. In the conflict with the Goths, appears the predominance of the heavy-armed horseman, which was so long characteristic of the warfare of the Middle Ages.

It is curious to observe that in the fifth century Narses, the great commander of the Imperial armies in Italy, discovered the principle, renewed eight hundred years afterwards by the Plantagenets, of employing archery posted on the wings of heavily-armed infantry to shatter the attack of the heavy cavalry, and reserving the cavalry to complete the rout. It was thus that the Gothic power in Italy was destroyed. The essential feature, however, of the Teutonic conquest was that the Teutonic army was the tribe in arms, the assembly of the fighting men of the tribe, not a picked body of disciplined professionals. When the Teuton learned to oppose heavy defensive armor to heavy defensive armor, and to wear a mail shirt, the legionary lost one of his two great points of superiority; and his discipline was counteracted by a superiority of numbers and greater fury in the onset.

On the other hand, the victorious Teuton did not secure his conquests by the establishment of professional garrisons. Either he was essentially a raider who smote, despoiled, and then retired, whether to his old home or to new fields, or else the whole tribe came with him or after him, and planted itself upon the conquered territory. There was no professional soldiery as distinct from the free civil population, every man of whom was a soldier in the sense that he was ready to obey the call to arms. Fighting efficiency was only an incidental though an important portion of his avocation; he was armed according to his means, not according to official pattern. He carried sword and helmet and round shield, wore a shirt of mail if he could afford it, and, according to tribal custom, fought on foot, or on horseback only if he could afford it. Most of the Teutons took a long time before they acquired a preference for fighting on horseback; the English before the Norman Conquest never had any efficient cavalry.

The English never came into collision with the heavily-armed Roman legions; hence they had no inducement to adopt heavy body armor. The spear, the sword, and the shield of linden wood strengthened with iron, were their main armor till they acquired the use of the war-axe from the Danes. The Danes themselves soon learned from the east and west Franks the uses of the byrnie, or shirt of mail, and the stout headpiece, which was at first worn only by leaders. Their peculiar national weapon was the great two-handed axe. Two special features characterized their method of warfare. They habitually formed entrenched and palisaded camps, on an island for choice, and they made it their first business on landing, unless they were going straight back to their ships, to sweep in all the horses on the countryside. Once "horsed," they became a rapidly-mobile force, moving from point to point at great speed, but not actually fighting on horseback. On the Continent the coming of the Danes was responsible for the development of cavalry to counteract their mobility, and of stone fortresses, which could defy their attacks and hold up their raids.

With the eleventh century we reached the era of the iron-clad knight, the mounted warrior with steel headpiece, shirt of mail developing into a sort of skirt covering thighs and knees, kite-shaped shield, and heavy spear. Almost the last stand of infantry against cavalry was made by Harold's men at the battle of Senlac; and that battle was, in fact, a demonstration that infantry under discipline and direction could hold their own successfully against cavalry. Harold would have won but for two fatal circumstances. His own men broke up the formation on which their power of resisting cavalry depended, and even then the better-disciplined force of huscarles might have held their own if William had not employed his archery to break them up and make gaps in their ranks.

Yet for more than two centuries after Hastings the conviction remained unshaken that infantry could against cavalry in the open. Stray examples occurred, like the battle of Northallerton between the English and the Scots, where the heavy-armed horsemen dismounted and fought on foot as a heavy-armed infantry, and being exposed only to a frontal attack, hurled back the charges of squadrons of heavy cavalry and masses of light-armed infantry. But in the main battles were decided by the crash of the mail-clad horsemen hurling upon the foe, whether mounted or on foot, the weight of the impact being the main factor. Light-armed troops were ridden down; light archery made no impression upon the defensive armor worn both by men and by horses; while the crossbow, though it discharges a very powerful bolt, was a weapon too slow and clumsy in operation to be of general service. Thus the pitched battles of the Crusades were all of this nature; mounted knights could only

be defeated by mounted knights or by being enveloped and attacked on flank and rear as well as in front.

Then as the thirteenth century passed into the fourteenth the power of the infantry phalanx again asserted itself. Falkirk almost exactly reproduced the old lesson of Hastings, though there the Scottish spear took the place of the Saxon battle-axe. The heavy offensive weapons, effectively wielded, enabled the massed infantry to hold its ground against the most desperate cavalry assault, until Edward I. brought up his archery to make gaps in the ranks through which the horsemen could burst. At Courtrai and Bannockburn the attacking cavalry were unsupported by archery, and at both they were overwhelmingly routed by the infantry wall.

Edward I., however, created a revolution by the introduction of the English long-bow—a revolution which gave the English an extraordinary supremacy in the field, because no other people ever acquired a like mastery of that weapon. The cloth-yard shaft conquered the steel-clad knight because it could penetrate armor against which ordinary arrows might pelt in vain, and at the same time it could be discharged with extreme rapidity. Crécy brought home to the French the lesson which they had not assimilated at Courtrai, that a heavy-armed infantry was not penetrable by the shock of a frontal cavalry attack; with the added lesson that a frontal cavalry attack under a hail of arrows discharged by the long-bow was a sheer waste of life. The charging against massed infantry ceased to be regarded as the proper function of cavalry. Battles began to be fought out between masses of heavily-armed foot, whether supported by archery or not, but with a practical certainty that victory would rest with the long-bow unless the flank of the force employing it could be turned. In the stricken field a threefold function was left for the cavalry: to cut up the enemy's archers if they were exposed to attack as the archers of Edward II. had been at Bannockburn; to execute a turning movement and fall upon the undefended flank or rear of the enemy, as was done by the Captal de Buch at Poitiers; or to fall upon the enemy's ranks when they were already broken. But since on the stricken field the archery was really decisive, the French for the most part endeavored to avoid the stricken field altogether, and, like the Scots, harassed English armies by sweeping the country bare in front of them, or cutting their lines of communication.

Yet it is singular to note that half the lesson was forgotten, and seventy years after Crécy the French repeated the old blunder of making a frontal attack, though it was on foot, not on horseback, across an open space, upon a body of heavy-armed infantry flanked by masses of archers; and the old lesson was repeated at the battle of Agincourt more emphatically than ever.

The War of the Roses afforded no similar demonstration of prin-

ciples, because neither side had a monopoly of effective archery. But the long-bow had had one unlooked-for effect. More and more defensive armor was constructed, with the intention of rendering it impenetrable by arrows; and it became so appallingly heavy that when once the armed knight was down it was no easy matter for him to get on his feet again. The climax was arriving as the fifteenth century drew to its close; the weight of defensive armor was destroying the efficiency of its wearer for offence.

Great battles, however, generally played only a secondary part in mediæval warfare. Hostile armies might devastate the open country, but campaigns were for the most mere raiding expeditions, unless, like those of Henry V. after Agincourt, they were directed to the reduction of fortresses and cities. And for a very long time in all siege warfare the advantage lay with the defence. Unless a place could be invested and starved out, or else taken by surprise, it could usually defy attack. Bruce drove the English garrisons out of Scotland, because one fortress after another was surprised by stratagem. Edward III. captured Calais by an investment; but he failed to conquer France, largely because his siege operations were habitually ineffective. Henry V. did conquer half France, partly at least for the converse reason—not through his skill as a tactician, so singularly displayed at Agincourt. Bedford failed, not for want of skill, but for want of men.

In fact, the investment of large places, the blockade which cut them off from external supplies, was possible only for larger armies than could often be assembled; while at the best the reduction of one fortress after another by starvation was an enormously prolonged process.

The alternative was assault. Assault necessitated either breaching or surmounting walls which were high and thick. Scaling-ladders were of no avail against walls which were adequately manned. Breaching, until gunpowder came into use, could only be effected by the clumsy device of the battering-ram. A ram which would make itself felt had to be of a mass which required fifty or sixty men to work in it, and it could only operate when close under the wall, from the top of which the ram itself, its protective coverings, and the men in charge of it, were subjected to the discharge of every kind of missile. For surmounting the walls, high movable towers were constructed, and these, again, had to be advanced up to the walls themselves, and so heavily manned that the occupants could make good their footing against a concentrated resistance. Before the invention of cannon the mangonel and catapult, gigantic slings and cross-bows, which discharged great stones, could not give them a velocity adequate for breaching purposes, though they might do considerable damage to the besieged when hurled over the walls.

It was only by slow degrees that the invention of gunpowder altered the operations of war. Even at the very end of the mediæval period cannon had hardly been brought into the field, though Edward III. is said to have had at Crécy a couple of them which can certainly have done no effective damage. The hand gun latterly became the subject of experiment, but was still of no practical use. In siege operations, however, cannons were certainly in use at the siege of Calais; and during the next hundred and fifty years their effectiveness for breaching was steadily on the increase. Henry V. used them with effect at Harfleur, and before the close of the period the siege train was an established and prominent feature of siege warfare.

# THE MODERN WORLD: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

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## CHAPTER XXIII

THE ERA OF TRANSITION, 1485-1520.

### *I.—The European States.*

At the moment which we have selected as marking the beginning of modern history the kingdoms of the West had at last taken shape. England had been compelled to resign finally her pretensions to dominion in France as well as her pretensions to sovereignty over Scotland, although an actual union with Scotland, necessary to the ultimate expansion of the British Empire, was still to come in the remote future. France was defined, though there were still outside her border provinces which, sometimes temporarily and sometimes permanently, have since been included within her boundaries. The supremacy of the Crown had been established by Louis XI.; only the dukedom of Brittany, isolated on the north-west, remained in possession of some sovereign rights, and its annexation to the Crown was imminent. In the Spanish peninsula, two of the four greater kingdoms were already united under one crown by the marriage of their respective sovereigns; and within a very few years a third, the Moorish kingdom of Granada, had been annexed to them, as well as the Spanish portion of the little fifth kingdom of Navarre. Portugal, the fourth, remained an independent kingdom, and preserved her independence, except that at a later stage she was for something more than half a century absorbed by the Spanish power.

No corresponding definiteness is to be found outside of the western kingdoms. Scandinavia was indeed united after a fashion under the terms of the union of Kalmar, and was definitely external to the Empire except for the personal connection of the kings of Denmark with the Imperial system as dukes of Schleswig and Holstein. The

Empire itself was little more than an expression covering a loose confederation of German principalities, bishoprics, minor estates, and free cities, which professedly recognized a common sovereign in the Emperor, and among which was included for certain purposes the kingdom of Bohemia. The Emperor himself, the head of the House of Hapsburg, was a considerable territorial magnate; but some time was still to elapse before the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia were to be appropriated to the House of Austria. Very recently, however, new territory had been acquired for the Hapsburgs by the marriage of the Emperor's son Maximilian to the heiress of Burgundy, since Philip the Handsome, the son of that marriage, was the heir not only of Maximilian but also of the mother who, dying in his infancy, left him the lord of practically the whole of the Low Countries and of Franche-Comté. This dominion, however, did not immediately become attached to Austria. While Maximilian lived, his offspring had no authority in Austria, and he himself had none in Burgundy. Through the marriage of the Archduke Philip of Burgundy to the heiress of Spain, the crown of Spain was added to the Hapsburg inheritance; but in the next generation, when the whole Hapsburg inheritance was divided between Maximilian's grandsons, Charles and Ferdinand, Burgundy went with Spain to the elder, while the Austrian inheritance went to the younger.

If Germany was indefinite, Italy was still more so, for its states did not form even a loose confederation. The Popes sought to establish a temporal supremacy in the center separating the kingdom of Naples on the south from the duchies and republics of the north. Ascendency in the north and the right of succession in the various duchies became endless bones of contention, mainly between the dynasties of Austria, France, and Spain, Milan occupying the foremost place. The crown of Naples itself was a subject of similar dispute. The world had to wait till the nineteenth century for any unification either of Germany or of Italy.

On the east of Germany and thrusting into it in the center, lay the mainly Slavonic kingdom of Bohemia, on its northern side the Slavonic kingdom of Poland, and on its southern the Magyar kingdom of Hungary. Eastward still, beyond the pale of civilized Europe, the Russian kingdom of Moscow was expanding, though its active influence was not to be felt for another two hundred years. And on the south of Hungary the Ottoman power had thoroughly established itself in the Balkan peninsula to be an aggressive menace to Christendom for more than two hundred years, rending Hungary, and perpetually distracting Austria from her Western and Imperial interests.

Finally the moment had arrived when new worlds were to be

opened up to the nations of the West, and their rivalries and antagonisms were to find new fields beyond the ocean and upon it.

In England then, at the end of 1485, we find upon the throne a king whose title by descent was of the weakest, who had won his throne by heading a rebellion which was successful mainly because his predecessor had been both a usurper and a tyrant. It was the primary business of Henry VII. to establish himself and his dynasty, not by force, after the example of Richard III., but by skillful management, and among other things by seeking alliances which would paralyze the efforts of the hostile party to obtain foreign support for attempting to eject him from his throne. The hostile Powers to be feared were France as being traditionally at enmity with England, and Burgundy because the Dowager-Duchess, the widow of Charles the Bold, made her court the center of every Yorkist intrigue.

As concerns Burgundy, Henry had a weapon to his hand in the commercial dependence of Flanders upon England. If Burgundy proved troublesome, pressure could always be applied and could hardly fail to be effective. For France, on the other hand, the development of the united Spanish power provided a counterpoise. Spain was remote from England; neither could greatly damage the other directly. But a consolidated or an expanding France would be dangerous to both. It was in the interest of both to prevent France from growing too strong. It was in the interest of each that the other should be strong enough to give material aid in restraining the growth of France.

Herein the Spanish monarchs and especially Ferdinand of Aragon saw eye to eye with Henry. Equally crafty, Henry and Ferdinand were equally alive to the necessity for co-operation, and equally determined to shift as much as possible of the work which was to be done on to the shoulders of the other. Henry's life was a long diplomatic duel, in which he and Ferdinand were endlessly engaged in an endeavor to get the better of each other, while each was perfectly aware that the other was necessary to him. At the beginning, Ferdinand was more necessary to Henry than Henry to Ferdinand, and all the bargaining for mutual assistance was in Ferdinand's favor. Latterly, when Henry was secure upon his throne, the position was reversed; the bargaining was in Henry's favor. But whatever the bargain was, each always endeavored to evade carrying out his own share. It was in the next generation that the preservation of the balance of power emerged as a guiding principle of statecraft, when Spain had become united to Burgundy. Then England needed France as a counterpoise to Spain no less than she needed Spain as a counterpoise to France.

At the outset France was under the wise regency of Anne of Beaujeu, the French king's sister, who succeeded in defeating the

attempts of the nobles to recover their independence, and also in marrying the young king to the still younger duchess of Brittany, so that the duchy was brought in effect under the direct control of the Crown, in spite of the efforts of Henry, of Ferdinand, and of Maximilian, who wanted to marry Anne of Brittany himself when his Burgundian wife died.

Charles VIII., however, when he assumed the government of France himself, had other ambitions of his own. He bought off Ferdinand and Maximilian by recognizing the claim of the latter to Franche-Comté and of the former to Roussillon, while Henry's demands were amply satisfied by his withdrawal of all countenance from the pretender to the English throne, Perkin Warbeck, and by a substantial cash indemnity for a war which had already brought into the English king's treasury a good deal more money than he had expended.

In the meantime, Spain, like England, had been playing an inexpressive part, accompanied by more talk than action, in the affairs of France. Ferdinand and Isabella were more seriously engaged in the war with the Moorish kingdom of Granada which had been commenced in 1481. At the end of 1491 Granada itself capitulated, and the kingdom was absorbed into Castile. The Moslem state which had subsisted in the west of Europe for close upon eight hundred years disappeared. A few years later the terms granted on the submission of Granada were torn up, and the Moors who refused to change their faith and adopt Christianity were expelled from Spain. The one great blot on the fair fame of the great Queen Isabella was that intolerant bigotry which caused her, not only to break faith with the Moors, but to establish the Inquisition in Spain, and thereby ultimately to give color to the Protestant conception of the Roman Catholic religion as an essentially intolerant, persecuting creed.

The fall of Granada made the Spanish monarchs the readier for an accommodation with France, because it deprived them of their main excuse for leaving the burden of the quarrel with her to the King of England. The project which possessed the mind of King Charles, and for which he wished to be set free from other complications, was the conquest of Naples. The Neapolitan nobility detested the tyrannical rule of the Aragonese king Ferrante (we retain that form of the name to prevent any confusion with King Ferdinand of Aragon). Charles VIII., as the heir of René of Provence, inherited the old claim of the House of Provence or Anjou to the Neapolitan crown. The Sforzas of Milan and the Medicis of Florence were in alliance with Ferrante. Lodovico Sforza, who had usurped authority in Milan, found his position endangered by the connection of his young nephew the duke with the rulers of Florence and

Naples; and therefore he diplomatically implanted in the mind of the French king the idea of asserting his claim to Naples.

So, in the autumn of 1494, Charles VIII. crossed the Alps on his Italian expedition. The expedition met with extraordinary success. Charles passed through Northern Italy unresisted. Ferrante was dead; his cowardly son Alfonso fled; Naples itself welcomed the French; Charles took possession of the new kingdom almost without a blow. General alarm, however was created. Charles showed unmistakable signs of having entirely misunderstood the nature of his success, and of meditating fantastically extensive schemes of conquest. Sicily, which belonged to the kingdom of Aragon, might prove the next object of Charles's ambition. The French king's cousin, Louis of Orleans, the grandson of Valentina Visconti, might take the opportunity of asserting his claim to Milan as against Lodovico Sforza. Maximilian, disappointed of his projected Breton marriage, had now taken to wife Lodovico's daughter. Venice, too, was nervous. Charles with a part of his army marched back to France, not without some fighting against the league which had been formed against him. But the Neapolitans, subjected to the rule of Frenchmen, turned against them, recalled Ferrante II., the son of Alfonso, and the French occupation of Naples ended eighteen months after the entry of Charles into the capital. Two years later, Charles himself died and was succeeded on the French throne by his cousin, the Duke of Orleans, Louis XII., the death of Ferrante of Naples having in the meanwhile passed on the crown to that prince's uncle Frederick. The new King of France made haste to divorce the unfortunate wife who had been forced upon him in his youth, and to marry Anne of Brittany, the widow of Charles VIII., so as to retain the royal control of the duchy. There was no son of this marriage, but a daughter, Joanna, was born, and the duchy was retained for the Crown by her marriage in due course to Francis of Angoulême, who, being descended in unbroken male line from the grandfather of Louis XII., succeeded him on the French throne and could make the same claim as Louis himself to the duchy of Milan through Valentina Visconti.

This claim, as well as that to Naples, Louis XII. now resolved to assert. Venice had quarrelled with Lodovico; Pope Alexander VI. was promised French support in his design of creating a strong central Italian state for his son Cæsar Borgia. Lodovico was isolated. Louis crossed the Alps in the late summer of 1499, and by the late spring of the following year was completely master of the Milanese.

Naples was his next objective, and here he might have anticipated opposition from Ferdinand of Aragon who had grounds for claiming the throne of Naples if his illegitimate kinsman were set aside. Fer-

dinand, however, did not want to quarrel with France, and proposed to Louis a compact for the partition of the Neapolitan kingdom, finding a sufficient excuse in the fact that Frederick in self-defence was trying to come to terms with the Turks on his own account. The project was carried out; and by the joint action of Louis and Ferdinand the Neapolitan kingdom was divided between them in 1502.

The victors, however, promptly fell to quarrelling over the spoil. Before the end of 1502 they were fighting each other; by the end of the next year, the Spaniards, under the command of the "Great Captain," Gonsalvo de Cordova, had completely beaten the French; and from 1505 onwards the two Sicilies were attached to the crown of Aragon.

Meanwhile Cæsar Borgia, by a combination of very high military and diplomatic skill with an unparalleled contempt for even the appearance of moral consideration, was swiftly and successfully achieving the mastery over all the central Italian minor despotisms, when the sudden death of Pope Alexander severed the connection between the House of Borgia and the Papacy. A new Pope, Pius III., died after a few weeks, and was succeeded by Julius II., a life-long enemy of the Borgias, who intended Central Italy to be a papal not a Borgia principality. Cæsar Borgia's career was effectively closed when he went to make a bargain with Ferdinand, and, in spite of a safe-conduct, was seized by that monarch of the instigation of Pope Julius. Borgia escaped from his captivity some while later, but was killed in a casual skirmish.

The power of Venice in Lombardy, clashing with the power of Milan, had led her to support Louis against Lodovico Sforza. Now that Louis was in Milan, he found in Venice a rival in Northern Italy. She stood also in the way of the territorial ambitions of Pope Julius; and Ferdinand, too, wished to recover from her towns which she had acquired in Apulia. In 1492 Maximilian had succeeded his father as Emperor-elect though he was not yet Emperor in the technical sense, since he had not been crowned in Rome. He, too, found his Imperial schemes in Lombardy interfered with by the power of Venice.

Maximilian's ambitions were vast but erratic, and he always lacked the material means for putting them into execution. His son, Philip of Burgundy, was married to the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, Joanna, who by the death without heirs of a brother and another sister had become heiress of Spain, and actually Queen of Castile on the death of her mother Isabella in 1504, since Ferdinand's marriage to Isabella had not given him the Castilian crown. Maximilian was in hopes that the marriage of his grandson Charles with the infant daughter of the King of France would ultimately unite under

his sway, despite the Salic law, the kingdoms of France, Castile, Aragon, and the Sicilies, besides the Burgundian and Austrian dominions. Those hopes were foiled when the little French princess was betrothed to her cousin, Francis of Angoulême. Moreover, the death of Isabella had aroused in Ferdinand an extreme jealousy of Maximilian and his son Philip, since Ferdinand and Philip each wished to have the control of Castile. In 1506 Philip died, and since Joanna had developed marks of insanity, Ferdinand succeeded in getting the regency of Castile into his own hands, the child Charles being only six years old. Maximilian found himself deprived of the influence he had hoped to exercise in Spain and at the same time powerless to avenge himself on Louis for the rejection of the proposed marriage.

The result of all this was that Louis, Julius, Ferdinand, and Maximilian agreed to find a common enemy in Venice and a common profit in the partition of her dominions, and in 1508 they formed the league of Cambrai. The excuse again was that Venice, whom no one would help in resisting the Turk, had been bargaining on her own account with that enemy of Christendom. To such a coalition Venice had no chance of offering effective resistance. She was soon forced to yield to the demand of the two kings and of the Pope, though Maximilian made little of the business.

The *raison d'être* of the league having disappeared, France became the object of hostility to the Pope in connection with the Venetians and with Ferdinand. Maximilian came in, and the young King Henry of England was induced to join the alliance. He had just married Katharine of Aragon, Ferdinand's younger daughter, the widow of his eldest brother Arthur, a dispensation having been granted by Julius. In spite of the brilliant exploits of the young French captain, Gaston de Foix, the French were before long driven out of Milan and the allies reinstated as duke Maximilian Sforza, a son of Lodovico. Ferdinand seized his opportunity to annex the greater part of Navarre, though the little kingdom still survived which ultimately became a part of France, on the accession of Henry IV. Henry VIII. invaded Picardy, and captured Terouenne and Tournay; while James IV. of Scotland, who had married Henry's sister Margaret, broke the peace, invaded the north of England, and was slain at the battle of Flodden with the flower of the nobility and gentry of Scotland.

Thus, at the end of 1513, France was in a perilous position. But at this moment Pope Julius died and was succeeded by Leo X., a son of Lorenzo de Medici. He was not inspired with the desire of Julius in his later years to expel the foreigner from Italy; Ferdinand had got what he wanted, Maximilian was easily bought off, and the astute Wolsey, who now held the first place in the counsels of

Henry VIII., out-diplomatized both Ferdinand and Maximilian by secretly effecting an alliance with Louis, England having only been drawn into the previous league that she might serve as a cat's-paw for Ferdinand and Maximilian. The effectiveness of the stroke, however, was marred through no fault of Wolsey's, by the death of Louis and the accession of young Francis I. at the beginning of 1515.

Francis, however, young and ambitious, felt himself secure against any attack by England; nor was he threatened by Burgundy, where, the young Charles, who had now assumed the reins of government though only fifteen, was guided by Burgundian nobles, not by either of his grandfathers Maximilian and Ferdinand. The French king promptly set himself to the recovery of Milan, invaded the Milanese, and at the Battle of Marignano won an absolutely decisive victory over the army of Swiss mercenaries, hitherto regarded as invincible in the field, upon whom the puppet duke and his allies had placed complete reliance. Duke Maximilian abdicated; the Milanese were once more in French hands, and Pope Leo soon came to terms with Francis, to whom he ceded Parma and Piacenza in return for the French support of the Medici family in Florence. They had been expelled soon after the death of Lorenzo in 1492, and though recently reinstated, still occupied a precarious position in the Tuscan city.

Immediately afterwards Ferdinand died, and young Charles, since his mother was insane, succeeded to the entire inheritance of his Spanish grandparents in addition to that of his Burgundian grandmother, of which he was already in possession. To the Spaniards, however, the young king was still a Burgundian and a foreigner; his position in his new kingdoms was as yet insecure; so he was willing enough to recognize Francis in Milan, subject to the withdrawal of all French claims to the crown of Naples.

Two years later Maximilian died. To his already vast and heterogeneous dominion Charles now added the whole German inheritance of the House of Hapsburg. Maximilian in 1508 had assumed the Imperial title without being crowned, an example which was thenceforth followed; but no king of the Romans had been elected during his lifetime. Charles was, as a matter of course, a candidate for the Imperial throne. The French king was his only serious rival, since no German prince would come forward, and the candidature of Henry of England was taken seriously by no one except himself. Francis might have won if popular German sentiment had not practically coerced the Electors to reject the Frenchman in favor of the Hapsburg. In 1519, when in his twentieth year, Charles V. became Emperor. Henry of England was only twenty-eight, Francis of France was barely twenty-five. For nearly thirty years these three princes completely dominated the affairs of Western Europe, which turned largely upon the fluctuating relations between them; whereas,

until the accession of Charles VIII. in France, France as well as England had had practically no international relations east of the Rhine and the Alps, or south of the Pyrenees. Thenceforth none of the Western states could live in isolation; the politics of all Western and half Central Europe were inextricably interwoven.

The active life of Maximilian almost exactly covered this era of transition, for he was a young man of twenty-three when Louis XI. died. When not yet Emperor, his marriage with Mary of Burgundy brought him into direct contact with the Western Powers at the moment when the French king was about to find new interests for France in Italy. His death occurred at the moment when Luther had opened in Germany the flood-gates of a religious revolution which swept away existing boundary marks and dragged the whole of Western Europe into its vortex.

But it was only in part that Maximilian's exceedingly diverse interests were occupied with the West. During the last years of his father's life, he was engaged in the recovery of Austrian dominions which had been seized by Matthias Corvinus of Hungary. After Frederick's death, and before he assumed the Imperial title, he was engaged in a contest with the Switzers, which resulted in their securing practical independence. On the other hand, the failure of the younger Hapsburg line restored to his house the whole of the hereditary Hapsburg dominion, whereby his position within the Empire was materially strengthened, apart from the external accession of territories brought about by his own marriage and that of his son. Moreover, after the death of Matthias Corvinus, Ladislas, King of Bohemia, was elected to the Hungarian crown; and when Maximilian, still King of the Romans, won back from Ladislas the possessions of the House of Hapsburg, a treaty was also impressed under which, if the king's male descendants failed, his dominions were to pass to the House of Hapsburg. In 1515 another treaty was arranged for the marriage of Maximilian's younger grandson Ferdinand to the daughter of Ladislas, and of Ferdinand's sister to Louis, the son and heir of Ladislas. As there were no children of the latter marriage, Hungary and Bohemia ultimately passed to Ferdinand.

It was fortunate for Christendom that Mohammed the Conqueror was succeeded by a less efficient ruler, Bajazet II., under whom the Crescent made no progress in Europe. Hungary and Bohemia under King Ladislas did nothing to drive back the Ottoman; while Venice, which, no doubt with selfish commercial objects, had sacrificed and risked more than any other state to hold the Moslems in check, was paralyzed for vigorous action by the jealous hostility of other Powers. The reign of Bajazet was ended with his forcible deposition by his son Selim in 1512. Selim was the incarnation of the Oriental doctrine that a wise monarch should get rid of his near relations. He

disposed of uncles, brothers, and nephews without mercy. But he thoroughly re-established the Ottoman supremacy in the west of Asia; and in 1517 he crushed the Mamelukes, who had ruled in Egypt ever since they had turned the tide of the Mongol invasion. Egypt thenceforward was a province of the Ottoman Empire, though its subjection meant little more than the payment of a tribute collected by an official appointed at Constantinople and called a governor, but practically exercising no administrative functions. At the same time the nominal Abbassid Kalifate disappeared, and thenceforth the Turkish Sultan claimed to be the religious head as well as the political chief of the Moslem world.

## *II.—The Birth of the Reformation*

Through the Middle Ages Western Europe had been dominated by the two conceptions of Christendom as a universal Empire and as a universal Church. Both conceptions had been traversed by the material fact of a division between Eastern and Western Christendom. The actual continuity of the old Roman Empire was preserved at Byzantium, while the new Holy Roman Empire in the West was primarily the creation of Charlemagne; but the supremacy of the Roman Pontificate of the Church was preserved in the West, and the Western Church parted from the Eastern, which retained its connection with the Eastern Empire and its authority among the Eastern Slavonic peoples.

The Imperial conception in the West was always vague; it never extended to England or Scandinavia; with the break-up of the Carolingians it ceased materially to affect either France or Spain; and long before the Middle Ages were passed the Holy Roman Empire, still bearing that title, had become nothing more than a German Empire with very little cohesion. The idea, already moribund, suffered the last pangs of dissolution with the consolidation of the Western states, which we may consider as having been accomplished at the end of the reign of Louis XI. in France.

The conception, however, of the Universal Church was, so far as Western Christendom was concerned, at that moment still unchallenged; it showed no sign of being even moribund, although its doom was very close at hand, so far at least as a universal church means a body with a common organization. The conception of the Church as a spiritual unity transcending all organizations is another matter with which we are not here concerned. The mediæval Church was a single organization embracing all Western Christendom, imposing its authority upon all Christians, and treating those who rejected its authority as outside the pale, so far at least as concerned its pronouncements on dogma, morals, and ceremonial observations.

And for this the Church had the full sanction of the State, dispute arising only where it appeared to the State that its own temporal authority was called in question by the claims of the Church.

From the days of Hildebrand onwards, the rival claims of Church and State had been fruitful sources of discord; but these quarrels had affected, not the question of the fundamental authority of the Church, but that of the sphere in which it was operating, until the dispute between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. brought about the Babylonish Captivity at Avignon. The Captivity practically disposed of the Church's claim to dominate the State; but beyond that it raised the question of the actual seat of authority within the Church, since the Popes personally could no longer command the reverence accorded to their great predecessors. The Great Schism still further lowered the papal prestige; and the fifteenth century saw the new or revived assertion of the claim that the ultimate authority within the Church lay not in the individual Pope, but in the General Council. For half a century after the Council of Constance the character of the Popes sometimes commanded and always permitted a decent respect if not much more; but at least after the accession of Sixtus IV., three Popes in succession were conspicuous for utter depravity of character; and assuredly nothing in the nature of moral inspiration could be drawn either from Julius II. or from Leo X. In brief, the moral influence of the Papacy, habitually exerted at least from the middle of the eleventh to the end of the thirteenth century, had become at the close of the fifteenth century a mere mockery.

At all times there had been a very strong pressure of circumstances urging the keenest intellects and the strongest characters among Churchmen to devote themselves to secular politics rather than to their functions as religious leaders. When the Popes abdicated their religious functions, the temptation impelling the whole of the higher clergy to follow their example became the stronger, and the difficulty of resisting it greater. The loss of moral influence extended from the Pope to the higher clergy and from the higher clergy downwards. And more than ever the clergy themselves felt that their influence depended upon the preservation of their position as the depositaries of an exclusive knowledge of things divine and of supernatural powers.

All these conditions combined to develop in the popular mind the anti-clerical spirit. Human nature is apt to resent the accumulation of wealth in the hands of recognizable groups of persons. A vast amount of wealth was accumulated in the hands of the clerical organization. But the clergy of all people were expected to set the example of the life of self-sacrifice, to maintain a high moral standard in their own lives, and, like Chaucer's "persoun," themselves to follow "the law of Christ and his apostles twelve." The popular

tendency was to ignore the numerous admirable examples, to dwell upon the examples which were not admirable to look upon the vices of Churchmen as particularly reprehensible, and upon the wealth which they accumulated as peculiarly ill-gotten. In earlier centuries, the Churchmen had stood between the greed of the nobility and baronage—the military class—and the common folk; latterly they had ceased to do so, and were no longer looked upon as protectors by the common folk. Even in the days of the peasant rising in England the animosity of the peasantry was directed against the ecclesiastical no less than against the lay landlords.

*Mutatis mutandis*, there was a similar anticlerical spirit among the ruling classes of the laity. Princes resented the financial drain upon the resources of their territories which drew off to the papal treasury contributions which might otherwise have been available for the treasury of the prince. Nobles resented the spoils of office appropriated by Churchmen. Nobles and gentry resented the absorption of great estates by the monasteries.

Finally the intellectual movement found itself in collision with clerical obscurantism. If physical science sought to wring secrets from nature, it was faced with the ecclesiastical veto, because it challenged the supernaturalism which, in the eyes of the Churchmen, was an integral part of the Christian faith, and which was in actual fact a mainstay of clerical authority. The fruit of the tree of knowledge was still forbidden fruit. With equal rigor the application of reason to whatsoever was claimed as falling within the sphere of revelation was rigidly circumscribed. Martyrdom in the cause of intellectual truth was unattractive; but the conditions tended to the development of a covert scepticism veiled by an ironical profession of orthodoxy and a sufficient observance of conventions. If heresy raised its head it was stamped out or driven into hiding. Nevertheless the seeds of dogmatic revolt had been sown and were germinating beneath the surface.

In one of its aspects the Reformation was to be the climax of the old contest for supremacy between the lay and the ecclesiastical authorities—the final demonstration that, though a partnership might be recognized, the State was master, *de facto*. The State stole, annexed, or recovered everywhere as much as it thought fit of the material wealth which rightly or wrongly had been appropriated by the Church; the State everywhere asserted the subordination of the ecclesiastical to the secular law, alike in those countries which broke away from the Roman Catholic Church and in those which remained orthodox. In a second aspect it was, like earlier movements within the Church, a revival of moral enthusiasm, of religious energy,

permeating Christendom, and not in the least monopolized by Protestantism.

In its third aspect the Reformation clove Christendom in twain, because it was a phase of the revolt of individualism against authority, the assertion by the individual that in the last resort his own reason and his own conscience must for him decide between truth and falsehood, fair and foul, right and wrong, not the fiat of any authority however reverend. In outward form indeed this right of the individual was not claimed either by the humanists in the intellectual sphere, or by the Protestantism of Luther or Calvin. The humanists had substituted for the authority of the Church the authority of the Ancients; the Protestants substituted the authority of the Scriptures. But the Ancients and the Scriptures, the new authorities, demand interpretation. The authority of the Church being once repudiated, there remains no authoritative interpreter; and if the individual has to choose his interpreter, to select between authorities, he is, as a matter of fact, falling back upon his own reason and conscience, choosing for himself what he would believe. The revolt came because questions were put which the Church failed to answer in a manner satisfactory to the reason and conscience of those who put them. Ecclesiastical authorities and secular authorities for centuries to come continued to claim for themselves severally the authority which had once been acknowledged as resting in the one universal Church of Christendom. But the substitution even of one authority for another presupposed the right of the individual to call authority in question, justified and even demanded by an immediate relation between every individual and his Maker direct responsibility of the individual to his Maker without and mediating authority. Whereas the recognized system of the Church rested on the assumption that the mediating authority was not only indispensable, but, for the individual, was also final.

A moral Reformation did not carry with it the idea of a violent revolution. The Reformation which changed the relations between the Church and the State was revolutionary. The Reformation which substituted or sought to substitute the authority of Scripture, however interpreted, for the authority of the Church, was a great revolution. The Reformation which definitely asserted the right of the individual to believe as his own reason and conscience dictated was a gradual growth, the slow outcome and the logical consequence of the Protestant Revolution, but it required centuries for accomplishment. In the sixteenth century the utmost limit reached was that a man might think what he liked, but must do as he was told and say only what he was officially permitted to say.

At the close of the fifteenth century a Reformation was a palpable necessity. The depravity of public morals was nowhere so extra-

gant as in Italy, because nowhere else could the degradation of the highest office of the Church to serve the personal ends of the spiritual head of Christendom be carried to such an appalling pitch; because also moral depravity in Italy flourished side by side with the highest intellectual activity. In the country where wickedness was treated as a fine art, rose the voice of Savonarola denouncing the wrath to come. The great Florentine in no sense belonged to the new age. His ideals were those of the past. Primarily, he was a supreme revivalist, come to convince men of sin. Florence heard and trembled, made bonfires of its "vanities," hailed the mighty preacher as a prophet and a political chief. Unhappily for himself he accepted the rôle from a perfectly intelligible conviction of his own divine mission. Disaster followed when reaction trod on the heels of stormy emotion. The hot fit passed from Florence. Savonarola's influence waned. Like other religious enthusiasts, his intervention in politics had drawn him aside from the purely moral issues; it may be that he lost faith in himself and tried to give himself confidence by extending instead of contracting the sphere of his claim to authority. Unintentionally perhaps, he taught his followers to expect miracles; and when the miracles did not follow, Florence deserted him. He had defied and denounced the Pope, Alexander VI., into whose hands Florence surrendered him; and he was condemned and suffered as a heretic. Savonarola was a symptom rather than a cause. Even his moral influence hardly extended beyond Florence, and it was exclusively emotional. He was a herald of the Reformation only in the sense that he was a voice crying, not in the wilderness but on the house-tops against the iniquities of his generation.

It seemed, however, not unlikely that effective reformation might be wrought without revolution by the humanists. Worldliness and active immorality among the clergy in high places, though by no means universal, were sufficiently conspicuous to be a public scandal to which no one could pretend to be blind. When the papal throne was occupied by men like Innocent IV. and Alexander VI., of whom one notoriously hesitated at no crime, while both openly acknowledged bastard offspring; when the cardinal's hat was bestowed upon boys of fourteen and bastards, because they were the sons of powerful laymen such as the Medici—it was a matter of course that loose morality should prevail among the lower clergy too. It was not less obvious that the latter were also monstrously ignorant. Among the humanists there were doubtless many pure intellectualists who cared nothing for things spiritual or things moral; but amongst the finest of the scholars not a few were earnest moralists, and some were men of an ardently religious spirit. To these it seemed that the root of the evil lay in ignorance; that what was palpably false in the popular teaching of the clergy was in no way bound up with the essential doctrines of

the Church, but was the outcome of ignorance which could be dispelled without any anarchical rejection of legitimate authority.

Above all, this school, seeking in the education of the clergy the remedy for the prevalent evils, relied upon a fresh interpretation of the Scriptures, based not upon the traditional Latin version called the Vulgate, but upon the Greek text, as the means to a correction of false teaching. And at the same time many of them looked to intellectual ridicule for the removal of what was palpably grotesque. The names most brilliantly connected with both these methods were those of the cosmopolitan Erasmus of Rotterdam, and in England Sir Thomas More; while a leading part was taken in the one group by Dean Colet in England, and in the other by Ulrich von Hutten in Germany. Public opinion protected such men from becoming the victims of the charges of heresy which were levelled against them; they were supported by the more intelligent and the more earnest of the higher clergy; there was no keener educationist than Cardinal Wolsey. If these men could have had their way, the Church would have done much to reform itself from within, the more flagrant abuses would have disappeared, and the authority of the one Church would have been preserved. But the corruption of the Papacy itself had gone too deep. The action of Pope Leo roused a theological professor at the university at Wittenberg in Saxony to a protest which logically involved the total repudiation of the papal authority.

Leo X. wanted money. From time immemorial, dating far back beyond the Christian era, the practice had prevailed of raising money by the sale of pardons for sins committed. Pagans as well as Christians believed in divine punishment for sin, believed also that the Divinity might be propitiated by offerings. Christianity rejected the doctrine of propitiation by sacrifices, but preached the forgiveness of sin as following upon repentance. The Church claimed that forgiveness was assured only if absolution was pronounced by a priest; and absolution was accompanied by the imposition of penance, theoretically as a demonstration that the repentance was sincere. Not infrequently, the penance took the form of a payment, an offering to the Church. Pardon or absolution thus became practically purchasable, though always on the theory that the offering was simply an earnest of repentance, without which it would have no efficacy. In practice, however, the prevalent belief encouraged by the clergy was that the purchase of a pardon was a business transaction—the penance, or payment, cleared scores.

On these principles, then, the sale of Indulgences was from time to time authorized. It had been a subject of protest on the part of the Hussites. Princes, too, had objected, because it withdrew money from their territories into the papal coffers; but their objections had been silenced by the receipt of a share of the profits. Leo now

proposed to procure funds by a sale of Indulgences on an unprecedentedly large scale, and at an unprecedentedly low price. Commissioners were appointed for the purpose. But Professor Martin Luther had satisfied himself that no man from the Pope downwards can grant or withhold the forgiveness of sins, and that the sale of pardons by authority of the Pope was not only rank fraud, but also rank blasphemy. When the papal commissioners were approaching Saxony, he affixed to the church doors a paper containing ninety-five theses denouncing Indulgences; and he persuaded Frederick, the Elector of Saxony, to forbid the sale of Indulgences on Saxon territory.

The sword was drawn. The only alternative to open war for Martin Luther was abject submission and recantation—the last thing in his mind. For the moment the Pope was too busy to give his attention to the crushing of an obscure “monk.” Luther prepared for a campaign by an appeal to the pockets of the lay authorities. He issued pamphlets, urging the princes to withhold those immemorial tributes to the papal coffers which had always been a grievance. Princes might not be ready to disturb themselves over controversial matters of theology, but they would lend a willing ear to arguments tending to release them from financial burdens. Luther’s argument was necessarily a blow aimed at the root of the papal authority; but, for the same reason that it was likely to appeal to the princes, it was peculiarly intolerable to the Papacy, which, like the princes, might not have greatly troubled itself about a merely speculative attack upon a particular theological doctrine. Leo realized that Martin Luther was a dangerous man. In 1520 he issued a Bull condemning Luther and his doctrines. Luther burnt the Bull publicly. In 1517 he had drawn the sword; in 1520 he threw away the scabbard.

### *III.—The Round World*

We have seen the modern world introduced by the arrival of new and complex international relations destroying the comparative isolation of the past, and compelling each portion of Western Europe to an active interest in whatsoever was of material concern to any other portion. We have seen also the culmination of one aspect of the intellectual movement which destroyed forever the conception of Christendom as a single organized Church; this being the aspect of the Renaissance which developed into a powerful factor in the construction of the modern international system. It remains to describe the contemporary movement which during the same period brought the entire inhabited globe within the ken of the European peoples, providing new fields for rivalry and development.

In the days of Alexander the Great Europeans had penetrated into

Asia as far as the eastern confines of the Persian Empire and the northwestern portion of India. But their hold on these regions had been of the slightest. New barbarian powers had risen up, the Parthians and the later Persian Empire, which practically cut off the Roman world from the east, and limited it to the regions west of the Euphrates, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea. The Persian Empire was displaced by the Bagdad Khalifate and successive Moslem empires. The wealth of the gorgeous East was known to mediæval Europe, but only by such of its products as the Moslems brought down to the Levant, by the reports of Crusaders, and, very rarely, through the relations of actual facts by daring travellers who had found their own way into those remote realms. For all practical purposes the Moslems formed an impenetrable screen between the East and the West.

The opening of communications, however, between East and West was a persistent dream, which attained a sudden fulfilment in the last years of the fifteenth century. Evidently there were three conceivable ways of reaching India, all by sea, since the obvious overland route was blocked by the Moslems. There might be a passage round the north of Europe; there might be a passage round the south of Africa; and it might be possible to sail westwards across the ocean until India should be reached.

The ice-bound seas of the North offered an unpromising field for exploration. There was a tradition, which is known to be a true one, that Northmen sailing west from Iceland had discovered land; but their explorations had not been followed up. There were other traditions of a mythical isle of Atlantis, and of lands sighted by storm-driven mariners, which may or may not have had a basis of truth in them. But much faith was required to provide a sufficient inducement for exploration to mariners who knew that every day was carrying them farther away from land, but had no corresponding certainty that there was a possibility of reaching a farther shore.

The way of wisdom, then, was that chosen by the Portuguese, who, as we have seen, under the direction of Henry the Navigator, were working steadily down the western coast of Africa from the second decade of the fifteenth century onwards. They had the field to themselves. The critical moment was reached when Bartholomew Diaz, in 1486, doubled the southern point of the continent, which he named the Cape of Storms, and entered the Indian Ocean. On his return to Portugal the cape was rechristened the Cape of Good Hope.

Eleven years later, Vasco da Gama sailed with three ships with the definite intention of reaching India. He sailed up the East African coast, found that the voyage between it and India was already familiar to the Mohammedan traders, and in 1498 reached Calicut, on the west coast of the peninsula near its southern extremity.

Mohammedan dynasties were ruling over the greater part of Northern India, but had not definitely dominated the southern half. In Calicut the Mohammedan population consisted chiefly of the Arab traders who carried on an active commerce between India, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, as well as with the Mohammedan communities which they had established on the eastern coast of Africa. Hitherto, however, there had been no direct communication between them and the Europeans. They saw their trade monopoly threatened, and were actively hostile to the newcomers from Europe.

The Portuguese, however, followed up the first visit of Vasco da Gama with an expedition under Cabral in 1500. This was eight years after the historic voyage of Columbus, and it was already known that land was to be reached by sailing across the Atlantic. It was not, however, with his own goodwill that Cabral's fleet was driven by storm westward instead of eastward, so that it fell to him to discover Brazil and to appropriate it for Portugal. Having done so, he made his way back to the West, and again accomplished the journey to Calicut, where he was allowed to establish a commercial settlement or factory, although a violent attack was made upon it by the Arab traders. The result was that a second expedition under Vasco da Gama adopted punitive operations against Calicut, and established trading relations with other neighboring Hindu rajas or princes. Practically this had the double effect of stirring up hostilities between principalities, and excusing, if not compelling, Portuguese intervention—a process by which immense credit was acquired for the Portuguese by the commander, Duarte Pacheco, whom Vasco da Gama left behind.

Hence developed the idea that the creation of a Portuguese empire in the East was feasible. Francesco d'Almeida was sent out as the first Portuguese viceroy. A fierce naval war ensued with the Mamelukes of Egypt, who saw their Indian trade passing into the hands of the Portuguese. After an initial disaster, in which the Portuguese force was overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the enemy, Almeida won a complete and crushing victory. He was killed, but his place was taken by the new viceroy, who had already been appointed, Affonso d'Albuquerque, in 1509. In the six years of his rule, Albuquerque by force of arms established the Portuguese headquarters at the island of Goa, conquered Malacca on the farther side of the Bay of Bengal, and opened up communications with Java and other islands of the great archipelago. Broadly speaking, Albuquerque's object was to substitute a Portuguese monopoly of the trade for what was in effect a Mohammedan monopoly; the inclination was to make war on Islam, but to foster friendly relations with Hindu powers; and it was in accordance with this plan that he performed his last exploit, the capture of Ormuz on the Persian Gulf. When he died in

the last days of 1515, the Portuguese naval empire in the Indian Ocean was firmly established.

Before King John II. of Portugal dispatched Bartholomew Diaz on the expedition which first passed the Cape of Good Hope, he had declined to entertain proposals for another voyage of discovery submitted by a Genoese sailor, Christopher Columbus. Columbus had thoroughly convinced himself of the practicability of sailing across the Atlantic to India; the more because the Asiatic continent was generally believed to extend very much farther than was actually the case. Rejected by Portugal, the Genoese first sought to obtain the support of Henry VII. of England; but the negotiations were delayed through the capture of his brother, Bartholomew, who was to have visited the English king, by Algerian pirates. But the cautious Henry was not satisfied by correspondence; the scheme of Columbus was commended to Isabella of Castile; and as soon as the conquest of Granada was completed, Isabella and Ferdinand lent a favorable ear to his proposals, which were impossible of execution without some such powerful support. Thus it was that the fame and the profit of the discovery of the New World fell to Castile.

On August 3, 1492, Columbus set sail with his fleet of three ships, averaging a hundred tons. On 6th September he left the Canaries to pursue his venturesome way across the waste of waters where day after day there was nothing to be seen but the sky and the sea and the sea and the sky. So he sailed on for five weeks. As the evening of the thirty-fifth day fell, the look-outs saw what seemed to be lights on the horizon. With the dawn the sailors found that they were approaching what was certainly an island. They landed, and found that the place was occupied by brown-skinned and very harmless savages, whom, as a matter of course, they took to be Indians. Columbus took possession as viceroy in the name of the Spanish monarchs. Expeditions from this base soon made it clear that it was on the outskirts of an archipelago. On 28th October, sixteen days after the first landing the island of Cuba was sighted, the first explorations giving the impression that the mainland had been reached. Then the island of Haiti, or Hispaniola, was discovered. Here Columbus established the headquarters of the expedition, and thence, at the beginning of the next year, 1493, he returned to Spain to announce his discovery.

There was no difficulty in raising a fresh expedition; the fleet which sailed with Columbus in September 1493 consisted of seventeen ships. But further explorations revealed none of those wealthy and populous cities which were supposed to exist on the coast of Asia, which Columbus imagined himself to have reached. There was murmuring and discontent among the settlers, and defiance of the authority of Columbus, who, leaving his brother Bartholomew in charge, returned

again to Spain to organize a third expedition. Then, for the first time, Columbus did actually reach the mainland of South America in the neighborhood of the island of Trinidad.

Meanwhile, however, the American mainland had already been reached in another quarter by another explorer. Henry VII. of England had missed the opportunity of which the Spanish monarchs had taken advantage. Spain was entitled to a clear field so far as concerned the regions lying toward the Equator; but in 1497 an English expedition, with some aid from the English king, set sail from Bristol to try its fortunes farther north. It was under the command of John Cabot, with his son Sebastian, the father being a Genoese or Venetian who had settled himself at Bristol. The Cabots discovered Newfoundland and Labrador, to the possession of which they set up an indefinite claim on behalf of English. The country, however, seemed unpromising, and no steps were taken for its occupation, though in Spanish maps of the time it is entered as English territory.

In 1500 Cabral, sailing for India, was driven westward by storms, and discovered the Brazils, the eastern shoulder of South America, which was claimed for Portugal. At the beginning of the new century, the Florentine, Amerigo Vespucci, was accompanying the Spaniard, Hojeda, on a voyage of which he afterwards published a somewhat imaginative account, with the curious result that it was his name that was permanently given to the New World.

In 1502 Pope Alexander VI. issued the famous pronouncement conferring upon Spain and Portugal the recently discovered and still undiscovered regions of the world, on the hypothesis that heathen lands were within the Pope's gift. Taking the line of longitude a hundred miles west of the Azores, all that was on the west of it was assigned to Spain, and all that was east of it to Portugal. The line was subsequently shifted by agreement between Spain and Portugal, with the actual result that the Brazils, originally within the Spanish portion, were brought into the Portuguese area. The papal award took no account of the English discovery of the North American continent.

In 1506 Christopher Columbus died, still in the firm conviction that the lands which he had reached were the eastern coasts of Asia; hence the universal application of the name "Indians" to all the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continents. There was no disposition on the part of the Spaniards to push their discoveries northward; the magnet was in the equatorial regions, owing to a general belief that there was some connection between the Equator and the yield of precious metals and precious stones. The great explorer had heard from the Indians on the mainland of another ocean lying beyond, and had accordingly formed the belief that what

he had discovered was an Asiatic peninsula. It was not till some years after his death that Nuñez de Balboa, in 1515, made his way across the isthmus of Darien and actually beheld the Pacific Ocean. The immense mineral wealth in this region gave an enormous value to the province of Darien.

Neither Columbus nor his immediate successors found any Indians who could be described as civilized; but from the tribes whom they found they heard reports which, in 1517, led a Spanish governor, Diego Velasquez, to dispatch an expedition to Yucatan. The expedition discovered a country in which there were massive stone temples, populous towns, and inhabitants who wore clothes. They discovered also that Yucatan was not another island, but apparently part of a continent extending to the northward. What came of this discovery is to be told later.

It remained for a Portuguese to captain the first expedition which circumnavigated the world, and gave the final demonstration which convinced the popular mind of its being a globe. Fernando de Magalhães, Anglicized as Magellan, sailing in 1519, penetrated the Strait of Magellan at the southern end of the American continent in 1520. The great navigator died in the Philippine Islands in the following year, but in 1522 his ship arrived in Europe, having completed the circumnavigation.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE ERA OF CHARLES V

#### *I.—Charles V. and Francis I., 1519-1530*

HAD the dominions of Charles V. been in any reasonable degree homogeneous, he must have entirely dominated Europe. In 1519 he was lord of four separate groups of territories—Burgundian, Spanish, Italian, and Austrian—and he was also head of the German Empire. But each of the four groups was isolated from all the other three, at least so far as concerned land communications; the populations in each group, their languages, and their traditions were entirely diverse from those of any other group, except in so far as two out of the four groups were mainly Germanic. And even within the groups there was little enough homogeneity. The Burgundian dominion was a collection of small principalities, brought under one lordship by a series of marriages, which did not even form a continuous territory. In Spain there was no love lost between Aragon and Castile, which were separate governments. In the Sicilies a Spanish dynasty was established of foreign rulers over an Italian population whose interests were entirely secondary to their other ambitions. The Austrian dominion was naturally designed to be, within the Empire, the main source of strength for a Hapsburg emperor; but it was precisely the dominion the control of which was the most impossible for a king of Spain, and at a very early stage it was transferred to the Emperor's brother Ferdinand.

Least of all did Charles enjoy an effective supremacy in the Empire, where every one—Electors, princes, knights, and even free cities—was bent on preserving the maximum of individual independence and reducing the imperial authority to a minimum. Ultimately the ascendancy in Germany was to be attached for three centuries to the junior or Austrian branch of the House of Hapsburg, with its material resources strengthened and its Germanic sympathies weakened by union with the Bohemian and Hungarian kingdoms; but till the middle of the sixteenth century was passed, it was Charles, the sovereign of Spain, of the Netherlands, and of the Sicilies, who was endeavoring to establish his own effective supremacy in the German Empire. And at the outset his sovereignty was by no means thoroughly established in Spain.

Hence the rivalry of the King of France was a very real matter, because Francis was the master of a powerful and consolidated kingdom. And on every side the interests of Charles and Francis were in collisions. An intense personal rivalry was set up by the electoral contest for the Imperial crown. On the side of Spain, Ferdinand had seized half the kingdom of Navarre, while the King of Navarre was the protégé of France. On the side of Burgundy, the French crown had annexed the duchy which Charles still claimed as a portion of the Burgundian inheritance. In Italy, France was in possession of Milan and the Milanese, which Charles claimed as a fief of the Empire; while Charles was in possession of Naples, to which Francis still asserted the old claim of the House of Anjou. In view of the distractions provided for Charles by disaffection in Spain, and by the problem of the German Empire, complicated by the new question of religion, it was possible enough that Charles would be unable to hold his own against Francis; and thus it was the primary object of Henry VIII.'s great minister, Wolsey, in England to hold the scales between them, to establish England as the arbiter, friendly to both, but necessary to both. Yet to Wolsey's position there was one fatal drawback. He could only make his policy effective if he could carry King Henry with him.

Charles and Francis were each of them anxious to secure English support, or, at the worst, neutrality; but each was prepared to the last resort to take the risk of English antagonism. In 1520, both were doing their best to procure the English alliance. Henry and Wolsey met Francis at the famous Field of the Cloth of Gold; but they met Charles also after a less ostentatious fashion. Charles was at least satisfied that he would have nothing to fear from English intervention; probably he judged also that the King of England's anti-French sympathies were so predominant that he might take the risk of alienating the minister. His attitude to Luther secured the support of Pope Leo, to whom the French predominance in Italy appeared more dangerous than that of Charles. Wolsey's hand was probably forced by Henry; and at the end of 1521 a league was formed between the Pope, the Emperor, and England for the expulsion of the French from North Italy. Leo died unexpectedly; Wolsey failed to procure the succession to the Papacy, and the Fleming, Adrian VI., formerly the tutor of Charles, was elected. The Italian war broke out in the spring of 1522. The arms of Charles met with unexpected success, and the French were driven out of Milan. In the autumn of 1523, Adrian died, and he was succeeded by Clement VII., an illegitimate cousin of Leo.

Matters continued to go ill for France, the circle of whose enemies was joined by the Constable of Bourbon, who deserted his country for selfish ends of his own. The Imperialists invaded the south of France,

but were expelled and pursued into Italy, where misfortune again descended upon Francis, whose army met with an overwhelming defeat at Pavia (1525), where he himself was taken prisoner.

The Emperor's allies suddenly awoke to the alarming character of his success. The military support given by Wolsey had intentionally been more ostentatious than vigorous; the country obviously resented taxation for a war from which it had no expectation of gaining anything. Henry was making up his mind to get rid of his queen, Katharine of Aragon, who was the Emperor's aunt; his friendship with Charles was, therefore, not likely to be prolonged. Negotiations were opened between England and the French regency which, during the captivity of the king, was in the hands of his mother, Louise of Savoy. Both the Pope and Francesco Sforza, who had been made Duke of Milan, wished to be free from the Emperor's domination. Charles dictated terms of peace to the prisoner Francis, who, as soon as he was set at liberty, repudiated his promises, having indeed openly declared his intention of doing so before signing the treaty. Venice joined with the Pope and Milan in a league against the Emperor. Charles's troops in Italy were under the command of Bourbon and Strundesberg, a declared supporter of Luther. The Imperial troops stormed the city of Rome, sacked it ruthlessly, and took the Pope prisoner. A French army entered Italy, but after initial successes once more met with irretrievable disaster. Francis was compelled to accept a treaty only a shade less humiliating than that which he had already repudiated. He withdrew all claim on Milan and Naples, as well as to the ancient French suzerainty in Flanders. Charles made his peace with the Pope, but Clement felt himself to be practically in the hollow of the Emperor's hand.

The struggle with Francis for ascendancy in Italy had hitherto occupied the first place in the mind of the Emperor. The outbreak of the war had been delayed by the development of unrest in Germany, primarily in connection with the Lutheran propaganda, and by even more active disturbances in Spain. While Charles was negotiating with Wolsey, Castile revolted. The revolt might have been disastrous for the monarchy, but effective rebellion demands vigorous and intelligent leadership. Divided counsels and personal jealousies prevented the nobles from acting together, until in their own interest they turned upon the Commons; and even the Commons did not hold together, with the practical result that the Cortes, the equivalent of a Castilian parliament, became a packed body controlled by the Crown, from which the nobles were excluded, and to all intents and purposes the monarchy became absolute. It was a matter of no less importance that Charles left the conduct of the struggle in Italy to his officers, and spent the years in Spain, recognizing it more and more as the seat of his power.

In Germany as yet his intervention had been limited. It had been made a condition of his election as Emperor that he should sign a declaration called the Capitulations, materially limiting the Imperial powers, and especially safeguarding the princes against the interference of non-German authorities or influences. The Imperial officers were to be German, the official language must be German or Latin, foreign troops were not to be employed in Germany, and an Imperial council was to be appointed for the conduct of the Government. At the first Diet of the Empire after Charles's accession, held at Worms at the beginning of 1521, the question of councils was further dealt with; and in the absence of the Emperor himself the administrative control was vested in a council whose members were appointed as representatives of the electors individually, of the body of the princes, and of the districts, called circles, into which the Empire was divided. The actual Diet of the Empire consisted of three Chambers—the Electors forming one, the rest of the princes, lay and clerical, another, and the representatives of the free cities the third and very much the least important. Apart from it, those who in England would have been called the commons were entirely unrepresented; the great body of the knights, holding their lands from the Emperor, was entirely excluded. German affairs, however, were so closely bound up with the Reformation that we postpone their further discussion at this point.

In 1521, Charles assigned his Austrian possessions, together with such claims as might arise in Hungary and Bohemia, to his brother Ferdinand, who married Anne, the daughter of King Ladislas. Ladislas died, and was succeeded by his son Lewis, who, in 1526, was killed in battle fighting against the Turks at the battle of Mohacz. In accordance with the agreement made between Ladislas and Maximilian and the still earlier agreement between Ladislas and Frederick III., the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary were conferred upon Ferdinand, and were once more attached to Austria.

The advance of the Ottoman was a source of intense anxiety to Pope Adrian VI., who, during his brief tenure of the pontificate, not only strove to inaugurate reforms in the Church, but endeavored vainly to persuade the Christian princes that they should reconcile their quarrels and make common cause against the Infidel. The lull in the Ottoman activities under Bajazet II. had come to an end with the accession of Selim I.; but that vigorous Sultan's energies had been chiefly absorbed first in the conquest of Mesopotamia from the Persians, and then in the subjugation of the Mamelukes of Egypt. Having assumed the Khalifate in 1517, setting aside the last of the Abbassides who bore the title of khalif, he began to turn his attention to Western conquest. The acquisition of Egypt made him complete master of the Levant, and was a crushing blow to the Venetian

trade with the East Indies, which had been mainly conducted through Egypt. By this time, however, the Portuguese were in full possession of the new trade route round the Cape, which was already supplanting the Mediterranean commerce with the East. Selim was preparing to destroy the last advanced stronghold of the Christians in the Mohammedan area by attacking the Knights of St. John in the island of Rhodes, when he died in 1520.

Selim's work was taken up not less vigorously by his successor, Suleiman the Magnificent. At the very moment when hostilities were on the point of breaking out between the great princes of Western Christendom, Rhodes was captured after a prolonged and heroic resistance. Hungary, the bulwark of Central Europe against the Turkish advance, was left to take care of itself, and it was in the vain effort to stem the Ottoman tide that her young King Lewis lost his life.

Three years after the victory of Mohacz, the Sultan was on his way to Vienna. John Zapolya in Transylvania had claimed the Hungarian throne when it was given to Ferdinand on the death of King Lewis. Having been defeated in the contest with Ferdinand he allied himself with Suleiman, and was practically master of one half of Hungary. But when Vienna itself was threatened, German parties became temporarily reconciled. After a three weeks' siege, Suleiman realized that he could not capture the city before the arrival of a relieving army. The siege was raised and the Ottomans retired for the time.

## *II.—Protestantism Takes Shape, 1521-1530*

At the moment when Martin Luther burnt the Pope's Bull, a Diet of the Empire was on the point of assembling at Worms under the presidency of the young Emperor, who was now only just completing his twenty-first year. There was much serious business to come before the Diet. War with France was imminent, and the machinery for the government of the Empire required settlement. In addition, the Diet found itself saddled with the necessity of dealing with the questions raised by Martin Luther.

Luther had been moved primarily by a moral indignation inspired by the proposed sale of Indulgences; but when once he had been aroused, he found himself impelled to join battle, not merely on that particular question, but on a whole series of questions. At the outset he was not even conscious of unorthodoxy. There was nothing unorthodox in resenting and denouncing moral laxity, worldliness, or deliberate fraud, as practised by many of the clergy, and conspicuously by those in high places from the Pope himself downward. There was nothing unorthodox in appealing to the Scriptures and to St.

Augustine for confirmation of the views which he adopted. There was nothing unorthodox in the appeal to the princes to withdraw contributions to the papal treasury. But in the course of the controversy, Luther discovered that the doctrines which he had absorbed and begun to maintain had been denounced as heretical both by popes and by councils; that in fact he was a Hussite, or something very like it, without having been aware of it. But the effect upon him of the discovery was not to convince him that he was wrong, since the pronouncement of popes and councils must necessarily be right, but to convince him that popes and councils had actually erred in their pronouncements. For that must be wrong which is contrary to Scripture, and their pronouncements had been contrary to Scripture. The infallible authority turned out not to be infallible. The logical conclusion was that every individual must find the criterion of truth in his own reason and conscience. If Martin Luther was entitled to reject the pronouncements of popes and councils because he could not reconcile them with his own interpretation of the Scripture, every other individual must have a similar right to believe at least whatsoever he personally found to be consonant with his own interpretation of Scripture. Luther, in fact, never did reach that conclusion; hardly any of the reformers reached it. What Luther saw was that he must himself believe that which his own reason and conscience recognized as true. The utmost that was recognized by any of the reformers was the existence of a considerable range of questions the answer to which was in doubt and in respect of which a large latitude of opinion was consequently admissible. For the great bulk of the reformers the latitude permissible for departure from their own particular views was extremely limited.

Nevertheless, when Luther took his stand in his own person for his own principles before the Diet of Worms, when at all costs he repudiated the infallibility of popes or councils, he was in fact unwittingly asserting the fundamental principle of the liberty of individual reason and conscience—that we must believe what our own reason tells us is true, and that we must do what our conscience tells is right. The principle, it may be remarked in passing, is not anarchical. It does not deprive the community collectively of its right to act upon the collective reason and the collective conscience, to punish the actions or the propagation of beliefs which the collective conscience condemns. The individual is not rendered immune from punishment because he claims to have done what he believes to be right, since the degree of moral guilt is only one of the factors in the measure of punishment. The overt act must be judged by the community on its own merits, since the validity of alleged motives cannot for the most part be tested.

Pope Leo had issued a Bull denouncing Luther, and Luther had

defied him. The Pope invited the Emperor to enforce the Bull. The Diet, assembled in January 1521, demanded that Luther should not be condemned unheard. Popular opinion was notoriously on his side; the lay princes were divided; the "good Elector" of Saxony, Frederick, was supporting him, while Frederick's cousin, Duke George of Saxony, was hot against him. Saxony had been divided in two, the elder or Ernestine branch holding the electoral dignity, while the younger or Albertine branch retained the title of duke along with their allotted share of the Saxon territory. Luther was summoned to Worms under a safe-conduct. He came. He refused to recant until he should be convinced of his errors by conclusive arguments. The papal party did not dare to treat him as Huss had been treated a hundred years before; it was too obvious that the result would have been a bloody insurrection. For greater security, Luther on his departure was carried off by the Elector and hidden in a castle in Thuringia. A decree putting him to the ban of the Empire was secretly prepared, and while the Diet was breaking up and some of the princes who supported Luther had already departed, the necessary sanction for the edict was obtained. It was published, and then practically fell flat. Charles departed to attend to matters which seemed to him of greater importance, and the princes for the most part simply abstained from acting upon the edict. The Council, in whom the administration of the Empire was vested during the Emperor's absence, was under the presidency of his brother Ferdinand, but its guiding spirit was the Elector of Saxony, and so many of its members were favorable to Luther that action against him was practically paralyzed; the more so, because no one knew where the reformer himself was hidden.

In Luther's absence his doctrines were taken up and distorted by fervent zealots—notably Carlstadt and Munzer, who associated themselves with other revolutionary theories. In England the peasant revolt a century and a half before had synchronized with the promulgation of Wiclif's doctrines; what at the present day would be called Christian Socialism was a natural accompaniment of a religious movement which obviously struck at clerical privileges and clerical authority, and could easily by implication be wrested into an attack upon other privileges and other authority. A movement which challenges iniquity in high places is easily attended by a movement to relieve the oppressed from tyranny. Appeals to the Scriptures lead easily to the emphasizing of the equality of men in the sight of the Creator. The serfdom of the German peasant was something far more galling than the serfdom of the English villein of the fourteenth century. A social agitation was inevitably and inextricably mixed up with the religious agitation, and with more than sufficient reason. The downtrodden peasantry rose to demand ameliorations in their lot

which, though anything but excessive, would in the sixteenth century have been revolutionary. Acts of violence were committed, answered by savage reprisals, followed by a brief but terrible class war in which the half-armed peasantry had no chance against the military classes and were crushed without mercy. Luther came out of his retreat to denounce the anarchical extravagances of the religious leaders, and the criminality of the agitators and their misguided followers. But the whole effect of the Peasants' War upon the minds of conservative reformers was precisely like that of the excesses of the French Revolution upon minds of the same type two and a half centuries afterwards. They had been inclined to favor doctrines of liberty; promulgation of liberal doctrines was accompanied by the loosing of forces which broke through all restraint; the progressive conservatives, filled with alarm, became reactionaries; and outside the range of Luther's immediate influence men rushed to the conclusion that Lutheranism was the parent of anarchism.

In Germany the antagonism between Luther and his disciples on one side and the revolutionaries on the other was too palpable for such an impression to prevail. Still the general effect was adverse to the progress of the Reformation, as had also been the Knights' War, which had immediately preceded it. The knights formed a very large class of landholders having no other overlord than the emperor, whose practical control over them was of the smallest. They were without political power, being unrepresented in the Diet. The princes were their natural enemies. As a class they had espoused Luther's cause; they had hoped much from the Diet of Worms, and their hopes were grievously disappointed. Ulrich von Hutten conceived the idea of making the knights the head of a national movement to resist foreign domination in Germany, whether that of the Papacy or that of an emperor who was not a German but a Spaniard or at best a Burgundian. It seemed vain to look to the princes to make any stand for Germany as a whole. The Knights' War began with an attack upon the Elector of Trier. But the movement was neither general nor united. The princes took alarm, and dispatched an army which completely crushed the knights. But in this case also the fact that the leaders Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen were Lutherans was prejudicial to the Lutheran cause, though Luther himself had entirely refused to encourage their movement.

When, however, the Imperial Diet met at Speier in 1526, the year after the Peasants' War and the battle of Pavia, the relations between Charles and the Papacy had changed. The Emperor no longer had the same reason as in 1521 for desiring to conciliate the Pope. Accordingly, the Diet proceeded to set aside the Edict of Worms and to agree upon the principle that, in respect of the religious question,

each state should "so live, rule, and bear itself as it could answer it to God and the Emperor"—in other words, each dominion was to be left to go its own way. The practical result of this was that Germany was divided into Lutheran and Catholic states, according to the predilections of the several princes, the bishops being as a matter of course anti-Lutheran, while the lay princes were fairly equally divided, the Lutherans being predominant in the north, and the Papalists in the south. Honest religious conviction doubtless counted for much, but perhaps the desire to suppress monasteries and secularize ecclesiastical lands and endowments, encouraged by the Lutheran doctrines, was equally responsible for the readiness to adopt Lutheranism.

In 1527 Rome was sacked and Clement VII. was a prisoner in the hands of the Imperialists. In 1528 Charles came to terms with his captive. He is not to be credited with any strong religious convictions; but politically friendly relations with the Papacy were advantageous, and Charles was inclined to the repression of heresy. At another Diet of Speier held in 1529 the Edict of Worms was revived and the last agreement of Speier was cancelled. The Lutheran party, however, was now too strong to submit, and its leaders signed the Protest of Speier, which caused the Lutherans first, and ultimately the whole number of the anti-Papalists, to be known as Protestants. Next year another Diet met at Augsburg, when the Protestants drew up the Augsburg Confession of Faith, affirming the essential tenets of Protestantism. But at this Diet Charles himself was present; and the Edict of Augsburg issued by the Diet forbade the teaching of Protestant doctrines, though Charles at the same time engaged that the Pope should summon a General Council for the authoritative settlement of the religious differences. Lutheran princes, however, were now too deeply committed to give way; civil war seemed imminent, and they formed the Schmalkaldic League for mutual defense.

For the time, however, the crisis was averted. The Turks were again advancing upon Austria, and in face of the menace, civil war in Germany would have been madness. No attempt was made to enforce the Edict of Augsburg, and peace was secured by the agreement of Nürnberg, which suspended all action against Protestants until after a General Council should be held. When the parties united to send an army under the Emperor against the Turks, the Turks themselves retired. Germany remained an armed camp, but without actual collision between the two parties.

### *III.—The Empire and Protestantism, 1530-1556*

For some years after the formation of the League of Schmalkald there was much intriguing on the part of foreign Powers, both France and England, with a view to making use of the Protestant

princes as a check upon the Emperor. Henry VIII. in England was carrying out a reformation on his own account, to which we shall presently revert. It was not doctrinal like that in Germany, but was directed first to the annihilation of the papal authority in England, and then to the transfer of the largest possible amount of spoil from the Church to the royal treasury. But though Henry's minister Cromwell might desire alliance with Lutheran princes, while Archbishop Cranmer yearned for a Protestant union, Henry always regarded himself as the champion of orthodoxy. He had earned from Pope Leo the title of Defender of the Faith, by writing a pamphlet to confute Luther, and he was consequently not at all disposed to make doctrinal concessions. Nor had he any wish to quarrel with Charles—at least after the great stumbling-block between them had been removed by the death of Katharine of Aragon in 1536. Hence Cromwell's negotiations were, at best, permitted rather than encouraged, and ultimately led to his ruin. For the minister in his zeal persuaded the monarch to take for his fourth wife a Protestant princess, Anne of Cleves. Henry's desire for the alliance, never fervent, did not survive the first meeting with the lady, and the minister paid with his head the penalty for having obtained his master's consent to the marriage.

Francis, on the other hand, had no quarrel with the Pope, and demonstrated his own orthodoxy as the "Most Christian King," not by writing pamphlets, but by persecuting heretics within his own dominions. This did not, however, prevent him from seeking any and every alliance which might cause embarrassment to Charles. He scandalized Europe by making a treaty with the Sultan Suleiman, and intrigued, with little enough success, with the Lutheran princes. They for their part looked askance on the King of France as well as on the King of England as being extremely dubious allies for Protestantism.

Francis was awaiting his opportunity to revive his claims on Milan. He had hoped to gain something by winning over Clement VII., and to that end he married his second son Henry to Clement's cousin, Catherine de Medici. But this brought him no advantage, because Clement died immediately afterwards, and was succeeded as Pope by the Farnese Paul III. in 1534. In the following year Charles was occupied with a naval campaign against the mighty corsair, Chaireddin Barbarossa, who had taken possession of Algiers, which he held as a vassal of Suleiman. In 1536, Francis found a pretext for attacking Savoy, whereby he provoked fresh hostilities with the Emperor, who invaded Provence, but was forced to retire without having effected anything. Peace was concluded in 1538, neither Francis nor Charles having gained any material advantage.

Meanwhile the strength of the Protestant party in Germany had

been increasing. The Leaguers had succeeded in restoring to the duchy of Würtemberg the Duke Ulrich, who was willing to place himself on the Protestant side. He had been removed on account of his misgovernment about the time of Charles's accession, and until this restoration Würtemberg had remained under Hapsburg administration. The Lutherans had three points in their favor. As a military organization they were better prepared for war than the Catholic princes. Ferdinand of Austria, representing his brother Charles in the Council, was very much alive to the need of conciliating them and preserving their support on account of the Turkish menace. And the foreign Powers, including Pope Paul, regarded them as a counterpoise within the Empire to the power of the Emperor—possible allies whenever Charles might feel himself strong enough to assert himself aggressively. Pope Paul, mindful of the career of Clement VII., though zealous for the suppression of heresy, was afraid of the excessive development of the Emperor's power; therefore even he did not wish to see the Protestant princes completely crushed. Then in 1539 two principalities were transferred to the Protestant side. Duke George of Saxony died; his brother Henry, who succeeded him, was a Lutheran, so that both the Saxon houses were now Protestant; and in the same year the Elector of Brandenburg, though he himself remained a Catholic, sanctioned the adoption of Protestantism as the religion of his dominions.

In these circumstances Charles, in spite of the pacification with France, the complete suppression of a revolt of the city of Ghent, and a political stroke in Spain by which the Castilian Cortes was practically reduced to impotence, did not conceive that the moment was favorable for an endeavor to bring the Protestant princes to subjection. An internal struggle in Germany could not be risked while the Turk was establishing an effective supremacy in Hungary and was likely to seize any occasion for turning his arms against Western Europe. That Germany should be divided into two hostile religious camps was unsatisfactory from any point of view. Charles was dreaming of giving the Empire political unity under the absolute supremacy of the Emperor. To that end, religious unity appeared to him essential, but impossible to impose by force as matters stood. *His immediate object, therefore, was pacification. This he hoped to procure by the expedient of calling a General Council.* Every one professed a desire for a General Council for the establishment of a religious harmony, which was in fact unattainable; but every one—Germans in general, Lutherans in particular, the Emperor, the King of France, the Pope, and the King of England—was determined that that Council should be held only under such conditions as would insure the victory of the particular views which he or they desired to prevail. There was no neutral spot available, and

the summoning of a Council was perpetually postponed.

In 1541, then, Charles succeeded in procuring, not a General Council, but a conference in connection with the Diet held at Ratisbon. Various parties were there represented, generally by the most moderate and conciliatory of their members; yet it served only to show how impossible it was to arrive at any common ground for general agreement. The conference having failed, all that remained for the Diet was to confirm the existing truce by ratifying the compact of Nürnberg, preserving the *status quo* until the questions at issue should be decided by a General Council.

Meanwhile two new religious movements had been inaugurated, apart from that which was going on in England, one having its headquarters in Switzerland, the other in Spain.

The Lutheran movement in Germany had not in fact been an isolated phenomenon. Its supreme importance lay in the fact that Luther had concentrated upon himself the active hostility of the Papacy. But while Luther was developing his attack in Saxony, Ulrich Zwingli was also developing an independent attack at Zurich. In many respect Zwingli's attitude and that of Luther were closely akin; the Swiss reformer, however, carried his rationalism further than Luther, rejecting the element of mysticism which was essential in the views of the German reformers. The difference presented itself most markedly in their views of the Eucharist. For the Roman doctrine of Transubstantiation—the change of the substance of bread and wine into the substance of the Blood and Body of Christ—Luther substituted his own peculiar doctrine of Consubstantiation—the simultaneous presence of both substances. Zwingli denied the Real Presence altogether, holding that the Lord's Supper was purely commemorative, and that the substance of the bread and wine was absolutely unaffected. The result was that Luther repudiated Zwingli and denounced him with hardly less virulence than he denounced the Pope; so that at a very early stage there was a serious breach between the Lutheran reformers and the Swiss reformers.

Zwingli was killed in 1531; the Swiss cantons, like the German states, were divided into Protestant and Catholic, each canton being free to follow its own religion. Switzerland, like the Protestant states of Germany, became an asylum for reformers who were persecuted in England, France, and elsewhere. John Calvin, a refugee from Picardy, took up his residence at Geneva, and in 1536 issued the work called the *Institutes*, in which he formulated that predestinarian system of theology which is called Calvinism, and laid the foundations of the system of Church government which is called Presbyterianism. Both were more fundamentally hostile to the Roman system of theology and Church government than was Lutheranism,

while Calvinism was far more rigid in its intolerance of diversity than the Zurich school, which initiated the reformation in Switzerland; and the Calvinists and Lutherans continued to be hardly less hostile to each other than both were to Rome.

The second movement was of an altogether different order. In 1521 a young Spanish knight, Inigo Lopez de Recalde, commonly known as Ignatius Loyola, was crippled by a cannon shot at the siege of Pampeluna. The fervor of religious enthusiasm took complete possession of him while he lay on his sick-bed; he rose from it resolved to exchange earthly for heavenly warfare. He would fight the battle of the Cross not with the arm of the flesh, but by the methods which gave strength to the arm of the flesh; the army of the Lord must be organized upon the principles of discipline and obedience, which gave their might to the armies of conquering kings and captains. It was to be inspired by the spirit of utter devotion, and trained to the highest perfection for its spiritual work. Loyola began by training himself. In 1534 he associated himself with six others, at Montmartre, like-minded with himself, as a small missionary company of enthusiasts. The company grew; it was not till 1540 that the Society of Jesus received from Pope Paul official recognition as an Order, organized on the principle of utter and unquestioning obedience on the part of every member to the superior officers. Later the Jesuits departed very far from the lofty spiritual ideals of their first founders; but the world has known few societies which, for good or for evil, have exercised an influence more potent or more all-pervading.

Chaireddin Barbarossa of Algiers had been defeated by Charles's Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, in 1535. The defeat was very far from crushing him, and in a very short time his corsair fleets were once more sweeping the Mediterranean. In 1541 Charles again collected a mighty force, which was intended to overwhelm Chaireddin. Unhappily the fleet itself met with overwhelming disaster; it was utterly shattered, not in battle, but by a terrific storm. The blow was crushing. Francis made haste to take advantage of it. He allied himself with the Duke of Cleves, whose territories provided convenient military access to the Netherlands, renewed his old alliance with Suleiman, and, though he failed to secure Henry VIII., declared war upon Charles in 1542. The French campaign in the Netherlands and another in the Pyrenees were both ineffective. In the next year Charles crushed Cleves, and proved more successful than his rival had been in seeking the active alliance of Henry VIII. In 1544 Henry invaded France and besieged Boulogne. Charles entered Champagne and marched upon Paris. Then with a sudden change of plan he threw over his English ally on the pretext that Henry had refused to march on Paris until he had taken Boulogne, and made a

definitive peace with Francis independently at Crespy. Each restored all recent conquests; Francis made his final renunciation of claims upon Naples, Flanders, and Artois; Charles finally renounced his own claim to the duchy of Burgundy; and a compact was arranged for a marriage between the French king's younger son and a daughter or niece of the Emperor which was to be accompanied by the restitution of the Duke of Savoy in the territories of which Francis had deprived him in 1536. The bride was to be dowered either with the Netherlands or with Milan. The latter part of the treaty was not carried out, as the French prince died before the marriage was completed. Francis and Henry remained at war for another eighteen months, with little result except the capture of Boulogne. Peace was made between the two countries in May 1546. Early in the next year both the kings died, Henry in January, Francis in March. In England the crown passed to a boy, and the government, to a Council controlled first by the young king's uncle, Protector Somerset, and then by John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland. Francis was succeeded by his second son, Henry II., the husband of Catherine de Medici, the elder brother having died some time previously without issue.

Charles had made his peace with Francis at Crespy, in order to have a final settlement which should leave him with a free hand for dealing with the German problem left in suspense after the Diet of Ratisbon. In the interval the Pope had reluctantly agreed to summon a General Council to be held at Trent; but it had not yet assembled for business. The position in Germany itself had been growing increasingly strained. The Schmalkaldic League, with Philip of Hesse and the Elector John Frederick of Saxony at its head, was growing dictatorial, and had taken action against the Catholic Henry of Brunswick which was resented even by some of the Protestant princes. Charles, after the peace of Crespy, set himself to win over the princes who were ill-affected to the League, notably the Brandenburgers and the young Duke Maurice of Saxony. He reckoned that if he broke up the League he would be able to establish the Imperial supremacy in Germany.

His designs were favored by the death of Luther early in 1546; the great reformer had always been a vigorous supporter of civil authority, and had resolutely opposed appeals to force. By midsummer Charles's plans were complete. Hitherto he had seemed always to be seeking an acceptable compromise; now without warning the chiefs of the League were put to the ban of the Empire. Duke Maurice, who wanted the dignity and the territories of Electoral Saxony, attacked the electorate before the forces of the Schmalkaldic League were ready to move. In the following year the armies of the League were routed at Mülberg; the Elector, and soon afterwards Philip

of Hesse, were taken prisoners, and thrown into prison in spite of pledges given to the latter by Duke Maurice, on whom the electorate was duly bestowed. The Schmalkaldic League was completely crushed.

Charles felt himself at last the master of Germany. At the Diet of Augsburg in 1548 he was able to impose upon the Chambers reforms in the constitution of the Empire, which virtually made him a more absolute monarch than any Emperor had been before him. The Imperial Chamber or Supreme Court of Justice was converted into an instrument of the Emperor, in whom the appointment of its members was now vested; and at the same time he was given complete control of a newly constituted military treasury. Not content, however, with forcing a new constitution upon the Diet, Charles also took upon himself to settle the religious question on his own responsibility. He forced upon the Diet a scheme known as the Interim of Augsburg, which was to be accepted throughout the Empire. Some Protestant demands were conceded, including the freedom of the clergy to marry, and the administration of the Communion in both kinds to the laity; but the doctrines sanctioned were for the most part orthodox. The Interim was received with amazement, indignation, and ridicule. It sought to provide a compromise, but it was a compromise acceptable to no one. It irritated both parties, and neither Protestant nor Catholic princes made any real attempt to enforce it within their own dominions. Nor was any one disposed to recognize in the Emperor a commanding authority on the principles of religion.

Charles had been driven to this surprisingly autocratic measure partly by an exaggerated impression of the power he had achieved, partly because he had despaired of the Pope and of the General Council, the sessions of which had been transferred from Trent to Bologna. Paul, in fact, took alarm as soon as it appeared probable that the Emperor would crush the Schmalkaldic League; the substitution of Bologna for Trent meant that the Council would be dominated by the Pope rather than by the Emperor; it caused Charles to repudiate the validity of the Council altogether; and at the same time a personal quarrel rose between Pope and Emperor over a papal claim to Parma and Piacenza. Hence the determination of Charles to take matters into his own hands.

Charles, however, overrated his power. While he was making vain efforts to procure during his own lifetime the election of his son Philip instead of his brother Ferdinand to the Imperial succession, and was employing Maurice of Saxony to force the Interim upon the recalcitrant city of Magdeburg and other Protestant states, that prince was preparing his overthrow, having determined to change his policy and to stand out as the champion both of Protestantism and of Constitutionalism. A secret bargain was made with King Henry of

France, who, in return for his support, was to be put in possession of Metz, Toul, Verdun, and other frontier towns. Suddenly, at the beginning of 1552, Maurice dropped the mask and swooped upon Innsbruck, where the Emperor was at the moment residing. Charles escaped capture only by headlong flight. He had no troops, and he found himself without supporters. He was obliged to give his brother Ferdinand full powers to conduct negotiations with the successful confederates with whom Maurice was acting; and the result was the treaty of Passau, by which the demands of the Lutherans were all in effect conceded. Disorder and hostilities continued rife, in the course of which the French made themselves masters of the fortresses promised them, and Maurice of Saxony was killed.

A pacification was at last effected at the Diet of Augsburg in 1555. The fundamental points of the settlement or peace of Augsburg were that each prince should control the religion of his own principality in accordance with the formula *Cujus regio ejus religio*; that Protestants and Catholics should be equally represented in the Imperial Chamber; and that in the Lutheran states, where Church property had been secularized—that is, taken away from the Church and appropriated to secular purposes—the secularization should be confirmed. On the other hand, the Catholics secured the inclusion of what was called the Ecclesiastical reservation as a clause of the treaty, though it was accompanied by the formal protest of the Protestants. It provided that if any ecclesiastical prince changed his religion, he should *ipso facto* forfeit his office. It is to be observed that the terms Protestant and Lutheran are here equivalent. The treaty made no provision for the followers of other reformed schools, whether Calvinistic or Zwinglian.

For a moment, at the time of the Interim of Augsburg, it had seemed to Charles himself and to the world that his triumph was complete. The pacification of Augsburg emphasized the thoroughness of his defeat. The Electors, too, had flatly refused to change the Imperial succession in accordance with his wishes. At the end of 1555 Charles formally handed over the Netherlands and the Italian territories to his son Philip. Early in the next year he resigned the Spanish crown also to his son, and abdicated the Imperial office, to which Ferdinand succeeded.

#### IV.—France, Britain, and Scandinavia

Almost throughout the Imperial reign of Charles V., Francis I. was ruling in France, Henry VIII. in England, and in Scotland James V. was nominal sovereign. The leading preoccupation of Francis was his rivalry with Charles, which led him, as we have seen, into repeated wars in which he achieved some brilliant successes and met

with still more overwhelming reverses. In the end, France had neither made material gains nor suffered material losses. Her frontiers, when Francis died, were what they had been on his accession. Her claims to wholly extraneous territory in Italy had been withdrawn; her ancient suzerainty of Flanders had been surrendered; but, on the other hand, Charles had withdrawn his own claim to the duchy of Burgundy. In each case, what had been the effective position of the territory at the beginning of the reign was recognized as its legal position at the end.

Political considerations alone controlled the attitude of Francis towards the Reformation. Broadly speaking, he generally expected to gain more by friendly relations with the Papacy than by friendly relations with the Protestants, and in order to gain over the Pope he was habitually disposed to the persecution of heresy in his dominions. The government was always orthodox, though the desire of Francis to pose as a patron of literature and art fostered the secular humanism which, while antagonistic to zealotry of any kind, was an influence favorable to reformation rather than to reaction. The government persecution of heresy in France, though occasionally savage, could never be wholehearted, because there was always a prospect of advantage to be gained by political association with the Protestants in the Empire; consequently, in France the Reformation made considerable headway, and it was in accordance with the genius of the French character that French Protestantism derived from Calvin instead of from Luther. Calvinism was palpably irreconcilable with Romanism; wherever Protestantism followed the Calvinist model it was impossible to establish a form of religion acceptable to any appreciable number of Catholics. Catholicism or Calvinism would have to disappear, or else the two would have to subsist side by side. In France neither Catholics nor Huguenots were strong enough to crush the other, and the country was divided into two definite religious factions, while the government itself was always officially orthodox.

The course followed in England was very different. There it appeared for some time that a reformation would be carried through by the educationists. The greatest dignitaries of the Church—Wolsey, Archbishop Warren, bishops like Fox and Fisher—were all zealous in the encouragement of education. Dean Colet and Sir Thomas More were intimate friends of the great humanist Erasmus. Such men were not attracted by the revolutionary attitude of Luther. If matters had been left to them, flagrant abuses would have been reformed, higher ethical standards would have been established, but there would have been no startling doctrinal changes and no breach with Rome. But the conduct of the Reformation was taken out of their hands by the king. From motives which we may allow to have

been mixed, Henry determined that his marriage with Katharine of Aragon must be dissolved. To that end, either the Pope's assent must be obtained, or the authority of the Pope must be repudiated. It became apparent that the first alternative was barred by Pope Clement's fear of the Emperor, who was Katharine's nephew, and Henry was thrown back upon the second alternative.

The papal authority had never been popular in England. There had always been an element of resentment against it among the English clergy, although, in the case of collisions between the Papacy and the Crown, the clergy had generally ranged themselves on the papal side lest the secular authority should dominate the ecclesiastical. In a collision of such unprecedented magnitude as that for which Henry was now preparing, it was necessary to paralyze the clergy, so that the Church should be unable to range itself effectively on the papal side; and necessary also that the Crown should be supported by a solid mass of popular opinion. Henry paralyzed the Church partly by terrorism, partly by the employment of Churchmen who at the moment were anti-papal, partly by securing the Primacy for Thomas Cranmer, in whom he recognized an instrument perfectly adapted to the ends he had in view. Popular support he secured by taking Parliament into partnership, procuring parliamentary sanction for all his measures, and giving a free course to the anti-clerical spirit, which no king had done before him because none had ventured to break openly with the Churchmen.

The papal authority was defied as being in England no greater than that of any other foreign bishop. The clergy were compelled to acknowledge the king as the "only supreme head of the Church in England." They were deprived of those privileges which had always been resented by the laity. They were heavily fined for having recognized the legatine jurisdiction of Wolsey, to which Henry had indeed given his own sanction, but which was in controvention of the statutes of the realm. Finally, a visitation of the monasteries enabled the Crown to formulate such a denunciation of their prevalent misconduct that their suppression could be treated as a crying necessity—all of these things being done with the full sanction of Parliament. Outside of Parliament, there was opposition passionate and sincere, as witnessed by the martyrdom of More and Fisher and many others, and by the northern revolt called the Pilgrimage of Grace. But in the main it is not to be doubted that public opinion was with the king in his anti-papal and anti-clerical reformation.

Henry had a twofold purpose. He wanted to refill a depleted treasury, and to be undisputed master in his own kingdom. In Wolsey's day, that minister had been taught that the commons of England would not readily submit to arbitrary taxation; but the commons had no objection to seeing the treasury filled at the expense of

the Church so long as their own pockets were not touched. Before a king and a minister who cared nothing for ecclesiastical anathemas, the Church lay a helpless victim, and therefore the Church was despoiled. Public opinion was little shocked, because in the popular judgment much of her wealth had been fraudently obtained and scandalously misused. As to the other point, the commons had no sort of desire to see the king's authority limited by Italian popes or English priests.

Henry's reformation did not go beyond being anti-papal and anti-clerical. Some ceremonial abuses were checked. The publication of an English version of the Bible was sanctioned. Formularies were issued by the royal authority drawing distinctions between the doctrines which were classified as necessary or as convenient; but these involved no departure of a character stamped as heretical by any authoritative ecclesiastical pronouncement. An Act of Parliament imposed very severe penalties for departures from established doctrine and practice which had been publicly commended by the Primate himself. Cranmer because of his religious sympathies, and Cromwell because of his political predilections, would have gone far in the direction of doctrinal reform, but the most they obtained was preparation for doctrinal reform by the publication of the Scriptures in the vernacular. After Cromwell's death in 1540 the English Reformation came to a standstill for the remainder of Henry's reign, though no active steps were taken to prevent the unostentatious progress of the more advanced views.

When Henry died in 1547 he had received authority from Parliament to nominate what was in fact a Council of Regency on behalf of his youthful son, Edward VI.; and in that Council the preponderance lay with the reforming party. Moreover, both the young king and his half-sister, Elizabeth, had been brought up under the tuition of teachers of the new school, although Mary, daughter of Katharine of Aragon, and eldest of Henry's children, had been educated as a devotee of the Roman Church.

In France the accession of Henry II. introduced no change. The new king inherited his father's hostility to Charles, and the religious orthodoxy which in him was a matter of genuine and even bigoted conviction. The government was increasingly hostile to the Huguenots, among whom were now numbered some of the leading nobles. On the other side, a new family, that of the Guises, was now assuming a predominant position. Claude, Duke of Guise, was the younger son of René of Lorraine, the grandson of René "the Good," of Anjou and Provence. The Guises, therefore, were of the blood royal. Of Claude's offspring, the most distinguished were his sons Francis, who succeeded him as Duke of Guise; Charles, called the Cardinal of Lorraine; and his daughter Mary, who had married

James V. of Scotland, and was now in effect, though not in name, regent in that country on behalf of her daughter, who was to become famous as Mary Queen of Scots.

England, on the death of Henry VIII., fell into the most unhappy plight. The control of the government was seized by the Protector Somerset, a man whose ideals were admirable while his methods were deplorable. Desiring the union with Scotland, he endeavored to force the Scots at the sword's point to marry their little queen to the young King of England; with the result that the child was shipped off to France and brought up at the French court as the prospective bride of the dauphin. He posed as a champion of popular rights, but in such indiscreet fashion as to alienate completely the dominant nobles of his own party. He sought to carry the Reformation forward by making the formularies of the Church comprehensive enough to be used without straining the consciences of the orthodox, of Lutherans, or of Zwinglians; but he only irritated the Romanists without satisfying the growing body of Calvinists. He was overthrown, and the reins of power were seized by John Dudley, who made himself Duke of Northumberland, and sought political advantage by allying himself with the reformers of the most extreme type. The finances of the country were allowed to fall into a deplorable condition, and the French recovered Boulogne without difficulty. On the death of Edward VI., in 1553, Northumberland failed in his attempt to divert the succession from Edward's half-sister, Mary, to his cousin, Lady Jane Grey, to whom Northumberland had married his son. Mary secured the crown; Northumberland was sent to the block; and a rebellion, headed shortly afterwards by Sir Thomas Wyatt, brought the same fate upon the hapless Lady Jane—a fate which was only narrowly escaped by Mary's Protestant half-sister, Elizabeth.

The extravagances of the reformers in the reign of Edward VI. caused a reaction which made the restoration of the previous forms of worship and the suppression of any active Protestant propaganda an easy matter. Unhappily for herself, Mary conceived it to be her duty to stamp heresy out. No prosecutor ever entered upon the task with a more honest conviction that the execution of it was a painful duty. No persecution has ever failed more conspicuously to accomplish its end. A few prelates, a few of the clergy noted for their learning and the sanctity of their lives, and some two hundred and fifty victims of no note whatever, perished at the stake. Their harmlessness roused the sympathy and their fortitude the admiration of the populace; their sufferings awoke repulsion and horror, but not fear. The fires of Smithfield did far more to implant Protestantism and a hatred of "Popery" in the minds of the English people as a whole than all the divines put together. When Mary died in 1558, England seemed to have awakened from a nightmare. The whole of what was

done during the Marian persecution was trivial in comparison with the massacres and persecutions which were to be perpetrated in the name of religion during the hundred and fifty years which followed. But what it accomplished was the precise opposite of its purpose; a loathing of Popery, much more than any specific religious conviction, became the substantive clause of the creed of the majority of Englishmen.

And, as it befell, a hatred of Spain was implanted simultaneously. For Mary chose as her husband the Crown Prince Philip, the heir of Charles V., and popular opinion found no difficulty in attributing the persecution primarily to Philip's influence, although, as a matter of fact, it was encouraged neither by him nor by his father. But Mary was the first queen regnant in the history of England. The country viewed with alarm from the outset her marriage to a prince who was the heir to a vast dominion, and would inevitably seek to control English policy in the interests of that dominion. Before Mary's death, England had been dragged into a war with France in the interests of Spain, a war in which the loss of Calais inflicted a blow more humiliating to English pride than the loss of all the conquests of Henry V. For that, too, Spain was held responsible; with the total result that popular hostility to Spain and popular hostility to Popery were the most powerful sentiments with which Mary's successor had to reckon.

The death of James IV. at Flodden left Scotland once more a prey to the feuds of the nobles, who sought to control the regency during the minority of a king who succeeded to the throne at two years of age. The queen-mother, Margaret, was the sister of Henry VIII.; in the course of legitimate succession her son was the nearest heir to the English throne after Henry's own legitimate offspring; and in fact his grandson did become King of England precisely one hundred years after Margaret's marriage to James IV., because Henry had no legitimate descendants in the second generation. The customary anarchy prevailed in Scotland during the young king's boyhood, an anarchy fostered by his English uncle. When James came of age, he displayed some vigor and capacity, and succeeded in completely destroying the power of the Red Douglasses, who succeeded to the old domination of the Black Douglasses which had been ended by James II. But otherwise he accomplished little. Like most of the Scottish kings, he attached himself to the ecclesiastical party as allies against the turbulent nobility. The Scottish Churchmen were traditionally the most determined foes of English influences; the young King of Scots was inspired with the intense distrust of Henry which was shared by his ecclesiastical allies. It was a matter of course that Henry should be looked to by reformers in Scotland as their patron, and that they should be harried by the king and by the Churchmen. The

marriage of James to Mary of Lorraine drew closer the bonds between the Scottish crown and France, and more especially the Catholic party in France, while it drove the reforming party in Scotland to depend the more upon England.

James died within a few days of the birth of his daughter, the future Queen Mary. Again there was regency. Party struggles in Scotland assumed more and more the character of a contest between the French and Catholic party on one side, with the queen-dowager and the Churchmen at its head, and the nobles who identified themselves with the party of the Reformation. At Henry's death, judicious intervention in the struggle on the part of Somerset might have secured the domination of English influence; his mismanagement united all parties in defiance of England, and secured the predominance of French influence. But after Somerset's fall England could spare no attention for Scottish affairs; the Scots began to find French domination hardly less intolerable than an English domination; the Reformation party grew in strength; and when Elizabeth came to the throne in England, Scotland was on the brink of a civil war, in which the Scottish reformers were once more looking to England for aid and support.

During this period, important changes were taking place in Scandinavia. When the century opened, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were nominally under one crown, though Sweden was virtually independent under an aristocratic rule with the Sture family at the head of it. On the accession of Christian II. in 1513, that monarch set himself to destroy the predominant power of the nobility throughout his dominions, and to foster commercial interests by way of a counterpoise. In 1520 he struck down the Stures, and followed up his victory by a general massacre of the nobles, known as the blood-bath of Stockholm. But Christian overreached himself by the tyranny of his methods. In 1523 Denmark revolted, drove him from the country, and made his uncle, Frederick of Holstein, king in his place. In Sweden a young noble, Gustavus Vasa, who escaped the massacre, had already raised the peasantry against the tyranny; the Danish troops which held Stockholm were withdrawn when the Danes expelled Christian from Denmark, and Gustavus Vasa himself became King of Sweden by election. Frederic, the new King of Denmark, consented to recognize the independence of Sweden, while he retained the province of Skaania, and Norway continued to be attached to the Danish crown.

Both the kings favored the Reformation, and both Sweden and Denmark became Protestant countries. But more than this resulted from the accession of Gustavus to the Swedish throne. He was able for the first time to establish a strong central government in the hands of the Crown; and he accomplished this without any reversion

to the methods of tyranny. Perceiving the absolute necessity for a firm control, he propounded a constitution in accordance with his own ideas; and when the Swedish Diet was on the point of rejecting it, he announced that unless it were accepted he would resign the crown. The Swedes themselves recognized that Gustavus was indispensable, and the constitution was adopted; with the result that in the following century Sweden was able to play a leading part among the European Powers.

### *V.—The New World*

At the moment when young Charles was made King of Spain by the death of Ferdinand of Aragon, at the beginning of 1519, Hernando Cortes was on the point of starting from Cuba—at this time an organized Spanish possession—on the fateful expedition which resulted in the conquest of Mexico.

Little enough is known of the origins of the American peoples. At the beginning of the sixteenth century there existed, still unknown to the Spaniards, two empires which had reached a relatively high stage of organization, comparable to that of the Egyptians and Babylonians two thousand years before the Christian era. One was the Mexican Empire of the Aztecs, the other the Peruvian Empire of the Incas. The rest of the races both in North and in South America were in various stages of primitive barbarism, though among the northern Redskins a tendency towards settling down into agricultural or pastoral communities was beginning to develop. Hardly any progress, however, had been made even in the domestication of animals; horses were unknown; and although precious metals abounded, bronze and iron, the use of which was the first condition of rapid material progress in the Old World, had nowhere come into use.

Civilizations had existed in Central America, as is proved by the remains of temples and other buildings with elaborate carvings, which carry with them dim suggestions of Egypt and Assyria, but not such as could be taken to imply any sort of racial connection. The names of ancient peoples, the Chipchas, Mayas, Toltecs, Chichimecs, survive, but without anything in the shape of authentic history; probably none of them go further back than a thousand years from our own day. The Spaniards found the Maya civilization still in existence, and the presence of the cross among their religious symbols induced an otherwise unsupported belief that Christianity had reached them. Sun-worship and human sacrifices appear, however, to be the most definite practices assignable to any of these peoples. Savage and warlike races separated Central America from civilized Peru; but the Aztecs would seem in the fifteenth century to have been starting upon a career of progress which was brought to an end by the Spanish Conquest.

There are records of the strifes between nation and nation, of the domination of Chichimecs and Tecpanecs, of the subjection of kingdoms to kingdoms, of struggles which suggest the contests between Hebrews, Moabites, Edomites, and Amalekites. But towards the middle of the fifteenth century Montezuma I. definitely established the supremacy of the Aztec state, the power of which was increased by Montezuma II., who was reigning when Columbus discovered America, and was still on the throne when Velasquez, moved by the reports of the Yucatan expedition, prepared for a fresh enterprise, the command of which was entrusted to Cortes.

Cortes sailed from Cuba in February 1519, with eleven ships, carrying 400 Europeans and 200 Indians, together with a few horses and a few guns, the use of which in European warfare was now steadily advancing. Landing above Yucatan he very soon impressed the natives on the spot with a salutary respect for Spaniards, and more particularly for their horses and guns. Definite information was given him as to the existence of the Aztec kingdom. Conquest was, as a matter of course, looked upon as legitimate. Cortes again took ship, and gave his new landing place the name of Vera Cruz. The rumor of his coming had already reached Montezuma. The Aztec governor gave the Spaniard a dignified reception, and conveyed from him to Montezuma a complimentary message to the effect that he had come from a mighty king in the East to visit the Mexican Emperor. Montezuma replied by sending gifts and discouraging the extension of the visit. Cortes responded by insisting on his intended visit to the Mexican capital, and at the same time established friendly relations with the native Totonacs who had recently been brought under the Mexican sway which they detested. Then, having literally burnt his boats, excepting one which was dispatched to Spain to report proceedings and obtain authority, he began his march towards Mexico.

Montezuma's messengers forbade him to enter the Mexican territory. Cortes, being warned that an attack was intended, anticipated it and intimidated Montezuma by destroying the town of Cholula. When he continued his march he met with no further resistance. At his capital Montezuma met Cortes in state and assigned quarters to him and his followers. The Spaniards required the Emperor to acknowledge the suzerainty of Charles V. and to pay a substantial tribute, which he did, though he refused to exchange his ancestral faith for Christianity. In effect he found himself obliged to recognize Cortes and his followers as *de facto* rulers.

Velasquez regarded the acquisition of Mexico as his own perquisite, whereas Cortes was now very obviously acting independently. Accordingly the Governor sent a second and larger expedition to Vera Cruz. Thither Cortes returned, leaving a part of his force at the capital, but declined to surrender his command. A collision between the

two parties gave the victory to Cortes, and the bulk of the new troops joined him, those who wished being allowed to return to Cuba. Meanwhile the people in the city of Mexico were adopting a threatening attitude to the Spanish garrison. Cortes returned with his reinforcements, which had been interrupted by the intervention of Velasquez; that his little band could escape annihilation at the hands of a large and hostile population. When Montezuma was produced on the walls of the citadel and compelled to address his subjects on behalf of the Spaniards, he was pelted with stones and missiles, and was so injured that he died shortly afterwards.

With immense difficulty the Spaniards cut their way out of the town, losing most of their guns and horses. Only after a desperate engagement were they able to escape back to friendly territory. Here, with the most astonishing skill and resourcefulness, Cortes reorganized his forces, established an ascendancy over native tribes in the neighborhood, and prepared once again to march on the capital. The resistance now offered was stubborn, but no longer overwhelming. The king, who had been set up in Montezuma's place, was forced to surrender; Cortes returned to the work of organizing the government, which had been interrupted by the intervention of Velasquez; and the city of Mexico soon became a center from which groups of Spanish settlers could be sent out to garrison an ever-increasing area of territory. By 1550 the Spanish dominion in Mexico was thoroughly established.

Meanwhile information reached the Spaniards of a wondrously wealthy empire on the west coast of South America.

Tradition points to the beginning of the thirteenth century as the probable date when the Inca tribe and the Inca dynasty established themselves at Cuzco. They claimed a divine origin as "Children of the Sun," and they came among the already established inhabitants as foreigners. To the Incas are attributed all those characteristics of the Cuzco Empire which make it entirely unique in the history of civilization. The natural presumption, however, is that, whoever they were, and wherever they came from, the Incas acquired the position of a ruling caste, depositaries not only of government, but of all kinds of wisdom. They were, so to speak, at once the Kshatriyas and the Brahmans, and they naturally adapted the records of history to their own ends.

Assuming in accordance with the records that their ascendancy began to be established early in the thirteenth century, and assuming also that there was nothing miraculous about their origin, we are obliged to regard them simply as a tribe, which, attaining a higher intellectual state than their neighbors, succeeded in establishing their ascendancy among peoples who had already acquired a considerable degree of the culture and civilization which they subsequently claimed

to have originated themselves. But the astonishing feature of the Inca government is its non-military character.

Among all other nations in their early stages—Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Teutons—the structure of the State is directly traceable to its organization for military purposes, and the early history is the history of conquest. But the Incas from the outset appear as organizers of a beneficent system of civil government gradually extended over neighboring territories, not indeed without wars, but preferably by means of agreements and alliances, and always to the untold advantage of the peoples whose kings they subdued and who habitually welcomed their sway. As compared with their neighbors their military organization and methods were so definitely superior that if war was forced upon them their victories were a foregone conclusion; but they were accompanied by no massacres and followed by no enslavement. Under such conditions there gradually grew up in the Inca kingdom a species of polity which, had Peru been invaded by European travelers thirty years before Pizarro's conquest, might almost have been regarded as the actual prototype of Sir Thomas More's imagined Utopia. Nothing but geographical condition could have prevented such a dominion from persistently absorbing adjacent territories and drawing tribe after tribe under its beneficent influence; nothing—except the coming of the Spaniards, who laid the whole fabric in ruins.

Now at the close of the fifteenth century there reigned at Cuzco a king named Huaina Capak. On his death he left two sons, born of different wives. According to Inca law his legitimate successor was Huascar; but the other son, Atahualpa, had won his father's confidence and affection. To him Huaina Capak left the recently acquired kingdom of Quito. Atahualpa claimed to be independent; Huascar required from him the equivalent of the feudal homage paid by a vassal to a suzerain. The practical effect was that Atahualpa appeared, but with an army at his back. Huascar was made prisoner, and Atahualpa usurped the Inca crown. Atahualpa himself was not a full-blooded Inca, his mother being of a different race; his forcible accession was accomplished by deeds of violence, and his reign, if it had lasted, could hardly have followed the lines of the traditional Inca development.

But he was destined to be not the inaugurator of a new polity, but the last of the line of the native rulers. The Spaniards in Darien had heard many rumors from the natives with whom they came in contact of a boundlessly wealthy nation dwelling to the southward on the Pacific coast. About 1524 an experienced adventurer, Francesco Pizarro, began investigations on his own account. He actually reached the Inca kingdom, realized the character of its enormous mineral wealth, and resolved upon a conquest. He returned to Spain, pro-

cured from Charles the authority he required for himself and the partners of his previous venture, and with a small party of no more than 168 Spaniards set sail for Peru. The sheer audacity of the undertaking has no parallel. With less than 200 men, Pizarro was proposing to do what Cortes had done in Mexico. But whereas Cortes had actually a considerably larger Spanish force, he was also at pains to secure the support of native tribes hostile to the Mexican dominion; Pizarro relied entirely upon his handful of Spaniards with their guns and horses. Still, he hoped to take advantage of the civil strife to which Atahualpa's recent usurpation was likely enough to give rise.

He marched up the mountains, unopposed; so tiny a force could hardly alarm the natives. Atahualpa sent complimentary messages, but held a great army in readiness. Pizarro having reached his neighborhood, fortified a position and sent forward a part of his company, all on horseback, to invite the Inca king to visit his camp. The invitation was accepted. On the following day Atahualpa arrived in procession. While he was held in conversation by the monks who accompanied the Spaniards, two culverins, who had been posted so as to sweep the ground, suddenly opened fire; the concealed horsemen dashed in among the surprised natives and seized the person of the Inca, while the foot soldiery threw themselves on the line of retreat. The brief and bloody battle which ensued proved the hopelessness of resistance to the superior armament of the Spaniards.

Atahualpa, who was subjected to no further violence, at once offered to purchase his liberty. The offer of a huge ransom was promptly accepted; but the cupidity of the Spaniards was the more excited when the treasure began to pour in. Meanwhile Pizarro had gathered further information as to the position of Huascar and the extraordinary character of the Peruvian polity. He opened secret negotiations with Huascar's party. Atahualpa, learning what was going on, ordered his brother's secret execution. Pizarro snatched at the opportunity, denounced Atahualpa as a usurper and a murderer, and ordered his execution; after which he provisionally set another member of the royal family on the throne. Reinforcements began to arrive in increasing numbers; Pizarro transferred the seat of government from Cuzco to Lima; and although fierce dissensions broke out among the Spaniards themselves their authority in Peru was irresistibly established and was rapidly extended far beyond the borders of the old Inca kingdom.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE ERA OF PHILIP II., 1556-1598

#### *I.—Storm and Stress, 1556-1572*

FOR nearly a hundred years to come the partition of states and populations between Catholics and Protestants was the primary cause both of domestic and of international complications. Each of these terms Catholic and Protestant is to some extent a misnomer, as all party labels must be. In the strict sense the name Protestant applied only to those of the reformers who adopted the Lutheran profession of faith—the Confession of Augsburg; but by general usage it came to be attached to all those who rejected the papal authority and the dogmatic decisions of the Council of Trent. The term Catholic was appropriated to all those who accepted the dogmatic position of the Council of Trent, because the Council denied the right of all others to claim membership in the Catholic Church—a proposition strenuously repudiated by large numbers of Protestants. It must, therefore, be clearly recognized that the use of the term Catholic in the popular sense is in no way an admission of the right of any ecclesiastical body whatever to define the limits of the Catholic Church, and still less of any exclusive claim to membership in the Catholic Church on the part of those who are labeled Catholics.

The partition was finally effected by the Council of Trent, which was dissolved in 1563. Originally summoned by Paul III. to meet at Trent and subsequently transferred by him to Bologna, in spite of the angry protest of Charles V., the conditions laid down for the assembly in effect excluded from participation the representatives of Lutherans, Calvinists, Zwinglians, and of the English Church, which had repudiated the papal authority. After the death of Paul III., his successor, Julius III., who was on friendly terms with Charles, restored the Council to Trent instead of Bologna. Still little progress was achieved; but so far as discussion went, no concessions were made in the Protestant direction, and the Council was again suspended in consequence of the successes of Maurice of Saxony. The brief pontificate of Paul IV. was distinguished by the Pope's rejection of the nepotism which, for nearly a hundred years, had been so prevailing a characteristic of the Papacy. The restoration of discipline and the purification

of morals within the Church, to which the name of the counter-Reformation is given, had at last become a primary aim of the Church of Rome itself.

The Council did not meet again till 1562, when Pius IV. had succeeded Paul IV. In this session and that of 1563, the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church were finally formulated. All the questions in dispute were settled in the sense adverse to the doctrinal reformers; thenceforth the advocacy of any of these views was branded as heresy by the authority of what claimed to be a General Council of the Church, though its claim to be so called was repudiated by every one of the reformed bodies. Within the Church the only division which still survived concerned the limits of the personal authority of the Pope; the French Church still maintained a claim to national independence in regard to Church government. The Council of Trent, therefore, is the great historical landmark, signaling the moment when the Roman Catholic Church defined its boundaries.

The abdication of Charles V. definitely severed the Hapsburg dominion into two portions, the Spanish and the German, the succession to the Imperial crown being thenceforth appropriated to the German branch of the house. With Spain went the New World, the Sicilies, the Netherlands, and Franche-Comté. With Austria went all the rest of the German territories of the house, and the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, though not more than a third of the last kingdom recognized the Austrian sway. During the next half century, international interests were absorbed by Spain, France, and England; Germany and the German Hapsburg in effect stood aside from Western affairs. In Germany the uneasy religious truce was preserved; the Emperors remained professedly orthodox, while one at least, Maximilian II., the son and successor of Ferdinand, only abstained for political reasons from avowing himself a Lutheran.

On the other hand, the championship of reactionary Catholicism was definitely assumed by Philip of Spain; the accession of Elizabeth in England secured that Power to Protestantism; while France was rent by a ceaseless strife between Catholics and Huguenots, the government being always Catholic in its sympathies, yet impelled by the rivalry with Spain to a half-hearted support of Philip's recalcitrant Protestant subjects. Philip was a bigot who regarded himself as divinely commissioned to wipe out heresy, primarily in his own dominions, but also everywhere else. In one corner of his dominions, the Netherlands, the Protestants bade him defiance. He failed to crush their stubborn resistance, and when he turned aside from that task in order to destroy England he met with overwhelming disaster.

At the moment of Philip's accession he was plunged into a war with France, into which England was dragged; the main outcome of it was the French capture of Calais, which had been in possession of the

English for two hundred years. After the treaty of Chateau-Cambrésis, which ended this war, interest centers in the struggle of the Protestant Netherlands for liberation from the Spanish yoke, in the development of England as a Protestant Power, culminating in her attainment of naval supremacy, and in the French wars of religion.

When Elizabeth succeeded her sister Mary on the English throne, Philip conceived that he held her in the hollow of his hand, that she could disobey his behests only at the peril of her throne. For she was a Protestant, the legitimacy of whose birth no Roman Catholic could acknowledge, since all were bound to regard her mother's marriage with Henry as invalid. There was a Catholic candidate for the throne in the person of Mary Stewart, Queen of Scots, the granddaughter of Henry's eldest sister Margaret. If Elizabeth was illegitimate, there was no possibility of questioning that Mary Stewart was Mary Tudor's legitimate heir; she was barred only by the will of Henry VIII, which had given precedence to the grandchildren of his younger sister, the Greys. Philip conceived that Elizabeth could not risk alienating him, and making him a supporter of Mary.

Elizabeth and William Cecil, the minister of her choice, had no fears. They saw that Philip himself could not afford to see Mary on the throne of England. At the moment there was every prospect that she would be Queen of France as well as of Scotland, and the union of the three crowns was the last thing that Philip could possibly desire. Even after the death of Mary's husband, the moral certainty remained that if she were seated on the throne of England, England would be the ally of France, not of Spain, since her mother was a Guise. The result was that Elizabeth went her own way, politely ignoring both the blandishments and the threats with which the Spaniards plied her. It was in fact impossible for her, even had she wished it, to take the Papalist side in England. To recognize the papal authority would have been to admit her own illegitimacy. She reversed her sister's religious policy and completed the official reformation in England by the Act of Uniformity requiring clergy and laity, under divers penalties, to conform to the doctrines and ceremonial laid down in a revised "Book of Common Prayer," which was sufficiently indefinite in its expressions to permit its acceptance by all but the more rigid Romanists on the one side and the more rigid Calvinists on the other—a compromise sufficiently satisfactory to the great bulk of her subjects. She intervened in Scotland to secure the victory for the reforming party over Mary of Lorraine, who died at the moment of her defeat. The result was that the young queen, widowed by the death of her husband after a reign in France of a few months, returned to Scotland to find the government completely in the hands of the Calvinistic nobles and clergy, who were always in the last degree

hostile to French influences, while their interests were bound up in the preservation of friendly relations with Elizabeth.

The religious question and the Scottish question being settled, Elizabeth and her ministers devoted themselves to the reorganization of the administration, which during the last twenty years had been going from bad to worse. Their efforts were abundantly successful. Financial corruption disappeared; strict economy was introduced; justice was administered without fear or favor; and in a very short time prosperity and content were restored. And in the meanwhile adventurous English mariners were developing the art and science of seamanship, partly on merely piratical expeditions, partly in pursuit of legitimate commerce, and partly in trading visits to the Spanish colonies—visits profitable both to them and to the Spaniards, but officially forbidden by the Spanish Government, which meant to hold the monopoly of the New World. To these performances the English Government turned a blind eye, while Philip's remonstrances were met with protests against the action of the Inquisition, which claimed to exercise its jurisdiction over Englishmen in Spanish waters.

England, however, did not secure the first place in Philip's attention. His first object was to concentrate in his own hands the control of every department of government in every part of his dominions, in despite of all existing rights or privileges. In Spain he succeeded completely, and also in his Italian territories. The Netherlands gave him a more difficult problem.

There he reposed full authority in the hands of his half-sister, Margaret of Parma, and a secret council appointed by himself, which overrode all other authority, and was supported by the presence of Spanish troops. The nobles, headed by the Catholic Count Egmont, Admiral Horn, and young William, Prince of Nassau and Orange (the latter title taken from a small principality in Provence), protested against the arbitrary system of government with no effect. The northern provinces, where Calvinism had become deeply implanted, were the more resentful because of the active persecution of Protestants through the Inquisition. The sense of national hostility to what was in effect a thoroughly alien government was stronger than the antagonism between the Catholics and the Protestants; and the Catholic nobles joined in urging Philip to recognize the traditional liberties and rights of self-government of the provinces. Violent disorders broke out. The Duke of Alva, a successful soldier, was sent by Philip to treat the situation with a high hand. The regent, Margaret of Parma, found herself superseded; the nobles, who had endeavored to pacify the angry populace, were treated as instigators of the rebellion. Egmont and Horn were seized, while William of Orange escaped to Nassau. Alva began a relentless and hideous per-


secution, so intolerable that open rebellion broke out, and a party of Spanish soldiery was routed at Heiligersee.

Then Alva struck savagely; Egmont and Horn were executed. When Alva took the field the rebellion could make no head against him. Resistance seemed to be completely crushed, and the Duke proceeded to vengeance. Its savagery was attended by an insane taxation, which produced no revenue, because it ruined the community. Alva seemed to hold the whole country helpless under his iron heel. But matters had reached a point when continued submission was worse than the penalties of a desperate rebellion; and in 1572 a desperate rebellion flamed out. Brille and Mons were seized; the four northern provinces proclaimed William of Orange their "stadtholder." The war of independence had begun.

Meanwhile France had been rent by the struggle between Catholics and Huguenots. Henry II. was killed accidentally in a tournament

#### VALOIS AND BOURBON

Louis IX., d. 1270.



immediately after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. He was succeeded by his young son, Francis II., the husband of Mary Stewart, whose brief government was dominated by the Guises. Their policy aimed at crushing the Huguenots; but, on the other hand, the Guise influence was resented by the older French nobility, many of whom, headed by Anthony of Bourbon and his brother Condé, took the Huguenot side, whether from religious conviction or out of opposition to the Guises.

But before the end of 1560 the young king died and was succeeded by his next brother, Charles IX., a boy of eleven, who was completely under the influence of his mother, Catherine de Medici. Ignored by her husband, she had hitherto taken no open part in politics; the moment had come for her to snatch the power which she had always coveted. She succeeded in procuring her own appointment as regent, although precedent would have given that office to Anthony of Bourbon. The House of Valois in direct male line was all but exhausted;

its only representatives were the young king and his two brothers. That house was derived from Charles of Valois, the younger son of Philip III., who had succeeded his father, Louis IX., in 1270. The Bourbons, of whom Anthony was the head, derived in direct male line from Robert of Clermont, the younger brother of Philip III.; consequently, Anthony stood next in succession to the French crown after the two young Valois princes, and was the next prince of the blood of an age to assume the functions of regency. Anthony was also, titular King of Navarre, having married the queen, Jeanne d'Albret, who was a convinced Calvinist. Though ambitious enough, he was altogether wanting in strength and decision of character. Catherine had no difficulty in buying his assent to her appointment as regent.

Anthony being himself a professed Huguenot was the figurehead of that party, and the natural leader of opposition to the Guise influence; but the effective leadership was in the hands of his brother, Louis Prince of Condé, and of the Chatillon brothers, notably the Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, whose office was purely titular, having no actual connection with the sea.

Catherine cared nothing for religion; what she wanted was power for herself, not for Catholic Guises or for Huguenot Bourbons. Her personal prejudices, like those of Elizabeth in England, were rather on the Catholic than on the Protestant side; but such views as she held on the religious question were, like Elizabeth's, entirely subordinated to political considerations. It was her object rather to secure general Catholic support by the sufficient suppression of the Huguenots, but without crushing the latter, so that they might continue to counterbalance the Guises. Moral considerations she ignored completely; and, in accordance with Italian doctrines of statesmanship, she hesitated at no crime which she judged to be politic. But religious bigotry was never a motive with her.

At the outset it appeared that toleration, earnestly advocated by the Chancellor L'Hôpital, would be the program of Catherine's government. Anthony was appointed Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and the Guises found themselves excluded from office. L'Hôpital urged that no measure against heresy should be pressed until the Council of Trent, which was then assembling for the most important of its sessions, should have formulated its final pronouncements. Anthony was persuaded to desert the Huguenots, whose activity was increasing in the belief that a government favorable to them had at last been established. Religious antagonisms, however, were growing not less but more bitter; collisions and riots were of frequent occurrence; and a particularly notable incident was the massacre of Vassy (March 1562), when a party of the Duke of Guise's soldiery attacked or were attacked by a Huguenot congregation, of whom some scores were killed and some hundreds wounded in the encounter. Guise on arriving in

Paris was hailed by the fanatically Catholic mob as if he had won a glorious victory.

The Vassy affair was the signal for the outbreak of the first of the French wars of religion. The Huguenots, headed by Condé and Coligny, took up arms. Catherine, who could hardly avoid treating them as rebels, joined herself reluctantly with the Guises. Many towns all over the country were held by Huguenots; but it was only to a very limited extent that any geographical area was predominantly Huguenot, the population being everywhere divided, with Catholics generally in the majority. Anthony of Navarre was at the head of the Government forces; the Catholics appealed to Philip of Spain for support, while the Huguenots appealed to England. Condé, however, made the blunder of handing over Havre to be occupied by the English, thus enabling the Government to denounce him as traitor.

The death of Anthony compelled Catherine to recognize Guise as the chief of the Catholics. In November 1562 there was an engagement at Dreux, at which each of the commanders, Condé and the Constable Montmorency, was taken prisoner. It seemed probable that victory would be with the Catholics; but Guise himself was assassinated by a Huguenot fanatic in 1563. Catherine was enabled to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, till the war was suspended by the peace of Amboise, in which the single concession was made to the Huguenots, apart from a general amnesty, that they should be permitted to exercise their religion and hold their own services in certain towns, among which Paris was not included. A sort of pacification was established which endured for some four years, and the English were turned out of Havre, the Huguenots withdrawing their support, with the natural result that Elizabeth's sympathies were completely alienated.

The pacification was extremely superficial. The conclusion of the Council of Trent put an end to any hopes of reconciliation between the creeds. A meeting between Catherine and Alva at Bayonne in 1565 was naturally regarded as ominous by the Huguenots at the moment, and was afterwards commonly, though erroneously, believed to have been the occasion for the concoction of a huge plot for the destruction of Protestantism. Catherine at this time did not wish to destroy Protestantism—it was still her object to preserve a balance of parties; and at the Assembly of Moulines in January 1566 a formal reconciliation was effected between the Chatillons and the Guises, the sons and the brothers of the murdered duke. But the alarm caused by the conference between Alva and Catherine was increased by the reign of terror which in 1567 Alva was establishing in the Netherlands. Before the end of the year the Huguenots were in arms again. The hostilities were of a desultory character. Condé was defeated and killed at the battle of Jarnac early in 1569, and Coligny became defi-

nately the head of the Huguenot party—a gain to them so far as concerned the character and abilities of their leader, but in other respects a loss, since Condé had been a prince of the blood royal, and Henry of Navarre, though being brought up as a Huguenot by his mother, was still too young to take his uncle's place.

In spite of a heavy defeat at Montcontour, Coligny was able to rally the Huguenot forces, and in 1570 the peace of St. Germain made large concessions to the Huguenots. The number of towns in which they were to be allowed the free exercise of their religion was now to be increased; they were permitted to garrison Rochelle and three other towns, and Protestantism was no longer to be a bar to public employment.

At last it seemed that a pacification had been attained, and for France it was sorely needed. As concerned her relations with England her position was weak, since the prospects of Mary Stewart were at their lowest. The unfortunate Queen of Scots, regarded by nearly every one as guilty of the murder of her husband Darnley, had fled to England from her rebellious subjects, and was a prisoner in Queen Elizabeth's hands; while the Calvinists, lay and clerical, who dominated Scotland, relied on English support, and were intensely hostile to French influences. France in fact required the friendship of England much more than England required the friendship of France. But at the same time the might of Spain was increasing. In Spain itself Philip was absolute, and the rebellion in the Netherlands appeared to be utterly crushed. He could even afford to encourage plots in England on behalf of Mary Stewart. So throughout 1571 negotiations were in progress for the marriage of the Queen of England to Henry of Anjou, the younger brother of the French king—a scheme which implied the acceptance in both countries of the principle of toleration for both the religions.

And beyond this it appeared that Charles IX. was falling more and more under the influence of Huguenot leaders, partly through jealousy of the little deserved reputation of his younger brother, who was a bigoted Catholic in spite of his pretensions to the hand of the Queen of England. In 1572, although this marriage project had been dropped, the pacification was to be sealed in France by the marriage of young Henry of Navarre to the French king's sister, Margaret of Valois. The prestige of Spain had just been ominously raised by a striking naval victory over the Turks at Lepanto in October 1571; but, on the other hand, the hopes of Protestantism received encouragement from the sudden fresh outbreak of revolt in the Netherlands.

But Catherine dreaded the loss of her power as she saw the increasing influence of Coligny over the king, who was now grown up. Mastered by her jealousy, she joined herself and her son Henry in a secret league with the Guises, brought all her influence to bear upon

Charles, and won from him his consent to a massacre of the Huguenots, who, in the summer of 1572, were assembling in Paris to celebrate the marriage of Henry of Navarre with Margaret of Valois. The signal was given by the tolling of a bell after the midnight of St. Bartholomew's Eve. The sun rose on Paris with her gutters running red with the blood of Huguenots; during the following days the example of Paris was followed in numbers of provincial towns. Of the numbers those massacred, it is impossible to form even an approximate estimate; it can only be said with something like certainty that those who were slain were not fewer than 10,000 nor more than 50,000. Huguenot estimates at the time raised the tale to 100,000.

## II.—*The Breaking of Spain, 1572-1588*

All through the first years of Queen Elizabeth's reign English hostility to Spain had been growing, partly on account of the collisions between English mariners and Spanish authorities in the New World, partly because of Philip's vain attempts to dictate to the English Government, and partly because of the increasing zeal of English Protestantism. That zeal was the outcome of the revulsion against the Marian persecution, intensified by the doings of the Spanish Inquisition, and of Alva in the Netherlands, and was attended by the suspicion that Roman Catholics in general wished to overturn Elizabeth's government, which was popular, and to set on the English throne the Queen of Scots, who was commonly regarded as a murderess and adulteress. The political dread of the Roman Catholics was confirmed in 1570 by a Bull of Pope Pius V., pronouncing the deposition of the heretic queen and proclaiming it to be the duty of all good Catholics to procure her downfall, while sanctioning an external loyalty to the *de facto* government. The Paris massacre provided a climax of horror; but it did something towards substituting Catherine of France for Philip of Spain as the primary object of Protestant detestation; and it served actually to mitigate the brutality of Spanish methods in the Netherlands, since Philip was disposed to go a little way, though not far, in order to conciliate England and to keep open the breach between her and the French king.

In France, on the other hand, the sheer enormity of the crime produced a reaction. Catherine herself realized that she had gone too far and had gained nothing by putting herself into the hands of the Guises. In the years which immediately followed the massacre, both Philip and Catherine were endeavoring to conciliate Elizabeth, whose main object was to avoid any open war, to continue the successful development of the national resources, and to strengthen the national organization. By modifying the severities of the government in the Netherlands under Requesens, who succeeded Alva, and Don John of

Austria, Philip's half-brother, who succeeded Requesens, Spain procured the comparative acquiescence of the southern Catholic provinces; though the northern provinces, under the leadership of William of Orange, were resolved to fight to the last gasp for the religious liberty which was still denied them.

William hoped against hope that, either from Elizabeth or from France, or from both acting in concert, he would get the support necessary to enable him to hold out; and in fact it was that exceedingly meager and surreptitious support which bridged the gap between the hopelessly impossible and the barely possible. In 1576, when Requesens died, a savage outbreak of the troops at Antwerp, known as the Spanish Fury, brought the southern provinces for a time into line with the northern; but the ground thus lost by Spain was again recovered by the conciliatory attitude of Don John, and was preserved by the still greater abilities both as a statesman and as a soldier of Philip's nephew, Alexander of Parma, who was appointed to the Governorship on the death of Don John in 1578. In 1579, William of Orange realized that the Protestant Provinces must stand or fall by themselves. The Union of Utrecht, formed in that year, signalizes the foundation of the Dutch Republic and the commencement of the desperate struggle for actual independence. If Philip could have brought himself to repose complete confidence either in Don John or in Parma, it is almost inconceivable that the Dutch Republic would ever have been established; but Philip never trusted any man, and whenever either diplomacy or military skill had brought victory within the grasp of his lieutenants, the king cut off the supplies or forbade the measures which were necessary to complete success.

The reaction in France, where the Huguenots at first stood desperately at bay, created the party of the Politiques, the Tolerationists, men on both sides with whom political considerations outweighed religious partisanship. Henry of Anjou was for the moment called away from the scene by his election to the crown of Poland, where the Jagellon dynasty ended with the death of its last male representative, Sigismund, in 1572. The nobles of that country declared that thenceforth the monarchy should be purely elective, which meant in effect that each successive king was to be the figurehead of an aristocratic republic; while the elections to the throne were destined to provide repeated opportunities for friction between European states through the promotion of rival candidatures.

The election of Henry of Anjou was of no moment to Poland; for in 1574 Charles IX. died, and Henry hurried back to France to assume the crown there as Henry III. Unlike his brother, he was not haunted by dreams of the massacre of which he had been the most zealous promoter. *His debauchery did nothing to diminish his religious fanaticism.* But he hated and feared the Guises hardly less

than he hated and feared the Huguenots. His natural allies would have been the Politiques, but the vehemence of his desire to persecute, and his dread of Henry of Guise, tossed him from one side to the other; he lacked the strength to stand firm between the extremes; while his younger brother Francis, formerly known as Alençon, who became Duke of Anjou on Henry's accession, was inclined to pose as the patron of the Protestants and the ally of Henry of Navarre. Roughly speaking, however, after the first shock of the massacre, something like a balance of parties was produced; from 1572 to 1577 hostilities and treaties succeeded each other, concluding with the Edict of Poitiers, which granted the Huguenots freedom of worship in all places where the reformed worship was actually being followed at the time. A number of towns were allowed to remain under Huguenot control, and the Huguenot nobles were allowed to enjoy private religious services. Once more it seemed that a *modus vivendi* had been arrived at, and that France would be able to concentrate upon what was of supreme importance to her—a policy directed to checking the power of the Spanish king.

The official display of friendliness between the courts of Spain and England was singularly hollow. Popular hostility to Spain in England was in no way diminished; English mariners continued to visit the Spanish Main in defiance of Spanish laws; the Inquisition continued to claim jurisdiction over English sailors who fell into their hands. Spanish officials and English seamen each denounced the other for flagrant violation of what would have been called international law if the phrase had come into use. In fact, among the Spanish colonies and on the high seas, there was a constant state of war between the two nations, though their official governments in Europe professed to be at peace.

In 1577 Drake started on that great expedition in which, first of all captains, he sailed the whole way round the world; for though Magellan's ship had been brought home, he had himself died in the course of the voyage. Drake considered himself perfectly entitled to fight Spaniards and empty their ships wherever he found them; and when he returned to England in 1580, with treasures worth some millions, of which his royal mistress received a handsome share, Elizabeth knighted him instead of hanging him for a pirate, as the Spaniards demanded.

But in 1580 the Anglo-Spanish relations had become more strained, and the whole situation, with regard to the Netherlands, more complicated. In spite of strong popular pressure, Elizabeth was bent on abstaining from giving to William of Orange the open and active support which would involve open war with Spain. Orange was prepared to make the United Provinces an English protectorate; in the alternative, he was ready to buy French support by offering the pro-

tectorship to Francis of Anjou, since he believed that, in the last resort, Elizabeth would choose rather to accede to his wishes and accept the protectorate for England. Elizabeth countered this mode of pressure by opening negotiations for her own marriage with Anjou, who was twenty years younger than herself. It was not in the least likely that she ever had the slightest intention of marrying him, but she quite successfully effected her object, which was to prevent France from assuming the rôle which she was so anxious to decline for herself. So far Philip was completely hoodwinked, imagining that Elizabeth was unconsciously playing into his hands. He had acquired the idea of establishing in France the Guise ascendancy, under the ægis of Spain, and of placing Mary Stewart on the throne of England, so that both France and England would be dependencies of the Spanish Empire, while the rebels in the Netherlands were to be crushed in the dust. He did not want to have open war with England until he had finished off the Netherlands; but he was ready to go to any length short of open war. And the Pope had his support in preparing a great campaign for the recovery of a Catholic ascendancy in England.

Therefore, in 1580, a flood of Jesuit emissaries invaded England, Ireland having already become the stage of an insurrection, the rebels there being assisted by a band of adventurers, chiefly Italian and Spanish subjects of Philip of Spain, though not acting under formal authority from the government. Although English volunteers were serving with William of Orange in the Low Countries, Elizabeth was provided with sufficient ground for refusing to take action against Drake and other mariners while Philip's subjects were openly supporting the Irish rebels. The rebellion was crushed in ruthless fashion, and the Jesuits were for the most part hunted down or driven out of the country. The general effect was that the tide of wrath against Spain and against Popery rose still higher. Still there was no formal breach. The United Provinces offered their crown to Francis of Anjou; but Elizabeth still evaded marrying him, yet still kept him dangling, and still kept France from independent intervention. And meanwhile, slowly and persistently, inch by inch, Parma was relentlessly pressing the insurgent Netherlanders always a little closer and a little closer.

Meanwhile, also Philip had effected a political stroke of the first importance. In 1578, Sebastian, King of Portugal, was killed in battle against the Moors in Africa. He had no children, and the crown passed to his granduncle, Henry, an old and childless priest, the brother of Sebastian's predecessor and grandfather, John III. Now Henry had had an elder sister, Isabelle, wife of Charles V. and mother of Philip. He had also had two younger brothers, the elder of whom left an illegitimate son, Don Antonio, known as the Prior of

Crato. The youngest brother left two daughters, of whom the elder was married to the Duke of Braganza, and the younger to Parma. According to all recognized rules of succession, the claims of either of these daughters had precedence of Philip's claim through his mother; for Antonio's claim, which in course of time he asserted, there was nothing to be said except to pretend that his parents had in fact been duly married. But when King Henry died in 1580, Philip claimed the Portuguese throne through his mother, and was able without serious difficulty to secure it, thrusting aside the Braganza and Parma claims; although, in the course of the next century, the House of Braganza succeeded in displacing the House of Hapsburg.

The acquisition of Portugal placed in Philip's hands the whole of the Portuguese maritime empire in the eastern seas, in addition to the Spanish-American empire in the West. No other European State was as yet in secure possession of a foot of land outside of Europe; no other State was credited with the possession of a naval power in the smallest degree fitted to cope with the navies of Portugal and Spain. Only in England, in the United Provinces, and on the high seas, there were sailors who knew that English and Dutch and perhaps French seamen had a grip of the conditions of naval warfare and a mastery of seamanship which were soon to make them more than a match for all the maritime might of Spain. In fact, from the time of Drake's return in 1580, if not before, English mariners were asking nothing better than the chance of trying conclusions with Spain.

Anjou was finally accepted as Prince of the Netherlands at the beginning of 1582, but his authority was very carefully limited. Any attempt on his part to incorporate his dominion with France was *ipso facto* to set a term to his office. It was to be held, moreover, without prejudice to the authority of William in the northeastern provinces, while in the southern and definitely Catholic provinces Parma was *de facto* master. Anjou, in short, was not in any sense effectively recognized except in the central provinces. Still, however, he was far from having lost hope of winning the hand of the Queen of England, and Catherine had been turned more definitely against Philip by his seizure of Portugal. French fleets sailed to support the cause of Don Antonio, but were disastrously defeated by the Spanish admiral, Santa Cruz, in 1583. In England, Throgmorton's plot to assassinate Elizabeth and set Mary Stewart on the throne, with Spanish assistance, was hatched with the knowledge of the Spanish ambassador, but also of Secretary Walsingham, who, according to his custom, waited for the precise moment when the plot was ripe, and then struck and crushed it. Diplomatic relations with Spain were practically broken off, and an Anglo-French alliance, including the Netherlands, seemed to be close at hand, when the project was

wrecked by the folly of Anjou. Frightened by the persistent progress of Parma, and annoyed by the restrictions on his own authority, he attempted to establish his own personal supremacy by means of his French troops while he was engaged in treasonable negotiations with Parma. The attempt failed completely, and Anjou had to withdraw from the Netherlands. In the next year, 1584, he died, and a month after his death William of Orange was assassinated. There had been several previous attempts to murder William, with the connivance of the Spanish Government, one of which had come near to success.

William the Silent stands out as one of the great heroic figures of history. As a soldier his talents were not remarkable; they were certainly in no way comparable to those of his son, Maurice of Nassau, a lad of seventeen at the moment of his father's death, who was presently to prove himself the worthy antagonist of the greatest of living soldiers, Alexander of Parma. Nor was William a peculiarly brilliant diplomatist. But it was the sheer indomitable constancy of the man, the inspiration of his heroically high-hearted political courage in the face of adversity, which preserved the invincible resolution of the northern Netherlands, and gave to the world an unsurpassed example of the triumph of moral force over blood and iron.

The death of the great leader appeared to be, but was not, an irretrievable blow. William's work was done. It is doubtful whether the struggle for Dutch independence was even prolonged by his fall; he had already made it certain that the Dutch might be wiped off the face of the earth, but would never yield. By a strange irony, a far greater material importance attached to the death of the entirely despicable Francis of Anjou, not because of his qualities, but for the sole reason that his disappearance made Henry of Navarre heir-presumptive to the French throne. The idea of that prince's succession was hateful to King Henry III., and intolerable to the Guise faction. From the moment of Anjou's death, France was paralyzed, because the question of the succession completely overrode everything else. The Guises formed what they were pleased to call the Holy League for the exclusion of the heretic heir and the suppression of heresy. The League was ready to pay the price of Spanish assistance by the cession of the kingdom of Navarre to Philip. The contemptible king found his own authority threatened by that of a league of his subjects; he submitted to their dictation, threw in his lot with them, and revoked all the edicts of toleration. The Huguenots rose with Henry of Navarre at their head as a matter of course, and France was once more plunged into a civil war.

The monstrous claims of the League and the extravagance of the action against the Huguenots drew the Politiques to the side of Henry of Navarre—the more because what remained of French patriotism

resented the appeal to Spanish intervention; and there were French Catholics in plenty who also resented the intervention of a Pope who issued a Bull of excommunication against the legitimate heir to the French throne. A force of German Protestants entered France to support the Huguenots. The royal army was defeated by Henry of Navarre at Courtas in October 1587, while the king was negotiating with the Germans for their departure. The Germans retired, but while they were withdrawing, Henry of Guise, who hardly made even a show of obedience to the king's orders, attacked them, and on returning to Paris was hailed as the deliverer of his country from the foreign foe. King Henry found himself in Paris virtually deposed by Henry of Guise, and would have been taken prisoner by the mob but for his hasty flight; and, in the meanwhile, Henry of Navarre was in the field. And still the wretched king abstained from the one step which would have saved his credit—that of openly joining Henry of Navarre and declaring the League to be rebels. Instead of doing this he summoned the States-General, which turned out to be wholly on the side of the League (September 1588), and Henry submitted to the whole of their demands. Having done so, he attempting to extricate himself from his difficulties by procuring the assassination of the Duke of Guise in the last days of the year, and executing his brother the Cardinal of Guise, so terminating what had been called the War of the Three Henries, since now there remained but two—the king himself and the heir-presumptive.

The murder of Orange and the death of Anjou seemed to Philip to have secured his triumph. Elizabeth still hung back; the Dutch were without any conspicuous chief, since Maurice of Nassau at seventeen could hardly inspire confidence. Parma captured one after another of the southern cities which adhered to the union—Ghent and Brussels, Termonde and Malines—and laid siege to Antwerp. In August 1585, the great city was forced to surrender after a stubborn siege, but was treated by the conqueror with a statesmanlike leniency.

But the course of events had proved too strong for Elizabeth. Philip, in his arrogance, imagined that she could be terrorized, and ordered the seizure of the Spanish coast. The reply was decisive. England joined in a league with the revolted provinces, and Drake, after five years of inaction, again took the seas. At last England and Spain were openly at war.

Drake with a squadron sailed in to the harbor of Vigo, wrecked what shipping was there to wreck, and then betook himself to the Spanish Main, where he put Caragena to ransom and San Domingo as well; after which he returned home with his ships full of Spanish booty. Still Elizabeth was half-hearted. She sent Leicester to the Low Countries with an army, and garrisoned some towns which were placed in her hands by way of security. But at the same time she

opened intrigues with Parma, probably with no more definite intention than to gain time. Leicester, a quite inefficient commander, was kept in a state of inaction.

But the declaration of war destroyed the plea on which Elizabeth had hitherto abstained from seeking the death of her prisoner, Mary Queen of Scots. She had been able to insure a sufficient degree of subservience to herself on the part of the Scottish nobles and young King James VI. by the threat of releasing or reinstating the imprisoned queen. But it was now too obvious that she could not possibly afford to release Mary, while her own life could not be considered safe as long as her rival was alive. The destruction of Mary was the work of Walsingham. She was placed under guardianship apparently greatly relaxed—actually more vigilant than ever. A plot was hatched which bears the name of Anthony Babington. The conspirators opened a correspondence with Mary; every letter which passed was read and copied, with or without emendations, by Walsingham's agents. When a sufficiently incriminating document was obtained, the conspirators were seized and brought to trial. Apart from the possibilities of forgery, the evidence produced was convincing; if the letters actually passed which were said to have passed, Mary was definitely privy to an assassination plot. Parliament clamored for her execution; Elizabeth signed the death-warrant, and by the prompt action of the Council Mary was beheaded before she had time to recall it.

Mary's death removed the only Roman Catholic candidate from the English throne claiming descent from an English king less remote than Edward III. Philip of Spain was audacious enough to claim the throne for himself, on the ground that all heretics were excluded, while he himself was of the English blood royal on account of his mother's descent from the eldest sister of Henry IV., and also because the unhappy Mary had chosen to name him her heir in her will. But this was a claim which many English Catholics, who had honestly regarded Mary as the legitimate Queen of England by right of birth, could by no means recognize.

Even at the time of Mary's death, when Elizabeth had just recalled Leicester from the Low Countries, Philip was engaged in preparing the Great Armada which was to subjugate England. But before three months had passed, Drake had carried another expedition to Cadiz, where he repeated on a much larger scale his performance at Vigo, burning the shipping, and carrying off or destroying all the accumulated stores; whereby the sailing of the Armada was postponed for a year. And still Elizabeth drove her ministers frantic by her persistence in negotiations with Parma; until at last they reached the point at which it appeared that Spain was to have all she wanted. Then Elizabeth explained that the fundamental surrender on her part was

only to take place after all the other conditions had been fulfilled. As it was obvious that this particular surrender was from the Spanish point of view a condition precedent of all the rest, the negotiations collapsed—as Elizabeth had undoubtedly intended them to do from the beginning.

Through the winter and spring of 1587-88 Philip continued the preparation of his great fleet. Through the spring and summer of 1588 the English fleet watched and waited.

In June the Spaniards came out of their ports. On 19th July they were sighted off the Scillies. The main English fleet from Plymouth worked out to sea that night and drew to windward of the course the Spaniards would take in sailing up the Channel; their destination was the Netherlands coast, where they were to take up Parma's army of veterans, and whence they were to proceed to the invasion of England. For a week as they sailed up Channel, a mass of great ships in close formation, the English harried their wings and tried in vain to bring them to an engagement under conditions which would give effect to the maneuvering powers of the English mariners; yet the Armada reached Calais ostensibly almost intact. On the night of 28th July the Spaniards were driven out of Calais Roads helter-skelter, with their cables cut, by the device of sending fireships among them. On the next morning they were scattered along the coast instead of being massed together. Any movement on Parma's part had been completely prevented by the Dutch ships. The English fell upon the scattered ships and pounded half of them to pieces; a gale rose before which the other half ran for the north, the English pursuing them half-way up the coast of England, and then giving up the chase for lack of ammunition, of which the Spanish supply had already been long exhausted. Never before had there been such a fight, for all fleet battles had habitually been fought on the principle of ship engaging ship at close quarters and boarding. For the first time the English fleet fought the Spaniards as single English ships had fought them before, by crippling them with cannon shot and destroying their power of resistance before coming to close quarters at all. Hence the expenditure of ammunition had been on a scale never before dreamed of.

The Spanish ships that escaped the English for the most part foundered or were wrecked on the north coast of Scotland or the west coast of Ireland; only a few crippled hulks struggled back to Corunna. The English struck a medal with the pious inscription, "The Lord blew and they were scattered." But it was the plain truth that the fleet which was scattered by the winds was a fleet which had first been beaten and shattered by English sailors. Throughout the whole engagement the English did not lose a ship, and the casualties were insignificant. The defeat of the Armada signaled a revolution in

naval warfare, the triumph of the sail-driven over the oar-driven ship, the triumph of gunnery, the triumph of maneuvering, the triumph of mobility over mass. It was the maritime equivalent of the triumph of the long-bow over the mail-clad column. And as the English had held the monopoly of the long-bow, so now the English and the Dutch for some time to come held the monopoly of effective gunnery, because they had the monopoly of that seamanship which used each vessel as itself an instrument instead of as a mere floating castle filled with soldiers; and their superiority remained long after the completeness of their monopoly had departed. From the day of the battle of Gravelines on July 29, 1588, the naval supremacy had definitely passed from the Mediterranean nations to the English and Dutch.

### III.—*The End of Spanish Ascendancy, 1588-1598*

Henry III., on the assassination of Henry of Guise, was under the mistaken belief that that act had secured his supremacy; in fact it only passed on the leadership of the League to the duke's brother Mayenne, without in any way diminishing its capacity for aggression, while markedly increasing its hostility to Henry himself. The king endeavored to cut the knot by definitely leaguizing himself with Henry of Navarre in April; but just three months later he was himself assassinated, his mother having died some months earlier.

The crown was at once claimed by Henry of Navarre, whose title under the recognized French law was indisputable. The League declared that the French monarchy was elective, and named Henry's uncle, the Cardinal of Bourbon, Charles X. Henry's claim was supported by the Huguenots and a section of the Catholics. In course of time he was to find it worth his while to conciliate another section of Catholics by announcing his conversion from the reformed religion, but to have done so at the moment of his legal accession would have very much weakened the zeal of his Huguenot supporters; he contented himself with declaring his intention of restoring but not extending all rights hitherto conceded to the Huguenots.

The defiance of the League was in no way diminished thereby. The fanatical Guises as before relied on the support of the still more fanatical King of Spain; and in default of a Roman Catholic prince eligible for the crown under the Salic law, it was proposed to set aside that law and to acknowledge as successor to "Charles X." Philip's daughter Isabella, whose mother, Philip's third wife, had been one of the Valois princesses. It was of immense advantage to Henry that he could appeal to patriotic sentiment against the League which proposed to place a foreign princess on the French throne; while the only alternative the League could offer was to nominate young Charles of

Guise, son of the murdered duke, in virtue of his descent from the House of Anjou.

The fight for the crown opened with campaigning in the north of France, Henry winning a brilliant victory against heavy odds at Ivry, early in 1590. He moved upon Paris; but Parma was turned aside from his work in the Netherlands to intervene in France. Henry was obliged to raise the siege of Paris, though Parma had no intention of being drawn into an actual engagement, and was far too skillful to allow his hand to be forced by his opponent.

Dissensions arose among the Catholics, since Mayenne was unwilling to admit any settlement under which he would be unable to exercise supreme power; while there were many of Henry's followers whom the king could not trust. Next year he renewed his activities, but was again foiled by the appearance of Parma on the stage, diverted once more from his main work in the Netherlands. Fortunately it was for the last time. Parma had to return to the Netherlands, and died at the end of the year.

It seemed, however, far from probable that Henry, while he remained a Huguenot, would be able by force of arms to compel the Catholics to accept him as king. In 1593 he made up his mind to take the decisive step. The crown of France was "worth a Mass;" peace for France was worth a Mass. Henry declared himself a Roman Catholic. The doing so involved no serious violation of conscience for a man who regarded the theological questions at issue as a matter of indifference. As a political stroke its effect was immense. If some of the Huguenots were disappointed, they were at any rate not alienated; some of them had actually encouraged the step. The great majority of Catholics who had scrupled to acknowledge a heretic king were prepared to accept a king who professed orthodoxy, even though he had been an avowed heretic, in preference to any foreigner. One after another the towns declared their adherence to Henry IV.; sundry Catholic nobles only waited to be assured of a sufficient reward for their change of front. Paris was won over; the spirit of opposition was conciliated by the complete absence of vindictiveness from the king's actions; and the young Duke of Guise himself came in.

The League and its principles were now finding their main support in Philip of Spain, who saw the prize of which he had dreamed slipping from his grasp. In 1595 war was definitely declared with Spain. Though the campaigning was not strikingly successful, Mayenne made his peace in 1596. In 1597, Philip, now an old man, assented to a truce which was transformed into a definitive treaty of peace at Ver-  
vins in 1598, a fortnight after the French king had issued the famous Edict of Nantes which remained for nearly ninety years the charter of Huguenot liberties.

The blow inflicted upon Spain by the destruction of the Armada

was a terrific one; but it was the first conspicuous symptom rather than the cause of the decay of Spanish power and of the maritime superiority of England. The English did not become supreme on the seas because they defeated the Spanish fleet; they defeated the Spanish fleet because they had already grasped, as the Spaniards had not, the fundamental principles that seamanship is the key to the mastery of the seas. The blow itself was not irreparable; during the remainder of his reign Philip fitted out three more Armadas. They all came to grief, partly because the elements always fought against Spain, partly because the Spanish ships were ill-found, and partly because the Spaniards were poor seamen; but in any case they would have come to grief because it was the simple fact, thoroughly established, that against any odds not greater than three to one the victory of English ships was a foregone conclusion. But Philip never understood that he was beaten; he diminished nothing of his grandiose scheme; he never doubted that he would crush the Netherlands and crush England; he hardly doubted that he would turn France into a Spanish province controlled in his interests by the Guises.

Fortunately for Philip, neither Elizabeth nor Burleigh in England wished to annihilate the power of Spain, which Walsingham, Drake, and Raleigh would have done if they could have had their way. Elizabeth and Cecil wished to humble Spain, to bring her on her knees, but to preserve her as a counterpoise to France. They wanted the United Provinces to be successful, but only barely successful. They wanted the Huguenots in France to be successful, but only barely successful. To the great majority of Englishmen a continuation of the war with Spain was desired, not as a project of empire, but as a short cut to be won by the raiding of Spanish treasure ships; a view which was conveniently adapted to the political aims of the queen, while in the view of those who may be called Imperialists such operations were regarded as merely subsidiary.

Hence, during the ten years which followed the Armada, the maritime war went on, but fleet operations were directed almost entirely to the interception of treasure fleets. English volunteers were allowed to serve with Henry of Navarre, and did yeoman service at Ivry and elsewhere. They were both allowed to serve also in Holland. But both in Holland and in France the English official support of England's allies was extremely meager. Occasionally the pressure of the Imperialists forced the queen into an ostensible adoption of their policy; in 1589 Drake was allowed to attack Lisbon on behalf of the Portuguese pretender, Don Antonio. In 1596 an English fleet was allowed to capture and sack Cadiz. But in the former case, Drake's operations were made ineffective by the way in which the Government tied the admiral's hands; and, again by the action of the Government, the Cadiz expedition was reduced in its effects to a highly successful raid

and nothing more. Spain was deprived of none of her possessions, and her fleets slowly improved; so that when Drake and Hawkins were allowed to sail on that last voyage against the Spaniards in the West Indies, from which neither of them returned, they found the Spanish fleets in such force that they could accomplish nothing of importance. In 1598 the power which had once threatened to bring all Europe under the baleful shadow of its dominion had ceased to be a serious menace to the world, but had not ceased at least to present the appearance of formidable might.

Nevertheless, the maritime dominion of Spain had passed away, and the doom of her dominion over the Protestant Netherlands was already sealed, while her aspirations for her own ascendancy in France were shattered.

Had the Armada been successful, the crushing of the Dutch resistance, even if it had involved the extirpation of the Dutch population, would have followed inevitably. Spanish fleets would have sailed up the Channel, providing Parma with unlimited men and material. But communication by sea between Spain and the Netherlands had long been too precarious to be of much value, and the destruction of the Armada only emphasized the fact. Still it was by no means impossible to convey by land to the Netherlands the men and munitions which would have enabled such a captain as Parma to establish a complete military ascendancy. But Parma was paralyzed by Philip himself, whose jealousy and mistrust kept the great soldier always insufficiently supplied with money, and upset his diplomacy. Even hampered as he was, Parma's arms were irresistible; but his very successes were counteracted by the orders which at critical moments in 1590 and 1592 forced him to suspend his operations and to intervene in France, not decisively, but just sufficiently to postpone the decisive victory of Henry IV.

In fact, Philip's sole hope in the Netherlands, though he was incapable of realizing the truth, lay in Parma. Even before Parma's death at the end of 1592, Maurice of Nassau was re-forming the Dutch army and developing new scientific methods of warfare, multiplying musketeers and sappers and imposing strict discipline, which quite changed the relative values of the opposing forces. When Parma was gone, the Spaniards had no general left who was a match for Maurice. Town after town was reduced. It was in vain for Philip to nominate first one and then another of his cousins, the Austrian archdukes, as governors of the Netherlands. Dutch ships were following the English example and acting with the English fleets, while year by year the area under the control of the Government of the United Provinces was increasing. The old desperate struggle for life was becoming a confident struggle for assured freedom. Nothing short of complete independence would now have satisfied the

Hollanders; when Philip made his peace with Henry IV. at Vervins in 1598, they refused to come into the treaty, although Henry in his own interests extorted from Philip a resignation of the sovereignty of the Netherlands in favor of his daughter Isabella and her husband Archduke Albert. The resignation ultimately came to nothing, since the marriage was without offspring, and the sovereignty reverted to the Spanish crown; but after 1598 the United Provinces were never again seriously in danger of being reunited with Spain.

#### *IV.—India*

Except the Spaniards and Portuguese, no one had as yet planted colonies. Attempts had been made by French Huguenots within what the Spaniards regarded as their zone, but nothing had come of them. Raleigh had sent a series of expeditions to give effect to his dream of founding a new England in America; but on each occasion the company left behind there had either been wiped out or else its survivors came home at the first opportunity.

The Portuguese in the East occupied a number of positions on the Persian Gulf, on the coast of India and Farther India, and in the southern Archipelago; but all were primarily naval and mercantile stations. Portugal had neither the will nor the population for the acquisition of territory; what she sought and for a time held was the control of the waterways, the monopoly of oceanic commerce with the East. Nor did Philip's usurpation of the Portuguese crown alter the position. Central and South America provided a sufficient field for the surplus population of Spain, and in the face of her military problems in Europe she had no temptation to attempt the setting up of a territorial dominion in the East.

The Portuguese monopoly, however, was on the verge of disappearing. On December 31, 1600, the English East India Company was granted a charter; four years later a Dutch East India Company was created. With the appearance of English and Dutch in Indian waters, the beginning of a competition for the Eastern trade, the West was brought into touch with the East after a new fashion, though it was not till the eighteenth century was well advanced that the establishment of a European dominion on Asiatic soil came within the range of practical politics.

One reason why this was the case lay in the change which was wrought in the Indian peninsula during the sixteenth century. When Albuquerque found the Portuguese Empire in the Indian Ocean, India was a mere congeries of kingdoms whose boundaries changed with every decade and whose dynasties rarely lasted for many generations—always with the exception of sundry Rajput principalities in the northwestern quarter of India, whose princes traced their descent back

to an antiquity more remote than any noble house in Europe. By a curious irony, in the greater part of Northern India, loosely called Hindustan, the ruling dynasties outside of Rajputana were in almost all cases Mohammedan, of Afghan or Turkish descent, sustained by a like Mohammedan nobility and soldiery; but in Southern India there were great Hindu kingdoms as well as great Mohammedan kingdoms.

Native Powers would not indeed have collapsed before a European attack as Mexico and Peru collapsed before the Spaniard; there was no such overwhelming difference of armament between Asiatics and Europeans as between Americans and Europeans. But at the beginning of the sixteenth century the annexation of a very substantial territorial dominion on the Indian continent would have offered no insuperable obstacle to an energetic invader.

The invader came, but not from Europe. A chief whose fathers had in Samarkand, descended on his father's side from Timur or Tamerlane the Turk, and through his mother from the Mughal or Mongol stock of Genghis Khan, laid the foundations of the Mughal or Mogul Empire. Babar was ousted from his own territories while a child, survived a breathlessly adventurous boyhood, and after many ups and downs of fortune, found himself at five-and-twenty king of Kabul, at about the time when Henry VIII., his junior by a few years, was on the point of succeeding to the throne of England. At this time the Lodi dynasty at Delhi was extending its sway, and its king claimed to be lord over the Punjab and the Upper Ganges. But presently his viceroy in the Punjab revolted and rashly called upon the King of Kabul for aid, in 1524. Babar came, but in the spirit of an adventurous conqueror. With an army consisting of some 12,000 Turks and Afghans, he flung himself against the Delhi Emperor, and in spite of odds of at least ten to one, shattered his forces on the historic field of Pantipat. All over Hindustan, Mussulman governors or Ratput princes rose to resist the irresistible conqueror, whose soldiers were ready to follow him through fire and water. He performed exploits as astonishing as Poitiers or Agincourt. In six years he was master of practically all Hindustan from the Punjab to the mouth of the Ganges.

Then before he was fifty he died. But he had not organized his empire; and his son Humayun was ejected and driven back to Kabul by a particularly brilliant soldier and statesman, Sher Shah, who made himself master of the provinces of the Lower Ganges. But Sher Shah did not live to do more than make the beginnings of organizing the empire which Babar had created. His successors lacked his abilities, and presently Humayun brought down from Afghanistan new armies to recover his father's conquest. Humayun was killed by an accident. By his extremely able and loyal follower and minister, Bairam, promptly proclaimed the thirteen-year-old prince Akbar his successor,

won a decisive victory, again on the field of Panipat, and proceeded to establish his supremacy over the greater part of what Babar had won.

Akbar became Lord of Delhi two years before the accession of Queen Elizabeth in England. She was just ten years his senior, and he outlived her by three years. During that half century it is hardly an exaggeration to say that he came near to creating an Indian nation. Certainly he came nearer to unifying an empire extending over the whole of Northern India than any one before or since. A very unorthodox Mohammedan, he entirely discarded the practice of distinguishing between Mohammedan and Hindu subjects, who were advanced to political or military posts according to their merits. The completeness of his toleration found no counterpart among the Christian rulers of Europe; he welcomed learned men of every creed to his court. Hindu princes enjoyed his confidence as readily as Mohammedan captains. He encouraged intermarriage, and discouraged all fanatical demonstrations and all practices which tended to emphasize an antagonism between the Hindu and the Moslem. He was ready to hail the defeated foe as one willing to be a loyal friend. And though his policy is by no means commended by the rigidly orthodox Mohammedan historians, who look upon him as something of a heretic, and though there were plenty of Mohammedans who resented the favor shown to Hindus, it went a long way toward reconciling to Mohammedan supremacy the greater majority of his subjects who were actually of the Hindu religion.

Conquest and military prestige were essential to the maintenance of any dynasty in the Indian peninsula, and Akbar was a successful warrior, whose personal skill in arms and almost reckless courage commanded universal admiration. But his conquests were made for the purpose of consolidation and security, not of wanton aggression. His primary aim was not the extension of the Empire, but the establishment of a sound and just government. The principles adopted by his great finance minister, the Hindu Todar Mal, are said to have been based on those of Sher Shah. The revenue was drawn mainly from a land tax based on careful and equitable assessment. The Empire was divided into provinces under governors who could be trusted; but these were not of such dimensions that an ambitious satrap could readily use his position for rebellion. Under Akbar, the governors stood to the Emperor rather as a medieval English earl or sheriff stood to the king, than as a Duke of Normandy or Aquitaine stood to the King of France. When Akbar died he left the Mughal dynasty completely established over an empire which covered more than the northern half of India—an empire which, to foreign observers, appeared surpassingly wealthy and irresistibly powerful. Nor was there any apparent decline in its power till Akbar had been dead for a hundred years.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### BEFORE THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

#### *I.—The European Position*

PHILIP II. was one of the huge failures of history, though he never suspected the fact himself. He began his reign as the lord of a mighty dominion—Spain, the Netherlands, the Sicilies, and the New World; while the Emperor was his father's brother. There was one way in which those dominions might have been governed successfully—by the recognition of their heterogeneity, of the need of applying a different system to each, adapted to its traditions or special characteristics. The task would have been difficult but not impossible. But Philip aimed at establishing a uniform system of arbitrary rule exercised by the Crown through governors who were to take from Madrid orders issued according to the monarch's preconceived ideas. There never lived a monarch who devoted himself more laboriously to the control of the government of his dominions in every detail. A great ruler requires to possess a clear vision of his aims, indomitable resolution in pursuing them, infinite patience, a mind which can grasp multitudinous details, invincible self-confidence. All these qualities Philip possessed in a high degree. But his self-confidence was misplaced, because he was wholly without understanding of human nature, and consequently aimed at the impossible; he was incapable of trusting any one, and therefore misused the abilities of the men whom he chose to serve him; he mis-estimated the power which he controlled and the forces that were opposed to him, and his false estimates were his ruin. He was perpetually preparing the crushing blows which were to be delivered in his own good time, with a persistent disregard of the fact that his enemies were active enough and strong enough to strike hard first, so that when his own blow fell it was ineffective. There is no surer source of victory than the self-confidence which has taken accurately the measure of the strength upon which it relies; but the self-confidence of Philip was the *Hubris*, the Titanic arrogance, which an inevitable Nemesis awaits.

His death placed on the throne of Spain Philip III., a prince who lacked even those qualities which entitled the father to some degree of respect. In Philip II. there was a certain power; in Philip III. there

was none; but there was a sufficient degree of force and dignity in the Spanish character for the Spanish people to maintain a show of power—a semblance which Elizabeth's successor on the throne of England mistook for a stern reality. Elizabeth died in 1603, less than five years after the antagonist whom she had defeated. During those years the air had been thick with plots and counter-plots for the disposal of the succession to the crown; till she was on her deathbed, the queen entirely refused to recognize any one of the various claimants to the throne as her heir. As a matter of legitimate succession there was no sort of question as to the title of King James VI. of Scotland, the son of Mary Stewart, and great-grandson of Margaret Tudor. But Elizabeth herself had ascended the throne in virtue of the will of Henry VIII.; and if that will had been followed, her successor would have been the Countess of Hertford, sister of Lady Jane Grey, or her son Lord Beauchamp. It was possible to make a claim on behalf of James's cousin, Arabella Stewart, who was descended from Margaret Tudor by a later marriage. Catholics inclined to the Infanta Isabella, whose candidature was made possible by the independent sovereignty of the Netherlands; it was conceivable that her accession might permanently unite England with the whole of the Netherlands on the basis of a toleration like that which was established in France. But when the moment came, the crown was secured for King James without any effective opposition. The kingdoms of England and Scotland were united, though not as yet incorporated in one State; united not by conquest, but by the accession of the King of Scotland to the throne of England, the one condition upon which the acquiescence of the northern kingdom was obtainable. England, when involved in foreign complications, could no longer be threatened with invasions from the north. But the Stewart succession was to bring with it troubles of its own, since Stewart conceptions of the royal authority were fundamentally different from the English conceptions. And an antagonism was initiated between the Crown and Parliament which paralyzed the country for effective intervention in European affairs, though not for ineffective interference, for half a century.

For France a new era was opened by the final establishment of Henry IV. upon the throne. The Government remained officially Catholic, but the Edict of Nantes secured religious and political liberty to the Huguenots, who tended to become a political party united by a common religious profession rather than a religious body banded together to defend liberty of conscience. The antagonism between Huguenots and Catholics was only in part actuated by the religious motive, the struggle between Protestantism and Roman orthodoxy. But it was not only for this reason that the triumph of Henry IV. was of fundamental importance. The supremacy of the Crown, won by Louis XI., had been broken down in the long struggle of the wars

of religion; the supremacy of the Crown was the immediate condition of the preservation of public order; and Henry IV. restored it in a fashion which, in the hands of his son's great minister, Richelieu, and his successor, Mazarin, developed it into the most complete absolutism that Europe has known, when it was wielded by Louis XIV. Incidentally, Henry's Government gave an unprecedented attention to the material prosperity of the population.

The struggle of the United Provinces for independence was already virtually decided in their favor, though it was prolonged for some years. Practically, though not technically, Dutch independence was recognized by the twelve years' truce of 1609, though formal recognition by treaty was deferred for another forty years. Even by the time that the seventeenth century opened, the United Provinces were acting as a sovereign State, and were definitely taking rank as a maritime Power, having already absorbed the greater part of the trade of the Netherlands central provinces, where the cities and the country had been ruined and devastated by the interminable war.

In Denmark and Sweden Protestantism was securely established. Something of what Gustavus Vasa had wrought for Sweden was undone during the reign of the two sons who followed him in succession, Eric and John. John's wife was a Jagellon of the Polish house which became extinct in the male line in 1572, when Poland declared itself a purely elective monarchy, and chose Henry of Anjou for its first king under the new régime. Henry deserted his Polish kingdom to return to France as Henry III. in 1574, and the Poles elected Stephen Bathori of Transylvania, Hungary being at this time practically divided into three portions—one under Turkish dominion, one still attached to Austria, while Transylvania was virtually independent. On Stephen's death, Sigismund, the son of King John of Sweden, was elected King of Poland. He was an ardent Catholic, and restored Catholic supremacy in Poland, which had at first promised to give toleration to both religions. When Sigismund succeeded his father on the Swedish throne, he endeavored to carry out the same Catholic policy in Sweden, with the result that he was deposed by his uncle, Charles IX.—the third of the sons of Gustavus Vasa who wore the Swedish crown. Charles recovered the royal authority which had been seriously weakened since his father's death, but left his son, the great Gustavus Adolphus, the heritage of a disputed succession, to which Sigismund of Poland persisted in maintaining his claim.

Russia had not yet entered into the circle of the recognized civilized nations of Europe. But for a century she had been free from the Mongol dominion; the kingdom of Moscow or Muscovy had grown in power under Ivan III. the Great, and Ivan IV. the Terrible. In the reign of Ivan IV., an English expedition in search of a northeast passage to the Indies had found its way to the White Sea, and plumed

itself upon the "discovery of Muscovy," though it was only to a very limited extent that communication was as yet opened between Russia and the West. The Tsar, Ivan IV., established a dominion which extended as far as the Caspian Sea, but his efforts to reach the Baltic were foiled by Poland and Sweden, which still shared with Denmark the control of the northern inland sea, where the Hansa had lost its power.

In the southeast of Europe the great era of the Ottoman advance had come to an end with the death of Suleiman the Magnificent. Oriental dynasties rarely provide a long succession of able princes; the successors of Suleiman never reproduced the capacity shown by the earlier Sultans of the line. But Western Europe failed to seize the opportunity which it had won by the great naval victory of Lepanto in 1571; the Ottoman advance was stayed, but that was all. What remained to Venice in the Eastern Mediterranean was soon afterwards lost and the Knights of St. John, who, after the fall of Rhodes, had been established in Malta, were again the outpost of the Christian Powers. The Ottoman menace was not finally quelled till more than another century had passed.

Since the death of Charles V. the battle of the religions had been fought in the West, in the form of civil wars in France, and of the struggle between Philip of Spain on one side, and on the other Protestant England and the Protestant states of the Netherlands. In Spain and in Italy there was no contest; Catholicism was supreme without dispute. The original energy of the revolt against Rome had a moral rather than a dogmatic provocation; and the moral appeal lost its effectiveness when the Church of Rome reformed herself. Whatever the faults of the Popes may have been—and a persecuting bigotry was certainly common to them—the whole series from Paul IV. onwards had set their faces against the old abuses which had lowered the Papacy in the eyes of the world. Rome, by the Council of Trent, defined her position and pronounced against toleration, maintaining her claim to compel the world to return to the fold by all means at her disposal, including such methods as the Paris massacre and the incitement of subjects to rebellion against heretic rulers. But she had no monopoly of intolerance, though Protestants were less ready to employ the torture chamber and the stake; and her missionaries were no less ready than the most zealous of Protestants to face and to welcome martyrdom.

But while Philip of Spain and the Guises were eager to champion Catholicism in its most reactionary and most aggressive form, the struggle in Germany had been suspended since the peace of Augsburg. The states of the Empire had each of them gone on its way on the principle *Cujus regio ejus religio*. Protestantism had extended wherever Catholic princes followed the example of toleration set by

the Emperors Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II. The number of the Protestant princes had increased, and the process of secularizing Church lands continued, although it was at least doubtful whether the doing so was warranted by the peace of Augsburg. That peace had definitely secured for the Catholics the principle that any ecclesiastical prince who declared himself a Protestant abdicated *ipso facto*. But it had left it possible for Protestants to claim that, when such principalities became vacant, the chapter of the diocese was at liberty to elect a Protestant bishop whose appointment was valid. By this means, sundry bishoprics passed into the hands of Protestant princes, who were bishops only in name.

But if Protestantism was thus extended, it was at the same time weakened by division, owing to the progress of Calvinism rather than Lutheranism, more particularly among the Protestants in Southern Germany. Northern Germany, mainly Lutheran from an early stage, did not feel the pressure of the Catholic states as it was felt by the small Protestant states of the south, which were wedged in among and surrounded by states preponderantly Catholic, so that the pressure of antagonism tended to produce among the form of Protestantism most hostile to Rome, which was Calvinism. But Lutheranism, not Calvinism, was alone recognized by the peace of Augsburg; and Calvinists and Lutherans repudiated each other only a fraction less energetically than each repudiated Rome. If Calvinism, therefore, should again become aggressive, it would not be faced by Protestantism with a united front. And in the last years of the sixteenth century two princes, Maximilian of Bavaria and the Hapsburg Ferdinand of Styria, succeeded to their dominions, who were both bent upon an aggressively Catholic policy.

Philip III. on his accession suffered from his father's illusion that the might of Spain was undiminished, and also from an illusion to which his father was never subject—that laborious effort might be neglected. The naval war with England, and the contest in the Netherlands, had both assumed a desultory character, but no advantage accrued to Philip from ill-organized attempts at showy demonstrations in either field of contest. In 1604, the year after the accession of James I. of England, peace was made between the two countries, followed five years later by the truce which in effect recognized the independence of the United Provinces, whose boundaries corresponded to the modern Holland. The modern Belgium and Luxemburg continued to be the Spanish Netherlands, while Franche-Comté also remained attached to Spain, from which these provinces had only been nominally separated under the scheme of independent sovereignty for Philip's sister Isabella. Hapsburg, but not Spanish, estates extended almost continuously through Swabia from Franche-Comté to the Tyrol; but Venetia and the Valtelline lay between the Spanish posses-

sion of Milan and these Hapsburg territories; while the southern kingdom of Naples was completely separated from North Italy by the Papal states.

The weakness of Spain lay to a great extent in the defectiveness of the territorial continuity of the Hapsburg dominions on the east of France. Her fleets secured the communications with Italy, but not with the Netherlands. The duchy of Savoy, which included Piedmont, an independent principality, commanded the western passage between the Milanese and Franche-Comté. On the east of Switzerland there was no security of entry to the Hapsburg territories; while between Franche-Comté itself and Luxemburg, Lorraine intervened. Hence the difficulties to which Spain was always exposed when France attacked the territories which lay on her borders. Hence, also, the comparative indifference with which England viewed her retention of the southern Netherlands, an indifference which disappeared when their acquisition by France was threatened. In the military point of view, the Netherlands were to Spain a weakness—a vulnerable point easily attacked; in the possession of France they could be turned into a formidable base for her aggressive activities. The recognition of this fact may be discerned as a guiding principle of intelligent English statesmanship from the days of Elizabeth onwards, until the peace of Utrecht transferred the Spanish Netherlands to the Austrian Hapsburg; after which the connection between Austria and the Netherlands was of the same character as that between Spain and the Netherlands, and could be treated with the same indifference, as involving no menace to Britain, even when Austria and British interests were opposed.

It is this which explains the tortuous policy pursued by Elizabeth in relation to the whole Netherlands problem. Her principal anxiety, though she did not allow it to appear, was to prevent a French ascendancy in the Netherlands from taking the place of the Spanish ascendancy, although what her people wanted was the liberation of a Protestant people from the grip of Spain.

## *II.—The Coming of the War, 1598-1618*

Although Henry IV. chose for political reasons to profess adherence to the Roman Church, and although he was not troubled by any intensity of religious conviction, his sympathies were Protestant rather than Catholic, and his creed was that of toleration. The great champion of aggressive intolerance was removed by the death of Philip II.; ostensibly the European position at the moment pointed to the establishment in every State, large or small, of the particular form of religion favored by the particular Government, Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, or Anglican, accompanied in some cases but not in all by

a limited toleration of other forms of religion. It was certain that Spain had not the power, single-handed, to impose an intolerant Catholic ascendancy upon Europe. And as yet no other power had arisen to combine and to lead Catholic aggression.

Henry, therefore, was able to devote himself energetically to the reorganization of France, disintegrated by a prolonged era of civil strife. The financial administration was entrusted to the incorruptible Huguenot, Sully, who so reorganized not its principles but its methods that debts were paid off, taxation was reduced, arrears were remitted, the treasury was filled, and expenditure was enormously reduced, while efficiency was increased.

The modern economic doctrine formulated by Adam Smith treats national wealth as the basis of national power, making the production of the maximum amount of wealth the aim of applied political economy. The earlier doctrine recognized particular sources of national strength in the possession of particular forms of wealth which it was accounted necessary that the State should produce for itself or of which it must acquire an immense reserve. Every State, therefore, aimed at making itself, so far as possible, independent of foreign supplies, and also at accumulating the largest possible amount of "treasure," the precious metals. Agriculture, food production, held the first place, the more because the development of the agricultural population also provided the material of armies. In England there was a corresponding necessity for developing the industry which provided fleets and sailors to man them—hence her Navigation Acts. In every country the Government wanted to accumulate bullion, and therefore encouraged exports to countries where they were exchanged for gold and silver, and discouraged the imports, which were paid for not in goods but in bullion. Government exacted tolls upon imports partly for the sake of the immediate revenue so obtained, partly to prevent competition with the home products, and from the protection of the necessary industries the protection of other industries followed as a matter of course.

These were principles which were never called in question by financial reformers; their efforts were devoted to improvements in the machinery for assessing and collecting taxes, so that the least possible percentage might be diverted from the State treasury; and this was the great work which was accomplished for France during Sully's régime. It was the acuteness of Henry himself more than of his minister which sought also to foster other industries not obviously profitable from the point of view of national strength. Nothing was done to check the most fatal defect in the whole French system—the exemptions from taxation enjoyed by the nobles and the clergy, which threw the whole burden upon the classes which could least endure it. But the burden itself was greatly diminished by the improved organi-

zation. And to this was due in no small measure the comparative success with which France endured the strain of the wars which were to come.

While Sully was reforming the financial administration, Henry was engaged in withdrawing control of the government from the nobles by the old expedient of English kings—intrusting administrative functions not to members of the *noblesse* but to professional lawyers and men of business, directly dependent upon the royal favor. In England the direct royal control of the administration had not produced arbitrary government because Parliament, having the power of the purse, could never be ignored; and Parliament had been created because the barons and the Crown alternately found in the commons support in checking the extravagant claims of the other. But in France neither king nor nobles had ever taken the commons into partnership; the nobles, ousted from the administration, had no other means of controlling it than the appeals to arms; when that failed them the king became an absolute despot. The appeal to arms had not yet ceased to be a possibility in France—absolutism was not finally established; but under a king so strong as Henry IV. the contest between the nobles and the Crown ended in strengthening the king's hands.

In 1610 Henry fell by the dagger of an assassin. He had made himself master of France; what he had done made it possible for Richelieu and Mazarin, in the course of the next fifty years, to secure to his grandson a mastery still more complete. He had not yet made France the dominant Power in Europe; but he had organized his kingdom, and indicated a European policy on lines which, followed up by Richelieu and Mazarin, had already made her the dominant Power in Europe; but he had organized his kingdom, and indicated a European policy on lines which, followed up by Richelieu and Mazarin, had already made her the dominant Power when Louis XIV. assumed the reins of government in 1600. Henry had grasped the fundamental fact of the European situation—that the Hapsburg and papal forces were about to unite, and that the interest of France lay in uniting Protestant Europe to resist the union; because for France its victory over Protestant Europe would mean her own isolation in the face of an overwhelming Hapsburg power, infinitely more formidable than that which had been wielded by Charles V. It was precisely at the moment when he had formed a league which, by striking at once, would have destroyed all possibility of an effective Hapsburg combination, that Henry was struck down by the dagger of the fanatic Ravallac. The blow he had designed was not struck. France passed under the control of a regency which had neither the will nor the intelligence to carry out Henry's policy. Protestantism remained divided and without a leader, and Protestant Germany paid the penalty in the

Thirty Years' War. For Germany was to be the field of the new war of religion.

The antagonisms between Lutherans and Calvinists and between Protestants and Catholics increased in bitterness. The interpretation of the treaty of Augsburg allowed of the most contradictory opinions as to the position of Protestant bishops and the representatives of cities which had become Protestant since the treaty, apart from the question of the legality of secularizations in the Protestant states subsequent to that date. The Imperial Chamber, which was the supreme judicial court of the Empire, had a Catholic majority, and, whenever opportunity offered, its pronouncements affirmed the Catholic view of the law. Yet Lutherans and Calvinists did not draw together, partly because the Lutherans remained blind to the Catholic menace which was so much more obvious to the Calvinists. And in the meanwhile Maximilian of Bavaria and Ferdinand of Styria, in the exercise of their legal rights, were in their own territories stamping out the Protestantism which had there been permitted a comparatively freedom under their predecessors.

Of the seven Electors, the three archbishops were of necessity Catholics, as was effectively proved when the Elector of Cologne declared himself Calvinist, and was thereupon compelled to resign in accordance with the terms of the Augsburg treaty. Of the lay princes the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were at this time Lutherans, while the Elector Palatine was a Calvinist. The kingdom of Bohemia was actually attached to Austria, and its king was the Emperor Rudolph. Bohemia itself was predominantly Protestant, and defied Rudolph's efforts to force Catholicism upon it. The nobles extorted from him the charter known as the Letter of Majesty, which secured partial toleration throughout Bohemia and complete toleration on the Crown estates. Bohemia provided the most vivid illustration of one of the defects of the Augsburg treaty. It had taken account of the opinions of princes, but not of subjects; and as the principal chambers of the Imperial Diet shared between them all the real power possessed by that assembly, it was more than possible for a minority of the rulers to feel conscious that the majority of the populations were with them and would support resistance, passively if not actively, to the decisions of the majority. Consequently there was an ever-growing tendency, especially among Calvinists, to adopt a tone and an attitude hostile to the Imperial constitution and to the Imperial claims in particular, from the time when the Hapsburgs began to depart from the tolerant attitude of Maximilian II.

Politically the moving spirit among the Calvinists was Christian of Anhalt, the minister of the Elector Palatine. In 1608, Christian organized a Protestant Union, ostensibly to maintain the rights of Protestants against Catholic aggression. As an immediate conse-

quence, Maximilian of Bavaria organized a Catholic League, ostensibly for self-defense against Protestant aggression; but obviously what each party meant by self-defense was by the other party regarded as aggression. The northern Lutherans, headed after 1612 by the Elector John George of Saxony, saw no particular need for self-defense, and were equally opposed to Catholic and to Calvinistic aggression. John George was always the advocate of compromises which were never accepted, with the result that Saxony remained obstinately neutral.

James I. of England had a private device of his own for keeping the peace. He married his daughter Elizabeth to the young Calvinistic Elector Palatine or Palsgrave Frederick in 1613, while he sought to negotiate a marriage between his son and heir and a Spanish Infanta. He lived perpetually under the illusion that the Spanish court, matrimonially allied to England, would forego its hostility to Protestantism and exert its influence in Germany on the side of toleration; whereas the Spanish court regarded the projected match merely as a means which it might be worth while to adopt for recovering Catholic ascendancy in England. The counsels of James and of John George were ignored by every one else for the simple reason that neither of them was prepared to intervene effectively in arms.

For many years after the death of Henry IV. France ceased to count. Henry's son, Louis XIII., was only in his ninth year; by the energetic action of the leader of the Catholic nobles, the regency was conferred upon the queen-mother Mary de Medici, who belonged to the branch of the Medici family then established as Grand Dukes of Tuscany. The government was immediately dominated by the Catholic faction; Henry's anti-Hapsburg policy was dropped; and it was not till Louis had reached full manhood and bestowed his discerning confidence upon Cardinal Richelieu, that the central government recovered its vigor.

In Germany, then, there were all the materials for a conflagration, but a general unwillingness to kindle it. Christian of Anhalt, having an immense confidence in his own diplomatic skill, trusted to achieve his ends by diplomacy, not by war. Maximilian of Bavaria, champion of the Catholic interpretation of the peace of Augsburg, hoped to achieve his ends by organizing for war without having actual recourse to it. The most inflammable spot was Bohemia; and it was in Bohemia that the fire was actually kindled.

The Emperor Rudolph, in the intervals of diversion from the pursuit of alchemy and astrology, endeavored very unsuccessfully to impose his will upon his kingdoms of Bohemia and of Hungary and his dominions in Austria and the Tyrol. It may be here explained that, on the death of the Emperor Ferdinand I., Austria and the Bohemian and Hungarian kingdoms had gone to his son and successors Maximilian, the Tyrol to his second son Ferdinand, and Styria with Carin-

thia and Carniola to his third son Charles. His daughter Anne married the then reigning Duke of Bavaria, wherefrom there arose an immediate connection between the House of Bavaria and the Hapsburgs, and, in the eighteenth century, a Bavarian claim to the Austrian succession. The Emperor Maximilian II. did not further subdivide his share, the Austrian inheritance, among his numerous sons, the archdukes. The whole went to Rudolph, and to it was added the Tyrol on the death of Rudolph's uncle Ferdinand. Neither Rudolph nor any of his brothers had children. His proximate heir was his brother Matthias, but the presumption was that the succession would ultimately pass to Ferdinand, the son of Charles of Styria.

Rudolph's mismanagement drove his brothers practically to insist first upon the transfer of a part of his dominions to Matthias. On Rudolph's death in 1612 Matthias was recognized in so much of Hungary as had not broken away from the Hapsburg dominion, in Bohemia, and in Austria and the Tyrol. Matthias, with the assent of the rest of the archdukes, resolved to recognize Ferdinand of Styria as his heir. Since Ferdinand had been active in enforcing Catholicism throughout his own dominions, the Protestants, especially in Bohemia, who had successfully resisted similar attempts on the part of Rudolph, viewed the idea of his succession with extreme disfavor. The Bohemians claimed that their monarchy was not hereditary, but elective; nevertheless, in 1617, the Bohemian Diet was persuaded or overawed into recognizing Ferdinand as heir to the throne by hereditary right. The actual administration of Bohemia was immediately placed in the hands of a rigorously Catholic regency, headed by the two ministers Slawata and Martinitz.

The Protestant leaders among the Bohemian nobility felt that they had been tricked, and were determined to stand by their doctrine that the Bohemian crown was elective. Early in 1618 a meeting of the Protestant Estates drew up a petition, which was sent to Matthias protesting against what had been done. The reply was uncompromising. Feeling ran high. Count Thurn, the hottest leader of the party of resistance, at the head of an armed band, seized the two obnoxious regents, charged them with responsibility for the Emperor's reply, and then flung the two of them and their secretary out of the window, which was some seventy feet from the ground. By what seemed a miracle, all three actually escaped with their lives. The "defenestration," a monstrous act of outrageous lawlessness, rang up the curtain on the great tragedy of the 'Thirty Years' War.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE ERA OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

#### *I.—Bohemia and the Palatinate, 1618-1625*

At the outset, the war was simply a revolt in Bohemia for the prevention of Ferdinand's accession. The Bohemians had not even fixed definitely upon an alternative king. The government was for the moment vested in a Council of thirty, called the Directors. Ferdinand, acting in the name of Matthias, who was indubitably the lawful sovereign, dispatched a force from Austria to the Bohemian frontier. The Bohemian Diet voted the money and troops should be raised, but dispersed before authorizing specific taxes, so that the Directors were left to do the best they could. Christian of Anhalt intended the Protestant Union to support the revolt, but the Lutheran members were at best half-hearted, and the Elector of Brandenburg, who had become Calvinist instead of Lutheran, was incapable of resolute action. All that the Union immediately did was to provide, in conjunction with the Duke of Savoy, a force of 2,000 men, under the adventurer, Count Mansfeld, to aid the Bohemians. On the other hand, Ferdinand II. was without allies, though help was promised from Spain. The Duke of Bavaria was biding his time. Consequently, when the year 1618 was drawing to a close, the prospects of the Bohemians appeared to be the better, though the population of Southern Bohemia was already suffering cruelly from the ravages both of the Imperialist troops and of Mansfeld's mercenaries.

A scheme was now on foot, fostered by Christian, for giving the Bohemian crown to the young Elector Palatine Frederick. The plan was not calculated to excite the enthusiasm of German Protestantism, especially that of John George of Saxony, who had no sort of desire to see the Elector Palatine endowed with a double vote in the College of Electors, apart from Lutheran jealousy of a Calvinist prince. Frederick, beguiled by Christian, was as yet only dallying with the idea and dallying also with a plan for joint mediation between Ferdinand and the Bohemians, in association with the Lutheran Elector of Saxony, the Catholic Elector of Mainz, and the Catholic Maximilian of Bavaria. And at the same time Savoy was being tempted by the suggestion that he should succeed Matthias as Emperor. In this latter

secret intrigue the principal question was as to the precise share of the Austrian spoils to be appropriated by Savoy and by Frederick respectively. If Christian of Anhalt and other leaders had made it plain that they were moved by the single determination of defending the cause of Protestantism against Catholic aggression, Protestants might have become united; but what they did make plain was that they were thinking of the territorial aggrandisement of particular princes and the humiliation of the Hapsburgs—projects which were not at all attractive to the rest of the princes, or to external Powers. In fact King James of England gave his son-in-law very clearly to understand that he would have nothing to do with helping him to the Bohemian crown.

In the early months of 1619, Frederick had not yet taken the fatal decision. Matthias died in March; Ferdinand was now obviously the leading candidate for the Imperial crown. He sought peace by engaging to observe the Letter of Majesty. The Bohemian nobles, believing that they were sure of victory, refused his terms, and were able to threaten Ferdinand himself in Vienna, while they were scheming to form an aristocratic federation with Austria. But the crisis passed when a small relieving force slipped into Vienna. The Bohemians met with reverses elsewhere, and Ferdinand, withdrawing to Frankfurt, where the Imperial election was to take place, succeeded in procuring the Imperial crown in August. At the same moment the Bohemian Diet formally deposed Ferdinand and offered the Bohemian crown to Frederick. Frederick could no longer defer his decision. He accepted the offer, and the fateful challenge was definitely thrown down.

The effect was immediate. Protestants might be willing to help the Bohemian Protestants in demanding concessions from Ferdinand; very few of them were willing to see Bohemia and the Palatinate united under one ruler, and that ruler a Calvinist. Moreover Frederick's acceptance was in flat defiance of public law, since technically at least Ferdinand had succeeded to the Bohemian crown in accordance with the pronouncement of the Bohemian Diet itself that the throne was hereditary. Maximilian of Bavaria could now intervene on Ferdinand's side as the champion of law; though he made his own private bargain with Ferdinand. The Elector Palatine had forfeited the electoral dignity, which was to be transferred to Bavaria; and Maximilian was to hold the province of Upper Austria in pledge from Ferdinand till his expenses should be paid. The accession of Maximilian was of first-rate importance, since it attached to Ferdinand a practical and clear-headed statesman prepared to act with vigor both in the field and in diplomacy.

The Palatinate lay in two great divisions, completely separated from each other, the intervening territories being only in part Protestant.

The Western, Lower, or Rhenish Palatinate lay on the Rhine, almost completely encircled by Catholic principalities and bishoprics separating it from Hapsburg territories. The Eastern, Upper, or Bavarian Palatinate marched with the borders of Bohemia on the east and of Bavaria on the south. Maximilian at once procured the neutrality if not the active support of Saxony by the definite promise of the Catholic League, guaranteed by the Emperor in the treaty of Mühlberg—that there should be no interference with the Protestant bishoprics or the secularized lands in the north, provided that the princes remained loyal to the Empire. In the spring of 1620 Spanish forces from the Netherlands were preparing to overrun the Rhenish Palatinate; the Protestant Union was frightened into a promise of neutrality, provided that its own territories were not attacked. This did not prevent it from nominally defending the Palatinate, but its resistance was less than half-hearted, and in the course of the summer the Spanish general, Spinola, had occupied as much of the Palatinate as lay on the west of the Rhine. Maximilian's army, commanded by the able General Tilly, promptly enforced the submission of Upper Austria and entered Bohemia, whither the Elector Frederick had betaken himself to take up the rule of his new kingdom.

The Bohemian insurgents had gained nothing by Frederick's arrival; his Lutheran subjects were offended by his aggressive Calvinism, and he brought with him no accession of military strength and no commanders who inspired confidence. In the autumn Tilly and the Imperialist troops were advancing on Prague. In November they forced a battle at the White Mountain. Their victory was decisive and complete; Frederick had to flee headlong, to find an asylum in the friendly United Princes. The Bohemian nobles did not seize the opportunity allowed them of escaping from the country; they were captured and executed; their lands were forfeited and redistributed among Imperial partisans, so that the place of the old nobility was taken by a new nobility, which was Catholic and Imperialist. Resistance in Bohemia was broken if not crushed; it was left in the hands only of Mansfeld and his mercenaries. At the beginning of 1621 Ferdinand formally put Frederick to the ban of the Empire, declaring his lands and dignities to be forfeited.

The step may have been justifiable, but its policy was certainly doubtful; the Protestants, who had been afraid of allowing one of their own number to become too powerful by the acquisition of Bohemia as well as the Palatinate, could not favor the threatened transfer of the electoral dignity and of Palatinate territories to the already powerful Catholic Duke of Bavaria. The King of England had preserved a correct attitude when his son-in-law claimed the Bohemian crown, but might not be equally ready to acquiesce in the loss of the Palatinate itself, though he was still hoping to procure the support of

Spain in obtaining an acceptable settlement by mediation instead of by the arbitrament of war. And Spain herself was not anxious for war. Trouble was brewing in the Netherlands, since the truce with the United Provinces in 1609 was made only for a period of twelve years; it was not likely to be renewed if Spain were engaged in a Catholic war against Protestantism; and the Spanish hold on the Spanish Netherlands was not so secure that the strain of maintaining a belligerent army might not prove too much for it. James's mistake lay in believing that he could get Spanish support for what might be called a definitely Protestant solution of the general problem.

For the time, however, both the Spaniards and the Protestant Union withdrew from active participation in the contest. Mansfeld was holding out in Bohemia. When the Union suspended hostilities, its hired troops went off to join Mansfeld. As his forces grew the chance of peace became more remote—peace was the last thing his soldiery wanted; the commander lacking the means to pay them, they looked to recoup themselves by loot. Frederick still believed that victory was attainable. Mansfeld, living on the country, presently found himself obliged to withdraw from Bohemia to the Upper Palatinate, and then again, owing to the same process of exhaustion, from the Upper Palatinate to the Lower.

So in the spring of 1622 the Lower Palatinate was again the scene of the conflict which in that quarter had been temporarily suspended in 1621. Allies had now joined Frederick—the Margrave of Baden from the south, and the adventurer Christian of Brunswick, nominal Bishop of Halberstadt, with mercenary forces from the north. But Tilly defeated the Margrave at Wimpfen. Mansfeld was pushed back into Alsace; it was only with extreme difficulty and heavy losses that Christian broke through and succeeded in joining him. By the end of the year practically the whole of the Palatinate was in the hands of the Imperialists.

In the spring of 1623 the Electoral office, for life, was formally conveyed from the Elector Palatine to the Duke of Bavaria, with an intimation to Frederick that if he made humble submission he might hope to have the Palatinate itself restored. Spain did not like the advancement of Maximilian, and protested, but obviously had no intention of going beyond protest. John George of Saxony remained angrily incapable of making up his mind to support either of the two parties, both of whose policies he detested. Mansfeld and Christian remained in arms, eating up Alsace, but having no definite political or military policy beyond remaining in arms until they could get themselves and their troops paid.

The Dutch war with the Spaniards had again broken out; the United Provinces called the two adventurers to their aid. They cut

their way through from Alsace; but the Dutch soon found them impossible coadjutors, and they turned their attention to North Germany. Mansfeld occupied East Friesland, and Christian set himself to stir up the princes of North Germany into active resistance to the Emperor, assuring them of what they were half inclined to believe already, that the Imperialists would not keep their engagement to leave the bishoprics and the secularized territories alone. Tilly, on the other hand, from the conquered Palatinate, was engaged in warning them that it was their obvious duty to support the Emperor and suppress the adventurers, with the implication that if they did so the engagement would certainly be kept, but that if they did not the engagement would no longer be binding, as it was expressly conditional upon loyalty.

For a time Christian found quarters with his brother, the Duke of Brunswick, while the princes and cities of the division of the Empire called the Lower Saxon Circle raised troops with an uneasy sense that they might find themselves forced to fight some one in self-defense without wishing to do so. But the most inflammable elements were gathering round Christian, the dashing soldier whose fame as a cavalry leader gave him a certain distinction. Evidently he was too much of a firebrand among people who wanted nothing so much as a guarantee of peace, and he was forced to make his retreat to the Netherlands. The troops which had been levied were allowed to disperse, and the Circle again lay open for occupation by any armed force which might enter it.

During 1624 active operations were in suspense; but intervention of a sort was coming from another quarter. King James in England continued to press his scheme for a matrimonial alliance with Spain, having for its object joint intervention for the restoration of Frederick in the Palatinate and the general recognition by Europe of James himself, as a Solomon, whose words of wisdom would be indorsed by the common intelligence as maxims of policy. Unfortunately Europe was not at all disposed to take James at his own valuation, and Spain in particular had ideas which to James appeared so incredibly unreasonable that he would not believe them to be serious. What the court of Spain wanted was to make it a condition of the English marriage that its offspring should be brought up as Roman Catholics, so that in the next generation at least England might be brought back to the bosom of the Church. Also Frederick was to be restored to the Palatinate on the similar condition that his children were to be so educated as to secure them for Catholicism.

James was only convinced of the painful truth when the Prince of Wales paid a visit to Spain to woo his destined bride, and came home again thoroughly determined to break off all friendly relations with Spain. James's private scheme of intervention was thus thrust out of

court, and at the same time the English Parliament was not at all tractable. If Protestantism was being seriously threatened it was quite willing to go to war, but it was perfectly convinced that Spain was in that case still the enemy as she had been in the glorious days of Queen Elizabeth. War in Germany, about which it knew nothing, was regarded with extreme suspicion. It was ready to vote money for a Protestant war, but it wanted that war to be conducted upon lines in accordance with its own views, which were not the views of the king. On the other hand, James, having been forced to give up his own theory of co-operation with Spain, sought instead the co-operation of France, which was not very much more to the liking of England. The rancor of English Protestantism against Popery had been greatly increased at the very beginning of the king's reign by the Gunpowder Plot. In the eyes of most Englishmen, all Papists were tarred with the same brush; the French Government was Papist, and therefore a French alliance was unattractive. The substitution of a Popish French princess for a Popish Spanish princess as the future Queen of England was no great improvement.

Now the direction of French policy was falling into the grip of Cardinal Richelieu. We have seen that the anti-Hapsburg policy of Henry IV. had been suspended by his death, that the Catholics had recovered an ascendancy in the Government, but that the Huguenots enjoyed under the Edict of Nantes certain privileges which gave them a degree of security. The general position, however, encouraged the idea in England that intolerant Catholicism was in the ascendant in France. As Louis grew up, he himself, while dissatisfied with the independence enjoyed by the Huguenots, was nevertheless disposed, as concerned foreign affairs, to the traditional view that Catholic rather than Protestant Powers were the European rivals of France. Much more definitely Richelieu had grasped the principles of policy by which Henry IV. was guided. At home he did not wish to suppress Protestantism, but was determined to curb the independence of the nobility whether they were Huguenots or Catholics; and as matters stood, Huguenots were more likely than Catholics to resist the central authority. Abroad, Richelieu had no doubt at all that France should aim at checking the developing power of the Hapsburgs.

Richelieu, therefore, encouraged the English alliance; but whether with or without his approval, the terms proposed for the marriage contract demanded concessions for Roman Catholicism to which James knew that the English Parliament would not give assent. Consequently when England actually intervened in arms the thing was done without summoning Parliament, and therefore without procuring the necessary funds for making the intervention effective. And at the same time the French evaded giving any military assistance to the expedition planned in England, although the opportunity was seized for

a stroke against the Hapsburgs in Italy. The Spaniards had occupied the Valtelline which gave passage to their troops from the Milanese into Hapsburg Germany. The French attacked the Valtelline, which was in some sort under French protection, and drove the Spaniards out, acting in concert with Savoy and Venice. The Cardinal's aim was to drive the Spaniards out of Milan. If they were ejected from North Italy they would be completely cut off from the Austrian Hapsburgs, and their only communication with the Netherlands would be by sea. Richelieu was fighting, not on behalf of Protestantism, but on behalf of France against a Hapsburg ascendancy. The forces antagonistic to Hapsburg ascendancy in Germany were to be encouraged, but for France it was of still more vital importance to paralyze effective co-operation between the three Hapsburg areas of Spain, the Netherlands, and Southeastern Germany.

Meanwhile England was also seeking to bring in two other external Powers on behalf of German Protestantism and the Elector Palatine. Neither Christian of Denmark nor Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden could regard the state of affairs in Germany with equanimity. But Gustavus was not ready to come in except upon terms which in his keen judgment would give some reasonable assurance of success; which meant in effect that he must himself have the unhampered control of military operations, and that England must not only promise but actually provide ample funds as well as troops. Christian was less exacting, and would be satisfied with fewer troops and smaller subsidies, and with promises to pay instead of money down. So the negotiations with Gustavus broke down, he turned his immediate attentions elsewhere, and the bargain was struck with Christian.

The French intervention was checked by the resuscitation of the Huguenot problem. The Huguenot chiefs conceived that the Government was not keeping faith with them. They broke out into open defiance, and the great port of Rochelle became the center of their resistance to the royal authority. An active military policy outside France was impracticable in these circumstances, and for a time Richelieu had no choice; he could only devote himself to the domestic problem.

Richelieu's plans were balked by insurrection; the action of England was made futile by sheer incompetence. The king and the Prince of Wales were both entirely dominated by the Duke of Buckingham. The blundering bargain with France had destroyed all possibility of confidence and co-operation between the Crown and the Parliament, on whose goodwill the Government was dependent for supplies. Not only were the promises given to Christian of Denmark made without any reason to suppose that they would be endorsed by the controllers of the purse, but an expedition was planned and dispatched when there were no funds wherewith to pay its expenses.

Twelve thousand men were raked together and sent off to the Low Countries under the command of Mansfeld, with the Palatinate as their objective; but when they were across the Channel they had neither money nor stores. Starvation, cold, and sickness mowed them down. The whole business was a miserable fiasco. Simultaneously with its final collapse the old king died, and Charles I. succeeded to the throne, with the fatal Buckingham still at his side.

## *II.—Christian of Denmark and Wallenstein, 1625-1629*

The area of which we have spoken as the Circle of Lower Saxony is that part of North Germany which lies between the river Weser on the west, Saxony on the south, Brandenburg and Pomerania on the east. This was the area whose fate was in doubt. John George of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg were satisfied with the agreement of Mühlberg which had neutralized North Germany; but the Lower Saxon Circle, mainly consisting of smaller principalities, did not feel the same security as these two electorates, largely by reason of the number of bishoprics scattered amongst them which, if they should again be claimed for Catholicism, would virtually lay the Protestant princes at the mercy of the Catholics. Against this fate it did not appear that the treaty of Mühlberg gave them a sufficient security; nor would Ferdinand and the Catholic League concede any guarantees beyond those contained in the treaty—which they were certain to interpret as best suited their own interest. It was this that constituted the danger to Protestantism which alarmed the northern Powers, and induced the King of Denmark, in his capacity as Duke of Holstein, to take the lead in offering an active resistance to the claims of the Emperor, the League, and their general, Tilly.

In the summer of 1625 Tilly opened operations against the new combination. The Imperial prospects were less promising than they had been when the resistance was headed by the fugitive Elector Palatine and the adventurers Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick. It was true that the Protestants were still without a leader of commanding personality, and were seriously lacking in cohesion; but, on the other hand, the Imperial treasury was depleted, and on the east intervention was threatened by Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania. Tilly's own army had been obliged only in a less degree than Mansfeld's to live upon the country, and it was more than doubtful whether additional forces could be raised to meet the new conditions.

It was at this point that Albert of Waldstein, commonly called Wallenstein, offered to take upon himself the business of raising and leading a new army. Wallenstein was a Bohemian whose ambitions had led him to take the Imperial side. He had distinguished himself as a soldier by many deeds of daring and skill; he had neglected no oppo-

tunities of advancing and enriching himself; he had married a wife who brought him immense wealth which procured him the title of Prince of Friedland. Practically his design now was to create an army, controlled by himself on behalf of the Emperor, which should in effect make of the Emperor a Roman Caesar, whose authority throughout the Empire would be irresistible—because the army would be an instrument actually at his own disposal under his own officers, as no army of a German emperor had ever been. According to Wallenstein's scheme the army was to be maintained neither by pillage nor out of the Imperial revenue, but by contributions compulsorily levied by the military authority with the Imperial sanction. For all practical purposes its commander would be a military dictator acting in the Emperor's name. If the Emperor's authority for imposing forced contributions was itself called in question, the army itself could argue the point conclusively. Wallenstein's offer was accepted. He raised and organized and paid his army, which was officered by men of his own choice. But it was to be no mere supplement to Tilly's force; it was to be Wallenstein's army, serving Wallenstein's ends, and it was to be perfected before being brought to the area of actual fighting. Meantime Tilly was left to take care of himself.

After the midsummer of 1625, when King Charles was able to send to Christian about six weeks' pay for the troops who were to be maintained upon English money, England took no more effective part in the war. Charles and Buckingham had entered upon the quarrel with Parliament which reduced the sources of the Crown to a point at which it was impossible to employ them usefully upon foreign wars. Moreover, while Buckingham lived, such money as could be collected was squandered upon a wholly inexcusable French war, nominally waged on behalf of the Huguenots in Rochelle. Christian was deprived even of the meager help which Buckingham had promised him without parliamentary warrant, while Richelieu was engaged in suppressing the Huguenot revolt.

In 1626, military operations in Germany began in earnest. Mansfeld, advancing with one army against Wallenstein on the Elbe, was routed at Dessau, and was then sent off to Bohemia to join hands with Bethlen Gabor, Wallenstein following in pursuit. Tilly caught King Christian at Lutter, and inflicted on him a severe defeat, partly because the king's soldiers refused to fight until they had been paid. In the east, Bethlen Gabor retired when he found that his hopes of Turkish aid were in vain; Mansfeld had to withdraw after a futile attack upon Wallenstein, and died before the year was out. Imperialist troops overran the northern provinces.

The progress of Wallenstein was by no means satisfactory to the Catholic League. Wallenstein was not, in fact, moved by an orthodox enthusiasm; for Catholics or Protestants he cared nothing, and was as

ready to give military promotion to a Calvinist or a Lutheran as to a Catholic. The particular quarrel with him was simply a means to the establishment of a dominant central power wielding an irresistible army. It was merely an accident of the situation that the activities of the army were directed against the Protestant resistance. The Catholic League, on the other hand, was seeking the predominance, not of any central power, but of Catholics over Protestants. Nor did it please them to see the forced contributions by which the army was maintained extorted with the same rigor and ruthlessness in Catholic as in Protestant territories. Nor did the high-born German princes like to see themselves superseded by a Bohemian upstart. As yet, however, their attacks upon Wallenstein were foiled. He retained his supreme influence, and in 1527 was engaged until the autumn in completing the subjection of Silesia on the east of Bohemia. Thence he turned to aid Tilly in driving Christian, not only off German soil, but out of the mainland of Denmark altogether.

The victory of the Imperialists seemed to be all but complete, but was manifestly the outcome of Wallenstein's Cæsarism. The Catholics were fain to turn it to account by carrying out their program in the Lower Saxon Circle, ejecting the Protestant bishops and desecularizing the secularized lands; for the pledge given at Mühlenberg held good only on condition of Protestant loyalty, a condition which had been broken when the Protestants offered armed resistance to the Imperial forces. But the result was that the Protestant princes and cities found themselves threatened by the intolerance of the Catholic princes, with which Wallenstein had no sympathy, and by the Cæsarism of Wallenstein, to which the Catholic princes as well as Protestants were entirely antagonistic.

Cæsarism at last aroused a determined resistance in quarters which had not been actively stirred by menace to Protestantism. The great commercial cities refused to recognize a military authority for which there was no precedent in the Imperial constitution. They closed their gates to Wallenstein's forces. It was no easy matter to reduce those of them which were ports; the sea belonged to them and to the Danish and Swedish fleets. Wallenstein had no ships and could not blockade them. Moreover, they remained obdurate to the temptations offered of military support against their trade rivals of Denmark, Sweden, and England, offers of which they doubted the efficacy.

Hence in 1628 Wallenstein resolved to force the seaports into submission. One after another the towns fell into his hands; but when his troops attacked Stralsund they were repulsed—Stralsund was resolved to hold out to the last. Wallenstein's wrath was kindled at the check. He resolved to crush Stralsund, and concentrated all his efforts on that one object. The Stralsund men for their part met him with stubborn defiance. They sent their wives and children away to

Sweden and abode the issue. The weeks passed, and Wallenstein could make no impression. Stralsund could obtain its supplies by sea without interruption, and Swedish and Danish soldiers as well. The citizens had, in fact, finally made up their minds that it would be better that they should be dependants of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark than that they should submit themselves to the new Cæsarism. And their defiance was successful. In August Wallenstein was forced to raise the siege which he had begun in March. The defeat was the first serious blow to his prestige.

Nor was Stralsund the only failure. Glückstadt followed the example of Stralsund, defying Tilly, and Wallenstein also when he came thither in the autumn. Stralsund and Glückstadt impressed upon Wallenstein the necessity of a peace with Denmark; both cities had been enabled to hold out largely by the support of Danish ships. Christian, on the other hand, had lost heart; English support had failed him, and he had no mind to supplicate aid from his rival of Sweden. In May 1629 the treaty of Lübeck withdrew Denmark from the war. Christian's territories were restored to him, and he undertook to abstain from further intervention in Lower Saxony.

The Emperor Ferdinand conceived himself to be the champion of law. In the particular case of sanctioning the levying of forced contributions by military authority, it was not easy to discover a legal justification; it was necessary to fall back upon the Imperial prerogative of providing for an emergency, the principle upon which Charles I.'s lawyers in England relied. The levying, however, was effected at least by a definite authority, so that, however oppressive it might be, it had at least more color of law about it than the unlicensed pillage commonly resorted to. Ferdinand persuaded himself, as Charles I. persuaded himself, not that the Crown was above the law, but that it was within the law in exercising whatsoever prerogative the legal advisers chosen by himself were prepared to claim for it. Wallenstein cared nothing about the law; his aim was to put an end to chaos by constituting a central authority the completeness of whose control would be absolutely indisputable; Ferdinand was satisfied as to the legality of the process by what was the equivalent of the English lawyers' doctrine of prerogative.

But Ferdinand wanted authority primarily in order to enforce his own views of the law in the matter of religion. Wallenstein regarded those views as fatal to the unity necessary to a powerful empire. In his eyes the demands of the priests and of the Catholic League, the demands which Ferdinand himself favored, were unreasonable. He was neither of the Protestant nor of the Catholic party. Resistance to the Imperial authority coming from Protestants was to be crushed, but not in the interests of the Catholics, who were to be made no less subservient to the Imperial authority. The practical solution of the

religious question was to be found in toleration. For that reason, as well as because he was determined to subordinate the authority of princes to that of the Emperor, Wallenstein's power was in the eyes of the League an evil to be endured only just so long as it was necessary to the destruction of the Protestant power.

On the religious-question Ferdinand was at one with Maximilian of Bavaria and the League. In his own dominions he suppressed Protestantism rigorously, though with employing the grosser forms of persecution. In so doing he was within his legal rights. In the Protestant Palatinate, after the ejection of Frederick, he pursued a similar course, though its legality might be called in question. In 1628 he conferred the whole of the Upper Palatinate and part of the Lower upon Maximilian of Bavaria, himself receiving back from Maximilian Upper Austria, which had been held in pledge by him since the beginning of the troubles. Maximilian, on the principle *Cujus regio ejus religio*, claimed the power of enforcing Catholicism in his new dominion, and Protestant worship was prohibited. All over South Germany, where there was no longer any power of resistance, the process of restoring secularized Church lands was carried out. In the early months of 1629 the negotiations for the withdrawal of Denmark were in progress; in spite of Stralsund and Glückstadt, it was obvious that the north would not long be able to resist the Imperial armies; and in March, when the peace of Lübeck was on the point of being signed, Ferdinand by his own authority issued the Edict of Restitution.

By this edict, two Protestant archbishops, a dozen bishops, and more than a hundred minor incumbents were deprived of their position. The treaty of Mühlberg was wiped away, on the legal pretext that the conditions had been broken upon which the pledges to the protestants had been expressly given. Protestantism was outraged, and Wallenstein's advice had been set at naught. But Ferdinand had no sort of desire to quarrel with Wallenstein. To prove the Emperor's confidence in him, he was invested with the duchy of Mecklenburg. The transfer of territorial dignities by the Imperial authority had appeared questionable in the case of the Palatinate; in the case of Mecklenburg it was doubly objectionable to the Catholic princes, who had persuaded themselves that the principal obstacle to the pacification of the north lay in the excesses of Wallenstein's soldiers. Thus the antagonism of the League to Wallenstein was intensified.

Meanwhile, however, two other enemies to Hapsburg or Catholic aggression were being set free. During 1625 Charles I. married the French princess Henrietta Maria, and the French Huguenots were on the verge of open revolt. Then England and France began to quarrel. The French complained that Charles was ignoring the promises on behalf of the Catholics which had been required as conditions of the

marriage. Charles complained that the French Government was not keeping faith with its Huguenot subjects. Next year matters were worse. England appeared to be definitely encouraging the Huguenots to persist in their demands. France declined to help England in the \* war with Spain upon which Buckingham had embarked and which he was again mismanaging. Rochelle was openly defying the French Government, and in 1627 Buckingham carried an expedition to the Isle of Rhé to support the Huguenot rebels. The expedition failed disastrously; but it had had the effect of giving the Huguenot rebellion a specifically treasonable character which forced the hand of Richelieu, whose desire was not to crush the Huguenots, but to bring about a general accord. He found himself compelled to conquer the Huguenots' resistance before parleying further with them.

In 1628 the blockade of Rochelle was completed. Buckingham was preparing another expedition for its relief, when he was assassinated. Rochelle was forced to surrender. Richelieu, having vindicated the authority and the power of the Crown, was able to show himself in his true colors as the champion of toleration and concord; even before the fall of Rochelle he had made it sufficiently clear that the Government was waging war, not upon Huguenots in general, but only upon the open rebels of Rochelle. The special privilege which had allowed the Huguenots to garrison certain towns and to rule there in practical independence was withdrawn, but even in Rochelle freedom of worship was guaranteed. No one could dispute that to the Huguenots such terms were just and even generous. The fear of an intolerant Catholic tyranny was removed, and France was again united. Richelieu was once more free to play his part for France in the politics of Europe.

It was not so with England. There the battle between Crown and Parliament, between prerogative and the rights of the Commons, had reached not a settlement but a crisis with the Petition of Right, which, while it pretended to define the royal powers, was sufficiently ambiguous to enable the king to claim that the gravest of the points in dispute had been decided in his favor. The fall of Buckingham gave to Charles a minister of infinitely greater ability in the person of Wentworth. The parliamentary crisis ended with the dissolution in January 1629, which left the king to govern for eleven years without a Parliament, but with powers of taxation too limited to allow of any schemes for intervention in foreign affairs. For twenty years England, so far as the Continent was concerned, was wholly negligible.

The second Power which had been set free was not England but Sweden. Gustavus had refused before to intervene in Germany except on his own terms. Since his accession in 1611, he had first of all a struggle to secure the independence of Sweden, at that time threatened by Denmark. Then he had driven back the advancing

Russian Power from the Baltic coast. Then he had been involved in a struggle with Poland, whose king, Sigismund, had been ejected from the throne of Sweden by his uncle Charles, the father of Gustavus. In 1625, when England had rejected his terms of intervention in Germany and had preferred the Danish alliance, Gustavus again turned to his contest with Poland, and secured Swedish supremacy in the Baltic. That supremacy would be gravely endangered if a centralized and military German empire gained possession of the Baltic ports. The time had come for Gustavus to intervene in his own interest, which had not been gravely threatened in 1625, and when he could do so on his own terms, because German towns and German princes now realized that they had need of him for the preservation of their own liberty.

### III.—*Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein, 1629–1634*

For Richelieu, Spain was primarily the enemy. A consolidated German empire would indeed be more dangerous to France than the decadent power of Spain could be. But the immediate need was to prevent effective co-operation between the two Hapsburg Powers; and this could best be accomplished by attacking Spain in North Italy, while fostering inside and outside of Germany all the forces antagonistic to a Hapsburg supremacy. And Italy provided a legitimate *casus belli*. The French Duke of Nevers had recently succeeded, through a somewhat remote connection, to the duchy of Mantua. Spain resisted the succession, a question lying technically within the jurisdiction of the Emperor, and Spanish troops, acting in the name of the Emperor, shut the new duke up in Casale. Other Italian states took alarm and invited French intervention. Richelieu entered Italy, incidentally compelled the Duke of Savoy, who had supported the Spaniards, to change sides, and relieved Casale. He had to turn back to France, however, to crush a factious Huguenot rising in the south. The suppression of the rebellion was duly accomplished and the rebels punished, but the religious liberties of the Huguenots were again confirmed.

Meanwhile, however, Ferdinand as well as the Spaniards renewed the attack upon Mantua. Richelieu returned in the spring of 1630 to relieve Casale again, and to convince Savoy more definitely of the wisdom of adhering to the French side. But diplomacy at the moment suited Richelieu better than war. The state of affairs in Germany and the Netherlands was full of possibilities of the renewal of a contest in the United Provinces which would give Spain sufficient occupation; of the overthrow of Wallenstein by the League; of armed intervention by the King of Sweden in North Germany. All the possible elements of discord were to be fostered, but time would show

how France could best turn them to her own advantage. Negotiations were opened with Gustavus, but that prince had no intention of fettering himself with conditions for the benefit of France, who for her own interests could not afford to oppose him and might be compelled to support him. The Dutch took the offensive in the Netherlands against the Spaniards. Gustavus landed in Pomerania. The League definitely demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein. Backed by French influence it overcame Ferdinand's opposition, and Wallenstein for a time retired into private life, while Ferdinand sought to secure French neutrality in the coming struggle by recognizing Nevers as Duke of Mantua. Wallenstein's army was put under the command of Tilly. The concentration of force in Tilly's hands was less dangerous than in those of Wallenstein, but was still unsatisfactory to Richelieu, who mediated a fresh bargain with the Spaniards.

The Swedes had landed in July. The Duke of Pomerania yielded to the persuasions of Gustavus; but German princes still had a natural hesitation about allying themselves with a foreign Power against the Emperor to whom they owed allegiance. The case had been different with Christian of Denmark, because as Duke of Holstein he was himself a prince of the Empire legitimately entitled to a voice in its affairs. George William of Brandenburg was not to be persuaded, though his sister was the wife of Gustavus. Nor was John George of Saxony to be persuaded. There had been no breach in his loyalty; he had submitted reasonable proposals to the Emperor; if these proposals were accepted he would be satisfied. Gustavus was condemned to inaction until one or both of the Electors could be shaken, and he could reckon with some certainty that they would be shaken before long by Ferdinand himself. Meanwhile, he arranged for a substantial subsidy from France.

On March 1631 Tilly made a thrust at Pomerania, with the aim of isolating and destroying a division of the Swedish army. He was outmaneuvered, and fell back to open the siege of Magdeburg, which remained in a state of stubborn resistance, though it was inadequately prepared for defence. John George would neither undertake its relief himself nor allow the advance of Gustavus, though the Swedish army had at last converted George William. In May Magdeburg was stormed. Its sack followed upon the storming, in accordance with the then recognized customs of war, but was carried out with an unprecedented and horrible brutality and savagery which distinguishes it even in the hideous annals of the Thirty Years' War.

Magdeburg fell. Ferdinand replied to John George's proposals with a point-blank refusal. The Elector had assembled his forces not with any aggressive intent but in case of accidents. Tilly received instructions to compel him to lay down his arms, and with that intent entered Saxony. At last John George, goaded beyond endurance,

broke from his neutrality and joined Gustavus. Tilly was besieging Leipzig. Gustavus, with Swedes and Saxons, marched against him. The Imperialist general was a capable commander, according to "the disciplines of the wars," as they had been practiced within the memory of man. But Gustavus was more. He was an originator of new methods which were not in the old rules. At Breitenfeld Tilly's army was completely shattered by the artillery and the tactical mobility of the Swedish troops. The Imperialists beat an orderly retreat in spite of heavy losses, but there was no question of the decisive character of the defeat.

Wallenstein in his retirement was well pleased with what he counted as the defeat of the League. He even made offers of himself joining Gustavus; but these were declined by the Swede, who certainly would never have worked in harmony with the Bohemian. The first object of Gustavus was the permanent possession of the Baltic coast, the second the establishment of the *Corpus Evangelicorum*, an organized confederation of the Protestant states in Germany, free from Imperial and Catholic domination—a very different conception from Wallenstein's military Imperialism. To this end the next step was the liberation of the Rhine provinces and South Germany. In the six months following Breitenfeld, Gustavus marched triumphantly through Western and Southern Germany. King Louis of France took alarm, but Gustavus was not to be diverted from his purpose. In April 1632 Tilly met him again at the battle of the Lech. The old general was again defeated, and was mortally wounded in the battle. Gustavus entered Bavaria. Ferdinand, who was driven into a corner, appealed to Spain. Spain was content to give the obvious advice that Wallenstein should be reinstated.

Wallenstein was willing, on conditions—practically unlimited authority for himself, and the cancellation of the Edict of Restitution. If the Protestant princes broke with their foreign ally and returned to their allegiance, there should be complete amnesty for them; if not, destruction. The terms were accepted; and at Wallenstein's word new armies assembled—adventurers from every clime, German Protestants as well as German Catholics. Gustavus would have been ready to come to terms which Wallenstein would have been ready to accept, but for one crucial difference in their respective policies. Gustavus required his Protestant federation—his *corpus Evangelicorum*. Wallenstein required the unqualified Imperial supremacy. John George could not make up his mind between them.

On 16th November the two great generals met at the battle of Lützen. Victory fell to the Swedes, but at ruinous cost; Gustavus was killed on the field.

After Lützen came chaos. Gustavus was succeeded on the Swedish throne by his young daughter Christina. Swedish policy was con-

trolled by his able chancellor Oxenstiern. But there was no one to combine the control of policy with the control of armies in the field, no commander of genius, no statesman of dominating force. Perhaps the most notable of the soldiers was Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, of that old electoral line of Saxony which had been dispossessed by the younger branch in the time of Charles V. At the moment all that Oxenstiern could do was to form a league of the Rhenish and Swabian Protestants. The attitude of Saxony and Brandenburg was again rendered extremely doubtful.

The death of Gustavus prevented the Swedes from reaping the fruits of an actual victory. Wallenstein withdrew into Bohemia, and endeavored to lure or frighten the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg into joining him. But the Catholic League had become more hostile to him than ever, and Spanish influence also was now exerted against him. Ferdinand would not commit himself to the concessions by which Wallenstein reckoned on securing Protestant loyalty. Wallenstein would probably have taken the law into his own hands, and would have imposed peace in Germany on his own terms, if he could have counted with certainty upon his troops, which was just what he could not do. They wanted to stand by him, but they had the curious code of mercenary loyalty. Their word was given to serve the Emperor, and their code forbade them to break it.

Then Wallenstein's enemies received intelligence which, justly or unjustly, was interpreted as proof that he was planning to take the crown of Bohemia for himself. The evidence convinced Ferdinand that Wallenstein was a traitor. Preparations were made for the dismissal of Wallenstein from his command, and the appointment in his place of the Emperor's son Ferdinand, to whom the crown of Hungary had already been transferred. Wallenstein's generals were one after another privately brought over to the side of his enemies. But the matter was settled by some of Wallenstein's own mercenary subordinates, Scottish and Irish adventurers. They were invited to pledge themselves to take their orders from Wallenstein, though edicts against him had now been issued. The soldiers refused to break the oath they had taken to the Emperor. Wallenstein was apparently a traitor. That night the men took the law into their own hands, slaughtered a party of Wallenstein's adherents who were at dinner, and then broke into Wallenstein's own chamber and murdered him.

Gustavus would not have given unity to Germany, though he might have given unity to north Germany under Swedish hegemony in something of the same fashion as Bismark, after Sadowa, united North Germany under Prussian hegemony. Wallenstein might have given unity to Germany as a military empire, an ideal which, though not based on any racial sense of nationalism, was reproduced, *mutatis*

*mutandis*, in the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns. But with Wallenstein's death the possibility of calling united Germany into existence was postponed till the latter half of the nineteenth century.

#### *IV.—The Last Phase, 1634–1648*

While Wallenstein's schemes were in suspense, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar had been attacking Bavaria, to which Wallenstein had refused assistance. The army, which had been perforce held inactive, took the field under the young King of Hungary, and in September of the same year, 1634, inflicted a crushing defeat on Bernard at Nördlingen, which decisively restored the imperial ascendancy in South Germany. The victory had a double effect. It brought about the treaty of Prague between the Emperor and John George of Saxony, who had always striven for peace. Ferdinand consented to restore the bishoprics which had been Lutheran, in 1627. This was sufficient for John George, though not for the Calvinists, who gained nothing by it. The second effect of the victory, however, was to force the still resisting Protestants into the French Alliance. That is to say, in the north they needed the Swedish Alliance, while the Swedes wanted them for their own ends; in the west they needed the French Alliance, while Richelieu wanted them for his own ends. French interests, Swedish interests, and Protestant German interests were by no means identical; the forces were only united in the sense that they had a common enemy, and that all the parties concerned meant to snatch as much as they possibly could out of the general welter.

Almost at the moment when the treaty of Prague was being signed in May 1635, Richelieu had made his preliminary bargain with the Swedes and Bernard, and declared war upon Spain. For to Richelieu the point of vital importance was to cut off Spain permanently from access by land to the Netherlands—the Dutch and French fleets would take care of the sea. And for that purpose he wanted the Milanese in Italy, and, on the Rhine, Alsace and Lorraine—the provinces for the possession of which a struggle has raged at intervals from that day even until now.

In Germany there was at least an ample supply of veteran soldiers, practised in war on a large scale. France had men in plenty, but they were untrained, inexperienced, and without capable generals except Bernard, who, having lost by the battle of Nördlingen the territories which had been assigned him, entered the French service. For some time, therefore, little enough success attended the French arms. The idea that the Spanish Netherlands might once again make common cause with the United Provinces and throw off the Spanish yoke proved entirely futile; the Netherlands preferred a Spanish to a Dutch domination. In 1636 the Spanish armies from

the Netherlands invaded France, and even threatened Paris, though the country answered to the call of patriotism and drove them out again. In the north; the Swedes were driven back on the coast, though they recovered ground by Baner's victory at Wittstock. Early in the next year Ferdinand II. died, and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand III. The tide of war surged backwards and forwards over North Germany, which was becoming a land of desolation. In 1638 Bernard made himself master of Alsace, which he would have retained for himself and for Germany but for his own death in the following year, when his army and his conquest passed definitely into the hands of France. A Spanish fleet, which had made its way up the Channel, was destroyed by the Dutch in the Downs. In 1640 the Portuguese proclaimed John of Braganza king, and Catalonia, on the north-east of Spain, was roused to revolt by a monstrously tyrannical royal edict. The Swedish arms were again advancing in the east; and in 1641 Brandenburg, which had been Imperialist since the treaty of Prague, withdrew from the war. George William died, and his young son Frederick, who was to be known in later times as the Great Elector, made a treaty with the Swedes which gave the electorate immunity during the remainder of the struggle, and enabled him to recognize it for subsequent aggrandisement.

At the end of 1642 Richelieu died, having commended as his successor Cardinal Mazarin, an Italian, whom he had chosen for his own service, and for whom he had obtained the cardinal's hat. Louis followed his great minister to the grave within six months, leaving the crown to Louis XIV., a child who was then in his fifth year. By the action of the Paris Parliament, the queen-mother, Anne of Austria, sister of the reigning King Philip IV. of Spain, was made regent. She had always been reckoned among Richelieu's enemies; but to the general astonishment, and to the disgust of that faction of nobles who were now hoping to recover the independence of which the Cardinal had deprived them, she placed herself in Mazarin's hands and the policy of Richelieu was maintained.

The position of the new French Government was established by a brilliant victory. The command of the troops on the Netherlands border had been given to the young and untried Duke of Enghien, soon to be known as the "Great Condé," the title to which he was on the point of succeeding. He had been appointed as being the next prince of the blood after the little king's uncle, Gaston of Orleans. He was a soldier of somewhat the same type as Edward III. and the Black Prince—no strategist, but with a consummate instinct for the handling and leading of troops in the hour of battle. His daring attack upon a superior force of the enemy at Rocroy resulted in a decisive victory, which was followed up by a series of successes.

From this time, France held this position of the first military

Power in Europe. Costly victories were won against heavy odds by the reckless brilliancy of Condé, while more decisive advantages were gained by the masterly strategy of Turenne. In 1646, the genius of Turenne enabled him to effect his junction with the Swedish commander Wrangel; the united armies swept into Bavaria, isolated Maximilian, and forced him to a truce. Maximilian, nevertheless, rejoined the Emperor later in the same year, but only with the effect of laying Bavaria open to the unrestrained ravages of the enemy's army. In 1648 he again met with a crushing defeat—the last battle of the war. For five years past negotiations had been going on for the termination of the struggle in which no one could hope for a conclusive victory. Ferdinand gave up the contest, which was closed by the group of treaties known as the Peace of Westphalia.

For thirty years Germany had been devastated by a war which laid her cities waste, made a wilderness of the Country, and destroyed half her population—a war filled with unspeakable horrors, such as were not again to be paralleled until the twentieth century. And except as concerted Sweden and France, the settlement reached at the end did not differ substantially from that which the much-condemned John George of Saxony had advocated from the beginning. It might have been summed up in the phrase, "Live and let live." Ecclesiastical states and estates which had been in Protestant hands in 1624 were to be permanently in Protestant hands. Those which had been Catholic at that date were to be permanently Catholic. Calvinist claims were recognized equally with Lutheran. Catholics, and Protestants were to be represented equally in the Imperial Chamber.

But the war had made territorial changes inevitable. France held Alsace, and the cities of Metz, Verdun, and Toul, which she had occupied without any formal cession under the agreement with Maurice of Saxony nearly a hundred years before. All this was now formally ceded to her, so that the community of Hapsburg territory on the east of France was permanently served. Switzerland and the United Provinces were formally recognized as independent sovereign states. Sweden obtained the western half of Pomerania, carrying with it effective control of the Baltic. The Elector of Brandenburg, formerly suzerain, of Pomerania, held the eastern half, and was compensated for the loss of the western half by the inclusion in his dominions of the Protestant bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden. To Sweden were given also the bishoprics of Bremen and Verdun. Bavaria retained the Upper Palatinate and the Electorship. The Lower Palatinate was given back to the son of the Elector Frederick, Charles Lewis, who was also constituted an eighth Elector. The Imperial authority which Ferdinand II. had attempted to assert was dead and done with. The Emperor was nothing more than the titular head of a loose confederation of sovereign princes; but he was

himself the greatest of these sovereign princes in virtue of the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria and the kingdom of Bohemia, in addition to the kingdom of Hungary outside the Empire. Henceforth we think no longer of the Empire as a power, but of Austria. And henceforth religion ceased to be a dominant cause of division among the European states, although some time was to elapse before that truth was fully recognized.

*V.—Europe Outside the Empire, 1603–1648*

Behind the struggle of religions which was the ostensible cause of the Thirty Years' War, it is easy to discern the gravity of another contest which was no less intimately associated with it—the struggle of the centralizing and centrifugal forces in the German Empire. For every state in Europe centralization meant the same thing—concentration of power in a monarchy. In Germany, Wallenstein endeavored to convert the Empire into a military monarchy. He failed. The centrifugal forces were completely victorious, and the Empire was all but dissolved. But it was not only in Germany that statesmen and politicians were seeking to solve the problem.

In England the government was centralized already, but disintegration threatened when the powers in the State, which acted harmoniously under the Tudors, developed antagonism under the Stewarts. In England, as in Germany, the attempt was made to annex all the powers of sovereignty to the Crown, and was countered by an attempt to annex them all to Parliament. The Crown was ruinously defeated, but under conditions which, immediately, were no less ruinous to Parliament. The King of England was beheaded, and the control was concentrated in the hands of a military dictator. The final victory of constitutionalism was postponed. In Holland, the House of Orange was on the verge of an attempt to establish Absolutism, which was foiled by the forces of Republicanism. But in France the despotic power of the Crown was almost established when Richelieu died, and the work of establishing it was completed under Richelieu's successor, with the "Roi Soleil" as its immediate, and the French Revolution as its ultimate, outcome.

The centralization of authority was the prime necessity for France, if she was to be a powerful and united State. In the domestic affairs of France it was the task of Richelieu to free the country from the dissensions springing out of religious antagonisms, and to destroy all the political privileges, by whomsoever enjoyed, which hampered the action of the Crown. The social privileges, which were one day to bring about the French Revolution, he left untouched. He solved the religious question by confirming the liberty of conscience and liberty of worship which had been established by Henry IV., but threatened

under the regency. The Huguenot insurrections were utilized only for the abolition of the special Huguenot jurisdictions which, like all privileged jurisdictions, hampered the royal authority. In like manner he abolished the privileges of the nobles, superseding their jurisdictions by those of officers of the Crown. When the nobles, upon whatever pretext, offered open resistance, or planned his overthrow, he struck them down with complete ruthlessness. There was none so high that he did not dare to strike, none whom he was not ready to bring to the block for treason, except the mother, the wife, and the brother of the king.

He made France the most powerful State in Europe, but he left her a fatal legacy of aggressive ambition which recognized no rights in other nations. He gave her a government completely centralized, irresistible, under the absolute control of an autocrat. But absolute autocracy means the annihilation of all political liberty. France reaped the fruits of his system under Louis XIV., and paid the penalty under Louis XVI.

Richelieu was the minister of Louis XIII., who had passed out of his minority before Richelieu came into power, and survived him by a few months. Louis was a capable prince—not a commanding character, nor yet a mere tool for cleverer men than himself, but one who knew how and where to repose confidence. His relations to Richelieu were not unlike those of Kaiser Wilhelm I. to Bismarck. Neither Richelieu nor Bismarck could have accomplished what he did but for the loyalty of the king to his minister, but neither king would have accomplished the work on his own initiative. In the case of France, Richelieu took up the threads which had been cut by the dagger of Ravaillac and tangled in the dozen years of the regency. The almost simultaneous deaths of Louis and his minister threatened France with a return of the entanglement. Had there been a strong and capable successor ready to mount the throne on the demise of Louis XIII.—had Louis XIV. been a grown man instead of a child of four—there would have been no such danger. The situation was saved because the regent and Mazarin took up the threads. But a Spanish queen-mother and an Italian minister lacked the compelling authority of the intensely French Richelieu, steadily supported by the unwavering confidence of a French king. For a dozen years ceaseless efforts were again made to entangle the threads. Not by force, but by finesse. Mazarin succeeded after many vicissitudes. The factions failed to rid themselves of the control of the central government, because they were factions, not a constitutional party; and the work of Richelieu was consummated when the threads were passed on to the hand of the young king, who could say, not as an expression of boastful arrogance, but as a simple statement of fact, "*L'État, c'est moi.*"

In France the constitutional struggle was that between monarchical centralization and the last effort of feudal disintegration, between a single despotism dominating the whole State and a multitude of uncontrolled despotisms—the system which prolonged itself in the Empire. In France, monarchism triumphed. In England, the contemporaneous constitutional struggle was of a totally different order. In effect it was a struggle between two rival claimants to the seat of the central authority—the Crown and the Parliament. Feudal disintegration had made its last effort long before. Even in the War of the Roses there was no faction avowedly fighting for the maintenance or recovery of baronial privileges and independence from the central authority; and the last privileges which still constituted a potential menace had been wiped out before the sixteenth century opened, when the Tudor dynasty was securely established on the throne by Henry VII.

The central government was a partnership between two authorities, one of which ruled but only upon condition of the acquiescence of the other. The Tudor absolutism meant that the Tudor princes took care to insure the acquiescence of Parliament—an institution which had no counterpart in any of the European monarchies, since nowhere else did the popular assemblies enjoy the power of the purse. In Scotland, however, the constitutional struggle, down to the close of the sixteenth century, had been not of the English but of the continental type—the struggle between monarchical centralization and feudal disintegration; consequently, when the Scottish Stewart dynasty acquired the throne of England by inheritance, the Stewart kings were imbued with the absolutist theory of the monarchy; they would not, because they could not, grasp the doctrine that the authority of the Crown was subject to the acquiescence of Parliament. The Crown endeavored to impose its will upon the nation in the enforcement of religious uniformity and in the conduct of foreign affairs. In both fields the Tudors had carried the assent of Parliament with them. In both fields the Stewarts failed to carry with them the assent of Parliament, and Parliament paralyzed the action of the Crown by refusing supplies.

The Crown endeavored to raise the supplies by methods which the Crown lawyers declared to be justified, but which, if they were legal, meant that the Crown was independent of the acquiescence of Parliament. Parliament, in effect, retorted with a counter-claim to direct the king's policy. The partnership had broken down; each party was bent on substituting for it its own ascendancy. Strafford, the great champion of the Crown, was brought to the block; the king found that the only alternative to his complete submission was civil war. The armies of the Parliament triumphed after three years of fighting; but the civil war had brought into play a new factor—the

army itself, which claimed no theoretical authority but made practical demands for toleration, which were approved neither by the king, by the Parliament, nor by the Scots, who had materially aided in defeating the king. Charles intrigued in the hope of recovering his ascendancy through the disagreement between the Parliament, the army, and the Scots. The army was driven to the conclusion that neither the king nor the Parliament was to be trusted; consequently, that Parliament must be purged, and the king put to death. Parliament was duly purged; what was left of it, the army recognized as the sovereign authority of the realm. It appointed a court, obviously possessed of no legal authority, which formally tried "the man Charles Stewart" for treason. On January 29, 1649, three months after the peace of Westphalia, the King of England was beheaded; and England was declared a republic, under a government whose authority rested entirely upon the support of the army which had been created four years before.

In the Spanish dominions absolutism had been thoroughly established under Philip II., but without any attendant benefits to the country. Philip III. had his father's faults without the industry and perseverance which had served the old king in the place of other virtues. The younger Philip wrought irreparable damage to industrial Spain first by the persecution and then by the expulsion of the Moriscoes, the Moorish population which had been permitted to remain in the south. Among them, almost alone of Philip's subjects, industrial arts flourished and wealth accumulated. Religious bigotry led Philip, in 1609, to drive the entire Morisco population over the seas.

Although Spain enjoyed the services of a very distinguished soldier, Spinola, during Philip's reign and for some time longer, neither under him nor under his son, Philip IV., did the State prove itself capable of vigorous and effective action in the affairs of Europe. The renewal of the contest with Holland in 1621 was barren of any advantage, and ultimately produced some extension of the United Provinces at the expense of the Spanish Netherlands. Philip was finally compelled to acknowledge their independence at the peace of Westphalia. Before that time had arrived the tyrannical methods of the Spanish monarchy raised revolts in other parts of Philip's dominion. After the Catalans had rendered admirable service against France, Philip issued an edict of a singularly oppressive character which stirred them to throw off their allegiance and offer themselves to the protection of France; so that for sixteen years Catalonia was attached more to France than to Spain, although, when peace was finally made between the two countries in 1659, Catalonia reverted to Spain.

Almost simultaneously with the revolt of the Catalans, the Portu-

guese rose against the Spanish authority, which they had always resented, and proclaimed John of Braganza their king. The House of Braganza had in fact a better title to the throne than the Hapsburgs, who had usurped the succession in 1580. Portugal as well as Catalonia received support from France, and after a prolonged struggle recovered complete independence under the dynasty of Braganza. The spirit of disaffection spread to Italy, where there were popular risings both in Sicily and in Naples, though without lasting results in either case. In fact, merely popular risings had little chance of success, since the wealthier classes were on the side of the Government, and no foreign Governments were in any haste to give active support to insurrections which might inspire imitation in their own dominions. The Neapolitan rising, however, is made notable by the personality of the popular leader, Tommaso Aniello, generally called Masaniello, who displayed remarkable abilities and a still more remarkable moderation during the brief moment of his power, which was ended by his murder.

#### *VI.—Overseas, 1600-1648*

During the sixteenth century two European states only had been successful as colonizers. Spain and Portugal alone, that is, had established a footing in regions outside Europe.

The Portuguese Empire in the East was exclusively maritime. Portugal had made no attempt to acquire and exploit great territories; she had been content with securing such positions, points on the coast of the mainland or on islands in the Indian Ocean, as enabled her to dominate the ocean trade-routes, and provided her with gateways into the interior, access to the commerce of India. Being a small country with a small population, to attempt more would have been to court disaster; and in fact, when the rivalry of other maritime Powers developed, she lacked the power and the resources to hold her own as the mistress of the Eastern Seas. And when in 1580, Philip of Spain set her crown on his own head, the combined Spanish and Portuguese sea-power was already ceasing, and very soon ceased altogether, to be a match for that of the English and Dutch.

English and Dutch did not, any more than the Portuguese, set about schemes of conquest. They had discovered the superiority of their own mariners to those of other nations; the East offered a vast field for maritime commercial enterprise, and thither their traders went, not to conquer or to rob, but to buy what they could sell again in Europe at a huge profit. The Dutch sought mainly the products of the "spice islands," the Archipelago; the English mainly those of the continent. In each country a commercial company was granted by the Government exclusive rights of trading—very much as in the

Middle Ages foreign commerce was debarred to any but members of the companies created by royal charters. The principle and the practice were both simple. The company had power to make its own regulations, which were binding on all its members, and to make any agreements which did not entail undesirable responsibilities on the King's Government. Its charter was granted for a term of years, so that when renewal was required a modified bargain might have to be made. Meanwhile, the company itself was not a close corporation, but one which any one might join if he chose to pay the fees and accept the regulations. Every man traded on his own account and made his own profit; but he must keep the rules which the company made in its corporate capacity. And so long as the company did not involve the Government in quarrels with other states, European or Oriental, the Government would leave it to go its own way without either help or hindrance, unless a very urgent case should be made out for the one or the other. As early as 1612, however, an important change was made in the English company: it became a joint-stock affair—that is, its members ceased to trade individually, but shared in the profits in proportion to the number of shares they held, while the trading was done by the company's paid employees. The Dutch method, on the other hand, differed in the essential particular that the company remained under the active controlling supervision of the Government, and was in effect a state department.

To carry on a large trade it was at once evident that the company required a permanent establishment on the mainland, a port and emporium. In 1613, soon after Akbar's death, the Mughal Jehangir authorized the British traders to set up such a "factory" at Surat, on the west coast—as the English kings had granted the Hansa headquarters in the Steelyard in London. A second factory was conceded by the same Mughal at Hugli, on the mouth of the Ganges, the reward granted, as tradition says, to an English doctor who had successfully wrought a cure upon one of the Imperial princesses. In 1639 the third great factory was planted on the south-east coast at Madras, by the prince of one of the southern kingdoms which had not yet fallen under the sway of the Mughals. And finally in 1661, when Charles II. took to wife the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, the Portuguese possession, Bombay, was conveyed to him as a portion of her dowry, and was by him transferred to the East India Company. The Portuguese had already ceased to be rivals, the Dutch had concentrated on the islands, and the French as yet had not entered the field.

Spain's colonizing energies were more than sufficiently occupied with the Western hemisphere. Except the Portuguese in Brazil, no other Europeans challenged the Spanish dominion over South and

Central America, including Mexico, or disputed her monopoly in the islands of the West Indies. The Spaniards had come upon the natives of the American islands and continent as an irresistible conquering race, with an equipment which made them at once absolute masters. The Peruvian Empire had gone down like a pack of cards before a Spanish adventurer with a few score followers. The population was of no account in their eyes; America to them was simply a vast storehouse 'of precious metals and precious stones, to be extracted from it with the least possible trouble. It had to be administered, because without a Government nothing would be extracted. It had to be garrisoned, because in the absence of garrisons troublesome adventurers from other lands would come and appropriate its treasures by the strong hand. It was administered as a private estate of the King of Spain; his offices and the garrisons had ample means of compensating themselves for their exile. When the weaker populations threatened to die out under the oppression of their taskmasters, sturdier negro slaves were imported in large numbers from Africa, eventually displacing the true natives in the islands. The Spaniards mixed with the natives, and a population of mixed breed grew up. On the other hand, although Spain ceased at the beginning of the seventeenth century to be actively at war with either English or Dutch, the islands became a rendezvous for the lawless adventurers who held that there was "no peace beyond the line," and the place of the Drakes and Grenvilles was taken by the Buccaneers, most of whom were neither more nor less than pure pirates. For Spain still strove to exclude intruders from her preserves.

No attempt was made to occupy territory claimed by Spain. French Huguenots had indeed planted themselves in dangerous proximity, but a Spanish force had wiped them out, "not as Frenchmen, but as heretics," and planted Spanish settlers in their place. But though other Huguenots came in turn and wiped them out, "not as Spaniards but as murderers," nothing more was done. The attention both of French and English, and of the Dutch also, was given to regions farther north.

As long as the war with Spain lasted, the English were much more inclined to seek a short cut to immediate wealth by raiding Spanish ships and putting Spanish towns to ransom than to set about making settlements in regions where there were no treasure-mines to be exploited. Here and there an Englishman might dream of founding a new England beyond the Atlantic. Humphrey Gilbert tried—and failed—to start a colony in Newfoundland, whose cod-banks provided a tempestuous nursery for English and French mariners. His mantle fell on his half-brother, Walter Raleigh, who made repeated attempts to plant a settlement which, he hopefully named Virginia, after the "Virgin Queen," farther to the south. But the companies

he sent out either lacked enthusiasm or were wiped out in collisions with the Red Indians, who regarded their presence with not unwarranted suspicion.

But peace was made between Spain and England in 1604. The belief in Eldorado was growing dim, and King James would have no more raiding of the treasure-ships of a Power whose amity he desired, and presently bought at the price of Raleigh's head. The exploitation of new territories for commercial purposes—too tame an employment while King Philip's ships were fair game—offered at least possibilities for speculators; and in 1606 a charter was procured by a company of capitalists in England for establishing a colony in Virginia, with better chances of success than had attended Raleigh (now a prisoner in the Tower). The country was certainly productive, if settlers could be induced to turn it to account; and in 1607 an expedition planted Jamestown.

Colonization in North America was different in kind from anything which had hitherto been attempted in the world's history; the nearest analogy was to be found in the Greek colonization of the western Mediterranean in the seventh century B.C. It was not a planting of military garrisons in the heart of subjected states, as with the Romans. There was no destroying of an organized empire, as with Mexico and Peru. The natives of North America had an advanced tribal organization, but they were still nomadic in their habits, and had not yet reached the stage of established agricultural settlement. There was plenty of room for pale-faces and red-skins, without conquest, ejection, or enslavement. But in practice the red-skin regarded the whole territory as his own for hunting-ground or settlement, and the white man as an intruder on his preserves. There were frequent attacks, not always unprovoked, and counter-attacks; the settlers were more than once almost wiped out. But, reinforced with settlers from England of a better quality, and under vigorous and resourceful leadership, they held their own, and the "plantations," the nucleus of the British Colonial Empire, were in a few years firmly established. The community under its charter was organized on self-governing lines after the English model, with a Governor, Council, and Assembly, corresponding roughly to the Crown, the Council, and Parliament. But the elective Assembly had no control over the Governor and Council, and the Governor was nominated in England; the English Crown was the supreme authority, however much or little it might exercise its powers.

The colony of Virginia was commercial in its objects and primarily agricultural in its methods; though agriculture meant mainly the cultivation of tobacco and other products for the English market. There was but a small industrial population, and the large estates were taken up mainly by the younger sons of the English gentry,

the class who made the strength of the Church and King party in the coming civil war. Labor on the plantations was soon provided by the importation of negro slaves. In another quarter, Nova Scotia, King James endeavored with no great success to induce colonists to plant themselves by the sale of the new title of "baronet" to participators. But another type of colonist was brought into being by the efforts of the English Government at home to enforce religious uniformity.

Puritans who found in the doctrine and ceremonial favored by the Church authorities an evil savor of Popery, sought freedom to worship after their own fashion on the other side of the Atlantic. The Government was well pleased to be rid of them, and readily permitted the founding of the New England colonies, in a region much farther north. The voyage of the *Mayflower* brought the Pilgrim Fathers to New Plymouth in 1620. This group was of the rigid "Independent" type; but they were soon followed by others, Presbyterians, or Puritans who still remained within the pale of the English Church: many of them actual English landowners who were paying a heavy price for freedom of conscience. Roman Catholics too were subject to penal laws at home, and found refuge in the second "plantation" colony of Maryland.

The New Englanders had not come in search of ease or wealth, but of a liberty for themselves which they were for the most part little enough disposed to concede to others. Toleration was the logical corollary of independency, but it was accompanied by the extreme of moral rigidity, and toleration had no place in Presbyterianism. The men of New England were hard; but in their battle with circumstances they needed to be hard. The Puritan always had towards the enemy who was not of his own way of thinking something of the attitude of the early Hebrew prophets towards the Amalekites and Canaanites, and his hostile temper was reciprocated by the natives. But the New England states, left to themselves, grew in strength, and laid the foundations of a future prosperity.

The New Englanders, however, had other competitors. Their northern outpost in Maine was a buffer between them and the French, but south of them the Dutch spared from the East the energy to plant the colony of New Amsterdam at the mouth of the Hudson; and before long the expansion of the Dutch and English groups was involving them in boundary disputes. To this was largely due the first attempt at federation among the English colonies, for purposes of mutual defense. Four of the colonies formed a league in 1643, in spite of the passion for individual independence which caused its immediate practical dissolution when, five-and-twenty years later, the Dutch colony was ceded to the British.

Meanwhile, a more threatening rival was being established farther

north. In the sixteenth century, Jacques Cartier had been the pioneer of French expansion. But he had only shown the way up the St. Lawrence, and it was not till he had been dead for more than half a century that the work was taken up by Champlain. The first settlement was made at the beginning of the seventeenth century in Acadie, which for a hundred years continued to be a bone of contention with the New Englanders, though the French occupation was maintained. But in 1608 Champlain laid the foundations of the city of Quebec, from which developed the French colonization of Canada. Champlain sought and obtained the friendship of the neighboring Red Indian tribes, but by so doing he created a permanent hostility between the French and the powerful and highly organized Iroquois, the confederation of the "five nations" which was on its way to becoming a real native Power, and whose aggressive activities had filled the other native tribes with alarm.

As yet the fur trade seemed to offer the only productive promise. Nevertheless Richelieu considered it worth while to encourage plans of colonization which for the time came to nought. Buckingham had involved England in a French war, and the French Canadian expedition was captured at sea by the English, who also visited Quebec and carried Champlain himself away. When peace permitted his return, the whole French population in Canada numbered only a few score. But the moment was coming when first the Church and then the Government were to take a share in the development for which private enterprise had hitherto proved insufficient.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

#### *I.—The Mazarin Period, 1648-1660*

THE assumption of the personal direction of the government and policy of France by Louis XIV. in 1660 marks the appearance upon the European stage of a personality which dominated it for more than half a century. Louis was not a commanding genius; there was nothing of the hero about him, nor anything dæmonic. History presents us with records of sundry great men of the heroic type, some with a dæmonic admixture; and with certain extremely remarkable figures who failed to achieve the greatness commensurate with their capacities because they were not heroic but dæmonic. Louis belonged to none of these categories. He displayed a largeness of design, a magnificence of execution, and an unflinching persistence which were very nearly but not quite heroic; an absence of scruple which was very nearly but not quite dæmonic. Almost throughout his reign his ambitions kept Europe in a ferment of war; they were directed to the aggrandisement of France, but of France identified with its monarch. Louis's patriotism was a gigantic egoism. Louis's European policy was that of Richelieu; but Richelieu pursued it for the love of France, and Louis pursued it for the love of himself. It was a policy which ignored all rights except the rights of France, an entirely selfish national policy; because it ignored the rights of all others except France, it was to be condemned. But the condemnation is different when the motive is love of country and when the motive is self-glorification. In the former case the heroic quality of self-sacrifice may be present, but not in the latter; the egoist cannot be a hero.

Richelieu, France, and Louis XIV. stand to each other in relations which bear a striking resemblance to those of Bismarck, Germany, and Kaiser William II. Richelieu and Bismarck built up France and Germany into the most powerful military States in Europe, rendering the Crown supreme in each; by doing so they made Louis XIV. and William II. possible, so that each became a menace to Europe. But the quality of the menace differed in accordance with the difference between the national character of French and Germans, and

between the personal character of Louis and William. For while Louis fell short of the heroic quality, he fell short also of the demonic. Yet in one sense Louis was the prototype of William; he was the first prince who deliberately made it his ambition to be the master of Europe, the immediate ruler of one half of it, and the dictator whose behests must be obeyed by the immediate rulers of the other half.

Though Louis XIV. was king when the peace of Westphalia was made in 1648, he was still only a child, and twelve years were to pass before he grasped the reins of active authority. In the second year after the peace were born two men, one of whom was destined to check and the other to break his ambitions, William of Orange and John Churchill. The date of William's birth is significant, because it marks the moment at which the republican party in the United Provinces won the supremacy which it maintained for twenty years. Ever since William the Silent had placed himself at the head of the Netherlands revolt, the House of Orange had maintained its ascendancy in the hands of his successors, Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William II. One after the other held the civil office of Stadtholder in conjunction with those of Captain-General and Admiral-General. Theoretically the United Provinces were a confederation of seven sovereign states, each governed by its own Assembly of Estates and its own Stadtholder or civil chief. For the management of affairs of the Confederation, each province sent delegates to the States-General, the parliament of the Confederation, which appointed the Captain-General and Admiral-General, while the executive was in the hands of a Council of State. As five of the seven states made the Prince of Orange their Stadtholder, he was in effect Stadtholder of the whole. Nominations to the more important magistracies were in his hands as Stadtholder; he was head of the Army and the Navy; and he was a member of the Council of State in the States-General, and in each of the provincial states. Thus, although not nominally a sovereign, he was in effect an elected monarch in a limited monarchy. At the same time the Assembly of Estates in each province consisted of delegates from the great towns, each of which was controlled by a close hereditary corporation, an aristocracy of burgesses. One province, Holland, almost outweighed the rest collectively. It followed that in Holland especially, with its many great municipalities, the burgher circle viewed the ascendancy of the family of Orange with a distrust and jealousy which were only kept in check by two considerations, the pressure of external danger, and the conspicuous ability and moderation of the Stadtholders.

Now the peace of Westphalia removed the danger from Spain. The Stadtholder William II. had married Mary, daughter of Charles I., King of England, and, deserting the wise restraint of his prede-

cessors, had himself resolved to be numbered among the crowned heads of Europe. In 1650 he attempted a *coup d'état*. It failed. A civil war between the Republican party and a Monarchist Orange Party seemed imminent, when William died suddenly, a few weeks before the birth of his son and heir, William III. of Orange, who subsequently married another Mary Stewart and became William III. of England. Obviously, however, it would have been impracticable at this stage to press the hereditary claims of the baby William; and John De Witt, who was made Grand Pensionary of Holland, became practically supreme in the United Provinces. It was not till the young Prince of Orange was growing up that he could become the figurehead of a monarchical and popular party, opposed to the supremacy of the burgher aristocracy.

By beheading Charles I. England completely isolated herself. No government in Europe was disposed to recognize the regicide Commonwealth as a legally constituted government. But with the triumph of the Republican party in Holland, the republicans in England dreamed of a close union with the United Provinces based on their common Calvinistic Protestantism, traditional hostility to aggressive Romanism, and joint ascendancy on the seas, which was to take the place of rivalry on that element. But when the Commonwealth found its overtures rejected—overtures for the surprising project of establishing a common government with its headquarters in England—it began to turn maritime rivalry into a ground for quarrel. The Navigation Act was passed, having as its object the prohibition of the import or export of goods carried in Dutch bottoms, a measure designed to transfer to the English the carrying trade which was almost entirely in the hands of the Dutch. An obstinately fought naval war was the result, a war in which English and Dutch seamanship were evenly pitted and neither of the two great admirals, Tromp and Blake, could establish a decisive supremacy. At the end of 1653, however, Cromwell's Dictatorship was established. He became Lord Protector, and in the following year he put an end to the Dutch war, which had been none of his making. For Cromwell was thoroughly imbued with the old Elizabethan idea (not that of the queen but that of the English people) of England as the Protestant champion, the ally and leader of all Protestant States against the common enemy. This conception continued to dominate Cromwell's foreign policy, although it was now actually the case that religious differences had ceased to be the primary motive to international quarrels.

The peace of Westphalia settled for the time being the quarrels between all the belligerents except France and Spain. At the moment all the advantages lay with France, for Catalans, Portuguese, and Neapolitans were all in revolt against Spain. But the prolonged con-

test between these two Powers was suspended by the outbreak in France of the Wars of the Fronde.

Only in its initial stages was there in this civil strife any real appearances of a struggle for constitutional principles. The Crown exercised absolute power; but during the king's minority, the Crown meant Anne of Austria and Mazarin. The States-General had never possessed any real political power and had not been summoned since 1614. The Parliament of Paris, among its other functions, registered the royal decrees. It was inclined to claim that this gave it the power of vetoing a decree, making it nugatory, by refusing to register it. Practically it had taken upon itself to upset the last ordinance of Louis XIII. and to convey the regency to Anne of Austria in spite of it. The Parliament in England had resisted absolutism with notable success. The Parliament in Paris issued a sort of Petition of Right of its own, requiring immediate trial of all persons upon arrest, and claiming control of taxation. Mazarin replied by arresting the popular leader Broussel. The Paris mob arose and compelled his release. The German war was over, and the victorious Condé returned and declared himself on the side of the Parliament.

But from the moment when the nobles began to intervene, the contest assumed its true character of a struggle, not for the acquisition of political power by the Parliament—which was itself merely a body of lawyers—but for the recovery of privileges by the nobles and the overthrow of Mazarin. The Government was forced to give way, but it was only to leave Condé to assume the reins of dictatorship. A chaos of intrigues, imprisonments, and insurrections ensued, which frightened Mazarin into flight; but Anne of Austria succeeded in manoeuvring Condé into open rebellion against the authority of the Crown, whereby Turenne was brought to declare himself on the royalist or Government side.

The Spaniards in the Netherlands seized the opportunity to recover lost ground. Only the unpopularity of Mazarin, who had returned, stood in the way of the complete defeat of the Fronde, the rebel party; his second withdrawal settled the matter. Condé played the part of an inefficient Coriolanus, and was welcomed in that character by Spain. The rest of the leaders of the Fronde were exiled or put to death. The edicts which the Parliament had procured in accordance with their demands were revoked. The triumph of the Court party was complete, and in 1653 Mazarin again returned. The noblesse as a force hostile to the Crown had been finally crushed. When Absolutism was again challenged more than a century later, the attack came from a different quarter.

The civil struggle in France was at an end, and it was once more possible to carry on the war with Spain. Spanish armies led by Condé were unequally matched against French armies led by Turenne,

but decisive victory was not easily attainable. Both Powers began to think of England as a possible ally, but to both the Commonwealth was an anathema. For Cromwell, however, the primary question was whether alliance with either Power would advance the cause of Protestantism; he was quite ready to fight either or both if need be. Condé was a Huguenot fighting in alliance with Spain; yet it was not easy to believe that the leopard had changed its spots, that Spain could be anything but the arch-enemy of Protestantism. On the other hand, the Duke of Savoy set about persecuting the Protestant Vaudois; if France did not stop him, she must still be accounted as the France of St. Bartholomew's Day.

So Cromwell came to the conclusion that Spain certainly and France possibly must be dealt with as enemies. He dispatched a fleet to the West Indies, with the result that the English captured Jamaica; he addressed France in plain terms on the subject of the Vaudois. Mazarin had no wish to persecute Huguenots, nor did his conscience trouble him about obtaining military support from Puritan regicides. He agreed to Cromwell's demands; England became his ally; and in 1658 Turenne, supported by a contingent of 6,000 invincible Ironsides, was overrunning the Netherlands, won the decisive victory of the Dunes, and captured Dunkirk, which was handed over to England—to be sold to France a few years later. Blake sank the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Teneriffe, under the muzzles of the Spanish guns.

Cromwell died in September. England was again plunged into a turmoil which was ended by the Restoration of Charles II. in the spring of 1660. But Spain could not recover what she had lost. The independence of Portugal was already won, and a continuation of the struggle would only have meant more losses in the Netherlands. At the end of 1659 the peace of the Pyrenees was signed. England once more, though only for the moment, had a foothold on the Continent at Dunkirk. France finally acquired the Pyrenean provinces which had been in dispute in the south, and Artois in the northeast.

Lorraine was restored to its duke, who had sides with Spain, but upon conditions which made the province a highroad for French armies. And to seal the reconciliation between Spain and France young King Louis was to marry Maria Theresa, the eldest of the Infantas, the daughter of Philip IV. by his first wife, with whom he was to receive a handsome dowry, while she was to renounce all possible claims for herself or her offspring to the throne of Spain.

Two minor European States have enjoyed during a brief period of their history the position of first-class European Powers. Throughout the seventeenth century the fleets of the United Provinces disputed the supremacy of the seas with those of England—that is, it was constantly an open question which of the two was the more powerful. When they fought each other they fought on equal terms,

though in each of the three Anglo-Dutch wars, all of which took place in the third quarter of the century, it may be seen that victory would have rested with England, if the issues had been fought out to the bitter end, simply because her lasting power was the greater. Holland was the outstanding example or illustration of the principle which provided the point of departure of the modern State economy as expounded by Adam Smith from the economics of what is called the mercantile system, the orthodox doctrine of three centuries at least. That principle is that wealth is directly convertible into power, and that consequently the State should pursue the development of wealth generally instead of promoting particular forms of wealth at the expense of others merely because the relation of those particular forms to power is more obvious. Holland by the pursuit of wealth was able to convert it into power out of all proportion to the population or the productive capacity of the country as compared with her neighbors. She could not maintain the position, because the balance of wealth was in the long run redressed by superior productive capacity even when its operations were hampered, and by larger populations. But, temporarily, Holland through the expansion of her commerce achieved a power which by any other method would have been completely out of her reach.

While Holland illustrates the acquisition of power by a State out of proportion to her size through the indirect method of developing material wealth, Sweden illustrates the acquisition of disproportionate power by organization for war and still more by the happy accident that gave her at intervals three kings endowed with quite exceptional military talents which enabled them to accomplish with small forces almost incredible feats of arms. Gustavus Adolphus, Charles X., and Charles XII. were all captains of this exceptional type, to whom Sweden owed her astonishing success. But since Sweden lacked material resources, it was only under such captains that such success was possible for her; for her as for Holland it was inevitable that in the long run she should drop out of the ranks of the first-class Powers.

The death of Gustavus did not dissolve the power of Sweden. She still had the troops and the generals who had been trained by the great king, whose fighting quality still kept her in the front rank. Her administration during the childhood of the daughter of Gustavus remained in the hands of Oxenstiern and the efficient bureaucracy which he created. A war with Denmark, an interlude in the German war, was carried to a successful conclusion, which restored to Sweden most of the provinces of the Scandinavian peninsula (except Norway) which had still been attached to the Danish crown; and it freed her from those restrictions on her Baltic commerce which Denmark had hitherto been able to enforce through her control over the

entrance to the inland sea. But the high ambitions of Gustavus had passed out of reach; the shrewdness of young Queen Christina recognized the un wisdom of excessive territorial ambitions; and at the peace of Westphalia Sweden was satisfied with the retention of the greater part of Pomerania. But Christina's reign was brief. She did not choose to marry; she did choose to become a Roman Catholic. She saw that a Protestant must reign in Sweden, and she insisted both on her own abdication and on the succession to her throne of her cousin, who became Charles X. in 1654.

And in the meanwhile, unsuspected, the foundations were being laid in a German principality of a Power which was destined within the next hundred years to assert itself with a perfect unscrupulousness, as vigorously and unexpectedly as Sweden had asserted herself, and, unlike Sweden, with permanent effect upon the European system; a Power which was ultimately to succeed in doing what the Hapsburgs failed to do, consolidating Germany into one tremendous dominant military State. The begetter of that Power was the particularly efficient son and successor of the inefficient George William of Brandenburg—Frederick William, the Great Elector.

Brandenburg, one of the three lay electorates in Germany, apart from the kingdom of Bohemia and the newly designated electorate of Bavaria, was one of the leading principalities, but had not, as a rule, played any very distinguished part except in the days of the first Hohenzollern Elector during the fifteenth century. Besides Brandenburg itself, the Elector possessed, or claimed, sundry territories on the Rhine, and also the duchy of East Prussia, which lay not within the Empire but within Poland. This had been acquired as a duchy by Albert of Hohenzollern, the last grand master of the Teutonic Knights to whom it had previously appertained; and from him it had passed to the Brandenburg branch of the family. Thus, the Elector's territories lay in three separate regions, completely isolated from each other.

Frederick William was alive to the extremely inadequate part played by his parent in the Thirty Years' War. He was himself a sincere Protestant, as he afterwards proved by twice declining the throne of Poland, the acceptance of which would have involved a change of his religion. It appeared to him that the thing needed for the security of North German Protestantism was that there should be a North German State powerful enough by itself to give pause to any attempts at the coercion of Northern Protestantism. Here was one motive for consolidating Brandenburg, that it might take its place as the head of North German Protestantism. This object being assumed, it became easy to regard the strengthening and consolidation of Brandenburg at the expense of its neighbors as a highly meritorious aim entirely in the public interest. From the be-

ginning to the end of his long reign, Frederick pursued this aim with a single eye, and with no inclination to place himself at a disadvantage by yielding to such moral scruples as might have touched a man of finer mould; although, at the same time, his unscrupulosity did not transgress the conventional bounds of his time.

To attain his ends, the immediate objects in view were the complete control of his Prussian duchy freed from the sovereignty of Poland, the acquisition of the whole of Pomerania, which would give Brandenburg a strong if not a predominant position on the Baltic, and the organization of all his dominions under his own absolute authority; for all of which purposes he required an effective army. He had withdrawn himself from the distraction of the Thirty Years' War by making a separate treaty with the Swedes shortly after his accession. By the treaty of Westphalia he had recovered a portion of Pomerania, though the better part of it went to Sweden, for which he had been given territorial compensation in the shape of secularized bishoprics, with which he was by no means well satisfied. Since that time he had found sufficient occupation in the work of organization.

Now, in 1655, King Charles X. of Sweden determined to attack John Casimir, King of Poland, who refused to recognize him as King of Sweden, just as Sigismund had refused to recognize Gustavus Adolphus. Frederick William designed to use the opportunity to attack Sweden in alliance with Denmark, and so to recover Pomerania, and perhaps extort from Poland the independence of the duchy of East Prussia. But Charles, having dealt successfully with John Casimir, got wind of the Elector's scheme and marched upon East Prussia. The Elector was not strong enough to resist, and was obliged to acknowledge Charles instead of John Casimir as his suzerain in East Prussia.

After this treaty of Königsberg, Frederick William, as Duke of Prussia, had to send troops to help Charles in his next Polish campaign. Charles defeated the Poles in a great battle, but Russia opened an attack on her own account, while Denmark was threatening an invasion of Sweden. In the face of the new danger, Charles tried to secure Frederick William by the concession of the independence of East Prussia, and returned to Sweden. Thereupon Frederick William offered his own alliance to John Casimir instead of Charles, upon condition that his own independent sovereignty in Prussia should be confirmed.

In the next year, 1657, Charles dealt with Denmark, overrunning the Danish mainland in the summer and autumn, and then, in an amazing winter campaign, marched his troops over the frozen sea and reduced the Danish islands. But the Swedish king had alarmed every one concerned with the Baltic trade—England and Holland,

as well as Denmark and Brandenburg. Even Charles must have been crushed by the threatened combination; but he was saved from that disaster by death. The Swedish crown passed to his son, Charles XI., who was a child, and the government again fell under oligarchical control. The oligarchy could not take up the work of the warrior king, and peace was established by a series of treaties—Oliva, Copenhagen, and Kardis. John Casimir of Poland resigned his pretensions to the Swedish throne, and to the Polish sovereignty over Prussia, where Frederick William now acknowledged no suzerain. Denmark gave up to Sweden the provinces which she still held on the Swedish peninsula. Curiously enough, it was probably Denmark that actually profited most by the treaties in which she had surrendered most. For a reaction followed against the nobility, whose independence had hitherto paralyzed the royal power; they were deprived of their privileges, which they had misused in the interests of their class. And thus Denmark achieved that centralization of the government in the control of the Crown, which in every state on the European continent had proved the necessary condition of terminating feudal disintegration.

These same years witness the resuscitation of another Power, which, so far as Western Europe was concerned, had attracted little attention for three-quarters of a century. Since the battle of Lepanto, the Ottomans in Europe had been almost inactive under a series of Sultans distinguished for nothing except sensuality and cruelty. Latterly they had been again engaged in a maritime war with Venice, now no longer a Power of first-rate consequence even upon the seas. Yet such was the anarchy of the Ottoman Empire that Venice was attaining a definite ascendancy when Mohammed Kiuprili was appointed Grand Vizier in 1656, the Sultan, Mohammed IV., being a boy of fifteen. Kiuprili grasped the reins of government with a strong hand, though he was already an old man. Discipline was rigorously enforced in the army, disorder was everywhere mercilessly repressed. In twelve months the tide had turned against the Venetians, and the renewal of the active aggressive movement of the Ottomans began with an attack on the semi-independent province of Transylvania, and the assertion therein of the Turkish sovereignty.

## *II.—The Aggression of Louis XIV., 1661-1678*

In 1660 Mazarin retired from the active direction of the French government, though King Louis treated him as a pupil his master until the Cardinal's death early in the following year. No new minister took Mazarin's place as virtually the supreme ruler; from that time all were ministers in the strict sense, servants of the

king, administrators carrying out his orders, counsellors tendering advice, but—whether or not the initiative of suggestion lay with them—waiting always upon the king's will in action. And his first years were peaceful enough. Richelieu and Mazarin had given to France new boundaries, strengthening her immensely whether for defense or for aggression; for the moment there was no need either for defense or for aggression. The cardinals had finally destroyed feudalism as a political force, though in its social aspect it still continued rampant; they had established the absolute supremacy of the Crown, but they had been neither financiers nor administrators. The administration and national finance were both in a bad way, and in much need of reform; what Sully had done in the past had long been undone. The reform was not taken in hand by Colbert, the industrious servant whom Mazarin had commended to his master.

As under Sully there was a purging of officialdom, so that the extremely substantial proportion of the revenue collected from the country which had gone to the illegitimate enrichment of officials again flowed into the State Treasury. Sinccures were swept away. The taxes which were laid upon the poor, while the rich were exempted from paying them, were reduced; duties were imposed upon articles of consumption which touched the rich more than the poor. Colbert, like Sully, was an uncompromising Protectionist; but he applied his protection in different fashion for the fostering of other industries than agriculture—industries which were fostered or actually created by State aid, while the foreign competitor was kept at arm's length by heavy tariffs. The protected industries flourished, if the consumer had to pay more for the product. The conditions in France at the time were precisely those under which everything that can be said for Protection was most favorably exemplified. That she profited at the time can hardly be questioned; whether persistence in the system was to her advantage after the young industries were thoroughly established is another matter. Industries nursed by the State lose the inducement to enterprise and improvement which is provided by competition, though at the outset the attempt to establish them has only been made worth while by the security against risk provided by State aid.

As the State fostered industry so also it fostered commerce. While England had established her great trading companies—the East India Company, the colonizing companies, and others—by private enterprise, with no other protection than a guaranteed monopoly under a State charter, French companies—East Indian, West Indian, and others—were, in France, created under the ægis of the State, and, as a necessary consequence, under State control. Each of the two systems had merit and defects of its own, but there was a significant difference in the result. The British companies could afford to pay

for their privileges; the French companies had to be subsidized by the Government.

But the development of maritime commerce involved for France, as it had involved for England, the development of a fighting marine service and the creation of a navy. It was the direct result of Colbert's administration that there was a time during the last quarter of the seventeenth century when the French fleet was able to hold its own against either English or Dutch.

In 1657, the Emperor Ferdinand III. had died, and was succeeded by Leopold I. In 1600, not twelve months before the death of Mazarin, Charles III. was recalled to the throne of England. In 1665 Spain was at last forced to acknowledge the independence of Portugal under the dynasty of Braganza, and in the same year Philip IV. died, leaving his crown to the sickly child, Charles II.—or Carlos, as it may be more convenient to call him, in order to avoid confusion with the King of England. The change from Ferdinand to Leopold was of no great importance. The death of Philip gave immediate prominence to one question of succession, and introduced less prominently another question of still greater material importance which for five-and-thirty years seemed to be perpetually on the verge of demanding an instant solution—a solution perpetually deferred because King Carlos continued to live instead of dying, as he was expected to do. The restoration of Charles II., the pensioner of King Louis, was of importance because it placed on the English throne a king manipulated English foreign policy with a single object in view—that of transferring money from King Louis's pocket into his own, without either revealing the fact to his subjects or otherwise endangering his crown.

The succession questions in connection with Spain derived their importance from the marriage of Louis XIV. to the Infanta Maria Theresa. She was the daughter of Philip's first wife; Carlos was the son, and the younger Infanta Margaret Theresa was the daughter, of his second wife; she was married to the Emperor Leopold. There was no doubt that Carlos was the heir to the Spanish throne; and it was clear that in the ordinary course, if Carlos died without issue, his eldest sister, the wife of Louis XIV., would be his legitimate successor. But this claim was expressly renounced on her behalf under the marriage treaty, so that Margaret Theresa, the wife of the Emperor, was the heiress-presumptive. But the eldest sister's renunciation was more or less conditional upon the payment by Spain of her promised dowry of 500,000 crowns. Until that dowry should be paid, which, as a matter of fact, it never was, there was always a possibility of setting up a far from untenable claim to the succession on behalf of Maria Theresa and her offspring—a possibility never lost sight of either by Louis or by Leopold.

A second question, not quite so important, but more immediate, arose from the fact that Maria Theresa was the daughter of Philip's first wife, while Carlos was the son of the second. There existed a local custom by which any child of the first marriage, even though a girl, still claimed priority of succession over any child of a later marriage, even though a boy. Louis was prepared to assert this claim on behalf of his wife in respect of the Netherlands; assuming it to be in itself valid, it was not affected by her renunciation of the Spanish crown. The acquisition of the Netherlands would be of immense military value to France, and not without naval advantages also, while it would be a stepping-stone to such an ascendancy over Holland, if not to its actual annexation, as would be intolerable to intelligent English statemanship. If France were once in effective control of all the ports on the coast line west of the Texel, the danger involved to England needs no emphasizing.

Louis's great ambitions were not yet fully formed, but in the first years of his reign he helped Portugal to win her independence decisively, because Philip declined to accept his views as to the Netherlands succession. Also he encouraged a renewal of the war between English and Dutch, in order that the two maritime Powers might beat each other to pieces. Their mutual trade jealousies made the matter easy. King Charles had not yet formulated his plans. Dutch and English drifted into a war in which the two fleets fought many stubborn engagements, generally indecisive, and in the outcome a peace was made somewhat in favor of the English, by which the Dutch ceded the colony which they had planted on the North American seaboard, and to which the name of New York was given. Incidentally, while negotiations for the peace were in progress, half the English fleet was put out of commission, and the Dutch seized the opportunity to enter the Thames mouth and sail up the Medway; a disgrace which filled the souls of the English with wrath, but was not significant of any actual naval superiority and did not affect the terms of the treaty. The event, however, enabled Charles to get rid of the minister Clarendon, whose services, supremely useful in establishing the king on the throne, were now becoming embarrassing. The king's plans for dipping his hand in King Louis's purse were now taking shape, and Clarendon was in the way.

The treaty of Breda was signed in 1667. In the same year Louis, having failed to obtain from Spain by diplomacy the recognition of his wife's claims in the Netherlands, opened hostilities. Flanders was invaded; town after town was forced to surrender, and French troops under Condé entered Franche-Comté, and brought it rapidly to submission. Charles was disposed to give Louis a hint that his friendship was worth buying; England, Holland, and Sweden entered upon the Triple Alliance with the avowed object of inducing Louis

to make peace on reasonable terms, which the French king promptly did. The fortresses captured in the Netherlands remained in his hands, while he withdrew from Franche-Comté. Not fear of the Triple Alliance, but a secret agreement with the Emperor Leopold as to the ultimate settlement of the respective claims of their wives to Spanish territory was the real reason of the pacification.

The aims of Louis, and the secret personal aims of Charles, were conveniently capable of accommodation. Charles wanted to be secured against rebellion, to be independent of Parliament, to reinstate Romanism, and to enjoy himself. Louis was contemplating the suppression of Protestantism in his own dominions, and the assumption of the leadership of aggressive Catholicism. Louis wished to suppress the Dutch Republic, and it appeared to him that the means thereto would be the elevation of young William of Orange to the Stadtholdership as a dependent of France. William was the nephew of Charles; it would suit Charles very well to have his nephew at the head of the Dutch state. Charles, in 1670, made with Louis the secret treaty of Dover. He was to do his best to restore Romanism in England; he was to aid Louis against Holland; he was to leave France a free hand against Spain; and in return he was to receive a substantial sum of money and military support in the event of a rebellion. Louis's diplomacy secured the neutrality of the Emperor, of most of the German princes, except the Elector of Brandenburg, whose robust Protestantism smelt danger, and of Sweden. In 1672 France and England declared war upon Holland.

The Republic appeared to be doomed. De Witt had persuaded himself to believe in French friendship. Military preparations had been utterly neglected; all war expenditure had been concentrated upon the fleet. French armies swept into the United Provinces; the mob at the Hague rose and murdered the Grand Pensionary. The Orange party proclaimed William Stadtholder and Captain-General like his ancestors. The Dutch proved themselves as indomitable as of old. Their fleet fought the combined French and English fleets, and beat them in the battle of Southwold Bay. The young Stadtholder never dreamed of allowing himself to become Louis's puppet. He gave unexpected justification to the blind partisanship which had set at the head of the State. He became the very incarnation of the national defiance to Louis. The army which had threatened to sweep irresistibly over the Provinces was itself irresistibly driven back by the opening of the dykes which laid the country under water.

The first French successes alarmed the Emperor, who discarded his secret agreements and united himself with the Elector of Brandenburg against France. England was but a broken reed for Louis to lean on. The English people had no heart in a war the meaning of which they could not grasp. They were sore with the Dutch, re-

membering the sound of the guns on the Thames; still they could not see what they were fighting for, and in any case they had no liking for a French alliance. As for Charles, his nephew was safely established in Holland, and he had no further interest in guaranteeing the Dutch Republic. He certainly did not mean to quarrel with Louis, but saw no reason to exert himself. Louis suddenly discovered that he had no effective ally, while half Europe was drawing into a coalition against him.

In spite of brilliant operations conducted by Turenne in 1673, the coalition grew. Early in 1674 England definitely made peace and withdrew from the conflict. The brilliancy of the French leadership, and the valor of French armies, maintained the war for another four years, though Turenne was killed and Condé retired in 1675. Before Turenne's death Franche-Comté was for the second time overrun, not again to be let go. A year later France achieved her first notable maritime success, when a Dutch squadron, under Ruyter, in the Mediterranean, met its match in the French Admiral Duquesne, and Ruyter himself was killed. Colbert's administration was bearing fruit at last, for at the beginning of the war the French fleet had done nothing, leaving all the hard work to their English allies. With the Mediterranean battles, France entered the field as the rival of English and Dutch upon the seas; and nearly twenty years passed before she was decisively relegated to a lower plane.

By the end of 1677 all the belligerents were disposed to peace with the exception of William of Orange, who was firmly convinced of the necessity for disabling France and of the power of the allies to effect that object, since the strain of the war was less intolerable for them than for the country which was standing at bay alone against a circle of foes. If the rest of the allies had shared William's energy and foresight, Louis would have been beaten to his knees. But they did not see the necessity. William himself was not one of those commanders who appeal to popular imagination; with him successes were rare, though the enemy could scarcely ever reap a substantial profit from the defeats he suffered. There was a serious risk that the Republican party would again become predominant in Holland. Spain's old fighting power was almost gone; the Netherlands were a long way from Austria. The Elector of Brandenburg was threatened, in Pomerania and Prussia, by the Swedes, Louis's only allies.

So in 1678 the peace of Nimwegen was signed, in spite of the efforts of William, who, four days later, made an unsuccessful attack upon the French forces under Marshal Luxembourg. William's detractors believed that he knew that peace had been signed, but still hoped to force a renewal of war by his action; but it is at least possible that he had no definite knowledge of the signing of the peace. Charles meanwhile had been playing his own intricate game

of deluding the public into believing that he would yield to popular opinion and go to war with France, while secretly scheming to sell his support to Louis at a handsome price. The marriage of his niece Mary, the daughter of his brother and heir-presumptive James, Duke of York, to his nephew, William of Orange, served the double purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the English and conveying a warning to Louis.

The peace of Nimwegen was a remarkable triumph for the French king. He had begun a war of plain, inexcusable aggression; by doing so he had brought nearly all Europe down upon France. France had stood at bay defiant, and after six years of fighting against such odds found herself with her territories increased by the annexation of Franche-Comté. Unfortunately for himself and for Europe, Louis, although he had in fact been completely foiled in the special purpose with which he had set out, drew the conclusion that France was already more than a match for the rest of Europe, and that universal dominion was still within his reach. Yet the one foe that had fought him whole-heartedly, the foe he had intended to bring to complete submission, the Dutch Republic, had defied him successfully, had not lost a rod of territory, and was in far better condition to face a fresh attack than she had been when the war broke out.

Meanwhile three of the belligerents had been engaged in a different war area, the Swedes as allies of Louis, Brandenburg and Denmark as allies in the Coalition. The Swedes had been launched against Brandenburg in order to create a diversion in the east. In 1675 Frederick William, hastening back from the Rhine to protect his own dominions, fell upon the Swedes and defeated them utterly at Fehrbellin. The invasion of Sweden itself by the Danes was repulsed but the Elector followed up his own victory by gradually mastering the whole of Pomerania—vainly enough as it turned out; for when the treaty of Nimwegen was signed, Louis, after his lordly fashion, intervened on behalf of his ally. Neither the Emperor nor any one else was ready to come to the support of Brandenburg and Denmark, and the treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye restored to Sweden everything that had been taken from her.

At the same time the seeds of feud were sown between the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, which were to bear fruit in startling fashion some sixty years later. The Elector of Brandenburg had claims to certain territories in Silesia, a province of the Bohemian kingdom, the duchies of Jägerndorf and Liegnitz. Jägerndorf had been the property of the Great Elector's uncle, who being a Protestant, had opposed the Emperor Ferdinand as King of Bohemia; Ferdinand had in consequence confiscated the duchy. The Elector of Brandenburg protested against the confiscation, and vainly

claimed the succession for himself. The case of Liegnitz was different. Early in the sixteenth century the then Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Liegnitz had entered upon a pact under which, if the line of either became extinct, its hereditary possessions should go to the other. The line of Liegnitz became extinct while Frederick was fighting the Swedes in Pomerania. The Hapsburgs as kings of Bohemia from Ferdinand I. downwards had denied the validity of the pact, as having been made without the royal authority. Therefore when the last Duke of Liegnitz died, the Emperor Leopold ignored the pact and took possession of Liegnitz. When Frederick William found himself robbed of the fruits of his victories in Pomerania by the action of Louis XIV. and the inaction of his own ally the Emperor, he sought compensation by asserting his claims both to Liegnitz and to Jägerndorf. Leopold entirely repudiated both claims. Technically the law was probably on Leopold's side; also he was in possession. But the circumstances at least entitled the Elector to a generous consideration of his claims which was not accorded to him. He was not in a position to enforce them, but the opportunity fell to his great-grandson, and was not neglected. It may here be observed in anticipation that before the Great Elector died he formally accepted a compromise under which his claims both on Jägerndorf and Liegnitz were withdrawn and the district called the circle of Schweibus was handed over in their place. But unknown to the Elector, his son was at the same time tricked into giving a promise that on his accession Schweibus was to be again surrendered. The Crown Prince kept his word, though he discovered that he had been tricked. But he naturally claimed that the restoration of Schweibus cancelled the withdrawal of the claims to the territories for which it had been substituted.

### *III.—The League of Augsburg, 1678-1697.*

The peace of Nimwegen marks the high-tide of Louis's success, though he imagined it to be merely a halting-place from which further advance was presently to be made. It was true that he had failed in his primary object, the domination of Holland by France; nevertheless she had matched herself against the European Coalition, and at the end of six years of war was the only Power that had strengthened her position. Her military administration was still in the hands of Louvois, who, though no statesman, was an excellent army chief. Turenne and Condé were gone, but Luxembourg and Catinat were reputed the ablest commanders in Europe with the exception of the great Pole, John Sobieski. If a skilful diplomacy should divide his enemies, Louis could look forward to beating them in detail; and French diplomacy was the most skilled in Europe.

Even as matters stood, Louis felt secure in continuing a domineering and aggressive policy. At the treaty of the Pyrenees, the terms upon which the newly acquired frontier territories and towns had been ceded were indefinite, leaving it by no means clear whether certain territories had passed to France as "dependencies" of ceded towns, and whether sundry estates were or were not held by immediate vassals of the Empire! who, under the treaties, were as a group still attached to the Empire, not to France, but without having been specifically identified. The settlement of these same questions had remained in suspense for twenty years. Louis now resolved that they should all be decided in his own favor. He set up courts by his own authority which were called Chambers of Reunion, to investigate and adjudicate upon the disputed questions. Naturally, they found the French title good in every case. Louis thereupon enforced his own authority, while no Power ventured actually to stand forward to champion the other side. Louis's ingenious theory of law, backed by armed forces, actually secured him additional territories and additional fortresses, including Strassburg and Luxembourg. Further, on the death of the Elector Palatine Charles (the grandson of Frederick) without issue, Louis laid claim to a large part of the Palatinate on behalf of the late Elector's sister, who was married to Louis's brother, Philip of Orleans.

Religion as an international question had almost ceased to count; but Louis revived its importance, though in different shape. During the first years of his active reign, he had not departed from the principles of toleration; but as time advanced, he fell increasingly under Jesuit influence, and also under that of an austere religious lady of unimpeachable character, Madame de Maintenon. At the same time he found himself, as King of France, opposed to papal claims to authority over the Church in France. He carried the French clergy with him in issuing a fourfold declaration, repudiating the authority of the Pope in things temporal and in respect of the usages of the Gallician Church, and affirming that the authority of General Councils is higher than that of the Pope, and that papal decisions are not irrevocable until confirmed by a General Council. These declarations were the king's answer to a papal pronouncement upon a novel claim put forward by Louis himself in 1653. By an ancient custom, not in dispute, the ecclesiastical emoluments within the Crown domains were, during vacancy, appropriated to the Crown. Louis claimed that this right, called the *regale*, applied not only within the Crown domains, but all over France. Innocent XI., being appealed to by certain of the bishops, pronounced against the claim; hence the declaration against the papal authority.

The result was that Louis found himself on the one side zealous to assert himself as the champion of orthodoxy and the hammer of

heretics, and on the other in direct opposition to the Pope. Henry VIII., under somewhat similar circumstances, had selected the Pope as the enemy to be fought, even at the cost of adopting a comparatively conciliatory attitude towards heretics. Louis reversed the position. There was no danger of papal domination, and consequently no need to conciliate heretics; but he could emphasize the genuineness of his own orthodoxy by aggressive action against heresy. The Huguenots had long ceased to be a political danger; their cause was no longer that of an aristocratic faction; they themselves were now merely the most valuable part of the industrial population. Disabilities were imposed upon them; deserters from their religion were rewarded; penalties were multiplied—when they sought escape by emigration, emigration was forbidden. The unhappy Huguenots were goaded into local insurrections; whereupon troops were quartered on them, and they were subjected to the brutal persecution known as the Dragonnades. Finally the whole fabric of toleration built up by Henry IV. and Richelieu was demolished at one stroke by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. By the same stroke, much of Colbert's work in the building up of French industries was ruined, since, in spite of all anti-emigration edicts, something like half a million out of the flower of the French industrial population succeeded in escaping to Protestant regions, and especially to England, Holland, and Brandenburg.

Now, to the Protestant countries it appeared that the days of Alva were returning; but there was the important difference between the European conditions under Philip II. and the European conditions under Louis XIV., that while Popes had applauded Alva's persecutions and the Paris Massacre, Pope Innocent entirely disapproved of the French king's proceedings, which were in consequence by no means whole-heartedly endorsed by the Roman Catholic world. The development of Louis's persecuting policy brought him no adherents among Roman Catholic princes, who were much more afraid of his political ambitions than anxious to stamp out heresy with a strong hand. The aggressive policy of France, never really masked, had recently been strongly emphasized by the seizure of Luxembourg and Strassburg, and, almost simultaneously with the Edict of Nantes, by the surprising claim to a portion of the Palatinate. During 1686 and 1687 the defensive League of Augsburg was being formed, combining Catholic and Protestant states, Spain and Holland, Austria and Sweden, Bavaria and Saxony, and one after another of the German and Italian principalities, of either religious complexion.

Hitherto two particular circumstances had favored Louis, the distraction of Austria and the adaptability of Charles II. Austria had been distracted first by a struggle with the Hungarians, fostered by

the Turks, which had been going on during the greater part of the recent war, and, after the peace of Nimwegen, by the direct attack of the Ottomans, aided by the Hungarians, upon Vienna itself. But, by the brilliant intervention of John Sobieski, Vienna was saved in 1683; the Turks were hurled back; in 1685 they were almost entirely ejected from Hungary, and in 1687 a second battle of Mohacs reversed the former verdict and resulted in a complete victory over the Turks; who for the time at least ceased to be a menace, while the Imperial authority extended over very much more of Hungary than it had covered during the last half century.

Still more ominous were the impending changes in England. In that country the French alliance had at no time been popular. It had been preserved only by the almost incredible ingenuity with which Charles hoodwinked his ministers and the public. Danby, whom Charles had selected as his instrument when it was no longer possible to delude Shaftesbury, was himself hostile to France. Moreover, the king had realized at the very beginning of the Dutch war that his dream of restoring Romanism in England could never materialize. The portentous invention known as the Popish Plot demonstrated the vehemence of popular hostility to popery. Nevertheless Charles by becoming Louis's pensioner had succeeded at last in making himself independent of parliamentary supplies, and would probably have succeeded in preventing the country from interfering with the designs of his paymaster.

But, in 1685, Charles died and was succeeded by his brother, James II., who was wholly devoid of his predecessor's astuteness. Like Charles, he wished to restore Romanism and to reign as an absolute monarch; unlike Charles, he did not realize that a persistent attempt to restore Romanism would cost him his crown. On his accession, there were two securities for his throne. One was the support of the Church-and-Throne element, the High Anglicans and cavaliers; he killed their loyalty by attacks upon the Anglican clergy and by the promotion of Roman Catholics. The other security lay in the divisions of the Opposition, who had done their best to exclude him from the succession. Unfortunately for themselves they had chosen as the Protestant candidate the Duke of Monmouth, an illegitimate son of King Charles, instead of naming the actual next heir to James, his Protestant daughter Mary, the wife of William of Orange. By this selection the Opposition leaders cut themselves away from any close association with William, who would certainly never stir a finger to help Monmouth to the throne to which, sooner or later, his own wife and his own children—if he had any—would presumably succeed in the natural course. But in the first few months of James's reign this security was removed. Monmouth raised the banner of insurrection; the

rebellion was crushed, and Monmouth was executed. From that moment, the only possible alternative candidate for James's throne was his daughter Mary, with her husband. The early accession of William and Mary, whether by the death or the deposition of King James, and the interposition of William in order to hasten that event, were thus brought within the range of practical politics; though William, still being all but secure of the ultimate succession, was not eager to hurry matters.

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes intensified the sentiment of antagonism to Louis both in Holland and in England, and the sentiment of antagonism to "popery" in the latter country. It was immediately followed by aggressive action on behalf of Romanism by James, still further rousing popular hostility, and by aggressive political action on the part of Louis, which in Holland restored the ascendancy of William and the anti-French party which had been somewhat shaken. In 1688 the unexpected birth of a Prince of Wales interposed an heir-apparent between the crown of England and Mary, hitherto heiress-presumptive. Thus William and Mary had an entirely new reason for answering any appeal from England to intervene and secure the succession for themselves. And the appeal came, not only from the Whigs, the normal Opposition, but also from a substantial section of Anglicans and Constitutional Cavaliers who had been roused beyond endurance by the king's reckless attacks on the Church and his assumption of absolute powers which the Cavalier Parliament under Charles II. had flatly repudiated. The accession of William to the throne of England would inevitably mean the accession of England itself to the circle of the overt enemies of King Louis.

Nevertheless, with a strange infatuation, Louis proceeded on his way, apparently incredulous of the danger that threatened him. A direct attack upon Holland would have paralyzed the Republic, preventing William from active intervention in England; but Louis chose instead to direct an immediate attack upon Germany, to make good his claim upon the Palatinate, and the establishment of his own instead of the Imperial nominee as Archbishop and Elector of Cologne. Holland was safe for the moment; William was set free to land in England; the king's troops deserted him; James himself fled from the country and took refuge with the French king; and the crown of England was offered to and accepted by William III. and Mary, on the false but popularly accepted hypothesis that the baby prince was a supposititious child.

The war of the League of Augsburg was singularly weary and unprofitable. Louis's enemies were no readier for war or for effective co-operation than most other coalitions of a similar extensive and miscellaneous kind. Through 1689 and 1690 William of

Orange was fully occupied with his new kingdom. Louis's first operations on the Continent, directed upon the Rhine provinces, were successful enough; but the sheer numbers of his foes and their presence on every frontier as well as on the seas compelled the French forces to be so widely distributed that local successes could never be carried to a decisive conclusion. Savoy was smitten by Catinat; Catalonia was invaded; separate French armies were on the Rhine, on the Moselle, and in the Netherlands, and everywhere they held their own; but the lack of concentration prevented any conclusive achievement.

Though Colbert was dead, this was one of the two moments in the history of France when her navy had an actual ascendancy, though it was only due to the neglect from which the English navy had suffered during the closing years of King Charles. Louis would seem to have attacked the Palatinate in 1688 as the result of a miscalculation. He imagined that the landing in England of the Prince of Orange would merely force King James to a closer dependence on himself, while diverting William from the struggle on the Continent. The theory was upset when James fled to France instead of fighting for his crown; but his restoration would be a serious blow to the Coalition.

The French fleet was now so powerful that communication between France and Ireland was uninterrupted. Thither James betook himself, and during 1689 he was still in effect king of that island with the exception of its northeast portion. But neither Louis nor William took immediate measures to establish a definite supremacy in Ireland. It was not till 1690 that William himself landed in the country and defeated James at the battle of the Boyne; nor is it at all clear that the Boyne would have been a decisive victory if James had not for the second time lost heart and retired to France; and it was only in the course of 1691 that Ireland was brought into complete subjection. The strangest feature of the situation, however, was the failure of Louis to bring sea-power effectively into play. He could apparently have carried troops to Ireland at pleasure; and it would seem that he could even have prevented William from carrying troops there. In the spring of 1690 the French defeated the English in Bantry Bay, and the battle of the Boyne was fought on the day following the most decisive defeat ever inflicted on the English fleet, in a battle off Beachy Head.

Although French troops were carried to Ireland in 1691 they did no more than help to defer the complete subjugation for some months. From 1691 onwards, William was generally engaged for the better part of the year upon campaigning or diplomacy in Holland. Year after year the campaigns resolved themselves into the sieges of great fortresses, varied by an occasional indecisive battle. In 1692,

however, there was a decisive engagement at sea. France retained a brief ascendancy after the battle of Beachy Head, but within a couple of years the English fleet had recovered from the effects of disaster and neglect. In 1692, when James designed an invasion of England, it took the seas in greater force than the French could muster. The French admiral Tourville, against his judgment but in obedience to imperative orders, challenged the English admiral Russell to an engagement. The result of the battle of La Hogue was the destruction of the greater part of the French fleet. It was not indeed annihilated, but no attempt was made to restore its lost efficiency. Neither Louis nor Louvois had ever understood Colbert's conception of the fleet as a primary engine of power; to them it was merely an auxiliary to the army. Louvois was dead now as well as Colbert, and less importance than ever was attached to the navy. After La Hogue the English supremacy of the seas was never challenged again for nearly ninety years.

Apart from La Hogue the balance of success, though never great, seemed generally to be somewhat in favor of Louis until 1695, when William recaptured Namur, which had fallen to the French some time before. This success of the allies may be regarded as the turning-point of the war. Luxembourg, the best of Louis's generals, was dead. Louis averted pressing danger by buying over Savoy in 1696, thus securing himself from attack on the Italian side; and in the next year a peace conference was opened at Ryswick. None of the Powers wished to go on fighting, but the allies had each their own several and inconsistent objects in view.

Practically the settlement was arrived at by an agreement between Louis and William, who brought pressure to bear upon the allies to accept the proposed terms. William himself was forced by the pressure both of English and Dutch to acquiesce reluctantly in terms which he regarded as too favorable to Louis. The French king was to recognize William as legitimate King of England and Scotland, though he refused to dismiss James from his own dominions. All that had been taken from Spain since the peace of Nimwegen was to be restored; the frontier towns of the Spanish Netherlands were to be occupied by Dutch garrisons. All had been acquired from the Empire since Ninwegen was to be restored with the exception of Strassburg. The Duke of Lorraine, whose father had been ejected by Louis, was to be reinstated; the claim on the Palatinate was commuted for cash, and the French claimant to the Electorship of Cologne was withdrawn. The cessions formerly extorted from Savoy had already been resigned.

Louis had gained absolutely nothing by the war; he had lost the spoils obtained from the Chambers of Reunion—Strassburg alone excepted—which but for the war would have remained with him.

Also he had been compelled to acquiesce in the strengthening of the Dutch frontier, in the establishment of William of Orange on the throne of England, and in the intimate union of England with Holland. Also France had lost that maritime equality which Colbert had won for her. Yet Louis was unconscious of defeat, though he was obliged to acknowledge a check. Once more he paused, but only by way of preparation for the pursuit of still more extensive designs.

#### *IV.—The Ottoman Aggression, 1660-1699*

The absorbing interest of our narrative is habitually to be found in Western Europe—that is to say, in the countries of the Continent which lay west of the eastern boundary of the Empire. In part no doubt this was due to the fact that British national interests until the eighteenth century were never in obviously direct contact with the affairs of East Europe—with the Baltic rivalries of Poland, Sweden, and Russia, or with the Turkish Empire and the Hungarian kingdoms of the Hapsburgs. The whole eastern area seems remote, rather unreal, and distressingly unpronounceable. But in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth, of supreme importance were taking place in the east and north.

The advance of Brandenburg belongs quite as much to the history of this region as to the history of the West; for in the days of the Great Elector the Powers which stood in Brandenburg's way were mainly Sweden and Poland. We have already traced the story of this contest down to the death of Frederick William. Of the fortunes of Brandenburg during the reign of his son Frederick it is unnecessary to speak in detail. That prince was not an astute or energetic politician. The boundaries of Brandenburg were not extended by him. But it was during his rule that the Elector of Brandenburg was included in the circle of European crowned heads by his recognition as King of Prussia, the title being taken from his duchy of East Prussia, situated outside the borders of the Empire. The Elector Frederick became Frederick I., King of Prussia. In 1713 he was succeeded by his son who, bearing the same name as the Great Elector, became Frederick William I., of Prussia. The Prussian kingdom came formally into existence in 1701.

Concerning Sweden also there is little to be said in the years between 1679, when the war with Brandenburg was closed, and 1697 when Charles XI. of Sweden was succeeded by his fifteen-year-old son, Charles XII. Charles XI. made no attempt to emulate his father's military feats; he chose the less striking part of establishing a beneficent despotism which was the one practical alternative to the aristocratic domination that in Sweden, as of old in Scotland, was periodi-

cally renewed by the accession of minors to the throne. Charles himself had been only four years old when his father died in 1660, so that the complete re-establishment, between 1679 and 1697, of the supremacy of law under the Crown was no small task.

Until the active rule of Peter the Great was established in Russia, that Power had presented itself only as an unsuccessful competitor with Sweden and Poland in the attempt to establish itself on the shores of the Baltic. Russia, with its capital at Moscow, was wholly an inland state. She had no port on the Baltic. Sweden had all the Baltic provinces north of Riga and the river Dwina. Poland, Brandenburg, Sweden, and Denmark shared the rest; the Black Sea was a Turkish lake. The only port possessed by Russia was Archangel on the White Sea, icebound for the greater part of the year. Peter succeeded to the Russian throne in 1682, when he was ten years old. He created the Russian Empire, but before he set about doing so he had to establish his own despotic authority in Russia, which was still unorganized. Russia does not begin to count effectively till the close of the century.

In the sixteenth century, when the Jagellon dynasty was reigning in Poland, there had been some possibility of her being organized on Western lines as a powerful State with a strong central government. With the lapse of the direct line, and the assertion of the principle that the monarchy was not hereditary but electoral, that prospect passed away. Princes who were of the Jagellon and the Vasa kin continued to rule, but enjoyed very little power. John Casimir, the last of the quasi-Jagellons, abdicated in 1668; and from that time the monarchy became unequivocally electoral. Two Polish nobles in succession were raised to the throne, Michael Wisnowiecky in 1669, and John Sobieski in 1674. But when Sobieski died in 1697 elections to the crown of Poland became mainly a matter of foreign influences, on one occasion involving a European war, and on most occasions connected with European conflicts. It was not Poland that intervened in European contests, but rival European Powers which competed to secure the crown of Poland for their own candidates, during the eighteenth century; and during the last thirty years of the seventeenth century Poland mattered to Europe chiefly because John Sobieski was a great captain who rendered invaluable service to Christendom against the last great aggressive movement of the Ottomans.

Hungary, Austria, and the dwindling maritime power of Venice formed the buffer between Western Christendom and the aggressive Ottoman. Of the Hungarian kingdom of the Hapsburgs only the small western portion was subject to the Emperor Leopold. In the center the Turk was dominant, and Transylvania, under a prince of its own, was vassal of the Turkish Empire, whose last era of aggression began with the appointment of the Albanian Mohammed Kiuprili as Grand Vizier in 1656.

At the moment when the ministry of the Kiuprili family began, Venice was conducting a successful war with the Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean. The tide was turned at once. The Venetians lost one after another of their recent gains, Crete was vigorously attacked, and the aggressive movement was next directed to the complete subjugation of Transylvania. Mohammed Kiuprili was followed in 1661 by his son Ahmed. Apasi, the prince whom the Turks set up in Transylvania, conceived that the Hapsburg would be a better master than the Turk. He invited the assistance of the Emperor Leopold. An army was sent into Transylvania under the command of Montecuculi, the ablest of the generals who fought against Turenne. At the moment France and Austria were not at war. Montecuculi defeated Ahmed Kiuprili at the battle of St. Gothard in 1664, but Leopold very promptly accepted a peace that merely conceded the withdrawal of the Turkish armies from Transylvania, which was still required to pay a tribute to the Porte.

It was again the turn of Venice. The Turkish siege of Candia, the principal city of Crete, was pressed. A long and heroic defense was offered by the commander Morosini, but at length, in 1666, Candia fell. Venice gave up the struggle and ceded Crete, the last territory added to the Ottoman dominion.

An opportunity offered for a new movement, in the revolt of the Cossacks of the Ukraine against the Polish sovereignty. The Cossack leaders appealed to the Turks for aid. The Turks overran the Polish province of Podolia. The vigor of John Sobieski, who commanded the Polish forces first as general and then as king, subjected the Ottomans to heavy defeats at Khoczim and Lemberg, but could not prevent them from retaining the greater part of Podolia when peace was made in 1676. A few days after the peace of Zurawna Ahmed Kiuprili died, and was succeeded as Grand Vizier by his kinsman Kara Mustafa.

No less ambitious than Kiuprili, Kara Mustafa directed his arms against the Emperor. In 1677 Leopold was at war with Louis XIV. The portion of Hungary subject to the Hapsburgs was in revolt under the leadership of Tokoli. The Magyars had bitter grievances against Leopold, who persecuted the Protestants of whom there were large numbers, suppressed the old Magyar nobility, and placed the country under German governors. Tokoli's revolt met with a considerable measure of success; but in 1679 the peace of Nimwegen freed Leopold from his contest with France. Still Leopold, under pressure from Louis, offered large concessions and the cessation of his more obnoxious practices. But Tokoli distrusted the Imperial promises and preferred an appeal to the Turk. In 1683 Kara Mustafa led a vast army into the Austrian territory and laid siege to Vienna.

The city was valiantly defended by Count Stahrenberg. The actual

siege did not open till the last week of July. The Imperial armies, under the command of Charles of Lorraine, were not strong enough to effect a relief. No aid was to be looked for from exhausted Spain, the Emperor's natural ally, from his enemy Louis of France, from Charles II. in England, or from Holland. John Sobieski, too, might well have refused help to a Power which had declined to assist Poland in her own contest with the Ottoman. But Sobieski was too great a man to be influenced by this or other personal considerations when the safety of Christendom was at stake. Sobieski persuaded the Polish Diet to let him come to the rescue. His energy enabled him to form a junction with the army of Charles of Lorraine early in September; on the 12th he won a brilliant and overwhelming victory over the Turks under the walls of Vienna. The vast army was driven in headlong flight across the Danube at Belgrade. Sobieski had done his work; he had saved Christendom—or, at least, he had saved Europe from a Mohammedan domination penetrating into its very center. If Sobieski had failed, if Vienna had fallen, it would seem as though the further advance of the Turks could have been stayed only if all Western Europe had united itself under the imperial sway of France.

But the Ottoman Power had suffered a blow from which it never recovered. Although Sobieski withdrew, the Imperial arms now received fresh support. Charles of Lorraine and Lewis of Baden—at this time a young and vigorous commander, though twenty years later Marlborough and Eugene in the Blenheim campaign were to find him a grievous incubus—smote the Turks in a series of battles of which the most famous is that of Mohacs, where the ancient victory of the Turks was reversed. By 1689 not only had Hungary been completely subdued and the sovereignty of Transylvania transferred from the Sultan to the Emperor, but Belgrade had been captured, the Imperialists were advancing on the south of the Danube, and it even seemed as if the downfall of the Ottoman dominion was at hand; the Venetians, under the leadership of Morosini, recovered the mastery of Southern Greece, though at the cost of the accidental destruction of the Parthenon at Athens.

But the end of the Turkish Empire was not yet. The war on the Rhine was renewed in 1688, drawing to the West the troops and the commanders who should have been engaged in the East. Mustafa Kiuprili took the place of Kara Mustafa as Grand Vizier, the latter having paid with his life for his failure before Vienna. There was a brief revival of vigor in the Turkish armies: Tokoli again called the Hungarians to arms in Transylvania. Belgrade was recaptured. But Lewis of Baden won another great victory. Kiuprili was killed on the field of battle, and there was no one to take his place. Again Transylvania was overrun, and a treaty was made by which the Hapsburg sovereignty was recognized in return for the confirmation of all the

ancient rights of the Magyars. Tokoli retired into exile and continued to fight in the Turkish armies.

Still the Turks kept their hold upon Belgrade, and a new Sultan restored some of the prestige of the royal house by some energetic campaigning. By 1697, however, Prince Eugene was free to leave his Italian command and to head the Imperial armies in their contest with the Turk. In that year he won a decisive victory at Zenta. Moreover, the young Tsar Peter had entered the arena on his own account, and a year before Zenta captured Azof, winning for Russia a port which gave an entry to the Black Sea. The war in the West was ended by the treaty of Ryswick. If the peace had not been, somewhat obviously, a mere pause preliminary to the debating of the great question of the Spanish succession, Prince Eugene's great victory must have been pressed to results more decisive than was actually the case. As matters stood the Emperor wished to free himself from the Turkish entanglement, and the peace of Carlowitz was signed at the beginning of 1699. By the treaty the river Save became in effect above Belgrade the boundary between the Turkish and the Austrian empires. The whole of Hungary and Transylvania, with the exception of the district called the Banat of Temesvar, was included in the Hapsburg kingdom of Hungary, the Morea remained to Venice, the conquered portion of Podolia was restored to Poland, and Azof was left in possession of Russia. It may here be remarked in anticipation that nineteen years later the Banat changed hands and was incorporated with Austria at the treaty of Passarowitz, but that in the meantime Russia lost Azof, and Venice lost the Morea; which, with the rest of Greece, remained in subjection to the Porte till more than a hundred years later.

#### *V.—The Spanish Succession, 1698-1713*

Since the accession of Carlos or Charles II. in Spain it had been obvious that the death of the King of Spain and the question of the succession to the Spanish Empire would present to the States of Europe a very serious problem, which they could hardly permit to be settled merely by an appeal to legal rights, on the basis of any law of succession to private estates. In the normal course of events kingdoms passed from one ruler to another precisely as though they had been family property—obviously the simplest way of avoiding dynastic disputes. But the system took no account either of international interests or of the interests of the particular subjects of each State. Accordingly Great Britain, the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, had recently on their own account thrown over the system and asserted the right of the State to divert the succession from its legal course by the exclusion of Roman Catholics. And so now the com-

plications of international interests suggested that in the case of the Spanish Empire the strict law of succession should be set aside by international agreement. For there could be only one heir-at-law, so to speak; and the succession of that heir-at-law, whoever he might be, would presumably attach the whole Spanish inheritance either to the House of Hapsburg or to the house of Bourbon, thus conveying to one or other of those two already preponderant families a huge and intolerable ascendancy in Europe.

Further, it was anything but clear which out of sundry possible candidates was actually the heir-at-law, nor was there any tribunal which could claim to settle the succession decisively except the sovereign authority of Spain herself—an authority whose finality would certainly be disputed by the unsuccessful claimants. There was, therefore, a clear case for settling the question by international authority; and that could only mean a compromising of claims by a partition of the Spanish dominion through the diplomatic agreement of Powers who, if they acted together, could enforce the acceptance of their decision upon the rest.

King Carlos of Spain had no children. His elder and younger sisters had married respectively Louis XIV. of France and the Emperor Leopold. The elder sister had expressly, but conditionally, renounced all rights of succession for herself and her heirs upon her marriage with the King of France; but the conditions had not been fulfilled, so that the validity of the renunciation was doubtful. The younger sister had renounced nothing. But the only child she had borne to Leopold was a daughter, who was married to Max Emmanuel, the Elector of Bavaria. On her marriage she had partially renounced the claims of herself and her heirs to the succession, except in respect of the Netherlands—a renunciation made under conditions which made its validity extremely doubtful. But if both these renunciations were valid, there was no descendant of Philip IV. who could make a claim. It was necessary to go back a generation to the daughters of Philip III., the sisters of Philip IV. Of these the elder, Anne of Austria, had renounced her claims on her marriage with Louis XIII.; the younger, who married the Emperor Ferdinand III., made no renunciation, so that her claim passed to her son the Emperor Leopold. Leopold, after the death of his Spanish wife, had married a second time, and had two sons, Joseph and the Archduke Charles.

Now it was obvious that in no circumstances could the actual heir of the Austrian throne or the actual heir of the French throne be allowed to succeed to the Spanish dominion. The dauphin's claim was passed on to his younger son, Philip, Duke of Anjou. Leopold's claim through his mother was passed on to his younger son, the Archduke Charles. The claim of Maria Antonia, wife of the Elector of Bavaria and daughter of Leopold and his first wife, passed to her

four-year-old son, Joseph, the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. The electoral prince was the heir-at-law if his mother's renunciation was invalid, and the renunciation of Louis's wife was valid. Philip of Anjou was the heir-at-law if his grandmother's renunciation was invalid. If both the renunciations were valid, the Archduke Charles was the heir-at-law. Whatever decision Spain herself might give, it was quite certain that no one of the three would be permitted to succeed to the whole inheritance without an appeal to arms.

The peace of Ryswick was hardly signed when Louis opened negotiations for agreement upon a compromise. If the question was to be settled without a war, it was necessary that the agreement should be arrived at before the death of the reigning King of Spain. If Louis could secure the support of England and Holland for a scheme of partition, that scheme would be carried through without war; but their support was essential, and therefore the scheme must be one which would be acceptable to them. They would certainly require guarantees for commerce and for the security of the Dutch frontier against French aggression. The scheme which Louis propounded to William and William's friend, Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of the State of Holland, was not extravagant; and with some modifications, the first partition treaty was accepted by them in the summer of 1698. The claim of Philip of Anjou was to be satisfied by Naples and Sicily and the ports of Tuscany. The claim of the Archduke Charles was to be satisfied by Milan. The rest of the inheritance—Spain, the Netherlands, and the Indies—were to go to the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, and thus would not be too intimately associated either with the House of Bourbon or with the Imperial House of Hapsburg.

But the whole plan was upset by the death of the young Electoral Prince, leaving only two claimants—Philip and the Archduke Charles. Even under the first partition treaty the ascendancy in the Mediterranean which still remained to France had been accepted with extreme reluctance by William, who was always and with excellent reason extremely hostile to the French domination. Louis proposed to William that in the altered circumstances Spain and the Indies should both go to the Archduke Charles, Milan should be added to the French share, and the Netherlands should go to the Elector of Bavaria by way of solatium. William, however, did not regard Bavaria as strong enough to preserve the Netherlands as a barrier between France and Holland. He insisted that the Netherlands should be added to the share of the Archduke Charles. It was further agreed that France should exchange the duchy of Milan for the duchy of Lorraine, an arrangement which satisfied the Duke of Lorraine.

This was the second partition treaty. Leopold, however, refused to accept it, hoping that he would be able now to make good his claim to the whole—Spanish sentiment being vehemently opposed to any parti-

tion whatever. But King Carlos, yielding to anti-Hapsburg influences, made a will declaring not the Archduke Charles but Philip to be the heir of the entire Spanish inheritance. Immediately afterwards he died (1700), and his will was made public.

There is no reason to suppose that Louis had intended from the first to snatch at the Spanish dominion for his grandson. It was he who had initiated negotiations, who had proposed compromises, who had made the largest surrender of claims which were certainly strong. It was Leopold, not Louis, who had held out against compromise, who had refused to come in even when the Netherlands as well as Spain and the Indies were allotted as his grandson's share. Towards Leopold Louis was certainly under no obligation. On the other hand, he was very definitely pledged to William, and if Louis and William together had insisted upon the terms of the treaty, Leopold would of necessity have given way and there would have been no war. Unhappily, Louis found the temptation too great. He had little enough to fear from a struggle with Austria, and at the moment he may easily have imagined that he had nothing to fear from William: For England and Scotland were both full of disaffection; the moment the last war had ended, the factions hostile to the king had turned against him openly. It was more than doubtful whether he would be able to drag the country into a war with France for any such abstract object as the preservation of the balance of power, especially when it was perfectly certain that the Jacobites and High Tories would represent everything that William did as being done in the interests of his beloved Holland. And even in Holland William would have to reckon with the anti-Orange party.

So Louis took the fatal decision. He accepted the whole Spanish inheritance for his grandson, who was proclaimed Philip V. Apart from the existence of the treaty, there was a great deal to be said for Louis's case. He had never received the dowry which was to be the price of his bride's renunciation. Spain itself declared emphatically in his favor. But the fact remained, that both when his father married and when he himself married, it was accepted as a recognized fact that neither marriage could be tolerated by Europe at large, except on condition that its offspring should be debarred from wearing or sharing the crowns of France and Spain at once. Recognizing that fact, Louis had made his compact with William. When Louis broke the compact, he was thereby openly and avowedly proclaiming his intention of asserting a Bourbon domination over Europe.

For a moment it seemed that Louis's success would be complete. William was paralyzed for immediate action by the factions in England and Holland. Moderate concessions would have extorted acquiescence in the new position. But while William, with indomitable resolution, was setting himself to the drawing together of an alliance

strong enough to obtain guarantees of security for the maritime Powers, and compensation for Austria, by conveying the Netherlands and Italy to Charles, Louis appears to have considered that the victory was already won. He announced that Philip was not to be debarred from the French succession by his acceptance of the Spanish crown. The Dutch troops were ejected from the barrier fortresses of the Netherlands which had been placed in their hands, so giving alarm even to the anti-Orange faction in Holland. He refused to consider any compensation whatever for Austria. There were already signs that in England the tide was turning in William's favor, when Louis struck a blow at British as well as at Dutch commerce by arranging for a French monopoly of the Spanish trade.

William's diplomacy was drawing together an alliance which was to demand the minimum necessary to the security of Europe—commercial guarantees, the Sicilies and the Netherlands for Austria, Philip's renunciation of the French succession. One thing only was wanting to make England whole-hearted instead of half-hearted, and that was supplied by Louis himself. Beside the deathbed of the exiled James II., he recognized the young prince, James Edward, as the rightful heir to the throne of England. England—not one party, but Whigs and Tories both—had definitely settled the succession not upon young James, but upon his Protestant sister, Anne, and her heirs. and after Anne, upon the next Protestant heir, Sophia, the wife of the Elector of Hanover, and granddaughter of James I. A blaze of wrath swept the country, of indignation at the insolence of the French king, who dared to decide for the English a domestic question which they had already decided for themselves. At the beginning of 1702 William, for the first time in his life, had a solidly enthusiastic England behind him.

But it was not given to William to lead the new coalition against the enemy, against whom he had fought for thirty years with indomitable resolution, consummate patience, and a relentless hostility. A fall from his horse, no great matter in itself, was more than his frame, worn out by ceaseless toil and ceaseless ill-health, could endure. William died; Anne became Queen of England; John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough, and soon to become Duke, took up the military and diplomatic tasks in which William himself had chosen him as his own successor.

From the point of view of the crowned heads of Europe the War of the Spanish Succession presented itself primarily as a struggle between two families for ascendancy in Europe. From the point of view of Louis's great antagonist, who died at the moment when the war was beginning, it was a struggle to safeguard the liberty of Europe in general, and of the Dutch in particular, from the domination either of Bourbon or of Hapsburg; though at the time it was not from

the Hapsburg but from the Bourbon that the menace came. The English and Dutch peoples were drawn into it largely by the direct threat to their commerce in which Louis, at the outset, permitted himself to indulge. Popular enthusiasm for the war was encouraged mainly by two considerations—the elation of victory and the expectation of acquiring trade. When an anti-war party did develop in England, it attacked the War Ministry for fighting the battles of the allies on land instead of the battles of the British nation by sea; entirely unconscious that Marlborough's military policy, however much it may have been influenced by personal greed for power and fame, was directed to the establishment of the British naval supremacy, which was infinitely more essential to her commercial supremacy than the raiding of commerce and the capturing of islands, for which the Opposition clamored. It is possible that, from the Imperial British point of view, the establishment of a permanent British naval base in the Mediterranean was actually the most important outcome of the whole war. But the simplest, and, up to a certain point, the truest, answer to old Kaspar's puzzle,

"What they killed each other for  
I never could make out"

was that one side was fighting in order that France might dominate Europe, and the other was fighting to prevent her from doing so.

Louis had made haste to procure two useful allies—Victor Amadeus of Savoy, who held the gateway of Italy, and Max Emmanuel of Bavaria. Otherwise the German princes in general were actively or inactively on the side of the Emperor, who had secured Brandenburg by recognizing the Great Elector's son and successor, Frederick, as king of Prussia, a title taken from the duchy once subject to Poland and still outside the boundaries of the Empire.

Before William was in his grave, fighting had actually begun in Italy between France and Austria, whose army was commanded by Prince Eugene, a cousin of the Duke of Savoy, who had entered the Austrian service after being rejected by King Louis. Marlborough took over the supreme command of the allies in the Netherlands. Spain, at the outset, was not a theater of war; that country generally, like the Spanish Netherlands, had accepted the Bourbon succession.

During 1702, Eugene, in Italy, could scarcely hold his own against the superior numbers under the French general, Vendôme; but in the north Marlborough, though much hampered by the Dutch authorities, mastered the line of forts from Venloo to Liège, which effectively severed the French army of the Netherlands from the army of the Upper Rhine, centered in Strassburg. In the next year, 1703, an English squadron, under Admiral Rooke, sunk or captured a Spanish

treasure squadron in Vigo Bay. The stroke was unpremeditated, but it had the effect of inducing Portugal, hitherto neutral, to join the allies; and the accession of Portugal was probably the decisive factor which induced the allies to change their program. William had assumed that Philip could not be ejected from Spain; his idea had been the surrender by the French of Italy and the Netherlands to the Archduke. The allies now chose to make the conquest of Spain for "Charles III." the primary aim of the war. The campaigning of the year was abortive. Marlborough's own plans were made almost nugatory by the persistent interference of the Dutch; while a French campaign from Strassburg, with Vienna as its objective, was thwarted by the Elector of Bavaria, who insisted on trying first to assert his authority in the Tyrol, which was stubbornly loyal to the Hapsburgs, and ejected his troops. Vendôme would have driven Eugene over the Italian border, but the Duke of Savoy chose the critical moment to change sides; with a hostile Savoy threatening his flank and rear, Vendôme was obliged to fall back.

In 1704 came the first great crisis of the war. The British and Dutch troops had their own work to do in protecting Holland from attack. An Imperial army of observation, under Lewis of Baden, was watching the French army of the Upper Rhine; but this was apparently the only force which could interfere with the revised French design of joining hands with the Elector of Bavaria on the Upper Danube and marching to Vienna. But the thing that happened was the thing that no one had imagined possible, except Marlborough and Eugene. Both of them knew that neither the Dutch nor the English Government would sanction the great plan which no one but Marlborough and Eugene could have carried out—to effect a junction between Marlborough's army of the north and the Imperial army on the Upper Rhine, and to fling that force across Germany, interposing it between Vienna and the Franco-Bavarian armies.

What Marlborough asked and obtained was sanction for a campaign in the Moselle, which was ostensibly concerned with the Netherlands area. But when Marlborough had carried his force as far as Coblenz, it became suddenly apparent—too late for any interference—that the Moselle campaign was merely a mask. Eugene in person slipped away to the north. Lewis of Baden, with his main army, joined Marlborough on the Neckar, leaving Eugene in command of the Imperial containing force facing Strassburg; and the united forces moving swiftly, succeeded in capturing Donauworth, which commanded the enemy's line of advance upon Vienna. Tallard, from Strassburg, marched to join the Bavarian Elector at Augsburg, on the south side of the Danube; Eugene made a parallel march on the north side to effect a junction with Marlborough.

The decisive battle was fought at Blenheim, or Hochstadt. Eugene,

commanding the allied right, made what appeared to be the grand attack, while on the extreme left a furious onslaught was made on the village of Blenheim. Thus Marlborough masked his real purpose, which was to pierce the French center, and was enabled to carry his cavalry across the stream of the Nebel. Having accomplished this task, he hurled upon the French center a series of charges, broke through, annihilated the French right, and then drove the French center and left off the field in headlong rout. The great French offensive was finally shattered. The remnants of the army escaped behind the Rhine, whence the French were never again able to advance. Bavaria lay at the mercy of the allies. In due time the triumphant victor was back with his army in the Netherlands, while Eugene was left to the weary task of reorganizing the Austrian armies.

The Blenheim campaign was only one portion of Marlborough's great design. He was able to direct it himself, and it was entirely successful. The other portion of it was a comparative failure. Marlborough's aim was to establish a powerful naval base for England in the Mediterranean. Rooke's exploit at Vigo in reality only covered his failure to capture Cadiz. But in 1704, not Cadiz but Toulon was the prize which Marlborough wished to secure by a joint naval and military operation. The military part of the design, however, required the co-operation of Savoy, who declined to play the part assigned to him. Yet to the fleet an opportunity was presented and seized for capturing Gibraltar, which was weakly defended. Although it was taken in the name of Charles III., it was held throughout the war as a British naval base, and was retained as a British conquest when Charles's claim to the throne of Spain was finally withdrawn.

In spite of the triumph of Blenheim, the year which followed (1705) was unproductive; in the Netherlands, because Marlborough's hands were tied by the Dutch, and in Italy, because Eugene was not there. The Spanish peninsular, however, was the scene of considerable activity. The accession of Portugal to the allies enabled the Hapsburg king to use that country as a base, the allies being dominant on the seas. The province of Catalonia, always jealous of its own liberties and hostile to the Castilian ascendancy, revolted against the Bourbon monarchy, and was the one section of the Spanish kingdom itself where Charles was acknowledged as king by the population. In this region Lord Peterborough held command, and accomplished various feats of great ingenuity and audacity, although personally he remained continually at daggers drawn with the titular king for whom he was fighting and with the other British commander, the Earl of Galway—British because, although originally a French Huguenot, he had been exiled from France by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and had come to England in the entourage of William of Orange.

Catalonia gave the allies an entry into Spain from the Mediterranean, and Peterborough secured the great port of Barcelona.

In 1706 Marlborough won at Hamillies the second of his great victories. The Dutch themselves had begun to wake up to the disastrous effects of their attempts to control the duke's military operations, and he had almost succeeded in obtaining a free hand. Had he done so completely, his campaign would have been conducted not in the Netherlands but in Italy, in conjunction with Eugene, and effect would almost certainly have been given to his favorite scheme of capturing Toulon. But this was too much for Dutch caution. Marlborough had to stay in the Netherlands, but in the Netherlands he was allowed to strike. Ramillies was an overwhelming victory in which the Dutch troops had a very full share. It was so decisive that within four months every town of importance in Brabant and Flanders had opened its gates, and there were no French troops left there. During the same summer Eugene, who had resumed the command in Italy, carried out by himself so much of Marlborough's great design as had concerned the peninsula itself. The French were cleared out of Italian territory. In Spain, Peterborough continued his erratic career; but the only notable event was the relief of Barcelona, for which Peterborough managed to claim the credit, although he had done his best to divert to another field the naval force by which the relief was actually effected.

The disaster of Ramillies drove Louis to make overtures for peace, or at least for the withdrawal of the Dutch, whom he proposed to leave in complete possession of the barrier fortresses. His proposals were rejected; but during 1707 the position of the allies was hardly improved. In Spain, indeed, it became definitely worse; since the French, under the command of Marshal Berwick, a natural son of James II., inflicted a complete defeat upon the Anglo-Portuguese forces at Almanza, a battle which practically ruined such chances as had ever existed of the conquest of Spain by the allies. With the exception of Catalonia, the whole country was devoted to the cause of Philip; and in 1708, as in 1808, it may be assumed with confidence that the imposition upon the Spaniards by a foreign Power of a king whom the Spaniards were unanimously determined to reject, was a sheer impossibility.

Marlborough's plan was again disconcerted. In view of the impossibility of carrying out his earlier scheme for joining Eugene in Italy he designed an invasion of France from the Netherlands, while Eugene, supported by the Duke of Savoy, by land and the British fleet by sea, was to invade the south of France and capture Toulon. But he was prevented from undertaking his own campaign by the diplomatic situation. Charles XII. of Sweden had suddenly startled the world by an amazing series of victories over Sweden's traditional

rivals, Russia, Poland, and Denmark, and he had now developed a grievance against the Emperor Joseph, who had succeeded Leopold in 1705. The intervention of Sweden would have introduced a serious complication into the war. Marlborough found himself compelled to desert the field for the cabinet, and to devote himself to the task of effecting such a reconciliation between Joseph and Charles as should induce the latter to leave Western and Central Europe alone and devote himself to a Russian campaign. Marlborough succeeded, with results for Sweden and Russia which we shall presently see; but in the meantime he was effectively withdrawn from the conduct of an active campaign.

In the south Eugene almost succeeded in carrying out Marlborough's plan in conjunction with the British admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovell. But there were two factors which Eugene could not control—the Emperor Joseph and Victor Amadeus of Savoy neither of whom at all desired Toulon to fall into British hands. Joseph wanted Naples, and did not perceive that with the English in possession of Toulon and consequently in complete command of the Mediterranean, Naples would be a comparatively easy prey. Lack of supports from Joseph and the inertness of Savoy forced upon Eugene delays whereby the French were enabled to throw a force into Toulon—barely in time to foil the intended joint naval and military attack.

In 1708 Joseph had made a private compact with Louis for the suspension of hostilities in North Italy, and Eugene was placed in command of an Imperial army on the Moselle, the Imperial army of the Upper Rhine having now been entrusted to George, the Elector of Hanover; who was presently to become King of England, and whose father had been the first of the line to enjoy the electoral dignity. Marlborough proposed to unite with Eugene in a great attack upon the French on the Netherlands frontier; but the preparations were disconcerted by the revolt of sundry cities against the Dutch domination, which had been established after Ramillies. The French were encouraged to take the offensive; while Eugene's army was not yet ready to join Marlborough. He himself, however, hastened to the side of his colleague. Without waiting for reinforcements Marlborough advanced with the startling rapidity which commonly characterized his movements, caught the advancing forces of Vendôme close to Oudenarde, and shattered them. The battle only began late in the afternoon; but for the fall of night the French army would have been annihilated. Marlborough settled down to the siege of Lille, which would give him the entry into France. Before the end of the year it had surrendered.

Meanwhile it had become clear to the duke that it was vain to hope for the capture of Toulon. Either for Cadiz or for Toulon the unfettered co-operation of land and sea forces was a necessity, and

events had proved that in both cases such co-operation was unattainable. But an alternative had presented itself. Two months after the battle of Oudenarde, Port Mahon in the island of Minorca was seized by General Stanhope and Admiral Leake to remain for fifty years the main British naval base in the Mediterranean.

Oudenarde was a blow to France even more crushing than Ramillies had been. For the second time Louis made peace proposals. But the allies were now convinced that the power of Louis was broken and that they could dictate their own terms. The French king was willing to surrender far more than would have amply satisfied the allies at the beginning of the war; but they, and especially the Whig party now predominant in England, had committed themselves to the principle that the Bourbon was not to reign in Spain. Not content even with this they actually demanded that Louis himself should assist in ejecting his grandson from the peninsula; to which Louis replied that if he must fight some one it should be not his friends but his enemies. The spirit of France rose to his appeal. Exhausted and impoverished as she was, her sons flocked to the colors. The French general Villars held (1709) the strongly entrenched lines of La Bassée. Marlborough captured Tournai and then turned upon Mons. Villars moved up to Malplaquet to cover Mons, and entrenched himself. Marlborough's attack was delayed; when it was delivered, Villars was driven back from his entrenchments and was compelled to fall back on the lines of La Bassée; and Mons fell shortly afterwards.

But the victory had cost the allies twice as much as the French in casualties. The slaughter had been frightfully heavy, and in fact the moral effect upon the French troops was entirely favorable; the allies could not afford to win victories of the Malplaquet type. In England it was freely declared that Marlborough had fought regardless of the lives of his soldiers, merely to enhance his own prestige. In fact Malplaquet proved to be the turning-point; for from that time onward the influence of Marlborough waned, and the ascendancy in England passed to the Tory politicians, who were much more anxious to cripple the duke than to annihilate Louis. There was indeed some reason in their doctrine that the war was being continued, although everything for the sake of which England had entered upon it could have been secured before Malplaquet, merely in order to procure additional gains for the Emperor and the Dutch, and to increase the duke's personal predominance.

So during 1710 the campaigning did little beyond confirming the ascendancy of Philip in Spain and of the allies in the Netherlands. In 1711 the Emperor Joseph died without male offspring, and was succeeded by his brother, the Archduke Charles. When the war began no one had for a moment contemplated the idea of one Hapsburg prince ruling over the Empire, Spain, and the Netherlands. The situation

was in fact completely changed. The allies owed their predominant position to Marlborough, and Great Britain could have legitimately claimed the leading voice in rearranging the terms for an honorable peace, without claiming for the Emperor all that the allies in the height of success had demanded for the Archduke Charles, when no one had expected him to succeed to the Austrian inheritance. And in fact the Tory Government, which was definitely established in 1711, did formulate the terms of the peace which was agreed to by France and imposed upon the allies at Utrecht in 1513.

In its broad outlines the treaty of Utrecht was reasonable enough; though France could by no means have insisted upon terms so favorable to her as were actually conceded. By those terms Holland was placed in complete possession of the chain of "barrier fortresses" in the Netherlands, which were regarded as giving her complete security against invasion. Philip was acknowledged as King of Spain, under solemn pledges from both Spain and France that the crowns of the two countries should in no event be united. Of the possessions of the Spanish Hapsburgs, the Netherlands, Sardinia, Milan, and Naples, went to Austria, while the royal crown of Sicily went to the Duke of Savoy. The greatest gains, not unfairly, fell to Great Britain. By the retention of Gibraltar and Minorca her naval position in the Mediterranean was permanently established; and France surrendered to her in North America the disputed territories of Acadia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay, together with sundry West Indian Islands. To her also was assigned that monopoly of limited trading rights with Spanish America, called the *Assiento*, which Louis in 1701 had acquired for France. Incidentally also she secured the French guarantee of the recognition of the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain.

In all these arrangements the one really questionable point was the recognition of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain by the side of the Bourbon dynasty in France, leaving the standing possibility that these two countries would not only be joined together in a close alliance but might seek a still closer union under a single crown in spite of pledges to the contrary. Nevertheless there was a very definite answer to this objection—the Spanish people themselves were determined to recognize no king but Philip. The question was not whether Philip had a right to the throne but whether Europe had a right to dictate to Spain—and whether all Europe in the long run could have coerced Spain; to which latter question the answer is to be found in the history of Napoleon's attempt to coerce Spain a hundred years afterwards.

Yet the treaty of Utrecht is one of the two classic occasions which have been given color to the doctrine of "Albion's perfidy." In procuring the treaty Great Britain deliberately betrayed her allies. While carrying on the war, she instructed Marlborough's successor, the Duke of Ormonde, to refrain from all military operations. It was not im-

possible to claim that in disregarding the interests of her allies she was merely treating them as they had repeatedly treated her; but much worse than this was her cold cynical desertion of those subjects of France and Spain in the Cevennes and in Catalonia, who had risen in arms at her inducement and in response to her solemn promises of protection. The Catalans and the Cevennese were left to the tender mercies of the Bourbon Governments, of which the less said the better.

In the year following the treaty of Utrecht, Queen Anne died. At the last moment the intrigues for a Stewart restoration were foiled, and the Elector of Hanover succeeded to the throne as George I. A year later, almost at the moment of the futile Jacobite rising known as "The Fifteen," the old King of France departed from the scene, leaving his crown to his great-grandson, Louis XV., a sickly child whose hopes of life seemed small, though his reign was to last for almost sixty years.

#### *VI.—Russia and Sweden, 1697-1720*

In the year 1687 the peace of Ryswick allowed Western Europe to pause for breath, and Eugene inflicted upon the Turks the decisive defeat of Zenta. In the same year John Sobieski died, and the Poles chose Augustus "the strong," Elector of Saxony, to wear the Polish crown in preference to any member of their own nobility. Charles XI. of Sweden also died, and was succeeded by Charles XII., a boy of fifteen. In that year also Tsar Peter of Russia reached the age of twenty-five and started upon his famous tour in Western Europe.

Little enough was known of Russia in the West. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the princes who ruled at Moscow had broken free from the yoke of the Mongols, to whose dominion they had been subjected ever since the days of Genghis Khan. They had extended a barbaric sway over a vast and sparsely populated region on the east of the Polish dominion. Early in the seventeenth century the Tsardom passed to the Romanoff family. The Tsars had failed to extend their rule either to the Baltic or to the Black Sea. They had escaped a subjection to Poland which had at one time seemed possible, but over a considerable portion of their territories that sovereignty was exceedingly vague. In the middle of the century the Tsar Alexis had made some attempt to remodel Russian institutions on Western lines, but had accomplished nothing revolutionary.

Alexis died in 1676, leaving two sons and a daughter, the children of his first wife, and one son, Peter, the child of his second wife. The eldest son Feodor, or Theodore, reigned for six years and died; so in 1682 the other two sons, Ivan, and Peter who was then ten years old, were proclaimed joint sovereigns, their very able elder sister Sophia securing the regency for herself. In 1689 the young Peter,

aided by a Scottish soldier of fortune, Patrick Gordon, overthrew Sophia, who retired into a convent. Ivar, weak in body and brain, continued till his death in 1696 nominally to share the crown with his brother, but to all intents and purposes Peter was sole Tsar, ruling at first principally through his loyal foreign servants, Gordon and the Swiss Lefort. More definitely his personal rule began when he took part in the campaigns against the Turks, which resulted in the capture of Azov.

Peter was a barbarian and a genius. Lefort, Gordon, and others, had taught him to understand something of the difference between his own kingdom and the civilized Europe, of which Russians knew as little as it knew of Russia. Peter resolved to go and see for himself, to study the secret of Western superiority, in workshops as well as in courts. He passed through Prussia, abode for some time in Holland and in England—chiefly in the dockyards—visited Vienna, and then hastened back to Russia to quell a revolt. The revolt had been raised by the Russian Nationalist party, who hated and feared the foreign influences and the foreign ministers that attracted the Tsar. The instrument of the revolt was the old national bodyguard, the troops known as the Streltzi. But Patrick Gordon, with troops trained by himself after another fashion, had already crushed the revolt before Peter reappeared on the scene; all that remained for him was to take merciless vengeance on the rebel ringleaders. The Streltzi were abolished, and their place was taken by a new force armed and drilled after the fashion of Western Europe. From that time the absolute power of Peter was irresistibly established.

Peter was determined to compel his people to absorb Western ideas without much consideration of the question whether the wine and the bottles were adapted to each other. But he was not only the militant apostle of Occidentalism, he was no less bent on Imperial expansion; and he had grasped the fundamental fact that the effective condition of progress and expansion was free access to the sea, which was not adequately provided by the possession of a port on the Black Sea. Russia must reach the Baltic, and the Baltic could only be reached by the acquisition of Swedish territory. The Swedish domination of the inland sea was resented by Poland and Denmark, and not less by Frederick William of Brandenburg while he was still living. But the present Elector Frederick, soon to be known as King of Prussia, was occupied with more showy and less substantial ambitions than his father.

The accession of a mere boy to the Swedish throne seemed to offer a promising opportunity for robbery. Peter had no sooner crushed the last fragments of resistance to his despotism in Russia than he applied himself to the formation of a league against Sweden. Denmark was willing; Brandenburg was shy. Augustus, Elector of

Saxony and King of Poland, saw in the scheme an opportunity for making his sovereignty in Poland a reality instead of a shadow; a war would give him a legitimate excuse for bringing Saxon troops into Poland. Livonia, the Swedish province on the Baltic which lay next to Polish Courland, was ready to revolt. Peter wanted the next group of provinces, Esthonia, Ingria, and Carelia; Denmark wanted to annex Schleswig and Holstein, whose duke was the brother-in-law of the young King of Sweden. So the three Powers agreed to attack Sweden in concert.

The league had reckoned without their host. Charles was a born soldier. He was neither a strategist nor a statesman, but he was soon to prove himself an incomparable leader in the field, who inspired his soldiers with his own reckless courage and won victories when he ought to have been annihilated. Boy though he was, he had already asserted himself in Sweden and established his authority, when the leaguers made their first move. Danish troops entered Schleswig early in 1700; while Augustus advanced against Riga and the Russians against Narva on the Gulf of Finland. Charles asked nothing better than the chance of war. No sooner had he heard of the attack in May 1700, he flung himself straight upon Denmark. The king, Frederick IV., was completely surprised; his capital lay at the mercy of the invader, and he was obliged ignominiously to retire from Schleswig and to pledge himself against any further hostilities.

Meanwhile the attack of Augustus upon Riga failed, but Peter had some 60,000 men swarming upon Narva. Charles, with perhaps 8,000 men, swooped upon him and shattered the army completely. Then he turned upon the Polish province of Courland, routed the Saxon troops, and brought Courland as well as Livonia to complete submission.

These amazing achievements filled the young king, who was only in his twentieth year, with the conviction that an unprecedented career of conquest was opened to him. At the moment Poland seemed to him a more promising object of attack than Russia; or rather the punishment of Augustus appealed to him more strongly than the punishment of Peter. The Poles had not been consulted by their Saxon king; they had held aloof from the war, which had been fought by Saxon troops; they offered no resistance to Charles when he marched upon Warsaw and demanded the deposition of Augustus. From Dantzic on the Baltic, to Lublin and Cracow, the cities of Poland fell into his hands. Western Europe had by this time plunged into the War of the Spanish Succession. Augustus could interest no one in his misfortunes except Peter; and Peter was as yet more anxious to apply the lessons he had learned and to reorganize his forces than to fight. Early in 1704 the Polish Diet deposed Augustus, and would have made John Sobieski's son James king, if Augustus had not succeeded in capturing him and carrying him off to Saxony. Under pressure from the King

of Sweden the Diet elected instead another Polish noble, Stanislaus Leczinski—an unfortunate choice on Charles's part, as the rest of the Polish nobility were jealous of him, while he was obviously only the nominee of a foreign potentate.

Wherever Charles went with his troops victory attended him, but wherever Charles and his troops were not present the Saxon party again defied the king he had set up. He had not in fact troops enough for a military occupation. So he struck at Saxony itself, regardless of the fact that this was making war within the bounds of the Empire. In 1706 Charles marched into the electorate and stationed himself at Altranstadt. Before the end of the year Augustus found himself compelled to acknowledge Leczinski as King of Poland; while Charles and his troops remained living practically at free quarters upon Saxony for another year.

During 1707 the Powers engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession were assiduously courting the young Swedish warrior. Louis, whose first overtures for peace had been rejected, tried hard to win the alliance of Charles; the Emperor endeavored to conciliate him; Marlborough strove to fascinate him. Louis's seductions were unsuccessful. Charles made up his mind to leave the West to its own devices and to smite the Russian enemy, whom he had neglected for the sake of punishing Augustus of Saxony.

Meanwhile Peter had been turning his breathing time to advantage. While Charles was engaged in Poland and Saxony, Russian troops overran Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia; on the Neva Peter had already laid the foundations of the city which he called Petersburg, but which future generations will know as Petrograd. It was quite time for Charles to deal with his Eastern rival. Therefore, in 1708, Charles started on the adventure which was imitated by Napoleon in 1812. He invaded Russia, with Moscow as his objective.

Charles fared as those do fare who imagine that Russia, like any Western nation, has a vital spot. Peter adopted the methods by which, a century later, Napoleon was to be destroyed. He declined battle, while Charles and his Swedes struggled through almost trackless regions from which no supplies could be obtained. Autumn came and Charles was still hundreds of miles away from Moscow. Then he turned south to join forces with Mazeppa, Hetman of the Ukraine Cossacks, who had promised him aid. The promises were futile. A deadly winter gripped the country. Reinforcements and supplies were on their way to Charles, but Peter with greatly superior forces intercepted them, cut up the troops, and carried off the convoy. Still, when the spring came Charles with his winter-worn troops laid siege to Pultawa. Pultawa defied him, and before midsummer Peter had arrived with forces twice as numerous as those of Charles, and very differently trained from the raw levies that had been scattered at

Narva. The Swedes were completely enveloped, trapped with no hope of escape. Charles himself, with a few followers, broke through and made their way over the Turkish border. Practically the whole of the Swedish army was either cut to pieces or compelled to surrender.

For five years Charles remained in Turkey. After something more than a year's intriguing, he succeeded in persuading the Ottomans to declare war upon Russia. In 1711 a great army was ready for invasion. Peter did not wait; he himself invaded the Turkish province of Moldavia. But on the river Pruth he was trapped and enveloped, like Charles at Pultawa. The fate of the Russian Empire hung in the balance. But the Turkish Grand Vizier was venal; Catherine, the mistress and afterwards the wife of Peter, was astute and ready of wit. She was with the Tsar in the camp; at her instigation everything available in the shape of treasure was collected. The bait was offered and accepted. Possibly the Vizier did not feel sufficiently assured of the results of an engagement with foes reduced to selling their lives as dearly as possible; in any case he was secure of a sufficient triumph. Terms were granted. Peter was to surrender Azov, captured fourteen years before. The King of Sweden was to be given a free passage to his own country; the Russians were to withdraw unmolested. That was all. Peter must have felt very much like a man for whom the order of release has arrived when the noose was already round his neck.

Still Charles remained in Turkey, desperately striving to induce the Porte to renew the war upon his enemy. But the Porte remained immobile. The Western war came to an end. And meanwhile Frederick of Denmark and Augustus of Saxony repudiated the treaties which Charles had imposed on them. Augustus easily expelled Leczinski from Poland and recovered the crown for himself. The Danes renewed their attacks upon Holstein, and though they were repulsed in an invasion of Sweden itself, turned upon the Swedish provinces in Germany, Bremen and Verden and Pomerania. To this renewed hostile league were presently added George, the Elector of Hanover, who had just succeeded to the British throne and hankered after Bremen and Verden, and Frederick William I. of Prussia, whose father Frederick died in 1713. On a sudden Charles appeared in Stralsund, having raced across Europe in two weeks with a single companion, at the end of November 1714.

The situation was desperate enough. Charles had been absent from Sweden for years, leaving it without effective government. His army had been lost in Russia. Struggle thought he might he was forced to evacuate Pomerania and everything else that Sweden still held on the south of the Baltic. But neither Charles himself nor Görz, the man who now became his minister, despaired. The king's confidence in himself as a conquerer never deserted him. Görz had no less con-

fidence in the subtlety of his own diplomacy. The German provinces were gone; the provinces about the Gulf of Finland were practically gone. A bargain which secured the latter to the Tsar Peter might insure the recovery of the former. George of Hanover in England might be paralyzed through the Jacobites. Peter had no objection to an arrangement which would insure his position in the Baltic provinces. While these intrigues were afoot, Charles invaded Norway, which was under the Danish crown. Then as befitted the whole career of Charles XII., the end came with dramatic suddenness; while he was besieging Fredrichshal, he was struck dead by a bullet, fired, according to general belief, not by the enemy, but by a traitor.

For a century the brilliant military talents of the kings of the House of Vasa and the military virtues of the Swedish people had given to Sweden an importance out of all relation to her resources. For her, as for Holland, the maintenance of her position permanently as a first-class Power was a sheer impossibility. Even the genius of Gustavus could not consolidate the dominion extended over disconnected patches of territory whose association with Sweden was merely arbitrary. Yet Gustavus had embodied an ideal; he was more than a national hero, and for him personally a more than national ascendancy was possible. But Charles X. and Charles XII. were merely Paladins, war-heroes, who accomplished miracles of fighting, but showed none of the qualities of the conquerors who have left their impress upon the world. With the death of Charles XII. Sweden finally subsided into the position of a Power of quite secondary political importance in the affairs of Europe.

The vigorous personal rule which a series of individual monarchs had been able to establish each during his own lifetime came to an end. The immediate succession rested between a nephew and a sister of Charles, neither of whom was prepared to enter on a contest with the oligarchy which immediately secured the control of the government and made Ulrica Eleanor a queen without power. The oligarchy dropped all the European ambitions of the monarchy. It ceded Bremen and Verden to Hanover for compensation in cash. On similar terms it ceded Sweden's Pomeranian claims to Prussia. It assented to Denmark's annexation of Schleswig, while to Sweden were restored Stralsund and Rügen. Finally, by the treaty of Nystädt it formally surrendered to Russia the Baltic provinces of Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Carelia.

The newborn Russian Empire was a Power which inherited the ascendancy that Sweden had once seemed likely to achieve. Peter had won that of which his predecessors had only dreamed, a grip on the Baltic. But the rulers of Russia had still before them the enormous task of welding their huge dominion into an organized state; Peter himself had been disappointed in his early ambition of establishing

himself on the Black Sea. He was disappointed also in the further ambition of connecting himself with the Empire by the acquisition of German territories, to which end he had married a niece to the Duke of Mecklenburg. The further expansion of Russia during his reign was towards the southeast, where he extended his territories of the Caspian Sea. But it was in another quarter that Peter prepared the way for Russian ambitions to become in course of time a dominating factor in the international politics of Europe. He had begun the battle between the Russian and the Ottoman, and had brought into being what the nineteenth century knew as the Eastern Question.

But even when Peter died in 1725, Russia may be said to have been still only on the outskirts of Europe. His vast experiment was as yet only in its initial stages—the experiment of imposing upon a primitive people the methods and the organization which had been developed in the course of centuries among wholly alien nations; of imposing them not by conquest after the fashion of the British in India, but by the fiat of a native dynasty which only half understood them.

#### *VII.—Over Sea, 1648-1715*

The century which followed the death of Elizabeth in England and of Akbar in India was in a sense decisive of the fate of the Mughal Empire. But even when half the period had passed, the portents were by no means obvious even to shrewd observers. An English trading company was doing good business, through the factories established with the approval and sanction of the Emperor in the north and of kings in the south; but the traders were peaceful and untroubled by military or political aspirations. The Portuguese activities had ceased, and the Dutch traders were of less account than the English. Jehangir and Shah Jehan, son and grandson of Akbar, had ruled with magnificence, waged wars which were decently successful, extended their borders but not excessively, and put down rebels. They had maintained the general principles of Akbar's government, not differentiating between their Mohammedan and Hindu subjects, and had been equally well served by the civil and military servants who were selected practically without consideration of creed or race.

But in 1658—just before the Stewart Restoration in England and the assumption of control by Louis XIV. in France—Shah Jehan was turned off the throne by his son Alam Gir, better known as Aurangzib, the hero of the Moslem chroniclers, but the real disintegrator of the Mughal Empire. For in three essential particulars he departed from Akbar's policy. A religious bigot like Philip II., he made an end of religious equality and penalized the Hindus, who greatly outnumbered the Mohammedans; he deliberately aimed at the conquest or subjection of the whole peninsula; and he set his satraps over dis-

tricts so large that, when his own hand was removed in 1707, each one of them could look forward to making himself the founder of a dynasty and principality as independent of the Mughal's control as were the great German princes of the Emperor's.

What Akbar's policy had gained in the course of a hundred years was destroyed or at best undermined in the fifty years of Aurangzib. The Hindu princes were insulted, distrusted, and depressed. The Hindu population was in effect doubly taxed. All the provinces were ruled by Mohammedan governors through Mohammedan officers. The flame of creed-hostility was revived. The loyalty which Akbar had won from the Hindus was sapped. The loyalty of the Mohammedan nobles to the Empire became at best secondary to their own dynastic aspirations. The Empire itself was so extended that it became impossible for the central authority to exercise effective control. And—most fatal of all to Aurangzib's own aims—a new Hindu Power was created in the western half of the Deccan, and a new organization, religious, political, and military, intensely hostile to the Mohammedan domination, grew up in the Punjab and Sirhind, the barrier between Hindostan and Afghanistan.

A century was to pass before these latter, the Sikhs, became in themselves a formidable State; but a few words must be given to the rise of the Mahratta power.

When Aurangzib came to the throne there was no Mahratta State; the Mahratta people were the race who mainly occupied a large area on the west and north of Deccan, subjects either of the Mohammedan dynasty of Bijapur or of the Mughals, who between them had recently absorbed the Mohammedan kingdom of Ahmednagar. A young Mahratta chief, Sivaji Bhonsla, conceived for himself the rôle of patriot and liberator of his people from the yoke of the Moslem and the alien, whether at Delhi or at Bijapur. The liberator was, of course, to be himself the lord of his liberated people. Unshakable determination, supreme audacity and faith in himself, infinite resourcefulness, and an entire freedom from scruples, were his mental and moral equipment, and his headquarters were in almost inaccessible country. The independence of Bijapur was threatened by Aurangzib, and Bijapur was the nearer oppressor. In effect, Sivaji rebelled against his sovereign at Bijapur, and in the course of a prolonged conflict won from him a great territory which he professed to hold as a subject of the Mughal. In due time Aurangzib completed the destruction of Bijapur; but Sivaji had made himself too strong to be easily crushed, and when the Mughal's armies marched against him he was able to make terms for himself which left him in virtual independence at the head of what had become a great Mahratta State: an organized community with a system of government and a military force which no enemy could afford to despise.

Sivaji died long before Aurangzib; his successors of his own house were incompetent, but the direction of his organization passed into the hands of nominal ministers, the Peshwas, who in due time were to play the part of the Merovingian Mayors of the Palace, and threatened even to achieve that relation to the Mughal himself.

Meanwhile Colbert had succeeded Mazarin as the first minister of Louis XIV., and Colbert, while he reorganized the whole system of commerce and finance, was bent on raising France to a maritime equality with England and Holland and so developing a French over-sea Empire. Therefore, in a very short time a French East India Company was entering upon a rivalry with English and Dutch, but upon the Dutch lines, which retained an active control in the hands of the State. The English company grew, not only bringing wealth to the country, but providing a revenue for the Treasury in return for its privileges. The French company grew likewise, acquiring its own factories, under governors who understood better than their English rivals the art of gaining the goodwill of the natives. By mutual consent, during the wars between Louis and William III. or Anne, the companies refrained from corresponding hostilities; the business of both was still commerce. But by the time that the treaty of Utrecht was signed there were both Englishmen and Frenchmen in India who foresaw another kind of contest than one between peaceful traders. As yet, however, there was in India neither a French nor a British army, though each company was allowed to keep a handful of soldiers for its protection in case of disturbances. Nearly all the French or English were merely clerks or higher officials of the two mercantile societies.

Side by side with the French progress in the East went French progress in the West. First the handful of fur traders on the St. Lawrence was supplemented by Roman Catholic missionaries whose religious work was from another point of view less valuable than their accomplishment as explorers. But with Colbert's accession to office, the French Government adopted the Canadian colony as its own child, encouraged emigration, and began the social and political organization on the French model. By the end of the century, the French population had risen to twenty thousand; there were great estates in the hands of seigneurs. Exploration had been carried beyond the Great Lakes which lay at the back of the northern English colonies. La Salle had not only reached the Mississippi, but had followed its southward course till he reached its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, where a settlement was presently made at New Orleans; and the whole territory which had been penetrated but not occupied was claimed as a French possession under the name of Louisiana. The English, had they recognized the French claim, would have thus been completely cut off from expansion westward by the Great Lakes, by the St. Law-

rence flowing from them north and east into the Atlantic, and by the Mississippi flowing south into the Gulf of Mexico.

Meanwhile the English colonies were also progressing. England had occupied islands of which the Spaniards had omitted to take possession—the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Barbadoes, and some of the Leeward Islands, where the French had also established a footing. War between the Commonwealth and Spain had given the opportunity for seizing Jamaica, though its value at the time had not been realized. Cromwell developed an Imperial colonial policy. The Commonwealth Navigation Acts transferred to the English the ocean-carrying trade which had been almost a Dutch monopoly. In Clarendon and Shaftesbury the Restoration supplied statesmen who shared Cromwell's ideas of colonial development, which were also well understood by Charles II. and fostered by him, except when they stood in the way of his private understanding with Louis XIV. The Dutch wars brought the cession of New Amsterdam, renamed New York, which made the whole coast line of North America British from Maine to Florida. New colonies—the Carolinas in the south, and Pennsylvania in the center—were started, Pennsylvania and New York belonging rather to the northern than the southern group. North of French Canada, the Hudson Bay territory, first under the name of Prince Rupert's Land, was claimed as British for the development of the fur trade. The same general principles applied to all the colonies on the Atlantic seaboard; each reproduced, with its own modifications, the English system of an elective legislature and an executive responsible not to the body of citizens but to the Crown, though the Crown itself was generally inactive.

The temporary federation of the northern colonies died out, and there was little enough of cohesion or co-operation between the individual states. All alike were subject to the control of the Home Government, which, for the most part, interfered in colonial affairs only for the regulation and restriction of trade in the interests of the English mercantile community, which were often antagonistic to those of the colonials. Finally, the treaty of Utrecht transferred Acadie and secured Newfoundland to the British from the French, though, in the latter case, leaving to the French fishing-rights, which later became the subject of troublesome disputes.

#### *VIII.—British Developments, 1648-1715*

The Thirty Years' War put an end to the possibility of a consolidated Germany, and of a supreme autocracy in Middle Europe, while it left every State within the Empire, to all intents and purposes, a simple despotism. During the same period, the Stewarts and their ministers in England were endeavoring to make the Crown despotic

by depriving Parliament of its control over the purse. And Richelieu in France had almost attained the same end of breaking down the political independence of the noblesse. Within the next few years Mazarin's finesse completed Richelieu's work, and Louis XIV., at the age of twenty-one, found himself a sovereign more absolute than Europe had known since the days of Charlemagne.

Louis was hardly out of his cradle when the corresponding struggle in England reached its critical point in the outbreak of the Great Rebellion or Civil War. In the arbitrament of arms the Crown was decisively defeated, but the immediate victory was won, not by Parliament but by the soldiery, who substituted a military dictatorship for the control of Crown or Parliament. Such a government, however effective and successful, was alien to every English instinct and tradition; it fell with the death of its great chief, and eighteen months had barely passed when the second Charles was restored to his father's throne.

But the Restoration was no more a victory for Absolutism than the Commonwealth had been a victory for Parliament. Parliament claimed, exercised, and materially strengthened all the rights which it had asserted against Charles I. By twenty years of diplomatic manipulation Charles II. achieved his own personal deliverance from parliamentary control, but only by selling himself to the service of the King of France. The brother who succeeded him was neither base enough nor clever enough to follow his example; and, pursuing his own blind and obstinate way, found himself in less than four years an exiled pretender to the throne which he had been forced to vacate. Parliament asserted its supremacy in practical fashion by offering the crown to the ex-monarch's son-in-law, the Dutch Stadtholder, upon terms which, once for all, set statutory limits to the royal powers. They were still great, and would have been greater for an English-born king of William's ability. But he was a foreigner, and his successor, though English-born, was a woman of little ability or force of character. The Stewarts had succeeded in retaining the ministers of their own choice in defiance of hostile Parliaments, but ministers now were no longer able to remain in office if Parliament demanded their removal. In other words, they became responsible, answerable, not to the Crown but to Parliament.

The Hanoverian succession completed the work of the "Glorious Revolution," for it set on the throne another foreigner whose great-grandfather had indeed been King of England, but whom every one—including himself—knew to be there simply to block the way for the exiled Stewarts. He was not at all indispensable, as William had been; if he proved troublesome, there would be no practical reason for preferring him to the Stewarts, while all the sentimental reasons were in favor of the banished house. The king left the government entirely

to the ministers; the ministers held office at the will of the man or the group who could make sure of a parliamentary majority, and on no other terms. The king became, and remained, a figurehead until the last possibility of a Stewart restoration had vanished; the custom of half a century deprived the Crown of rights which no statute had cancelled; but in effect the supremacy of Parliament had been secured for ever with the coronation of George I.

England, or Great Britain, was a republic in the guise of a monarchy, as the Commonwealth had been a monarchy in the guise of a republic. It was precisely the experience of Cæsarism which ruled out of the possibilities an explicitly republican form of government; so that the world was presented with a solid example of a revolution carried through without breach of continuity, with nothing more than a deflection in the royal line. But the deflection involved the negation of the divine authority of the individual monarch, and in so doing recognized a principle fatal to the whole scheme of Absolutism which everywhere else, save in Holland, Switzerland, Venice, and Genoa, had triumphed.

The English Revolution was the triumph of Parliament, but by no means of democracy; for Parliament was very far from being a democratic body. It was, in fact, very fairly representative of instructed public opinion, but it was not elected by the popular voice. Virtually it was an assembly of landowners, or nominees of landowners. More than a century was still to elapse before the "Great Reform Bill" abolished the more glaring anomalies of the electoral system, regulating and extending the irregular and narrow franchise, and for a full half-century the existing electorate was to be largely controlled by a Whig oligarchy. But at the worst, the electors were amenable to popular influences, and the broad fact remained that the Parliament of Great Britain had a wider popular basis, and more nearly reflected popular opinion, than any Government in Europe. And therefore it was to England, and the apologists of the English Revolution, that European inquirers turned in search of remedies for the vices they found in their own governmental systems.

In the five-and-twenty years when England was, with little intermission, perpetually at war with France, was definitely and permanently establishing her primacy on the seas, and was remoulding the Constitutional Monarchy, domestic events were also materially changing her relations both with Ireland and with Scotland. From the days of Henry II., Ireland had always been ruled—and always most inefficiently—as a dependency. In the century between the accession of Queen Elizabeth and the recall of Charles II., colonies of English and Scottish Protestants had been planted on Irish soil at the expense of the surrounding Irish Catholic population, among whom they formed an element unmistakably alien and unmistakably hostile. Racial in-

compatibilities and religious antagonisms were intensified by the imposition of alien laws which ignored native traditions, robbed the peasantry of what had been their land, and confined the limited share of dwellers in Ireland in their own government to Protestants. The Stewarts, in practice, extended as much toleration as they dared to the Catholics, and the Irish in the civil wars were on the side of the Stewarts. The expulsion of the Stewarts had the effect of a military conquest of the Catholics by the Protestants, who numbered perhaps one-fifth of the population; in their hands was all the power which was not directly exercised by the supreme government in England; and they used it without mercy for the depression of the Catholics politically and economically. Thus, while on the one hand the bulk of the population was rendered incapable of protecting or advancing its own interests, on the other it was rendered permanently hostile both to the dominant section in Ireland itself, and to the British control, to which even that dominant section was subordinate.

Altogether different was the change inaugurated, thought not yet brought to completion, in the relations between England and Scotland. Until the accession to the English throne of the Scottish King James VI., the two kingdoms had been independent; until Elizabeth ascended the throne, Scotland had generally been in alliance with England's continental adversary, France. The union of the crowns was incompatible with a renewal of international hostilities—the King of England obviously could not be at war with the King of Scotland—but otherwise the two States remained independent; the government of one had no control over the government of the other. When England offered her crown to William of Orange, Scotland would have been entirely within her rights if she had chosen to keep James II. on her own throne, or to offer it to another king than the one chosen by England; though, in fact, she elected to make her own terms with William, and the union of crowns was maintained. But the failure of Anne's heirs left it open to Scotland to choose for herself who should succeed Anne on the Scottish throne. If she recalled a Stewart and England did not, inevitably she would revert to the French alliance. And that, in the eyes of the Scots, seemed preferable to a continuation of the existing relationship—primarily because England's commercial policy included the suppression of Scotland's trade rivalry. For England the prospect was so disquieting that Scotland could practically make her own terms—within reason—for accepting the Hanoverian succession. Those terms were an incorporating union which should give to Scotland security for the preservation of her own national institutions, a due share of representation in what would be the Parliament no longer of "England" but of "Great Britain," and common trading rights hitherto denied to her by the Navigation and other Acts. Thenceforth there were to be not two States, which

might become separate and hostile, but one—a common citizenship conveying common rights and commanding a common policy for all.

The treaty of Union was negotiated in 1706, in the middle of the War of the Spanish Succession; and the first Parliament of Great Britain assembled in 1707. Thenceforth it is not England but Great Britain whose Empire expands, who negotiates with foreign Powers, and does battle with foreign foes. Hostility to the Union still survived in Scotland for the best part of half a century, kept alive by the suspicion that Scottish interests were subordinated to those of England, and by the more active Jacobite sentiment in the north. But when at last it had become clear that the star of the Stewarts had set for ever, and that amity with England guaranteed for Scotland a prosperity impossible if the two countries were at feud, the Union bore its full fruit, and the Scots played their full part in the struggle which won the British Empire and in its subsequent development; which, if the Union had not been carried out, might have taken a very different course.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### THE STRUGGLE FOR EMPIRE, AND THE RISE OF PRUSSIA, 1713-1763

#### *I.—The Western Powers after Utrecht, 1713-1739*

THE twenty years which followed the treaty of Utrecht were an era of comparative peace. Then the Continent was turned upside down in a particularly barren dynastic war—that of the Polish Succession. In 1739 was reopened the conflict between Great Britain and the Bourbons, which had been initiated by William III., and culminated, though it did not end, with the destruction of the French power in America and India. In this same group of wars Frederick the Great asserted and established the position of the young kingdom of Prussia, the old Brandenburg electorate, as a first-class Power—primarily by his intervention in another dynastic struggle; the War of the Austrian Succession. After the treaties of Paris and Hubertsburg in 1763, there again ensued an era of comparative peace among the European Powers, though with an interlude of renewed contest between Great Britain and the Bourbons, owing to the intervention of the latter in the struggle between Great Britain and her revolted colonies in America—a struggle of vital importance to the world, because it resulted in the creation of the new independent Republican Empire of the United States of America. The French intervention sealed the doom of the Bourbon régime in France; and a new chapter in the world's history was opened by the French Revolution, coinciding in point of time with the development in Great Britain of the no less vital Industrial Revolution.

These seventy-five years between the treaty of Utrecht and the summoning of the States-General, from 1713 to 1788, constitute the era which we conveniently, but not quite accurately, label as the eighteenth century; whereof the outstanding products were the decision between France and Great Britain of their rivalry for empire outside of Europe, the creation of the United States, and, within Europe, the definite emerging of Prussia and Russian as first-class Powers.

The treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, the confirmatory instrument under which, in effect, the Emperor Charles VI. accepted the terms upon which the rest of Europe had agreed, remodelled the map of

Europe; the finishing touches relating to the northern Powers were given seven years later by the treaty of Nystadt. In effect France retained all that Louis XIV. held at the treaty of Ryswick, and a Bourbon prince occupied the throne of Spain. The Austrian and Imperial House of Hapsburg had acquired the possession of one-half of Italy, and the ascendancy in the other half; also it had acquired what had been the Spanish Netherlands—but these were remote from the rest of its possessions, of which they formed an appendage, not an integral part. The danger of the Mediterranean being turned into a Bourbon lake was averted by the Austrian position in Italy, and much more decisively by the British retention of Minorca and Gibraltar. Russia entered into the Swedish inheritance in the Baltic.

The settlement was made on the hypothesis that it was in the interests of Europe at large; but the interests of Europe meant those, not of populations, but of dynasties. And two at least of the Powers, Austria and Spain, were a very long way from being satisfied. For Charles VI. clung to the belief that he had a right to Spain, and Philip V. clung to the belief that he had a right actually to Italy, and potentially to the French succession. The former belief was held still more vigorously by his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, who wanted her own children to find compensation in Italy for their presumable exclusion from the throne of Spain, which would naturally pass to Philip's elder children by his first wife.

On the other hand, a very peculiar situation had arisen in the relations of Great Britain and France. While the War of the Spanish Succession was still raging, the hitherto separate kingdoms of England and Scotland had been incorporated in a single State by the treaty of Union, and the succession to the throne had been settled upon the Elector George of Hanover, to the exclusion of the exiled Stewarts. While there was an appreciable Jacobite sentiment in England, half Scotland hankered for the repeal of the Union, and hoped to get it by a Stewart restoration. Jacobitism, therefore, provided the enemies of the British Government abroad with a fertile field for intrigue. On the other hand in France, Louis XIV. was an old man; his heir was a sickly child, his great-grandson. Apart from his renunciation, Philip V. of Spain stood next in the succession, which the treaty of Utrecht transferred to Philip of Orleans, the nephew of the old king. To Orleans, therefore, it was of supreme consequence that the conditions of the treaty of Utrecht should be maintained. The old king died in 1715, a year after the accession of George I. in England; the child Louis XV. came to the throne; Orleans secured the regency; and the result was compact or alliance between His Britannic Majesty and the Regent of France to guarantee the succession in both countries in accordance with the terms of Utrecht; while in France there was an anti-Orleanist faction corresponding to the Jacobite fac-

tion in Great Britain. Hence the *de facto* governments of the two countries remained in close alliance until the young king outgrew the sickness of his early years, married a wife, and ended alike the prospects of an Orleanist and of a Spanish succession.

For a time Austria found occupation in the East. An energetic Turkish Vizier made war upon Venice and recovered possession of the Morea in 1715. Then, in an unhappy moment for himself, he turned the Turkish arms against Austria, hoping to recover territories lost by the treaty of Carlowitz. Eugene at the head of the Austrian armies repeated the triumph of Zenta, shattered the Turkish army and killed the Vizier at the battle of Peterwardein, and recaptured Belgrade. The war was ended in 1718 by the treaty of Passarowitz, which left Belgrade and the Banat of Temesvar in the possession of Austria. The Emperor threw away the opportunity of pushing forward on the Danube, whereby he might conceivably have settled the Balkan question once for all. His failure left it open to Russia to re-enter the field at her own time. Austria was, in fact, fatally hampered by the contradictory demands of her Imperial and her Eastern interests.

Meanwhile, in the West, Spain was the storm center. The general direction of administration and policy fell into the hands of Alberoni, an Italian, who was raised to the cardinalate. To the Spaniards, however, he was merely a low-born foreigner. Nevertheless his zeal and energy rapidly effected immense improvements in the domestic arrangements of Spain. Foiled in his first hope of obtaining a British alliance against the Orleanists in France and the Austrians in Italy, he plunges into intrigues with Jacobites, with disaffected French nobles, with Sweden and with Russia, in the hope of destroying the British and French Governments; but his supreme energies were devoted to the revival of the Spanish navy, which he saw to be the condition of Spanish aggrandizement. While Austria was engaged in the Turkish war, Alberoni, before he was ready, was forced by the queen into open hostilities with Austria. Sardinia was easily occupied (1717), and in the next year the Spanish fleet sailed to Sicily. Off the coast of Sicily, however, it was annihilated by a British squadron, although there had been no declaration of war; the prospect of restoring the naval power of Spain was obliterated at Cape Passaro. The Austrian armies were at the same moment set free from the campaigns in Turkey; the series of plots which Alberoni had fostered was brought to light; the British, French, and Austrian Governments combined to bring military and naval pressure to bear upon Spain; and Philip was compelled to eject Alberoni from his dominions.

Spain herself was obliged to join the already formed Quadruple Alliance of France, Britain, Holland, and the Empire. Charles VI. and Philip mutually pledged themselves to withdraw their respective

claims on territories which had been allotted to the other, and Savoy handed over Sicily to Austria, receiving Sardinia in exchange.

The next phase was a curious *rapprochement* between Spain and Austria, following upon, though not deriving from, the promulgation of the famous Pragmatic Sanction.

This was a decree issued by Charles VI., fixing the succession to the whole of his dominions upon his daughter, Maria Theresa. The whole of the Hapsburg inheritance descended normally in the direct male line; thus when the Emperor Joseph I. died without leaving male heirs of his body in 1711, his brother Charles succeeded. Charles had no sons; there was nowhere any representative of the House of Hapsburg in the direct male line. The Pragmatic Sanction decreed that children born to Charles, whether male or female, should succeed in priority to the daughters of his dead brother. In 1717 Maria Theresa was born. From the various Estates of his various realms Charles gradually procured the acceptance of his decree, which was formally published in 1724. The Emperor's nieces, the daughters of Joseph, were married in due course to the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria, but were required to renounce any claims they might have to the Austrian succession. Whether those renunciations would be treated as valid at a later date was another matter. From this time forward it was a fixed idea with Charles to procure from every possible Power its guarantee that the Pragmatic Sanction should be carried out.

Now there arose about this time a coldness between Austria and the maritime Powers; because Charles created under the ægis of the State a rival to their East India Companies, in the Ostend Company, which, in the view of England and Holland, was a contravention of existing treaties. Spanish hostility to France was roused for a different reason. Orleans was now dead; for the time being the Duke of Bourbon, the cousin of the young French king, was in the ascendent. Orleans had arranged the betrothal of young King Louis to a Spanish Infanta; Bourbon cancelled the betrothal and married Louis instead to Maria Leczinski, the daughter of Stanislaus, the exiled claimant to the crown of Poland. Spain was grievously insulted. France was still closely associated with England. The coolness, on the one hand, between Austria and England, and, on the other between Spain and France, added to the commercial jealousy of the maritime Powers, and caused Austria and Spain to draw together. By the end of 1726, two hostile leagues had come into existence, into one or other of which nearly all the minor European States had been absorbed. A general war was only averted because the friendship of Austria and Spain was purely artificial, while the interests which those two governments had at heart were really irreconcilable. Spain actually made a perfectly futile attempt to capture Gibraltar; but Charles deserted the alliance, a peace was patched up, and a settlement at last

appeared to have been reached at the treaty of Vienna in 1732, which placed the Spanish queen's son, another Charles, in possession of the Italian duchies of Parma and Piacenza at the expense of Austria. The Emperor, however, had his compensation in the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by Great Britain and Holland, as well as by Spain and Russia.

That guarantee was refused by France; and at the Imperial Diet held in this year it was refused also by the Saxon, Bavarian, and Palatine Electors, though it was adopted by the rest, including Hanover and Prussia.

Now Augustus II. of Saxony had been nominally or actually King of Poland for five-and-thirty years, and he wished to secure the succession to his son, another Augustus. In 1733 he died. The obvious opposition candidate was the exiled Stanislaus Leczinski, the father-in-law of the King of France, whose election would mean a French ascendancy in Poland. Stanislaus, assured of French support, appeared suddenly at Warsaw, and procured his own election. The Tsarina, Anne of Courland, Peter's niece, who had just established her authority in Russia, was prepared to support the Saxon candidate by force of arms. The Emperor solved the dilemma in which he found himself by an agreement with Augustus III., who, in return for his support, gave the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction which his father had refused. England, controlled by Walpole, remained judiciously neutral; so also did Prussia, and, as a matter of course, Hanover. France, now under the direction of the aged Cardinal Fleury, did not hurry to the aid of Stanislaus, who was easily ejected from Poland by the Russians and Saxons.

But France, pledged to support Stanislaus, could utilize the circumstances for other ends in conjunction with Spain. There was no longer any question about the French succession, any reason why the two Bourbon Powers should not enter upon a close family alliance. The secret Family Compact was drawn up, directed in the first instance against Austria, and secondarily against Great Britain. Fleury was confident that nothing would induce Walpole to drag England into the war. When Austria was disposed of, England could conveniently be taken in hand, with the certainty that Austria would not come to her aid even if she could. The immediate project was for a union between France, Spain, and Sardinia—that is to say, Savoy—for the absorption of Italy and the expulsion from it of the Hapsburgs. Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia was to leave Lombardy; Charles, the young Duke of Parma and Piacenza, was to have the Sicilies, resigning his duchies, together with the of Tuscany of which he was the acknowledged heir, to his younger brother. France was to find her own compensation in Lorraine, whose duke had been betrothed

to Maria Theresa, and in the transfer of Savoy itself by the King of Sardinia.

Before the end of 1733 the new plan of the campaigning, which still bore the title of the War of the Polish Succession, was in full operation. There is no need to follow the details of the uninteresting contest. Austria had no actual supporters. On the other hand, Fleury was extremely anxious to end the war as soon as France had achieved her own immediate ends. At the end of 1735 terms of peace were settled—though the definitive treaty was long postponed—more favorably for Austria than might have been expected. The Spanish queen's son got the kingdom of the Sicilies, but it was not his brother but the Emperor who took Parma and Piacenza; while the succession to Tuscany was given to Francis of Lorraine, who transferred Lorraine itself to Stanislaus, who withdrew his own claim to the crown of Poland. In effect this meant that Lorraine would be absorbed by France at his death, and would practically be her dependency during his life. Further, Charles attained once again the illusory prize on which he set so much store; France was at last explicitly pledged to the Pragmatic Sanction. No specific progress had been made towards the secondary object of the Family Compact. Austria was not in fact crippled, nor had a rupture been procured between her and Great Britain. For although Walpole had refused to intervene in arms, his diplomatic pressure had made itself felt, and Austria owed to it the acquisition of Parma and Piacenza. Moreover, while France and the rest of the European Powers had been wasting blood and treasure profusely, England had been piling up vast reserves of wealth, the sinews of war. And in the meantime both France and Spain had continued to neglect the navies whose predominance on the sea was the necessary condition of striking any effective blow at the maritime Power.

There can, in fact, be little doubt that actual war was not a part of Fleury's project. In dealing with Walpole he trusted to the diplomatic methods which he greatly preferred to the military, and relied too much upon Walpole's passion for peace. The possibility of the English minister's hand being forced by more bellicose elements in the nation was overlooked. Unfortunately for Fleury those over-powerful bellicose elements were present both in Spain and in England. Of the two ancient causes of quarrel between the two countries, which had actuated the Elizabethans and Oliver Cromwell, one had disappeared—Spain was no longer the champion of aggressive Romanism. But the second, the commercial grievance, had been reinvigorated instead of being removed by the treaty of Utrecht. Under that instrument limited rights of trading with the Spanish colonies had been conceded to the English; but those rights had been used as a means to illicit traffic, for the suppression of which the Spanish authorities

had reverted to their old high-handed and illegal methods of search. It was no instinct of Imperial prevision on the part of either British or Spaniards which broke down the pacific policy of Fleury and Walpole. The quarrel was perfectly capable of adjustment; but both in Spain and in England, popular opinion was irritated into adopting a thoroughly unreasonable attitude, blind and deaf to the legitimate grievances of the other side. Walpole in bitterness of spirit found himself unable to control the outbursts of popular passion, and in 1739 war was declared between England and Spain.

In the eyes of the British and Spanish peoples the quarrel was one simply between England and Spain. To their rulers it meant the probable interposition of France in the interests of the Family Compact. Neither to the peoples nor to their rulers did it present itself in its true character as the first clash in a decisive struggle between France and Great Britain for Imperial supremacy beyond the seas. Yet for fifty years past a shrewd observer might have guessed that such a struggle was becoming inevitable.

In the East, the French had become formidable rivals to the British East India Company; in the seventeenth century, however, it would still have seemed absurd to prophesy that the peninsula would become a battle-ground for their armed forces. But with the eighteenth century and the death of Aurangzib, set in that disintegration of the Mughal Empire for which the fanaticism and the ambition of Aurangzib, had prepared the way. There Mughals followed Aurangzib in rapid succession; such control as could be exercised was seized by ambitious ministers; governors and sub-governors of the great provinces began to act as independent princes, while paying only a formal allegiance to the authority at Delhi. The heirs of Sivaji became the puppets of their Peshwas, a Brahmin family in which the post of first minister became hereditary; four chiefs of the Mahratta stock acquired a supremacy in various parts of the expanding Mahratta region, and the five formed a "Pentarchy," a confederation recognizing the Peshwa as its head, which rapidly became dominant in the central and western provinces, and was presently threatening to assume control over the almost powerless Mughal himself. In 1739, a few months before the declaration of war between Great Britain and Spain, a Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah, swept down through the passes and the Punjab, sacked Delhi, and destroyed the last vestiges of a real Imperial authority, though he left the heir of Akbar still in occupation of the throne. If a European Power elected to enter the welter of competition for territorial aggrandizement, it would be certain of at least securing a share of the spoils, unless another European rival should frustrate its aims. If it succeeded, no rival would have a chance of competing with it. In such circumstances it was a moral certainty that sooner or later one or both of the two Powers which had great commercial interests

in India would take the field; that when Great Britain and France should next be at war, one of the issues at stake would be the Indian prize.


In America, though critical moments had occurred in the relations between the colonies, notably Virginia and Massachusetts, and their governors and the crown, and though there was strong resentment against the Navigation Acts, which Massachusetts again took the lead in evading, there was otherwise, after the English Revolution, little material interference with the self-government of the colonies. Walpole was judiciously blind to the vast amount of illegal traffic which was carried on; and the Colonials accepted the situation, because of the French menace. Since the planting of a French settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi in 1697, the French had planted outposts, though at wide intervals, along that river, and claimed that the whole basin and all that lay to the west of it was theirs. The northern English colonies, though hardly as yet the southern, were feeling the pressure, and conscious that their own visions of expansion westward could not be realized without a struggle with the French. In numbers the latter were very much inferior; but they had the advantage of a single government, in effect under autocratic military direction, with king's troops to carry out its orders. The English were under a dozen different governments, each without any other military force to rely on except its own almost untrained militia, and none could depend on its neighbor for active co-operation. Hence it was understood that there would be absolute need of naval and military support from England when French and British colonists should come to grips. And the nearness of the danger became more apparent when the French began to lay claim to the basin of the Ohio, the great eastern tributary of the Mississippi, as well as to the more remote Mississippi itself. Once war should be declared between Great Britain and France, it was evident that the rivalry in America would be forced to an issue.

## *II.—Russia, Turkey, and Prussia, 1713–1739*

In the last years of Peter the Great, Russian expansion was all in the south-easterly direction, chiefly at the expense of the Persian Empire, and conducted by arrangement with the Porte. The great Tsar died in 1725. The law of succession in Russia was of the vaguest; Peter himself had claimed in a decree of his own the right of nominating his successor, and he actually nominated his extremely able second wife Catherine, who reigned for two years. During his life his own son Alexis had been put to death, but left a young son Peter; who was made Tsar on Catherine's death, but himself died without leaving any children three years later in 1730. On

the other hand, Peter I.'s elder brother Ivan, who had been joint Tsar with him for a few years, left two daughters. Of these two the younger, Anne, married the Duke of Courland; she by sundry court intrigues was made Tsarina on the death of Peter II. and reigned till 1740, when she died leaving no children. To clear up the complicated matter of Russian succession: Anne's elder sister Catherine had been married to the Duke of Mecklenburg; on Anne's death, this Catherine's grandson, Ivan VI., was made Tsar for a few months, at the end of which he was deposed by Peter's own younger daughter Elizabeth, who reigned from 1741 to 1762. Peter's other daughter Anne had been married to the Duke of Holstein, and their son succeeded Elizabeth, to reign for a few months as Peter III. From Peter III. and his wife, who reigned after him for thirty-four years as

#### PETER THE GREAT AND HIS SUCCESSORS.



The figures give the order and date of succession.

Catherine II., the later Tsars have descended; Peter III. having been a grandson of Peter the Great, although Two Tsars and three Tsarinas intervened between Peter I. and Peter III. Altogether the six nominal reigns which succeeded that of Peter the Great covered only thirty-seven years, a condition of things not tending to progress.

In fact each succession was the occasion of violent family intriguing, if not of open insurrection, on the part of factions of the nobility. Catherine I. nominated by Peter himself, was established as Tsarina with the support of the group who had enjoyed the great Tsar's confidence. The same party established Peter II. on her death, expecting to maintain control of the young Tsar. He, however, broke free from their dictation and made friends with the chiefs of the Nationalist party of reaction. On his death from smallpox this group offered the crown to Anne of Courland, the great Peter's niece, instead of to his daughter Elizabeth or the infant grandson who afterwards became Peter III. They offered the crown to Anne, who was a widow, upon

terms which would have made her a mere figurehead while vesting the government of the country practically in the hands of a supreme council of twelve nobles. Anne appeared to comply, but within a fortnight of her accession, she effected a *coup d'état*, sent the leader of the hostile faction to Siberia, and assumed the despotic powers which had been wielded by her uncle. It was the Tsarina Anne who in effect set Augustus III. on the throne of Poland, who guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction on behalf of Russia, and who was still reigning when the war broke out between Spain and Great Britain in 1739.

After the peace of Passarowitz, Turkey, in spite of incitement from interested quarters, and the distractions provided for the Tsar Peter in relation to Sweden, refused to attack Russia. A more fruitful prospect was offered to her in Asia, where the Persian Empire of the Safavid dynasty—the Persian “Sofis”—was in a state of disintegration. Peter having turned his eyes to the same quarter, a treaty of partition was arranged with Russia which extended the Russian border to the Caspian Sea and appropriated Georgia to the Turkish Empire.

Now there were at this time two claimants to the Persian throne, belonging respectively to the two great divisions of the Mohammedan world, the Sunnites, and the Shiites, of whom the latter claimed that the true successors of the prophet were the descendents of his kinsman Ali. The Shiite cause was espoused by the great adventurer Nadir. The Sunnite, an Afghan named Ashraf, was supported by the Turkish Sultan, the head of the orthodox Sunnite Mohammedans. Nadir overthrew Ashraf and drove the Turks out of Persian territory. This conflict comes in touch with the affairs of Europe. For the outbreak of the War of the Polish Succession made the Tsarina Anne anxious to keep Turkey engaged in the Persian war, lest the Turk should yield to the blandishments of France and attack Russia. Therefore she encouraged Nadir, whose arms after some checks were successful. He recovered Georgia, and peace was made in 1735. In the next year this champion of Persian independence was himself raised to the Persian throne as that Nadir Shah who invaded India in 1739.

Now the arrangement made with Peter the Great had only suspended the Russian designs against the Turkish Empire, while it had involved Turkey in this prolonged contest with Persia. Accordingly, in 1726, the Tsarina Catherine made a treaty with Austria under which the two Powers agreed that either would send 30 000 men to help the other, if called upon, in the event of a war with Turkey. At the end of 1735, Augustus of Saxony, the candidate supported by Russia and the Emperor, was definitely established as King of Poland. During the conflict Russia had taken charge of the operations in Poland, thereby setting Austria free to devote her energies to the war in Italy in defence of her own territories. Turkey was as yet hardly free from her Persian entanglement. It was easy for the Tsarina

Anne to find an excuse for attacking Turkey. In 1736 Russian troops invaded Crimean territory and again seized Azov.

The Emperor Charles VI. was easily induced to plunge Austria into the war in the following year. But the military operation were ill-conducted on the part of both Russians and Austrians; their diplomacy fared no better; in the latter field the Turks had the advantage of French support. The result was that when peace was made in 1739, Russia, although she retained Azov, evacuated the rest of the territory which she had sought to occupy, and was expressly precluded from having any ships either in the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov. Austria, though she obtained Temesver, gave up Belgrade and the rest of the territories on the south of the Danube which had passed under her dominion at the treaty of Carlowitz.

Meanwhile another Power had been organized within the bounds of the Empire which was destined to play a leading rôle in the immediate future. We have seen how the great Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg organized a powerful central control over his divided dominions in Brandenburg, Prussia, and the various scraps of territory in the west of Germany which had come to him by inheritance; although he had failed to acquire Pomerania, Polish West Prussia still separated Brandenburg from Prussia itself, and he still maintained claims which had not been recognized upon other German territories which would have consolidated his western principalities. Almost the only advance made by his son Frederick was the recognition of his regal title as King of Prussia. Frederick I. was succeeded in 1713 by his son Frederick William I.

Frederick William was completely dominated by beliefs which were extremely narrow but which he held with a proportionate intensity of conviction. Safety for his kingdom was attainable only by raising it to the highest possible pitch of military efficiency—to that, everything else must be subordinated. To that end, in his eyes, his dominion must be self-sufficing, producing for itself all things necessary to a perfect fighting machine, free from any dependence whatever on the foreigner. The things not necessary to the efficiency of the fighting machine, not conducing to its greater efficiency, were superfluous, frivolous, and presumably demoralizing; the less such things were produced or enjoyed the better. Prussia being a poor country the most rigid economy was to be enforced, king and court setting the example. Everything foreign was suspected, everything French necessarily stood condemned. Unfailing obedience was the supreme virtue, indiscipline the unpardonable sin.

On those principles Frederick William drilled Prussia. With a population less than half that of England he built up in time of peace an army as big as the maximum numbers of the British army at its highest expansion during Marlborough's wars. His army was a mania

with him, leading him into such grotesque devices as the creation of the famous Potsdam regiment in which every man was a giant in stature. Giants were the only foreign product welcomed in his kingdom by Frederick William. But though it is easy to see madness in his method, he attained his end, and created for Prussia an army of unexampled efficiency, an army bigger than could be mustered by any potentate except the monarchs of France, Austria, and Russia. And he was scientific enough to provide his troops with a better weapon than was possessed by any other army, the musket with an iron ramrod.

But the King of Prussia had no sort of wish to use his army for aggression. He made war upon no one. The army was an end in itself. It was not even a diplomatic asset, a portentous possession of persuasive significance for the conduct of pacific negotiations. For to Frederick William diplomacy was full of terrors. He was an honest man himself, of an obstinate loyalty to his word and to his creeds, which is hardly to be found elsewhere among the rulers, statesmen, and politicians of Europe in his day. But he knew quite well that there were a great many dishonest people about; he knew himself to be no match for them, and he was horribly afraid of being made a dupe, which fate indeed befell him on more occasions than one. Therefore to the best of his power he held aloof from all European complications, seeking no alliances and taking action outside his own kingdom only when he recognized a duty to the Emperor—a conscientious obligation. Charles VI. rewarded him by making promises which he ignored when the time came for fulfilment. Of which things careful note was made by Frederick, Crown Prince of Prussia.

Europe, however, was unconscious of the Prussian army. Prussian regiments had fought valiantly enough among the Imperial troops at Blenheim and Malplaquet, but no Prussian general had been heard of since the Great Elector himself, nor had any Prussian army, as such, taken the field. Only the Crown Prince Frederick knew or guessed the qualities of the instrument forged by the Prussian king.

### *III.—The War of the Austrian Succession, 1739–1748*

Great Britain, though her commerce had been expanding, though she had been accumulating immense wealth to fall back on, while her neighbors were exhausting themselves and their treasuries in the War of the Polish Succession, had yet made no adequate preparations for war, although Walpole himself was fully informed of the terms of the Family Compact. Still she was far stronger on the seas than any other Power. By the end of 1739 a British squadron was operating in the West Indies, and captured Portobello. Beyond that it accomplished nothing. Even when reinforced in 1741 it only made a

woefully unsuccessful attempt to capture Cartagena. Before that time the European conflagration was already kindled.

In the spring of 1740 Frederick William of Prussia died and was succeeded by Frederick II., a young man of twenty-eight. In October the Tsarina Anne died, the throne was captured for her young nephew Ivan, and an intrigue was promptly at work to remove him and to set on the throne Peter the Great's younger daughter Elizabeth. Immediately after Anne the Emperor Charles VI. died. The Austrian succession was forthwith claimed under the Pragmatic Sanction by his daughter Maria Theresa, whose husband Francis, formerly Duke of Lorraine and now Grand Duke of Tuscany, hoped to succeed his father-in-law as Emperor, though that office was not in actual fact hereditary. On the other hand, the succession was claimed in defiance of the Pragmatic Sanction, to which he had never acceded, by Charles Albert of Bavaria, in right of his wife, the daughter of the late Emperor Joseph, and, failing that claim, in right of a doubtful ancient compact under which the Emperor Ferdinand III. was said to have recognized the claim of the Bavarian House of Wittelsbach in the event of the failure of the direct male Hapsburg line. He too hoped to be elected to the Imperial dignity, with which the Pragmatic Sanction was not concerned.

Now Charles Albert could not fight single-handed for his claim. Only the Palatine and Cologne Electors had refused their guarantee to the Pragmatic Sanction. Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover had given theirs. So had all the external Powers, Russia, Great Britain, France, Holland, and Spain. But the temptation for many of them to repudiate the pledge was strong. Owing to the death of the Tsarina it was impossible to count upon Russia. Augustus of Saxony had a claim similar to that of Charles Albert of Bavaria. To both the Bourbon Powers the break-up of the Hapsburg dominion was a desirable event; and Charles Albert was quite ready to hand over to Spain and Sardinia the Austrian possessions in Northern Italy on which the Imperial House had no long-standing claim. Only England, Hanover, and Prussia were by tradition and interest friendly to the Hapsburgs and hostile to Bavaria. Still, even in the eighteenth century, when political promises were lightly made and lightly broken, statesmen usually preferred to produce some colorable pretext for deserting their pledges. It seemed not unlikely that the Bourbon rivals of the House of Hapsburg would reluctantly content themselves with doing their best to secure the Imperial election for Charles Albert, which could be done without tearing up their guarantees of the Pragmatic Sanction.

But there was one prince who had no troublesome scruples. In the view of Frederick of Prussia his father and grandfather had allowed themselves to be duped by a blind loyalty to perfidious em-

perors who had robbed them and the Great Elector before them of their just rights in Berg, in Jülich, and in Silesia. Frederick had no moral punctilios about breaking a promise made by his father; but here was a sort of excuse, if any one considered an excuse necessary. For the rest, he had an army, untested indeed but in absolute readiness, large, and admirably trained and organized, under the command of a king young, vigorous, ambitious, and supremely self-confident. The Austrian dominion was made up of heterogeneous elements, some of them of very doubtful loyalty, and at the head of Austria was a girl of twenty-three. Charles VI. was hardly in his grave when Frederick, with a Prussian army behind him, entered Silesia and offered terms to Maria Theresa. If she would cede Silesia to him, he would maintain her claim to the whole of the rest of the Austrian inheritance intact. If not, he was in Silesia and intended to stay there.

Maria Theresa answered by a flat refusal of the insolent offer, and made ready for war, for which no preparations had been made. Meanwhile Frederick's armies occupied Silesian towns, no resistance being offered except by such fortresses as had Austrian garrisons in them. To the people of Silesia it was a matter of indifference whether a Hapsburg or a Hohenzollern was their sovereign. Neither the Hapsburg nor the Hohenzollern would have paid the smallest regard to their wishes if they had not been indifferent. Not till late in the spring of 1741 did the Prussians and Austrians meet in a pitched battle at Möllwitz. Frederick was so nearly beaten that he left the field under the impression that he had actually been defeated; but the fortunes of the day were turned by the skill of Schwerin and the valor of the Prussian infantry. At the end of the day the Prussians were decisively victors.

Möllwitz was an unexpected demonstration that a new force had appeared on the scene. The comparatively cautious policy of the aged Cardinal Fleury was discarded by France in favor of that of the aggressive Marshal Belleisle, who saw an opportunity for a redistribution of German and Hapsburg territories which would greatly facilitate a Bourbon domination. Guarantees were ignored. In the course of the summer an Anti-Pragmatic League was formed. Frederick as an Elector was to give his vote for Charles Albert at the approaching Imperial election; in return his conquest in Silesia was to be guaranteed to him. Spain and Sardinia were to be rewarded for their support of Bavaria by the Hapsburg possessions in the north of Italy. Russia was diplomatically implicated in a quarrel with Sweden, ensuring her nonintervention. France, without declaring war, provided money and troops as an "auxiliary"; a French army on the Lower Rhine prevented any active measures on the part of Holland or Hanover, while another force joined the Bavarians and threatened Vienna. Maria Theresa was apparently isolated, but she appealed

to the loyalty of her Hungarian subjects, and they, to the disappointment of the League, answered her appeal with enthusiasm.

Still the Queen of Hungary's position was so critical that she yielded, though with great reluctance, to the pressure of English diplomacy, and came to terms with Frederick at Klein Schnellendorf, though without a formal treaty. George II., of England and Hanover, did not want to quarrel with Prussia, but neither did he want the Anti-Pragmatic League to be successful. Frederick cared nothing whatever for the League, which had only sought his assistance when it realized his importance; he was quite satisfied that for his interests the League cared nothing. So it was arranged the Lower Silesia was to be ceded to him after a show of resistance enabling the Austrians to concentrate for the defence of Vienna.

The attack on Vienna was duly foiled, but the League succeeded in capturing Prague. This was not what Frederick had bargained for, so he found an excuse for repudiating the secret agreement, and by the end of the year was invading Moravia as a member of the League.

Nevertheless the year 1742 went badly for the League; Frederick's Moravian campaign was a failure, since the population, unlike that of Silesia, was actively hostile. In England Walpole's place was taken by Carteret, a much more vigorous war minister. In North Italy the King of Sardinia fell out with the Spaniards, changed sides, and helped the Austrians to drive the Spaniards out. A small British squadron appeared before Naples and compelled the young King Charles to pledge himself to neutrality. Through Carteret's diplomacy a mixed force of Dutch, British, and Hanoverians assembled in the Austrian Netherlands, as auxiliaries, to protect them against attack. Frederick, foiled in Moravia, accepted the definite treaty of Breslau, ceding Lower Silesia to him, and made a further compact with George by which Prussia and Hanover mutually guaranteed each other's territories. For two years Prussia was withdrawn from active participation in the war. And in the meantime, though Charles Albert had succeeded in procuring his own election as Emperor Charles VII., he was practically dispossessed of Bavaria by the Austrians.

Next year the French army of the Rhine and the army of auxiliaries assembled in the Netherlands came into collision at the battle of Dettingen, where King George blundered into a trap from which he was extricated by the valor of his troops and the blunders of the enemy; so that in effect the battle of Dettingen, fought between armies belonging to States none of which were in theory at war with each other, was a reverse for the anti-Pragmatics.

The ascendancy which Maria Theresa's supporters were now gaining, led to a new treaty among them, the treaty of Worms, in the autumn. But this was countered by a fresh treaty in 1744 between

France, Bavaria, and Prussia. Frederick's alarm had been aroused; he suspected the treaty of Worms of meaning that the treaty of Breslau was to be thrown over. Hence his readiness to renew the war. France dropped the fiction that she was only acting as an auxiliary, and declared war openly. Frederick attacked Bohemia, though with little success. The French placed their army under the command of Maurice of Saxony (Marshal Saxe), one of the numerous illegitimate sons of Augustus the Strong, and directed their attack upon the Netherlands, where they made considerable progress.

At the beginning of 1745, Charles VII. died, leaving as Elector of Bavaria a young son who obviously had no claim to the Imperial succession, and on whom it was easy for Maria Theresa to impose terms. He was satisfied with his own restoration in Bavaria, since there was now obviously no prospect of making good his father's claim to the Hapsburg inheritance, accepted the Pragmatic Sanction, and promised his support to Maria Theresa's husband at the Imperial election.

Thus the Austrian succession, which has given the whole war its general name, had nothing to do with the continuation of the war which was going on in 1745. The positions were changed, except that Austria and Prussia were again fighting each other for the possession of Silesia, which had been definitely made the stake between them by Frederick's renewed intervention in 1744. Great Britain and Spain, too, were still nominally at war on the old quarrel, but France was obviously fighting for Bourbon advancement and the domination of the Netherlands. Success returned to Frederick, who inflicted severe defeats upon the Austrians in Bohemia. Still Maria Theresa would not give way, encouraged by the open accession to her side of Augustus of Saxony, who was thoroughly alarmed by the development of the power of Prussia. But the result was that Frederick again defeated Austrians and Saxons as well, and occupied Dresden itself before the end of the year. This was conclusive. On Christmas Day peace was signed between Austria, Saxony, and Prussia, confirming Frederick in the possessions of practically all Silesia. Frederick again retired from the war, this time permanently; having given his adhesion, hitherto withheld, to the election of the Emperor Francis I.

Meanwhile Austria, intent upon the struggle for Silesia, had neglected the campaign in North Italy, which was being conducted in conjunction with Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia against the Spaniards and their French allies. The result was the Bourbons captured Parma and Piacenza, and laid siege to Milan. When the Austrians advanced to its relief, unsupported by Charles Emmanuel, who was only anxious to make Piedmont secure, a Bourbon force attacked and routed the Sardinians. At the same time the attempt to relieve Milan failed, and the town, though not the citadel, was entered in December. The disastrous situation which had thus arisen in North Italy forced

Maria Theresa the treaty which set her free from the contest with Prussia, though it left her no less determined to recover the lost province of Silesia if ever the opportunity for doing so should arrive.

In the Netherlands, too, the successes were for the Bourbons. The young Duke of Cumberland, the commander of the allied forces, was no match for Marshal Saxe, who captured Tournay after defeating him at the battle of Fontenoy. The sudden appearance in Scotland of the young Prince Charles Edward Stewart, and the last Jacobite insurrection which was finally crushed at the battle of Culloden in the following year, 1746, necessitated the withdrawal of Cumberland himself and the British troops from the Netherlands to England; so that, during the latter half of 1745, the great towns of the Netherlands, one after another, opened their gates to Marshal Saxe.

For two years more the war dragged on in Europe. Through 1746 the French continued to overrun the Netherlands, adding Brussels, Antwerp, and Mons to their captures. In Italy, however, the Bourbon advance was checked by the arrival of Austrian reinforcements. In the summer King Philip died, and was succeeded by Ferdinand VI., the son of his first wife, a sister of the King of Sardinia. Ferdinand's inclinations were towards domestic reform. He had no territorial ambitions, and no interest in the Italian projects into which Philip had been seduced by his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese; who, having established her eldest son, Charles, as King of Naples, wanted the northern duchies for her second son Philip. Elizabeth had practically ruled Spain for the last thirty years, but with Ferdinand's accession she was relegated to the position of queen-dowager, and completely lost her power. The result, in brief, was that Spain was now more than ready to make peace.

The open declaration of war by France in 1744, provided the actual opening for the struggle overseas between France and Great Britain. In 1745 a colonial force from Massachusetts, supported by a royal naval squadron, attacked and captured the great fortress of Louisbourg, which the French had established on Cape Breton to guard the entry to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The advantage gained, however, was not pushed further; a naval expedition, intended for that purpose in the following year, was diverted to a futile attack upon Lorient in Brittany, and in another quarter of the globe an attack was opened by the French which threatened, for a moment, to expel the British from India altogether.

François Dupleix, who since 1741 had been the French governor of Pondichéri, conceived the great design. Both Madras and Pondichéri were in the province of Arcot, or the Carnatic, ruled by Anwar-ud-Din, the Nawab or Lieutenant-Governor appointed by the Nizam of Haidarabad. Dupleix, by way of precaution, secured the Nawab's favor; also he confided his schemes to Labourdonnais, the naval com-

mandant at the island of Mauritius, the French naval base in the Indian Ocean between Africa and India. The French and British East India companies had instructed their respective governors in India that a war between the Powers at home was not to be extended to India; but that was an instruction easily set on one side. When the news came of the declaration of war between France and England, Anwar-ud-Din was easily persuaded by Dupleix to warn the British in Madras that no hostilities between them and the French would be permitted. But when, in 1746, the French opened hostilities, and Labourdonnais with a French squadron from Mauritius appeared before Madras, the Nawab was deaf to appeals from the British for his protection. Madras was captured, and occupied by Dupleix.

Then Anwar-ud-Din ordered that it should be handed over to him, To his astonishment, Dupleix refused. The Frenchman had grasped the importance of a discovery made long before by the Portuguese, that natives, drilled and officered by Europeans, were a match for infinitely larger forces composed of the undisciplined levies which formed the armies of the native potentates. He had accordingly drilled a small force of sepoys, as these troops were called. Anwar-ud-Din sent ten thousand men to eject the French from Madras; a young French officer, at the head of a thousand sepoys and a handful of Frenchmen, put the Nawab's army utterly to rout.

The fame and the power of the French were speedily noised abroad. The Nawab had plenty of enemies; there might be serious trouble if Dupleix made himself the center of disaffection. Anwar-ud-Din took no further action against Dupleix. The French failed in an attack upon the neighboring British station of Fort St. David, but they held on to Madras. In 1748 a British squadron appeared in Indian waters and attempted to recover Madras, but was driven away by stress of weather, the coasts affording no harborage. It must have been successful in the following year, since the Mauritius squadron was not strong enough to interfere with it; but the necessity was averted by the news that peace had been made between Great Britain and France, and that Madras was to be restored to the British.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had been signed in 1748. Already, in 1747, Maria Theresa was the only one of the belligerents who was disinclined for peace until she could obtain some equivalent at least for what she had conceded to the King of Sardinia, and for what she had been compelled to surrender to the King of Prussia. Her attitude put an end to the negotiations when they were first opened. Marshal Saxe attacked Holland, with the result that a fourth William of Orange was raised to the Stadtholdership, which had been vacated since the death of William III., and the office was formerly made hereditary in the family. Marshal Saxe continued to win victories which the dogged character of the allied soldiery made extremely

costly. Practically the military operations, wherever undertaken, were indecisive. Negotiations were reopened at Aix-la-Chapelle. Maria Theresa found herself in effect deserted, since more of her allies had the slightest intention of exerting themselves if the war went on, and all insisted on the reasonableness of the terms offered her, which in her eyes were extremely inadequate, if not actually humiliating. In France, despite the completeness of her success in the Netherlands, there was no enthusiasm for the war and no inclination to press for the retention of conquests, whereby the war spirit might again be roused in her adversaries. Still Maria Theresa remained intractable.

Hostilities were renewed in 1748. But France, Great Britain, and Holland, came to a private agreement for forcing the hands of the other belligerents. They settled the terms, and practically imposed them on the rest. Sardinia got back Savoy, of which the Spaniards and French were in effective possession, retaining also the Piedmontese territory which she had extorted from Maria Theresa. Silesia was guaranteed to Frederick, though he had retired from the war long ago. The claims of Spain were satisfied by the establishment of the young Prince Philip as Duke of Parma and Piacenza. All the other claims to Austrian territories were withdrawn, Maria Theresa's title to them being fully recognized. France evacuated the Netherlands, and the barrier fortresses were restored to the Dutch. As concerned Great Britain and the Bourbons, Spain confirmed the commercial concessions of the treaty of Utrecht; while the whole question of the right of search, the original occasion of the war, was completely ignored. France and Great Britain mutually restored their respective conquests; Louisbourg and Cape Breton went back to the French, and Madras to the British. The Imperial crown had already returned to the Hapsburgs with the election of Maria Theresa's husband, Francis of Lorraine, on the death of Charles VII.

The net result of the war was that neither Great Britain nor France had gained any territory; while from the Hapsburg possessions Sardinia had snatched a part of Piedmont, Parma and Piacenza had gone back to a scion of the Spanish royal family, and Frederick of Prussia was established in Silesia, the recovery of which became the supreme desire of the Empress. Incidentally, her passionate private hostility to Frederick of Prussia was shared by Elizabeth, the Russian Tsarina, not for any political reason, but because the king had privately commented in caustic and disrespectful fashion upon the unmarried Tsarina's reputation.

#### *IV.—Between the Wars, 1748–1756*

From 1748 to 1756 Europe enjoyed an uneasy peace—the pause before a struggle more tremendous than that which had just been

ended. For on the Continent it was quite certain that the Empress would not remain contented with the results of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; that she would not rest so long as she could dream of recovering Silesia and of crushing the king who had robbed her of it by an act of political brigandage. Outside of Europe it was equally certain that, sooner or later, Great Britain and France would fight out their rivalry in America and India. It needed no very acute prophet to foresee that these two quarrels between France and Britain, and between Austria and Prussia, would not be isolated, but would, in some way or other, be involved together. But no one in 1748 could have foreseen that Austria and France, Hapsburg and Bourbon, would be in alliance against Prussia and Austria's traditional allies, Great Britain and Hanover.

While the diplomatic revolution which brought about this unforeseen combination was progressing in a Europe superficially at peace, and Great Britain and France were officially friendly Powers, French and British in India and America found means of carrying on their quarrel, the nature of which was hardly yet realized in the home countries. The plain fact was, that in both regions the ultimate issue depended upon seapower—that is to say, superior sea-power, adequately applied, was certain to ensure victory to its possessor. Superior sea-power lay unmistakably with the British; that had been abundantly proved in the last war, although nothing like adequate use of it had been made. Whether it would be given full play in the coming struggle was another question; but, in any case, while the two nations were officially at peace, their navies were, so to speak, off the board. The contest for the time was one solely between the two groups of colonists in America, and between the rival commercial companies in India.

In India the decision was reached, though not yet finally confirmed, during years of peace and without the intervention of sea-power. Dupleix forced it on, under the most favorable conditions for the French, and Dupleix was beaten—owing, at least in part, to the failure of the authorities in France to appreciate properly either the man or his aims. They recalled him, not because he failed, but because the goal of his policy was not commercial but imperial. By so doing they dealt a fatal blow to the rising French power in India.

Dupleix, not any Englishman, originated the idea of creating a European ascendancy in India; Dupleix invented the method and first forged the instrument for giving effect to the idea. The British followed up the idea, developed the method, and appropriated the instrument; with the result that the British, not the French, were the Europeans who established their ascendancy in India.

At the moment when the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle reinstated the British in Madras, French prestige stood exceedingly high with the

natives, while the British appeared to be of little account in comparison. It was the French who had ignored the order of the Nawab of the Carnatic, had defeated his armies ignominiously, had taken Madras from the British, and had held it successfully when attacked by a British squadron. Dupleix's plan now was to make the French influence supreme at the courts of the native princes, among whom dynastic revolutions were not abnormal events. By French intervention, when the opportunity should occur, princes were to be established and maintained on their thrones, and would then very soon find themselves in effect the actual dependents of the French.

An opportunity for such active intervention soon presented itself. Dupleix ransomed from the Mahrattas Chanda Sahib, the son of a former Nawab of the Carnatic, with intent to set him upon the throne in place of Anwar-ud-Din, with whom his own relations were strained. At the same time the aged but very powerful Nizam, the viceroy of the whole Deccan, died. A son and a grandson both claimed the succession. The former, being on the spot, actually seized the throne. The latter, having some sort of authority from the Mughal himself, appealed to Dupleix for his support. Dupleix thereupon openly espoused the cause of the two retenders to the thrones of Haidarabad and the Carnatic; as an inevitable result, the British declared in favor of the two *de facto* rulers. The French, with their sepoy troops, defeated and killed Anwar-ud-Din, and Chanda Sahib was proclaimed Nawab. The dead Nawab's son, Mohammed Ali, escaped to Trichinopoli and proclaimed himself his father's successor.

Then the reigning Nizam took the field, and was joined by a small contingent of British and British-trained sepoys. Then the Nizam and the claimant to the Nizamship whom the British supported, were both assassinated, but Dupleix managed to secure the recognition of a new candidate. The new Nizam retired to Haidarabad accompanied by the French soldier and diplomatist, Bussy, nominally as his adviser, practically as his master. The French, with Chanda Sahib, proceeded to besiege Mohammed Ali at Trichinopoli. At the beginning of 1751 it seemed absolutely certain that within a few months both the Nizam and the Nawab, the lords of the better part of Southern India, would be the puppets of Dupleix, and the French supremacy would be at least temporarily, established.

Then came a sudden change. The conquering party were startled by hearing that a few Englishmen and sepoys, led by young Robert Clive, had made a dash upon Arcot, the Nawab's capital, and had seized it, dispersing its garrison. The pressure upon Trichinopoli was relieved by the dispatch of a huge force to recover the capital. Clive defied the besiegers, and at the end of seven weeks completely

repulsed a grand attack upon his slight defenses. The repulse was followed up by a sally, and the total rout of the enemy's forces. From that moment the tide turned. The fame of British skill and valor overtopped that of the French. The besiegers at Trichinopoli were enveloped and forced to surrender. Chanda Sahib was assassinated; the Carnatic acknowledged the sway of Mohammed Ali, the British candidate for the Nawabship, though at the same time the French nominee was on the throne of Haidarabad under Bussy's control.

Still, however, it was possible enough that Dupleix's diplomacy would restore a decisive French ascendancy for the time being; but that prospect disappeared when he was recalled in 1754, and his place as governor was taken by the safe commercial manager, with no dangerous gifts of imagination. The struggle between the Companies was suspended until the renewal of the war in the west between Great Britain and France. Then sea-power asserted itself and the British victory was decisive and final.

In America the retrocession of Louisbourg was viewed with great indignation by the British colonists, to whom the French retrocession of Madras carried no consolation. The peace did not prevent the French authorities in Canada from maintaining their claim to the basin of the Ohio, or from supporting it by the garrisoning of entrenched outposts by means of which they would have established themselves in actual occupation. At a point which they called Fort Duquesne, actually claimed as British, they expelled the British pioneers and planted a fort of their own in 1752. It was certain, too, that they were fostering disaffection among the French population of Acadie. This led, in 1755, to the extremely high-handed measure on the part of the British authorities of deporting the French population—celebrating in Longfellow's poem of "Evangeline."

In the British colonies the resentment at French aggression was becoming acute, though the colonists were still not sufficiently roused to adopt Benjamin Franklin's suggestion of a closer federated union amongst themselves for the purpose of offering a common resistance. Both French and British governors, however, succeeded in procuring the dispatch of troops from home when an attempt by the Virginians, under young George Washington, to recapture Fort Duquesne had been defeated. In 1755 the British colonial militia succeeded in seizing the French fort of Oswego, but British regular troops, under the command of General Braddock, were cut to pieces by the French and their Indian allies when they made another attempt upon Fort Duquesne. In fact, the French government of Canada was primarily a military organization; the government of the thirteen British colonies was not military at all, nor was there any cohesion between them, so that, although the British were far more numerous, the presumption was that if Canadians and British

colonists were left to themselves, the French would have the better of the contest. Here, as in India, however, the final decision would turn upon the application of sea-power; a duel between Great Britain and France, as distinguished from a duel between the colonists in the one region and the East India Companies in the other, for dominion in the West and in the East would depend upon the ability of the two Powers respectively to send reinforcements across the ocean, and to preclude the rival from doing so.

In Europe, during the eight years after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the whole traditional system of friendships and alliances between the Powers was completely changed. Hitherto the basis of it had been the rivalry between the House of Bourbon and the House of Hapsburg, to which other rivalries adapted themselves. But the War of the Austrian Succession itself did away with that basis. For Austria the Bourbons had ceased to be the principal enemy; their place was taken by the newly-risen power of Prussia, which had annexed a rich Austrian province, and now challenged the position of Austria as the leading German State in spite of the Hapsburg retention of the Imperial crown.

The depression of Prussia was the supreme object in the eyes of Maria Theresa and her very able minister, Kaunitz. The threat of a Bourbon domination had lost its terrors. Spain and her new ruler at least might be reckoned as off the board, and France had degenerated since the days of Louis XIV. Still France was obviously the natural ally of Austria's enemy, to whom her military power could render very material assistance. At first sight it might have been assumed that Austria would take for granted the Franco-Prussian alliance, and would seek to counteract it by preserving the old friendship with Great Britain. Benevolent neutrality, if not actual assistance, could be counted upon from Russia, so long as her destinies should be controlled by the Tsarina Elizabeth.

But Kaunitz took a bolder view. England had no quarrel of her own with Prussia, whose enmity was certainly dangerous to Hanover; Great Britain, therefore, could not be counted upon as a zealous ally in carrying out the main Austrian design of crushing King Frederick; very little help could be looked for from British and Hanoverian armies. On the other hand, there was no warmth of friendship between Prussia and France. They had played fast and loose with each other in the recent war, and there was no love lost between their rulers. King Louis, moreover, had fallen under the sway of a mistress (the Pompadour), whom Frederick offended as bitterly as he had offended the Russian Tsarina. Active military hostility on the part of Great Britain was no more to be feared, if her alliance were dispensed with, than active military assistance was to be counted on if her alliance were maintained. The project conceived by Kaunitz

was that of detaching France from Prussia and actually attaching her to Austria; and to this end his diplomacy was directed.

Frederick was exceedingly well aware of the danger of his own position and his isolation, with no whole-hearted ally and several whole-hearted enemies, among whom was included his immediate neighbor, Saxony, to which State the development of Prussian power was a serious menace in respect both of Saxony itself and of the Elector's kingdom of Poland. To Frederick it appeared that a British alliance might be more valuable than that with France. It was morally certain that in any event those two Powers would fight against each other; it was probable that France would be paralyzed on the Continent through the demands which would be made upon her by a colonial and maritime struggle. Hanover, too, would serve as a barrier against French attacks from the west. And even if England should take no very active part in military operations on the Continent, she could supply him with the money which he needed more than anything else for a prolonged struggle.

The diplomacy of Kaunitz triumphed in France. In Great Britain there ruled an abnormally incompetent ministry which hoped somehow to escape from being involved in the coming European contest, but was wholly without a definite policy of its own. At the beginning of 1756 it drifted into an Anglo-Prussian convention by which each of the Powers guaranteed Prussia and Hanover against the aggressive attack of any other Power; thus was Hanover to be protected if war broke out between France and Britain over the colonial question. Immediately afterwards a treaty was signed between Austria and France, each guaranteeing the other against attack as concerned Europe, though not as concerned the French and British colonies. Austria in fact was completing the arrangements for a simultaneous attack upon Prussia by Russia, France, and Saxony, though none of them were as yet ready to move. As in the last war, however, the European conflagration was to be preceded by a collision creating a state of war between Great Britain and her Bourbon colonial rival, though this time the rival was not Spain, but France.

#### *V.—The Seven Years' War, 1756-1763*

The great conflict began in May 1756, without any formal declaration of war. Even the British Government had realized that war with France was imminent. It was known that a French fleet was in readiness at Toulon and was on the point of sailing, though its destination was unknown. Before the treaty of Versailles between Austria and France had actually been signed, a British squadron was dispatched to the Mediterranean. When it arrived there it found that the Toulon fleet had started and that Port Mahon in

Minorca was already invested. There was a partial engagement between the two squadrons, in itself indecisive; but the British admiral, Byng, came to the conclusion that he was not strong enough to insure a victory over the enemy's fleet, while a defeat would mean the loss of Gibraltar as well as Minorca. He retired to cover Gibraltar, Port Mahon surrendered, and Byng was subsequently court-martialled and shot for his error of judgment. For twelve months to come the British Government was in a state of chaos, but no further advance was made by the enemy. In the summer of 1757 the famous Coalition was formed between Pitt and Newcastle; and from the moment when Pitt's hand grasped the helm a new spirit and a new system prepared the way for an overwhelming triumph. But there was little enough sign of any such prospect when the Anglo-French duel began.

No other Power was under any obligation to take part in the strife between Britain and France. But war is contagious. Three months after Byng's engagement in the Mediterranean Frederick's troops crossed the borders of Saxony. Instead of waiting to be attacked he struck the first blow.

Frederick was not troubled with scruples. Where the safety or the interest of Prussia was at stake, he never hesitated to break a promise or to ignore the conventions of international morality. But he preferred to have some plausible pretext of right. In this case he not only guessed but knew that Austria was organizing a league for his destruction, and he guessed, though not quite accurately, that Saxony had joined the league. There was no good reason why Austria and Russia, whose armies were not yet in readiness, should be allowed to prepare at their leisure and to attack him at their own time. Diplomacy would certainly be of no avail. But the way to Austria lay through Prague, and the convenient way to Prague lay through Saxony. If he could get Saxony properly out of the way, he might be marching through Bohemia before the Austrians could concentrate troops to resist him, and before either Russia or France could enter on the campaign.

The situation had some resemblance superficially to the German version of the situation in 1914. Saxony gave the entry to Austria as Belgium gave the entry to France. A prompt and crushing blow in that quarter would allow Prussia a free hand to deal with the other enemies on either side of her—Russia and France in 1756, Russia and England in 1914. But there was this fundamental difference between the two cases, that in 1756 Frederick was in actual fact defending himself from falling a victim to a definite conspiracy of which he had positive information and would soon be able to produce undeniable documentary proof. In 1914 Germany professedly violated Belgian neutrality to defend herself against a conspiracy

which was planning to destroy her; but the conspiracy had no existence in actual fact.

Frederick did not reach his aim. Instead of submitting to obviously superior force, the small Saxon army occupied Pirna, on the way between Dresden and the Bohemian border. There it remained at bay, while invaluable time was lost. For a long time no succor came. When the Austrian general, Browne, was at last enabled to advance to the relief of the Saxons, he was checked at Lobositz. The check did not prevent him from a further advance, which proved too late. The Saxons of Pirna were starved out; the Elector had to retreat into Poland, and Frederick's army was reinforced by reluctant Saxons who had no choice in the matter. Yet by holding the pass at Pirna the Saxons had prevented all that Frederick hoped to gain by the suddenness of a surprise attack on Bohemia.

The delay gave time for Austrian diplomacy to work. Before Frederick could enter Bohemia under the new conditions, France had definitely come in on the side of Austria. The second treaty of Versailles offered France nothing more than the possession of some towns in the Netherlands which were only to be conveyed to her after Frederick should be ejected from Silesia. The rest of the Netherlands Austria proposed to exchange with Duke Philip of Parma and Piacenza for those two duchies. For Great Britain the arrangement was convenient enough; it showed that France was allowing Austria to direct her action, and that her energies would be distracted from the maritime and colonial wars to the military adventure against Prussia.

Frederick enjoyed two positive advantages, neither of them altogether of his own making. His regiments were the best trained in Europe, and he held the interior lines. Thus he could concentrate his forces on any part of the semicircle of which he stood at the center, very much more rapidly than any of the allies could do so. To this may be added that he had struck once and still had time to strike again before his enemy's preparations could be completed. In all other respects the advantage lay with his opponents.

Early in 1757 he struck his second blow from Saxony, which he could now use as a base. He burst into Bohemia and defeated an Austrian army under the walls of Prague. But it withdrew into the city, to which Frederick was obliged to lay siege. Meanwhile Austria had completed her series of treaties as well as much of the reorganization of her army. From every side, even from Sweden, armies were in motion. In June one of the new Austrian armies was advancing to the relief of Prague. Frederick advanced, attacked it with a force of greatly inferior numbers, and suffered a disastrous defeat at Kolin. The Prussian army was driven back into Saxony.

Frederick escaped destruction because throughout the war the Austrians, whenever they did meet with a success, failed to follow it up. He was now allowed to recover and reorganize his troops while the Austrians slowly moved upon Silesia.

Meanwhile Cumberland on behalf of Frederick's one ally, had been placed in command of the Hanoverian and other North German troops who were engaged upon Frederick's side. Against them advanced the first French army from the Lower Rhine. Soon after Kölin, Cumberland was defeated at Hastenbeck, and was then driven into a corner and obliged to sign a convention at Klosterseven in September, which, if carried out, would have precluded Hanover from any further activities. It was not, in fact, carried out because a convention, not being technically a military instrument, required ratification; the ratification was refused, Cumberland was recalled, and the reorganized army of the Weser was placed under the command of Ferdinand of Brunswick.

But when the convention was made matters looked exceedingly threatening for Frederick. A second French army was moving upon Saxony from the Upper Rhine. The Swedes were threatening Pomerania, the Russians East Prussia, and the Austrians were making progress in Silesia. England too had been recently depressed by the year-old news of the atrocity known as the Black Hole of Calcutta; no one yet knew that vengeance had already been exacted, and that the British had won the lordship of Bengal through Clive's victory at Plassey.

Quite suddenly the tide turned again. It was imperative that Frederick should strike a paralyzing blow at the new French army under Soubise in order that he might be released for action in the eastern region. But Soubise had no temptation to seek an engagement. Then by good fortune he was enticed into a movement which gave Frederick his chance, and at Rossbach Frederick won a brilliant victory which secured him from any further attack from that quarter. Just a month later the victors of Rossbach were facing the Austrians in Silesia at Leuthen, where their triumph was even more brilliantly repeated. Meanwhile, the Swedish attack from Pomerania had been successfully dealt with, and the advancing Russian armies had suddenly retired owing to a rumor that the Tsarina was dying, and a reversal of Russian policy was imminent.

Another year passed. Ferdinand of Brunswick, with his reorganized army, supplemented by a small but valuable British contingent, held up the French army on the Weser, and then drove it back over the Rhine. The military energies of the French were hampered by a perpetual threat of British naval attacks upon the French coast, necessitating the retention of substantial garrisons, though the descents actually made were apparently unproductive.

Frederick's success at Leuthen enabled him to open a campaign in Moravia where, as in the earlier war, he met with no great success. Thence he was summoned by the reappearance of a Russian army on the Oder, the Tsarina having recovered. The Russians were thrown back by a sanguinary engagement at Zorndorf. But the Austrians had used their opportunity to threaten Saxony; Frederick had to hurry back from the Oder; and an over-rash attempt at Hochkirchen to win a decisive victory at all risks resulted instead in a severe defeat. Frederick had to fall back, though the slow-moving Austrian commander, Daun, made no further use of the advantage he had gained.

The year 1759 brought disaster to Frederick on every front except the Rhine, where his very efficient general, Ferdinand of Brunswick, extricated himself from a very critical position and inflicted a decisive defeat upon the French at Minden in August. The French army, considerably outnumbering that of the allies, had again crossed the Rhine, compelled Ferdinand to retreat from Bergen, captured Frankfurt, and pushed on to the Weser, occupying Minden. Unless a heavy blow could be inflicted upon it, it would almost certainly overrun Hanover. A direct attack was impracticable; but Ferdinand lured the French general, Contades, from his position, and forced a battle upon him in which the French army was shattered mainly by the valor of the British infantry. It would have been annihilated but for the utterly inexplicable conduct of the commander of the British cavalry, Lord George Sackville, who remained immovable in spite of repeated orders to charge at the critical stage of the conflict.

The Austrians allowed Frederick to reorganize his forces after Hochkirchen; but he could find no opportunity of striking at them, and in the summer the Russians were once more advancing in the east. Thither the king had to hasten at high speed. After hard marching he met them at Künersdorf, engaged them, and all but defeated them. But a mere check was not enough. Frederick, with his already exhausted troops, endeavored to transform his success into a crushing blow; the Russians rallied, the Prussians were overwhelmed, the battle ended in a rout, and for a few days, Frederick seems to have yielded to despair.

Yet the one constant element of good fortune did not fail him. As before, the Russian general held his hand, in the expectation of the Tsarina's death and a reversal of Russian policy; since it was known that her nephew and heir, Peter of Holstein and Gottorp, cherished for Frederick the Great a vehement admiration instead of a fervent aversion. Frederick recovered his nerve, again reorganized his army, and turned to attack the Austrians who, in the meantime, had sent a column forward into Saxony which occupied Dresden. Frederick dispatched a force to cut its communications, but the force was itself

trapped and compelled to capitulate at Maxen. Practically, therefore, at the end of 1759 Saxony was lost, and Frederick's position would have been, as it seemed, absolutely hopeless, but for the subsidies which his exhausted treasury received from his ally and the still more overwhelming disasters which she had inflicted upon the French.

For at the end of 1759 the decision in the Anglo-French duel had been reached in all the three fields of India, America, and the Sea.

In India the British ascendancy was definitely established. In 1754 it had still appeared doubtful whether the French domination at Haidarabad or the British domination in the Carnatic would ultimately achieve a decisive supremacy. The governors of the two companies, in accordance with instructions, had arrived at a compact for abstention from hostilities in the event of war again breaking out in the west. But in 1756 the young Nawab of Bengal chose to attack the British settlement at Calcutta. Those of the English who had not taken flight were seized and thrust into a small airless dungeon where five-sixths of them perished during the night. Clive was dispatched, accompanied by a small British squadron which happened to be in Indian waters, on a punitive expedition. Calcutta was recaptured and compensation demanded. While negotiations were in progress, sundry leading natives, inspired with alarm by the blood-thirsty rule of the half-crazy Nawab, invited Clive to help them in deposing him and putting the commander-in-chief, Mir Jafar, in his place. A bargain was struck. An ultimatum was sent to the Nawab, Suraj-ud-Daulah, which was followed by Clive at the head of some 3,000 men, of whom two-thirds were sepoys. The Nawab advanced with a huge army, which was scattered at the battle of Plassey. Mir Jafar was proclaimed Nawab; his son captured and killed Suraj-ud-Daulah; but palpably it was the British who had effected the dynastic revolution. The new Nawab was simply their puppet, and from that moment they were *de facto*, though not *de jure*, masters of the wealthy province of Bengal. Incidentally the French station at Chandernagur was captured, the French having taken part with Suraj-ud-Daulah. These events took place in 1757.

When the war broke out, the French Government resolved to fight for India. A new governor-general, Lally, was sent out. On his arrival in India at the beginning of 1758, he made the extraordinary blunder of ordering Bussy to leave Haidarabad, thereby losing the French control over the Nizam. He began active operations against the British in the Carnatic; but met with no success owing to his inexperience and mismanagement of the natives. The presence of a British squadron cut him off from supports. The Nizam had ceded to Bussy the province of the Sarkars on the coast north of the Carnatic; but Clive from Bengal ventured to dispatch an expedition thither, which in 1759 captured Masulipatam. The Nizam preferred

the rising to the setting sun, and transferred his gift of the Sarkars to the British. At the end of the year, the French were almost shut up in Pondicheri. Their last battle was fought in February 1760 at Wandewash, where they were completely defeated by Eyre Coote. A twelvemonth later Pondicheri itself fell, and with it the last hope of French ascendancy in India.

The operations in America had been equally decisive. In 1756 and 1757 no progress had been made. But with Pitt's accession to office in England a vigorous policy was adopted. In 1758 the British ascendancy on the sea was making itself felt. French reinforcements intended for Canada were unable to reach their destination. A force co-operating with a British squadron captured Louisbourg; and a column of colonial troops recovered Fort Duquesne which was given the name of Pittsburg, though a third central column, aiming at the upper St. Lawrence and Montreal, met with a disastrous check at Ticonderoga.

In 1759 the command of the center column was given to Amherst, while that of the force on the lower St. Lawrence, previously held by Amherst, was intrusted to General Wolfe in co-operation with a naval squadron under Admiral Saunders. The western column from Pittsburg and the central column both pushed their way forward, but too slowly to co-operate with Wolfe's column before the winter should set in, and the St. Lawrence become icebound, when the naval squadron would be useless. Wolfe and Saunders were before Quebec at midsummer; but the position of Quebec was extraordinarily strong, and it was held by forces numerically greater than those under Wolfe's command. At the end of two months Wolfe had almost despaired of solving his problem. On 13th of September he had solved it, paying for the solution with his life. By the skilful co-operation of the squadron, he had been enabled undetected to land troops by night at the foot of the precipitous Heights of Abraham. When the morning broke they had scaled the Heights; the French gave battle on the plain before the town and were completely defeated. Four days later Quebec capitulated. Its capture was a decisive blow, although another twelve months passed before the conquest was completed by the capitulation of Montreal.

The decision in India and America had been won through the naval ascendancy which had isolated the French in both regions. It was secure by the establishment, not of a mere ascendancy, but of an unqualified supremacy on the seas. Since the initial success of the French at Minorca their fleets had been unable to interfere effectively with the movements of British squadrons, while their own had for the most part remained in port or retired again in haste if they attempted to put to sea. Their mercantile marine had almost been swept off the seas. But in 1759 the direction of French operations

had at last passed into the hands of the able minister Choiseul.

Choiseul designed a great invasion of England; it was to be effected through a junction of the two main fleets at Toulon and Brest. The British Mediterranean fleet under Boscawen was obliged to withdraw to Gibraltar for repairs. The Toulon fleet seized its opportunity; but though it slipped through the Straits it failed to evade Boscawen, who started in pursuit, drove a portion of it into the neutral port of Cadiz, and practically destroyed the remainder off Lagos on the Portuguese coast. The Toulon fleet had practically ceased to exist. Three months later, in November, while Admiral Hawke was weather-bound at Tor Bay, the Brest fleet put to sea. A change of wind enabled Hawke to sail from Tor Bay; he found the French fleet, pursued it into Quiberon Bay on the Brittany coast, and destroyed it.

After 1759 British fleets were sweeping the seas, going where they would, with no necessity for leaving more than a few ships to keep watch over the French ports among which the remnants of the French navy were scattered. Elsewhere Great Britain was merely making good the victories already won, continuing her support of the army of Ferdinand of Brunswick, and preserving Frederick's treasury from complete exhaustion. Frederick maintained his own desperate struggle against Austria and Russia, helped always in the latter by the political complications in Russia which continually reduced Russian generals to inaction.

The general situation was affected by the death of King Ferdinand of Spain and the accession of his brother Charles III., who was thereby forced to resign the throne of Naples to his second son, in accordance with the terms under which it had been originally bestowed upon him. Unlike his brother, Charles bore a bitter grudge against England on account of the high-handed manner in which he had been treated by her when neutrality was imposed on him during the War of the Austrian Succession. Hence Choiseul made determined and ultimately successful efforts to revive the Family Compact, and to bring Spain into the war as an ally of France. Pitt in England was alive to his schemes, and determined to anticipate their fulfilment by threatening Spain with war. But the accession of George III. at the end of 1760 deprived Pitt of control. The young king and his favorite Bute were bent on re-establishing a royal ascendancy incompatible with the political domination of the Whig families or with Pitt's effective dictatorship. Pitt declined to be responsible for a Government which he did not control, and resigned; the war in its last phase was directed by Bute and the king. Spain dropped the mask and Pitt's prevision was demonstrated; but the only practical difference was that Spanish commerce and colonies, as well as French, became the prey of British fleets.

Frederick at the end of 1760 had inflicted two defeats on the Austrians. In 1761 there were no pitched battles. Happily for Frederick, Austria as well as Prussia was feeling the strain of exhaustion, though hardly so severely. But the Prussian king understood the meaning of Pitt's retirement at the end of the year. The new ministry was of opinion that enough had been done for Prussia and that there was no obligation to continue providing her with subsidies. The declaration of war with Spain, forced upon them at the beginning of 1762, did not alter their attitude towards Frederick. Unsupplied with funds, it seemed that it would be impossible for him to hold out any longer. But again fortune aided him. Elizabeth died; the new Tsar, Peter III., immediately broke off the Austrian alliance and made a treaty with Prussia in its place. Released from the perpetual Russian menace, and expecting actual support from his recent foe, Frederick was able to devote all his energies to the Austrian conflict; in which he managed to do a little more than hold his own, although no help came from Russia. The new Tsar failed to secure his position; after a very brief reign he was deposed and was subsequently murdered, while his wife secured the crown and reigned as Catherine II. Neither hating Frederick like the last Tsarina, nor revering him like her husband, Catherine simply declined to take further part in the war.

The only Power which could gain anything by the continuation of the war was Great Britain, since there was nothing to prevent her fleets from clearing both Spanish and French out of every island they possessed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean. Ferdinand with his German and British troops was more than capable of holding any Bourbon armies on the Continent. Austria left by herself could hope for nothing by prolonging the struggle with a foe so indomitable as Frederick in spite of Great Britain's desertion. For the British ministers displayed a stronger desire for peace than any one else, and to procure it were willing to leave their ally in the lurch and to surrender much which they could legitimately have insisted upon retaining by right of conquest, since there was no possibility of questioning that France was the original aggressor.

So at the beginning of 1763 peace was made by the treaty of Paris between Great Britain, France, and Spain; and a few days later between Austria, Prussia, and Saxony, by the treaty of Hubertsburg. Austria and Prussia and Saxony reverted precisely to the *status quo ante bellum*, so far as territories were concerned. As for the Anglo-French duel: in India the French were allowed to retain their trading stations but nothing more; while the British had established a complete mastery, though not a formal annexation, of Bengal, the Sarkars, and the Carnatic; and they had taken the place of the French in exercising an effective control at the court of Haidarabad.

In brief, the French power had gone, and the British power had been conclusively established without practical risk of any European rivalry. In America the French ceded Canada. Florida was ceded by Spain, which received Louisiana from France by way of compensation. All the territory as far west as the Mississippi was recognized as British. Great Britain recovered Minorca in exchange for Belle-Isle, an island on the French coast which she had captured; but she restored most though not quite all of the islands and the African colonies which she had absorbed during the war.

Thus, territorially, the net result of the Seven Years' War was that France as a Power disappeared from India and America, leaving Great Britain without a rival in both; although the ejection of France from the western continent prepared the way for the disruption of the British Empire by the separation from it of the thirteen colonies. In Europe the war wrought no territorial changes at all. But it finally and definitely established Frederick of Prussia in the position which he had won for himself ten years before by what was, in the first instance, sheer brigandage. Prussia held rank in Europe on an equal footing with Austria and France; while in Germany she had become actually though not technically the rival of Austria in the leadership of the remaining states of the Empire. The drain on her manhood as well as on her very limited wealth had been terribly severe, but the ordeal through which she had passed had hardened her both for good and for evil. Frederick had had his fill of fighting and now desired chiefly to continue the work of domestic organization and reform on which he had embarked during the last interval of peace. But there remained with him one sentiment which he permitted to influence him in the relations with foreign Powers which otherwise were directed solely by expediency. He never forgave England for her desertion of him in the last phase of the war.

As the great gainer had been the British Empire, the heavy losses fell upon France. It was not only that she was robbed, however legitimately, of a prospective empire overseas; she had lost reputation and influence; her finances were exhausted; the condition to which her people were reduced had carried her far on the way towards the Revolution whose approach was still unsuspected. And France, like Frederick, nursed one dominant sentiment, the fervent desire for vengeance upon the Power which had humiliated her.

## CHAPTER XXX

### FROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

#### *1.—Great Britain and the Birth of the United States 1763-1789*

THE peace of Paris left Great Britain the decisive victor in the rivalry with France for oversea dominion. Her colonies were free to expand, with no European competitor. But in relation to Europe she was in a state of complete isolation; and on her throne was a young king bent, before all else, on getting into his own hands the control over Parliament which for fifty years had been held by a few Whig families. His efforts were crowned with temporary success. He had already driven Pitt from office, and in another five years his manipulation had insured a parliamentary majority for ministers of his own choosing, upon whom he could rely to carry out his wishes. The disastrous result was the rending in twain of the British Empire. As, before, salvation had come from the coalition of Newcastle with the elder Pitt, so, after the United States had severed the British connection, recovery was made possible by the coalition of the king and the younger Pitt; but only when the mischief had been done.

We have remarked earlier that the British Government controlled the trade of the American colonies in the interests of the commercial community in Great Britain. The legality of such control was not questioned, but it constituted a serious grievance. It was the price paid for the help of British fleets and regiments against the French menace, and it was made tolerable by the laxity with which the regulations were generally enforced. When the French menace was ended by the Seven Years' War, it was absolutely certain that the colonies would not long consent to pay the old price for a protection which had become superfluous. The colonists, like the Scots in 1706, would inevitably demand to be placed on an equal footing with their fellow-subjects in England.

But the home Government was thinking not about grievances but about the alarming burden laid upon the revenue by the recent war. It occurred to George Grenville, the working head of the administration, first that a vigilant application of the commercial regulations would bring into the Treasury not much but something to which it was legally entitled. Active measures were taken to put down in

America the smuggling in which the most respectable citizens had shared with untroubled consciences, and with the connivance of the British Government for a couple of generations. The old grievance at once became acute. Next, Grenville found that the huge war expenditure had been in great part incurred on behalf of the colonies, which clearly ought to pay their share; which was not unreasonable, though obviously it would not be easy to arrive at what was fair in the aggregate, or in apportioning the shares of the several communities in that aggregate. There was no common central authority in America. Grenville invited proposals, but none were forthcoming. So the British Parliament passed the Stamp Act.

Forthwith the colonies were ablaze with indignation. Law and precedent sanctioned the imposition of duties for the regulation of trade; taxes for raising revenues were without precedent. It was an established principle of the British constitution that the people might be taxed only by consent of their representatives; the colonists, therefore, might not be taxed by a body in which they were not represented. The spirit of the law was set at defiance by the tax, however skillfully lawyers might demonstrate that the letter was unbroken. The Americans refused to obey and mobbed the officers who attempted to carry out the Act. The storm was quieted for the moment by the fall of Grenville and the repeal of the Stamp Act; but at the same time a Declaratory Act affirmed that the British Government had the legal right to tax the colonists if it thought fit. Then the new ministry fell and another was formed headed by Pitt, who took the title of Earl of Chatham. The breakdown of his health deprived him of all semblance of control; Charles Townshend and the composite group of ministers which passed for a Government imposed new taxes—productive at best of a perfect trivial sum—with no apparent motive except to show that they had the power; and the fire blazed up again. Each side had brought itself into a position from which it was impossible to recede without humiliation.

At the outset there had been no inherent reason why the differences between mother country and colonies should not be adjusted. The outstanding grievances of the colonists would have been removed by treating them as Scotland had been treated and placing them on a commercial equality with the English. The claim for a colonial contribution to the Imperial exchequer in respect of the war was recognized as in itself reasonable by the colonists, and could have been amply met by voluntary action on their part had they seriously desired it. But the goodwill necessary to an accommodation had been destroyed when, on the one side, George Grenville took his stand on a technical right never before asserted in practice and opposed to principles which had been laid down as fundamental the British Constitution; and, on the other, when the challenge was taken up, vio-

lence was done to the officers of the law, and a spirit of open defiance manifested itself. Townshend's taxes were valueless and merely provocative, and the colonials gave full vent to their irritation—alienating what had at first been a comparatively sympathetic popular opinion in England by refusing to buy British goods till the taxes should be withdrawn.

In theory, escape from the dilemma would have been possible by giving the colonial direct representation in the British Parliament; in practice, the plan was not workable. The agents of the colonies in England and the Government officials in America could not communicate with their principals only by sailing vessels which took weeks to cross the Atlantic; very few colonists had ever set foot in England, the the Englishmen who had visited America were fewer still; the physical conditions and the moral atmosphere combined to multiply and magnify misunderstandings, often generated by mere flippancy, distrust and irritation, which would have been still-born had there been any strong mutual desire to re-instate goodwill. The Government and the Governors treated the Americans like naughty schoolboys, when they were and felt themselves to be far past the stage of tutelage. And so the rift which might have easily been closed widened into a chasm; although even when actual hostilities broke out it is probable that a majority in America would still have preferred an accommodation on their own not unreasonable terms to separation from the British Empire.

But from the moment when Townshend taxes were imposed it was certain that unless the principle of practical autonomy were conceded, the colonials would not yield without an armed struggle, and that if they were defeated in that struggle it would only be to renew it later. With every year the prospect of a peaceful settlement grew more remote. A normally law-abiding population deliberately set itself against the law as promulgated by the British Parliament and enforced by the British authorities. The lawbreakers were sheltered by the whole community; the champions of the law had to seek protection at the hands of soldiery from over the sea. In England George III. had at last found in Lord North a minister who considered it his first duty to carry out the king's will, and a Parliament mainly consisting of place-men who would vote to order; and he was obstinately determined to make no concessions to subjects whom he regarded as virtually rebels. The colonists burned a revenue schooner, and emptied into Boston harbor the tea-ships whose freight was liable to the obnoxious tax. The Government closed Boston harbor, and suspended the Massachusetts Assembly and Charter. The colonists set about organizing themselves for armed resistance. A congress practically representative of all the thirteen colonies, met at Philadelphia. At the last moment North on one side offered a Conciliation Bill which the

Americans regarded as merely a trap; on the other, a deputation was dispatched carrying what was known as the Olive Branch Petition, which was not even accorded a hearing; for already (April 19, 1775) there had been a collision near Lexington between Governor Gage's regulars and the local militia, which opened the War of American Independence.

On any normal computation, the rapid victory of the English forces ought never to have been in doubt. On the one side were the colonial volunteers, civilians who had undergone the minimum of military training, called away from their normal avocations, wholly without habits of discipline, commanded by officers without professional training; on the other, an array of professional soldiers, supported by the fleet which a dozen years before had wiped all enemy fleets off the seas. But during the dozen years the administration of the British army and navy had gone to wrack. There was no failure in the personnel of the navy; officers and men repeatedly showed their excellent quality throughout the war; what the fleet was called upon to do it did with efficiency until, with the intervention of France, it found itself heavily outnumbered. But the army, which ought to have been able to destroy any quantity of raw levies, was under extremely inefficient commanders, and was so much smaller than it should have been that it was supplemented with German troops hired from Hesse. Lord Howe, in command of the fleet, was a great admiral, who thoroughly understood his business; his brother, Sir William Howe, who took Gage's place at the head of the army, was not without ability, but made little use of his talents. The operations in general were hampered by his official chief in England, Lord George Germaine. In England there were classes and large sections in every class who sympathized strongly with the Americans, looked upon the war as almost criminal, and at best preferred awaiting the commonly anticipated dissolution of the colonial forces to victory achieved by heavy bloodshed; which largely accounted for the dilatory methods adopted. There was, in short, no general sense that energy—much less sacrifice—was called for to bring the war to an early and decisive conclusion. The colonials, on the other hand, though slow to recognize and apply the necessity for discipline, had no intention of allowing themselves to be beaten; and the Congress made generally wise choice of the men who were to lead them, and, above all, in the appointment of George Washington to the supreme command. His unqualified devotion, unfailing resolution, endless patience, courage, firmness, and tact, made him an asset of infinite value, though he was no genius as either strategist or tactician—which mattered the less, considering the mediocre qualifications of his antagonists.

The revolt was confined to the "Thirteen Colonies," of which Georgia alone, in the south, had been founded since the Union between

England and Scotland, the other twelve, including the originally Dutch New York, being otherwise exclusively English in origin. Canada, with the northern colonies which had become definitely British at the treaty of Utrecht, took no part in it. The Canadians had no English tradition of popular government to rouse them against external control; the British Government gave to the French inhabitants, and to the Roman Catholic religion, practically all the rights they had enjoyed under the French crown; and they had every reason to believe that those rights which they cherished would be lost by association with neighbors whose traditions were either Puritan or Anglican, while the rights so valued by the English colonies did not appeal to them.

In the first year of the war an attempt was made to seize Canada, but it failed decisively, since the French did not rise, but in the main gave active support to the Government. Otherwise the events not only encouraged the "Continentalists," as they called themselves in the hope that their resistance would be successful, but converted them to a conviction that they must be satisfied with nothing short of complete independence—a doctrine which they had still repudiated at the outbreak of hostilities. On July 4, 1776, Congress issued the Declaration of Independence.

When the war began, the British headquarters were at Boston. The first serious engagement, the battle of Bunker Hill, though technically a British victory, was won at such cost that it taught the Americans confidence. Through the autumn and winter Howe remained inactive, while Washington had the utmost difficulty in keeping his own army in being, facing Boston—which Howe elected to evacuate in March, withdrawing by sea to Halifax; whence he returned in June, not to Boston, but to New York, which he was able to occupy in the late summer. Satisfied with this, he attempted nothing further, and in the winter permitted Washington to improve his own position by an offensive, the success of which established his prestige. In 1777 came the campaigns which were really decisive. Howe determined to capture Philadelphia, the headquarters, not of the army, but of Congress. Another campaign was projected, in which Burgoyne was to march south from Canada, while a force was to march north from New York to meet him, and so isolate the New England states. But Howe took practically all the available troops from New York for his attack on Philadelphia, which succeeded; when Burgoyne started, Clinton from New York could not move to join him till too late; Burgoyne was enveloped at Saratoga, and had to surrender with his whole force.

In itself the disaster should not have been irretrievable; but it brought to the Americans an ally whose intervention proved to be decisive. France had been gleefully watching a contest by which

she hoped that her successful enemy of the Seven Years' war would be seriously weakened. Ever since the peace of Paris, she had been developing her navy. French society was playing with a political philosophy which it did not dream of applying in France, but which made it sentimentally sympathetic to the "Sons of Liberty" elsewhere, especially when they were defying the arrogant oppression of the Tyrant of the Seas. Aristocratic Paris was charmed with the simplicity of the very astute political agents who appeared in its midst, clad in garments of homespun. Saratoga decided Paris that it would be worth while to take a hand in the humiliation of Albion. In 1778 France was at war with Great Britain; in 1779 Spain, and in 1780 Holland, followed suit. And Great Britain was without an ally in the world.

Pitt's fleet would have shut up the French fleet in the French ports, or annihilated it if it came out; any other fleet intervening would have met with the same fate; and a Pitt bent on military victory would have raised and dispatched troops to America under capable and energetic commanders, whose operations would have been entirely unaffected by the action of France. No French soldier would have reached the shores of America. North's fleet found that the naval ascendancy had passed to the enemy. In American waters, and in the West Indies, the Franco-American alliance had the command of the sea, until Rodney recovered it for the British in 1782. But by that time the last possibility of defeating the Americans had vanished, and Great Britain was fighting for life.

During 1778 Lord Howe skillfully withdrew the force from Philadelphia to New York without interference from the French. General Howe gave place to Clinton, who, instead of concentrating his strength at New York, dispatched Cornwallis to bring the south to subjection—a vain project, since the latter had no troops to occupy the states though he might march through them with little effective opposition. Clinton himself could take no active measures against Washington, who, in the next year, received reinforcements from France, which embarrassed almost as much as they helped him. Spain joined in the war, and set about a siege of Gibraltar, which lasted some three years. The British Channel Fleet was outnumbered; so were the fleets in the West. Still nothing decisive happened till Cornwallis, marching from the south in 1781, reached Yorktown, where he expected a British squadron to support him. But the French admiral was beforehand and occupied the entrance of the Chesapeake; Washington tricked Clinton at New York, and carried his main force south to Yorktown. Cornwallis was completely cut off, and with his surrender the cause of the Americans was won.

The war was not yet over; Great Britain was still fighting for life against the Bourbon Powers. Holland had joined in the attack, of

had been attacked, for forming the "Armed Neutrality," the object of which was to resist the British claims (always maintained) as to the rights of the belligerents in relation to neutrals at sea. The Dutch, isolated in the North Sea, were beaten, and had to retire; but the Bourbons remained. In 1782 a junction was to be effected in the West Indies between the French and Spanish fleets, which would then have had an overwhelming preponderance; but Rodney caught De Grasse on his way to the rendezvous and broke him up. Gibraltar was relieved after a furious but unsuccessful attempt to reduce it by an unprecedented bombardment. The French hopes of crushing the British navy were dissipated, and in 1783 the exhausted belligerents made peace. Spain recovered Minorca and Florida. France made practically nothing out of her adventure. Great Britain lost the thirteen colonies. Canada, with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, remained under the British flag; the British navy had at last emerged victorious, though only by the narrowest margin.

The war had broken King George's attempt to recover the supremacy of the Crown; incidentally it had also given to Ireland a Parliament with effective control of Irish affairs—but still a Parliament in which no one could sit but members of the Church of England, and an administration similarly limited; though some relations had been made in the penal code against the Roman Catholics and in the commercial restrictions by which Ireland was economically throttled. In 1783, after the peace had been signed, Chatham's second son, the younger William Pitt, became Prime Minister; and retained that position, except for one brief interval, until his death in 1806. Under his able administration, the country recovered with astonishing rapidity from its exhaustion; the financial system was to a great extent reorganized, and the nation embarked on a new era of prosperity; when the development of the French Revolution plunged Europe once more into a chaos of wars, and Great Britain was again dragged into the vortex.

The supreme outcome of the war, however, was the creation of a new nation with what might be called an unlimited field of expansion. It was true that large numbers of the loyalists, or Tories, who throughout had remained faithful to the British Empire, left their homes and settled across the border in Upper Canada and New Brunswick, choosing to remain under the British flag at all costs. But they were an insignificant minority of the population of the thirteen colonies, now colonies no longer. The future of the thirteen, however, was extremely uncertain. They were separate states, which had never been under a common control until they had united to give a very limited authority to the "Continental Congress"—like the Greek states of old, they were intensely particularist in sentiment, and had only accepted, under stress of emergency, something in the nature of a cen-

tral control. Unless such a control were created, they would inevitably go the way of the Greek states. The authority of Congress had been shaped under Articles of Confederation in 1776, and gave no compulsory powers whatever. There was no body which could adjust the various and complicated claims put forward by the several states to the unoccupied territories between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi; and the Articles of Confederation had only been finally ratified in 1781 by some of the states on condition that each state should surrender its individual claims to the united states as a whole. Congress could not enforce the payment of any levies to meet the debts incurred through the war. Congress alone could make treaties with foreign Powers, but it could make no bargains which contravened each state's control of its own commerce and finance—and each state was more inclined to be guided by jealousy of its neighbor's competition than by considerations of a common expediency. It was only the imminence of chaos that brought about the creation of a written Constitution, which provided a central government with power to enforce its decrees.

In 1787 Congress issued an ordinance regarding the territory of the United States, which was of the highest importance because, although it had at the time no binding force, it was confirmed after the Constitution came into being, and was the basis of all subsequent expansion. A government was appointed for the whole area west of the Ohio, which was divided into six portions. When each was sufficiently occupied, it automatically acquired the right of framing its own government, with certain limitations, and becoming a state, the settlers in it being guaranteed what were regarded as fundamental rights, while slavery in them was prohibited. Just before this, circumstances had led to the appointment of a convention of delegates from the several states to consider the whole question of commerce. Only five states sent representatives, and the delegates went on to procl<sup>it</sup>. the appointment of a new convention to consider the Articles of Confederation. All the states, except Rhode Island, sent delegates to this Federal Convention at Philadelphia (1787), which drew up the New Constitution. It was not a piece of *a priori* constitution-building, like the logical but impractical structures presently to be devised for France by the Abbé Siéyès, but was based on State practice and what was understood to be the working of the British Constitution, though it was far from being a reproduction of the latter.

Briefly, it proposed to set up a central government with defined powers, correspondingly limiting the powers of the several state legislatures. It created an elective House of Representatives, Senate, and President and Vice-President, with defined powers, discharging their functions for different fixed periods, the membership of the states being allotted on different principles in the two houses; it provided a

highly complicated machinery by which it would be possible, but very difficult, to introduce amendments of the Constitution; and it set up a Supreme Court of practically irremovable judges, whose decision should be final on the question whether a given Act was constitutional or not, the Act being *ipso facto* confirmed or invalidated. With some amendments the scheme was accepted and passed by each state, and thus became the law of the United States in 1788; and in 1789 George Washington was unanimously elected the first President of the new Republic.

## II.—India, 1761-1786

In 1761 the surrender of Pondicheri marked the final downfall of the schemes of Dupleix, and left the British without a European rival in India. Their actual territorial possessions were fractional—a tiny patch about Bombay, a tiny patch about Madras, and the coastal strip called the Northern Sarkars. But since 1754 the Nawab of a considerable province, Arcot or the Carnatic, had been a puppet under their control; and after Clive's victory at Plassey, in 1757, they were also effective masters of the province of Bengal, though without any legal status. Macaulay's rhetorical description of Clive with a handful of Englishmen overthrowing a mighty empire extending over the whole peninsula is a picturesque if popular effort of imagination. The British had never come into collision with the Imperial authority at all. The disintegration of the Mughal Empire had not even been hastened by the events in the Carnatic and in Bengal; but they had made the British into a power with which the native powers nominally subjects of the Mughal, would have to reckon.

Even at that moment another power was rising in the south, where a Mohammedan military adventurer was on the point of establishing himself as Sultan of Mysore. The Mahrattas, masters of Central India, paying little attention to French and British, were already dominating the Mughal himself, when their power was shattered for the time at Panipat, in 1761, by the invasion of the Afghan, Ahmed Shah, who, however, like Nadir Shah twenty years before, retired, content with booty instead of empire; and the Wazir of Oudh, the Ganges province above Bengal and below Delhi, found a respite from the Mahratta menace only to view with anxiety the new menace from Bengal. The Nizam, who, a few years before, had been the most powerful prince in India, feared almost equally the rivalry of the Mahrattas, of Mysore, and of the British, and inclined to alliance with the last as offering on the whole the best security. But to speak of the British as in any conceivable sense masters of India is merely absurd.

For three years after Plassey, Clive ruled Bengal by his personal

prestige. He left India in 1760, and the Nawab of Bengal found himself under the control of the East India Company's officials in the province. Nowhere in history was there precedent for such a situation as had arisen. The Company's ill-paid servants used their position of practically unlimited power to enrich themselves. The Wazir of Oudh, in conjunction with the Mughal's heir-apparent, attacked Bengal, but was treated by Hector Munro at Baksar very much as Suraj-ud-Daulah had been treated at Plassey. Clive reappeared to take the growing anarchy in hand. By negotiation with the Mughal, he obtained from the Company the Diwani, the official administration of the revenues of Bengal, which in effect gave them the legal status of rulers of the province, responsible to the supreme Imperial authority. He established friendly relations with Oudh, which thenceforward remained the loyal ally of the British and a buffer between Bengal and the Mahrattas. He prohibited the Company's servants from receiving "presents" from the natives, a practice which had been appallingly abused, but he gave them salaries which made them free at least of the extremes of temptation. When he finally departed, he had not set up a system of government, but he had laid its foundations. Expansion was in his program; there was quite enough for a trading company to do in organizing the government of some millions of natives, for which Plassey, Wandewash, and Baksar had made them responsible.

Still matters were far from satisfactory; the Company's servants were exposed to great temptations. They were without administrative training or experience; they had no great tradition behind them, no historical precedents to guide them; and the British Government in England had an uneasy if not very acute sense of responsibility. After a time the control of Bengal passed into the hands of an able governor, Warren Hastings; but it was not enough that he should be responsible to a Board of Directors in London whose chief interest was bound to be in the acquisition of dividends. The Government would not take over the control, though such a design was in the minds of Clive and Chatham; but it must have a voice. The first experimental Constitution for the territories under British administration in India took shape in North's Regulating Acts (1773).

There were three presidencies, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, each having its own governor: but the governor of Bengal was also Governor-General. Control was vested in the Council of Five, of which he was president; all were appointed in the first instance by the Home Government; decisions were fixed by a majority vote. With three hostile members of Council the Governor-General would be helpless. A High Court or Commission of Judges was to administer English law, and in its own view at least was responsible not to the Indian but to the Home Government; while it took cognizance of illegalities in

the administration. The government on the spot was to take its instructions from the Court of Directors in England to whom it was responsible—though fully twelve months normally passed between the sending of a dispatch and receipt of the reply. The intention was sound enough; but its tolerable working required accord between Governor-General and members of Council, between Council and High Court, between the government on the spot and the directors in England, and between all these authorities and the Government in England.

The impracticability of the plan made itself felt from the beginning. Three of the Council, men without first-hand experience of Indian affairs, started with a determination to override Warren Hastings, who was named Governor-General, in everything. The authority of the High Court and the Council were in perpetual conflict, till Hastings devised a compromise, which was accepted by Impey, the Chief Justice. The directors issued instructions upon which it was impossible to act. A year after the members of Council arrived, Great Britain was at war with her American colonies and could give the government in India no financial or military help in its difficulties with native powers. The directors clamored for dividends when the expenses of administration could only be met by resorting to expedients for which the best excuse was sheer necessity. And the reckless conduct of the subordinate presidencies involved the supreme Government in the gravest difficulties.

In spite of all, Warren Hastings won through. When he left India in 1785, he had convinced the Mahrattas that at least so long as he was there the British power was not to be overthrown. He had insured the permanent loyalty of Oudh. He had saved Madras from Haidar Ali. He had given Bengal the best administration it had known since the time of Akbar, and had laid the foundations of the Indian Civil Service. But he had on occasion paid more regard to expediency than to justice, and had shut his eyes when Oriental allies used Oriental methods for which he could not be held irresponsible; and his welcome home took the form of impeachment and scathing denunciation by the greatest orators of the time. In the eyes of the natives of India, Hastings was anything but an oppressor; but the impeachment, though largely based on misapprehension both of particular facts and of general conditions, was the genuine expression of a sound moral sentiment, and served a sound moral end. For the fear of suffering undeserved penalties (often enough inflicted) has rarely if ever deterred British Governors from ignoring uninstructed opinion and acting as in their judgment the circumstances demanded; but from that day it has been realized that no circumstances warrant a departure from the moral standards of Christendom.

While still governor of Bengal only, Hastings had in effect hired

out the Company's troops to the Oudh Wazir for the suppression of the Rohillas (an Afghan tribe which had recently established its domination over the Hindu population of a portion of Oudh); with the political excuse or justification that they were in league with the Mahrattas, and hence that the security of Oudh and ultimately of Bengal required such action to be taken. He had initiated the policy afterwards known as that of "subsidiary alliances" by ceding to Oudh the Allahabad district on condition of the maintenance therein of a force under British discipline and British control, at the Wazir's expense. He had instituted an inquiry into the real conditions of land tenure in Bengal and made provisional arrangements for a fair method of raising and collecting the revenue. Then for three years his action was paralysed by the hostile majority in the Council. Meanwhile, Bombay had chosen on its own responsibility to take sides with Ragonath Rao, a claimant to the Mahratta Peshwaship which was in dispute. Hastings was forced to intervene, and again his action was paralysed by the Council. At last in 1778 his hands were freed by changes in that body; but the premature and misdirected zeal of Bombay placed that presidency in such a predicament that it made the hasty and ignominious convention of Wargam with Sindhia—now the most powerful of the Mahratta chiefs—which for the moment spread a conviction that the British power was on the verge of collapsing. The situation was barely saved by the skill and audacity of a young officer, Captain Goddard, who had been dispatched across the peninsula with a small force to assist Bombay, and who had no more qualms than Clive about taking risks and assuming responsibilities.

The activities of Madras had been no less pernicious. The Nawab of Arcot, heavily in debt to the British, proposed to liquidate his debt in part by seizing the independent principality of Tanjore. The Madras government shamelessly aided him. Whoever might be governor, the control got into the hands of a clique, and so evil was the general impression produced by their conduct that the Nizam joined the now very powerful Haidar Ali of Mysore in a league for the destruction of the British, who were by this time (1779) in the thick of the Mahratta complication. In 1780 Haidar's armies swarmed into the Carnatic, and overwhelmed the British detachments which sought to stem their devastating career. The situation was again saved by a blow in the Mahratta country, equally daring and unexpected. The capture of Sindhia's fortress-capital, Gwalior, esteemed wholly impregnable, followed by another unlooked-for reverse, convinced that particularly shrewd chief that the British were never so dangerous as when their defeat seemed most inevitable. He came to an understanding and called off the Mahrattas.

Hastings sent the veteran victor of Wandewash, Eyre Coote, from

his post as military member of Council at Calcutta to take the command in Madras, where he inflicted three defeats in three months on Haidar Ali's forces (1781). Great Britain was now at war with Holland; a new and vigorous Governor arrived at Madras, who raised more troops and captured from the Dutch Negapatam, and Trincomali in Ceylon. Next year Haidar died and was succeeded by his son Tippu Sahib. The Mahrattas promptly accepted a definite treaty with Hastings. The Nizam had already withdrawn from the confederacy. A British column entered Mysore; and Tippu made his peace not with Hastings but with the Madras government almost as if he had been the victor. Not only had the defeats of the Mahrattas and of Haidar been due to the energy of Hastings; his diplomatic skill had first sundered the confederacy and then convinced the hostile powers that friendship was wiser than enmity.

Hastings left India with the British thoroughly established as probably the strongest power in the country; himself unconscious that he was going home to face impeachment. The ten years of the Regulation Acts had demonstrated the inefficiency of the working system, and in 1784 Pitt's India Act was passed, creating the form of government which, with some modifications, remained in force till 1858. Under the new Act practically the whole executive authority lay in the Governor-General in Council. As there were four members instead of five, the chief having a vote and a casting vote, he could not be outvoted if one of the Council supported him; and on emergency he could even act without consulting the Council. No Governor-General could again be hampered as Hastings had been. He was still responsible to the Company's Board of Directors whose instructions he was expected to follow, and to a new parliamentary Board of Control which issued its own instructions and supervised, when necessary, those of the directors; but the instructions did not override his decisions on the spot, though he transgressed them at the risk of dismissal. The great series of Governors-General opened fittingly with Lord Cornwallis, one of those men who, without great brilliancy, inspire confidence by cool and clear judgment, high character, absolute fearlessness, and convincing justice—qualities which he shared with George Washington.

Warren Hastings had established the position which Clive had won; the British held an assured position as one among many territorial powers in India. With the new system inaugurated under Cornwallis began the next phase of development which made the British paramount and sovereign.

### III.—*France, 1763–1789*

Fifty years had passed since the peace of Utrecht, when France had emerged from the long series of Louis XIV.'s wars still un-

mistakably the premier nation of the continent. The Seven Years' War left her humiliated, exhausted, for the time negligible. Fortunately for her the minister who had been best served her during the years of defeat retained the direction of her affairs for another seven years. Choiseul was not a statesman of the first rank, but he was strong enough to go his own way, and at least to help the country on the way to recovery. Perhaps the best proof of his competence lies in the fact that fifteen years after the peace of Paris the French fleet was able to challenge, and for a time with success, the supremacy of the British on the seas, and that she owed it to Choiseul. He realized that it was the British navy which had given to Great Britain the decisive victory over France, and that France could never inflict a decisive defeat in return until she was able at least to hold her own upon the seas against her rival.

He achieved little else, however, except the purchase of the sovereignty of Corsica from Genoa, an event fraught with consequences upon which neither he nor any one else could have calculated. The ostensible value of the island was for the service of French fleets in the Mediterranean. It belonged technically to Genoa; the Genoese government became intolerable to the Corsicans, who revolted under the leadership of Paoli. Genoa strove in vain to bring them to subjection; Paoli offered the sovereignty to Great Britain, which was too much occupied with domestic and colonial affairs to risk the troubles which might ensue on acceptance. Genoa offered it to France for hard cash. The bargain was struck; French troops succeeded where the Genoese had failed; Great Britain had missed her chance, and, a year after the purchase, in 1769, Napoleon Buonaparte was born a French subject. It may be confidently assumed that the course of history would have been appreciably modified if Corsica had remained politically as well as racially Italian, or if the "Corsican upstart" had been born and bred a citizen of the British Empire, which provided no openings for a new Clive.

Choiseul was summarily dismissed at the end of 1770, mainly because he declined to bow the knee to the last and worst, the most degraded and degrading, of the French king's mistresses, the Du Barry. He had not restored France to such a position that she could interpose effectively in the affairs of Europe: within two years of his fall, Prussia, Austria, and Russia had appropriated by mutual agreement half the kingdom of Poland, undisturbed by French protests. France could not be fully restored without a fundamental reconstruction of the whole political and financial system. Even in the splendid days of Louis XIV. that system had borne in it the seeds of decay; since then it had become thoroughly rotten within, despite a still glittering outside. Reconstruction was a dream of philosophers, not of "practical" politicians; it never occurred to

Choiseul to attempt it. But he tinkered at the system as he found it, with such benefit as tinkering could attain; though it all amounted to little more than the revival of a navy and some improvement in the organization of the army.

Here, however, we must advert to an event of much importance which was brought about during the period of his ministry—the downfall of the Jesuits. In the missionary field outside Europe the Order had done incomparably more efficient work than any other Christian organization; in Europe it had been the most efficient instrument of aggressive Catholicism, playing a political part always in the interests of ecclesiastical supremacy, though by no means always in accordance with the views of Popes and other ecclesiastical authorities. For the Jesuits loyalty and obedience to the Order overrode all other considerations; they belonged to no temporal state, though they sought to exercise a dominating influence everywhere. Monarchs superstitiously inclined were apt to fall much under their sway; Jesuit influence had done much to bring about the suppression and dispersion of French Huguenots in the reign of Louis XIV. Wherever there was popular or political hostility to clerical domination, the Jesuits were detested—and feared.

The man in whom they first found their match was the very able minister Pombal, who for a time controlled the government of Portugal. Finding himself in direct antagonism with the Jesuits, he rejected all half-measures, decreed the suppression of their activities in Portugal, and then their expulsion; and, since the Pope seemed disposed to support them, settled the matter by forcibly deporting them to Civita Vecchia, in the Papal territory, in 1759. Immediately afterwards a like fate befell them in France, whence they were expelled in 1764; Spain and Naples following suit three years later. The combined pressure of the Powers at last forced a reluctant Pope, Clement XIV., to issue a brief suppressing the Order in 1773. It survived even that blow, but never again recovered its old power.

After Choiseul's dismissal, there appeared for a time no minister with an intelligent policy; as for the king, he never had one. No attempt was made to solve the financial problem of a Treasury with an expenditure in annual excess of its revenue. The only body in the country which could in any way act as a check on the power of the Crown was the Paris Parlement, supported by the Parlements of the Provinces; and they were legal, not legislative or executive, bodies, which could at best hamper the Crown—not, like the English Parliament, by refusing supplies, but by declining to register the royal decrees, which meant that they were a dead letter in the Courts. Judiciously applied, and supported by public opinion, this limited veto had its uses. But the Parlements were close bodies with interest of their own; neither in opposing the Crown nor in

the exercise of their judicial functions could they be relied upon to act in the public interest. As a result of a series of collisions with the Crown, the minister Maupeou abolished them together, and set up in their place new tribunals under control of the Crown. When Louis XV.—once but no longer the “Well-beloved”—died in 1774, there was no legal check on the royal autocracy.

The grandson who succeeded him, Louis XVI., was an amiable young man with the best intentions, limited capacities, no training, no self-confidence, and all the moral virtues becoming in a private citizen. He had recently married Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa and sister of the Emperor Joseph II., clever, beautiful, high-spirited, with all the vigor and self-confidence which her husband lacked, but full of prejudices and unfortunately regardless of conventions. The king's first selection of ministers was promising. The chief minister Maurepas had a good administrative record in the past; Vergennes, the best available choice, was put in charge of foreign affairs; and a very able finance minister was found in Turgot.

Unfortunately Maurepas, for the sake of popularity and against the opinion of Turgot, reinstated the Parlements. Turgot set about a drastic reorganization of finance. Internal trade was developed by the abolition of the duties and restrictions by which it was fettered; there was a violent outcry from the privileged classes who had profited by them. A rigid economy was applied, sinecures were abolished, the numbers of officials reduced, leakages stopped; the annual deficit was turned into a handsome surplus; but the outcry was redoubled. Turgot, confident in the king's support, went on his way regardless of the opposition of the queen, the princes, half the *noblesse* and the clergy, and of the desertion of Maurepas, who dared not face unpopularity. New measures proposed the abolition of more privileges and exemptions, and the substitution of labor paid out of a land tax for the *corvée*, the forced labor of the peasants upon the roads. The revived Parlement refused to register the decrees; family pressure proved more than the weak king could resist; Turgot was dismissed after eighteen months of office. With his fall vanished the hope of reform and entered the certainty of revolution, though the latter fact was not yet apparent to the privileged classes.

Privileges are justified when they are counter-balanced by corresponding burdens and responsibilities borne by those who enjoy the privileges. Broadly speaking, the immunities from taxation had in their origin been the compensation for such duties and responsibilities. Thus, when the people were taxed for the maintenance of military forces, the lords were not taxed because they were required to maintain military forces at their own expense. The lords had rights of service from the peasantry because the peasantry had cor-

responding rights of protection from the lords. But in France the privileges had remained, though the duties had long ceased to be regarded as obligatory; while the privileged considered that the whole structure of society depended on their retention of their rights. Yet the burdens upon the unprivileged had become too great to be borne, because the burdens which had primarily rested upon the privileged had been added to their own, while those which they themselves had always borne had been in no degree mitigated. A readjustment of burdens at the expense of privileges had become imperative—as a matter not merely of abstract justice or of theoretical expediency, but of sheer practical necessity. Between forced services to the State and forced services to the seigneur, taxes paid to the State and the legal exactions of the seigneur, the peasant, ground between the upper and the nether mill-stones, lived upon the brink of starvation; which he and his family only escaped—if they succeeded in escaping it—by the exercise of a desperate economy. He could barely earn or produce enough to keep himself alive. The bourgeois, too, was taxed beyond endurance; and neither peasant nor bourgeois had a voice in the matter. The clergy contributed what they thought fit; the seigneurs, the lords of the soil, were virtually immune, since the taxes were heaviest on those bare necessities which absorb the greater part of the poor man's expenditure, but only a fraction of the expenditure of the rich. And still the whole product of taxation provided a revenue far short of the government's annual outgoings, while deficits were met by borrowings and ever more borrowings at increasing rates of interest, piling up the already huge weight of debt.

Now there were three possible remedies: to develop production, whereby the same revenue raised from the same sources would entail less strain on the producers; to find new sources of revenue which would not add to the burdens of those who were already overburdened; to reduce expenditure till the revenue showed a surplus. But production could only be increased by the removal of trade restrictions, which were highly profitable to private vested interests; new sources of taxation meant taxes which would fall wholly upon the privileged classes; reduction of expenditure meant application of the revenue to the public services and the abolition of an infinite number of highly paid offices which involved no real public services at all, to say nothing of extravagant "perquisites"—and the living of half the French *noblesse* was derived from precisely this source. Incidentally, too, the reckless extravagance of the Court would have to be curtailed.

All these were things possible to do; all would certainly be done some day. Turgot in his brief tenure of office removed restrictions and cut down expenditure in spite of clamor; but when he at-

tempted to adjust the incidence of taxation, the opposition proved that it was too strong, not only for Turgot, but for any reformer working under the existing system. There would be no effective reform without a revolution.

Turgot went, and Maurepas entrusted the finances to the Swiss Protestant banker, Necker. In one respect, the endeavor to cut down expenses, Necker followed Turgot. But he dared not touch the incidence of taxation, and he held by the traditional economics which rejected Turgot's free-trade doctrines. On the other hand, his skill in raising loans was so great that for the moment he seemed to have conquered the immediate difficulty of filling the Treasury and restoring national credit.

But the events were too strong for him. At the moment when economy was essential France elected to plunge herself once more into a costly war. The temptation to strike at Great Britain was irresistible. When her struggle with her Colonies began, Turgot was in office, and Turgot judged that France would gain nothing by an intervention emphatically forbidden by the state of her finances. But when his restraining influence was gone and the war spirit was rising, when Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, and the American envoy, Benjamin Franklin, became the idol of Paris, Vergennes's hesitation ended. France allied herself with the Americans, and Great Britain barely escaped decisive overthrow. But France in the end gained nothing except Tobago and Senegal—and she had not counted the cost. Necker's loans floated the war; yet he was driven to further economies, which turned the vested interests against him. A new departure, the publication of Treasury accounts (the *Compte Rendu*), won him fresh popularity in other quarters; but on the one hand it was soon found that the optimistic picture therein presented did not correspond to the facts, and on the other the statement made revelations which brought upon him new enemies. In 1781 Necker resigned, and no one was left with even a pretence of capacity for dealing with the financial situation.

Matters went from bad to worse. Maurepas died; Vergennes, competent enough in dealing with foreign affairs, had no understanding of domestic problems. Successive finance ministers piled up debt and provided no remedies, till a climax was reached under Calonne, who after a brief period of lavish extravagance found himself at the end of his resources. As a last desperate expedient he reversed his policy and designed schemes of taxation borrowed from Turgot, so sweeping that the king could not venture to accept them without the acquiescence of the interests they attacked. The interests which had rejected Turgot were not likely to accept Calonne; but the attempt to win them over was made. In 1787 an Assembly of Notables was called, composed practically of members

of the privileged classes; their opposition to Calonne was instantly manifested. It was headed by the Archbishop of Toulouse, Loménie de Brienne, and supported by Necker, on whose régime even his enemies were beginning to look back regretfully. Calonne was dismissed, and Louis chose to appoint Brienne instead of Necker in his place.

Brienne was as helpless as his predecessors. He fell back on attempts to introduce piecemeal the measures which he had just opposed as parts of a general scheme. When the land tax came up, the Parliament refused to register it. The king overrode the refusal; the Parliament protested, and was removed from Paris to Troyes, whence it was permitted to return on condition of registering the edict. When the next tax was brought forward the quarrel was renewed, and the Parliament demanded the summoning of the States-General, which had last been called in 1613. The quarrel waxed high; public opinion throughout the country was manifestly on the side of Parliament. The king and Brienne were forced to give way: the States-General was summoned to meet in May 1789; Brienne resigned, and Necker was reinstated.

#### *IV.—The First Partition of Poland, 1763-1774*

Catharine II. became Tsarina of Russia in 1762. In 1765 the Emperor Francis died. Not he, but his wife Maria Theresa, was sovereign in the Hapsburg territories, Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, and the Austrian dependencies. On his death Joseph II., the son of Francis and Maria Theresa, became emperor, though his mother's reign continued till her death in 1780. Sweden, for half a century after the death of Charles XII., was the prey of factions, and powerless. The Crown exercised no authority during the nominal rule of Frederick of Hesse-Cassel (the husband of Charles's sister), and of Adolphus Frederick, of Holstein, who succeeded him by election in 1751. In 1771 the latter was succeeded by his son, Gustavus III., who immediately accomplished a *coup d'état* which restored the power of the Crown, and with it the power of the country to resist the foreign aggression with which it was threatened. These dates may usefully be borne in mind, in relation to the very important affairs of Eastern Europe which issued in the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the Russo-Turkish treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774.

The close of the Seven Years' War left Prussia, as it left Britain, isolated in Europe, since its last phase proved fatal to the continued alliance of those two Powers. Peace was essential to Frederick, for whom the only security lay in effective alliance with Russia. But the war had given to Russia a dominating position in Poland, which

had been freely occupied by her armies as a basis for operations against Prussia, the enemy of the Saxon King of Poland. The ascendancy of Prussia in Poland might easily again become a menace to Prussia, while Frederick had always been extremely anxious to acquire Polish Prussia, by which East Prussia was isolated from Brandenburg. Hence the policy which Frederick had ultimately in view involved a partition of Polish territory which would give West Prussia to him, thereby making his territory continuous, and a corresponding cession to Russia.

Ascendancy in Poland, and domination of the Black Sea at the expense of Turkey, were the two primary objects of Catherine's foreign policy; and in both the antagonism of Austria was inevitable, because Poland and Turkey formed a continuous barrier between Russia and Austria—a barrier which Austria desired to preserve. Hence Catherine's own inclination to the Prussian Alliance which was definitely established in 1764.

In 1763 King Augustus of Saxony and Poland died. His desire had been to make the Polish monarchy hereditary in his family. Had Poland become a hereditary monarchy it would have been strengthened, very much to the disadvantage of Prussian and to the detriment of Russian schemes of ascendancy. Catherine therefore imposed upon the Polish Diet the election of a creature of her own, Stanislaus Poniatowski, in 1764. The weakness of Poland was as essential to Frederick as to Catherine; whereas it was in the interest both of Austria and of France that Poland should be strengthened. But Austria was not prepared to interpose single-handed, and Choiseul in France was preoccupied with designs directed against the British power. The election of Stanislaus made the Russian ambassador in Poland almost a dictator.

There is no escaping from the fact that Poland and its existing constitution had become intolerable and impossible to Eastern Europe. The Crown had no authority; the governing body was the Diet of nobles; and the Diet was paralyzed for action by what was called the *Liberum Veto*, the right of any individual member of the Diet to veto any measure which was brought before it. Each individual noble enjoyed despotic power over the serf population on his estate. At this time all public offices were exclusively in the hands of Roman Catholics, although there were a large number of Protestants and of adherents of the Greek Church, known as the Dissidents, who were thus shut out of office. Under such conditions Poland was dangerous, not as an aggressive power, but because it was for its neighbors a perpetual incitement to a reagggression. A reformed Poland under a vigorous government of her own could have played her own part on the European stage; but as matters stood

Poland could not play a part of her own; while she kept her neighbors in a ceaseless state of unrest.

Now the existing constitution gave to the individual nobles the maximum of individual liberty, of freedom from any control. As individuals most of them did not want any control; as patriots they resented foreign intervention. But amongst them there was a party which realized that without some unifying control there could be no strength. To that end they desired constitutional reforms. Stanislaus Poniatowski, as a Pole, was preferable to a foreigner like the Saxon kings; he was related to the leaders of the reform or constitutional party, who expected him to act with them; and his election was carried without active opposition. But Stanislaus was the tool of Catherine, whose interests demanded the enfranchisement of the non-Catholics of the Greek Church, as those of Frederick demanded the enfranchisement of the Protestants. Instead of the reforms wanted by the Constitutionals, the emancipation of the Dissidents was proposed in the Diet of 1766. The aims of the Dissidents were not those of the Constitutionals, who rejected the proposals, thereby setting themselves in antagonism to Catherine, though Poniatowski's sympathies were known to be with them. To defeat the Constitutionals, and with the hope of ejecting Stanislaus, many of the Anti-constitutionals, who arrogated to themselves the title of "Patriots," leagued themselves with the Dissidents in the Confederation of Radom; only to find that they had subjected themselves to the dictation of Catherine, who had no intention of removing Stanislaus, since his obedience to her orders was assured, whatever his personal sympathies might be.

Consequently, when the Diet met in 1768, the disabilities of the Dissidents were abolished, but the only "constitutional" reform was the modification of the *Liberum Veto* in respect of finance; while the new law, guaranteed by Russia, was declared to be unalterable. But such palpable admission of Russian domination was more than the patriots of the Radom Confederation could endure. A new Confederation of Bar was formed to uphold religion—that is, insist on the disabilities of the Dissidents—and maintain independence. Risings took place in Southern Poland; Russian troops dispersed the insurgents and followed them into Turkish territory, in violation of international law.

No one could view with equanimity the virtual transformation of Poland into a province of Russia; least of all Frederick, whose position was extremely difficult, since he could neither afford to quarrel with the Tsarina nor to surrender Poland to her domination. Great Britain was too much absorbed in her own affairs to intervene; Chiseul in France could not venture to do more than use diplomacy to encourage Polish resistance, and to urge upon Turkey, Austria.

and Prussia the active opposition to Russia from which France herself was debarred. Partly at his instigation, Turkey made the violation of her territory a *casus belli*, and declared war at the end of 1768. Frederick was not to be persuaded to a breach with Russia, but a *rapprochement* with Austria might avert the danger of a conflagration in which he himself would have to take part as Catherine's ally. Maria Theresa was still ruling the Hapsburg dominions; but her son Joseph had succeeded his father as emperor, and did not share his mother's irreconcilable antipathy to Frederick. In Frederick's own mind was forming the idea, adopted again a little more than a century later by Bismarck, of a league between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, for their mutual interests, on give-and-take principles; but immediately for all them the giving-and-taking was all to be at the expense of Poland.

In 1769 active hostilities were in progress between Russia and Turkey—in the novel rôle of Liberator of the Poles. Little efficiency or energy was displayed on either side, though in the balance the Russians had the better. In the next year a new Russian commander inspired greater vigor: Moldavia and Wallachia were occupied, and the Crimea was attacked (it must not be forgotten that the Black Sea littoral was under Turkish dominion); it seemed likely that Turkey would have to sue for peace, while in Poland Russia had practically suppressed resistance. A meeting at Neisse between Frederick and Joseph in 1769 produced no tangible results, but established amicable personal relations between the two monarchs. In 1770 they met again at Neustadt. Austria did not want war with Russia, but it would be forced on her if Russia remained in occupation of Wallachia. Frederick did not want Austria and Russia to fight, lest he should be dragged into the vortex. To Neustadt there came an appeal from Turkey to the two princes to use their good offices with Russia. With the approval of Joseph, Frederick opened a negotiation with Catherine, which developed into the scheme for the first partition of Poland.

If the three principals were agreed, there was no one to say them nay. In the eighteenth century territories were bandied about by the great Powers as suited their own convenience, without any pretence of considering the views of the populations, who were mere pawns on the chessboard. Such ideas as that of nationality never entered into the calculations of the players. But they were usually at some pains to unearth some technicality of dynastic right to serve as a pretext. Frederick had himself provided the most flagrant example hitherto recorded when he robbed Maria Theresa of Silesia; but he had then had at least the excuse that, even viewed as robbery, it was only retaliation for the chicanery by which Austria had robbed his immediate predecessors; and even so he had thought it worth while

to pretend to a legal title. Legal titles, however, were ignored in the bargain which was now struck between the three Powers. Maria Theresa was not easily persuaded, for she had a conscience; but her scruples were overcome or her wishes overridden by Kaunitz, her minister for twenty years, and by her son the Emperor. Actually the best excuse was to be found in the undeniable fact that Polish anarchy had made Poland an impossible neighbor.

Poland, then, was to be reduced to practicable dimensions without upsetting the balance of power between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. In consideration of Austrian susceptibilities, Russia would have to abandon Wallachia, but she could find compensation in annexing the greater part of Eastern Poland. Austria could square the account by appropriating Galicia. Frederick would be content with West Prussia, which intervened between East Prussia and Brandenburg—an extremely inconvenient arrangement, as he had found in the Seven Years' War, when Russia had been able to use Poland as an advanced base for attacking him. The Treaty of Partition was signed between the three Powers in September 1772. Poland was not yet to be effaced—a still considerable Polish kingdom survived till the partitions of 1793 and 1795. The assent of the Diet was obtained in 1773, for the simple reason that resistance was impossible. For the time being, king and Diet remained effectively under Russian control.

As to the Turkish War, it dragged on till 1774, when the Russians won a victory which enabled them to dictate their own terms—subject to the understanding with Austria which had been a part of the recent bargain. Under the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, Russia retired from Wallachia and Moldavia, on condition of toleration for the Christians; but she kept Azof, and the freedom of Turkish waters for her own ships.

There is not much doubt that a similar fate to that of Poland would have come upon Sweden at the hands of Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, but for the *coup d'état* of Gustavus III., which concentrated the control of the state in the king's hands, instead of leaving it to the chaos of factions. Each of the Baltic Powers wanted its share of such provinces on the south and east Baltic as still remained to Sweden. But Gustavus was able to present a firm front to his enemies; Sweden was of more immediate consequence to the Western Powers than Poland; in spite of their other engagements, Great Britain and France both showed signs of a definite determination to intervene on behalf of Gustavus if his position were endangered. Frederick, as before, had no intention of achieving his ends by war; peace was to him of more importance than any territorial acquisition. Catherine found it advisable to postpone her designs for the dismemberment of Sweden.

*V.—Frederick and Joseph, 1774-1786*

In shaping the policy which arranged the partition of Poland as it was carried out, Frederick was actuated first by the determination to strengthen and consolidate his own kingdom as much as he possibly could, and, secondly, by the consciousness that it was hardly less necessary to provide checks against Russian aggression in the future than to secure Russian friendship in the present. For the attainment of that end it would have suited him to establish close friendship with Austria in place of the old hostility. We may observe the similarity of the conditions which arose a hundred years later when Bismarck was controlling the destinies of Prussia and Germany. Bismarck, like Frederick, had dealt a heavy blow to Austria in the interests of Prussia; Bismarck, like Frederick, was extremely anxious to maintain friendship with Russia, but was not less anxious for a strong alliance with Austria; in both cases, because Russian hostility was more dangerous than Austrian hostility to Prussia, while Austrian friendship provided substantial security against Russian aggression. But Bismarck was able to carry his scheme to completion; Frederick was not, because the Emperor was still his rival in Germany, with German ambitions not compatible with Frederick's; whereas such ambitions were destroyed for Austria actually in 1866, and visibly in 1871.

No long time elapsed after the first partition of Poland before Frederick was made aware that he must remain on guard against the Emperor Joseph's designs. Austria capped the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji by seizing from the Porte for himself the province of Bukowina, rounding off the connection between Transylvania and the recently acquired Galicia. And this was done without any reference to Russia or Prussia. Then, at the end of 1777, the reigning house of Bavaria came to an end with the death of the Elector Maximilian Joseph, the son of the former Charles VII. The Bavarian inheritance passed to the elder branch of the house of Wittelsbach, represented by the old Elector Palatine. Joseph saw the opportunity for asserting a Hapsburg claim to the Bavarian succession, which had been forgotten for three centuries and a half. The Elector Palatine was frightened into acknowledging the claim; his heir refused to ratify the arrangement; Austrian troops entered Bavaria to occupy it, and it appeared that no one would interfere to prevent this extension of the Hapsburg territories. Frederick took up the cudgels. The constitution of the empire and the rights of the princes were at stake. France was just plunging into the War of American Independence, and could give Austria no help; Frederick's appeal to

Catherine for support seemed not unlikely to receive a favorable answer; and the Austrian claim was withdrawn.

In the next year, 1780, Maria Theresa died, and Joseph became the sole head of the Hapsburg dominion, as well as Emperor. He was therefore able to pursue his policy unhampered by his mother's conservative predilections.

Joseph was an enthusiastic reformer of the type which conceives that an imperial fiat is all that is required to annihilate abuses and to establish new ideals, irrespective of all custom and tradition. He had begun his reign as Emperor with the dream of establishing that imperial authority which had never had an actual existence. Finding that the result of his efforts did not come up to his anticipations, he reverted to the plan of attaining supremacy in Germany by magnifying the Austrian state; and this had been his real aim in seeking the acquisition of Bavaria. Foiled in this particular plan by Frederick's action, he now made it his object to obtain Bavaria by way of exchange for the Netherlands: for Bavaria was contiguous with the Austrian territory, easily to be assimilated with it; the Netherlands were remote, practically isolated, difficult to defend, difficult to rule. Hapsburg domination in the empire had already been furthered by the election of Joseph's brother Maximilian as Archbishop and Elector of Cologne.

To these ambitions Frederick was opposed, because the extension and consolidation of the Hapsburg power in Germany would relegate Prussia to the minor position such as she had occupied in the past. Equally unsatisfactory, from Frederick's point of view, was the increasing friendship between Austria and Russia. Catherine's ambitions, under the influence of her minister, Potemkin, were now directed mainly against Turkey. For the fulfilment of those ambitions an understanding with Austria was of the first importance. On the other hand, for the aggrandisement of Austria in Germany, an understanding with Catherine and her severance from Frederick were of the first importance. That understanding was reached in 1781. Russia would look favorably upon the extension of the Austrian power in Germany, and Austria would look favorably upon the Russian expansion to the Black Sea. As a result of the understanding, Turkey, in 1783, found herself compelled to cede the Crimea and the province of Kuban, on the east of the Sea of Azof, to Russia. Frederick was again left in complete isolation, since nothing could be hoped from attempting an alliance either with France or with England.

Meanwhile Joseph was assured of Russian friendship and of such freedom of action for himself in the West as might be expected to result from Frederick's loss of Russian support. His first move was an attempt to put an end to the effective restrictions upon the

Austrian position in the Netherlands, which had been imposed, along with their transfer to Austria, at the treaty of Utrecht. The barrier fortresses remained in the occupation of the Dutch, and the Scheldt below Antwerp was also under their control, whereby the value of Antwerp was very much lessened. Joseph took advantage of the implication of Holland in the war between Great Britain on the one side, and the Americans and Bourbons on the other, to compel the evacuation of the barrier fortresses by Holland, and to demand the opening of the free navigation of the Scheldt.

But the termination of the war encouraged the Dutch to refuse the demand. They appealed to France, which had restored a close understanding with its traditional allies of the burgher party, who were now threatening to overturn the Stadtholdership—which had been re-established and made hereditary in the house of Orange, the friends of England, in 1747. On the question of the Scheldt, English interests demanded that the treaties which guaranteed its closure should be maintained, so that Great Britain was now on the same side as the Dutch and the French. Russia showed no disposition to intervene in arms on Joseph's behalf, and he was obliged, at the beginning of 1785, to accept the treaty of Fontainebleau, under which France took the lead in guaranteeing the continued closure of the Scheldt—a fact which was to become of primary importance before eight years had passed. At the same time the old barrier treaty was annulled, and the fortresses were not restored to Dutch occupation.

Joseph now made one more effort to acquire Bavaria by a private arrangement with the Elector, Charles Theodore; who was to exchange Bavaria and the upper or Bavarian Palatinate for the whole of the Netherlands, with the title of King of Burgundy. But this, like the previous Bavarian scheme, was foiled by Frederick the Great. Such an arbitrary rearrangement of territories was a violation of the constitution of the empire. Frederick himself was not seriously troubled about the constitution of the empire, but by posing as a champion of constitutional rights he saw his way to prevent the strengthening of Austria, and to extend his own influence in Germany. He set himself forthwith to the drawing together of a league of princes—the Fürstenbund—for the maintenance of the constitution of the empire, threatened in more than one direction by the policy of the Emperor. He succeeded in his object. In the face of the newly formed league, Joseph and Charles Theodore made haste to drop their agreement, and matters remained as they were before.

Conceivably the Fürstenbund might actually have developed into a real German confederation under Prussian leadership; but only its immediate and avowed object was actually achieved, since Frederick died in the following year, and his nephew and successor, Frederick

William II., was not the man to carry any great political project to a successful conclusion.

Frederick, building upon the foundations laid by his father and his great-grandfather, was the creator of that Prussia which modern Europe has known to its bitter cost—the Prussia whose motto has been “Efficiency knows no law.” Within his own very narrow range, Frederick William I. pursued and attained for Prussia an extraordinary efficiency. There he stopped. No one could have been more loyal to law, as he understood it, than the father of Frederick II. But Frederick II. neither recognized law nor admitted that competent statesmanship anywhere recognized it. He divorced politics from the moral law with a perfect and unqualified cynicism. He pursued an efficiency much wider in scope, though not more thorough in its own field, than that in which his father had been absorbed. But efficiency was all that his father wanted; Frederick wanted efficiency as a means to attaining further ends—primarily that of raising his kingdom once for all to the position of equality with any other state in Europe. He succeeded, and his success was of evil omen for the world. In the third generation his principles were again applied on behalf of Prussia by Bismarck, the minister of William I.; but Bismarck, like his exemplar, knew when to hold his hand, making no attempt to subject the world to his sway; that was an extension of Frederick’s ambitions which was reserved for the master who dismissed Bismarck.

Frederick’s work was so thorough that Prussia survived the inefficiency of his successors; but the system he created needed for successful working a master who was himself efficient, and in the immediately succeeding generation the efficient head was wanted. Prussia did not actually drop out of rank, but for three-quarters of a century after Frederick’s death there was only one crisis in which she played with credit the part of a leading state—nor was it then due to her Hohenzollern rulers that she did so.

#### *VI.—Europe, 1786-1792*

The causes of the French Revolution lay deep in the social and political conditions of France—the magnificent France of Louis XIV., the corrupt France of Louis XV., the all but ruined France which was his legacy to his grandson, Louis XVI. The actual events which we call the French Revolution were initiated by the meeting of the States-General in 1789. For nearly three years it was possible for Europe at large to regard what was going on in France as a domestic matter having a merely indirect interest for other countries, like the struggle between Crown and Parliament in England in the seventeenth century. Until the European conflagration was actually kindled

by a declaration of war in 1792, the states of Europe pursued their several policies hardly influenced by the events in France, except in so far as they paralyzed her for active intervention in the affairs of Europe. In other words, until 1792 international politics were external to the French Revolution, but from that date were involved in the new movement. It will be convenient, therefore, to reserve the continuous narrative of the Revolution and all that it involved, but to proceed here with the account of European affairs external to it, down to 1792.

The accession of Frederick William II. in Prussia (1786) was followed in France by the death of Vergennes, who had been chiefly responsible for the direction of French foreign policy since the accession of Louis XVI. British policy was now under the direction of William Pitt the younger, whose primary aim at the time was to keep the country at peace and to renovate the power and wealth which had been so grievously shaken in her recent single-handed contest with her colonists and the Bourbon Powers. Vergennes had encouraged intervention in that struggle; but he was satisfied with the humiliation already inflicted on Britain, accompanied by the development of French influence in Holland, which left the maritime power in complete isolation. Vergennes and Pitt were jointly responsible for a commercial treaty between France and Great Britain, which discarded the traditional doctrine that a country gains more by injuring its neighbor's trade than by developing its own. The death of Vergennes (February 1787), however, again left the foreign policy of France without capable direction. And at the same time the accession of Frederick William II. revived the possibility of cordial relations between Great Britain and Prussia.

A change in the situation soon made itself felt. The Dutch Republican party, relying on French support, pursued its endeavor to destroy the power of the Stadtholder, William V. William's wife was the sister of the King of Prussia. Neither Pitt nor Frederick William was inclined to intervene in arms in support of the Stadtholder, though the existence of British influence in Holland was at stake. But in 1788 a personal insult to the Princess of Orange caused her to appeal to her brother. Encouraged by England, he dispatched troops to Holland. France, now on the brink of the Revolution, did not venture to support the Republican party—for the moment she had become a negligible quantity. The authority of the Stadtholder was restored; British, instead of French, influence became supreme in Holland; and the Triple Alliance was formed for defense between Prussia, Holland, and Britain.

Meanwhile Catherine of Russia was pursuing her aggressive policy against Turkey, with the ultimate intention of reinstating a Greek empire at Constantinople under Russian domination; a project in-

volving such a partition of the Turkish Empire between Russia and Austria, and such support of Austrian projects elsewhere, as should insure Joseph's active participation. French acquiescence was perhaps to be purchased with Egypt. Joseph had to decide whether he would oppose Russian expansion, fraught with obvious danger to Austria, or would follow the policy of sharing the spoils. He chose the latter course. War broke out between Turkey and Russia in 1787, and in the following year Austria, too, declared war upon Turkey.

The Austrian campaign was disastrous. On the other hand, the Russians achieved notable successes before the end of the year. Gustavus of Sweden intervened, attacking Russia in the north, but his advance was effectively stopped by a mutiny of his officers, and Denmark in turn invaded Sweden. But the Swedish peasants answered the king's call to arms, and the Triple Alliance intervened. With the Prussian army on one side of them, and the British fleet on the other, the Danes were forced to give way. Peace was made between Denmark and Sweden, and Gustavus seized the opportunity to obtain increased powers for the Crown from the Swedish Diet.

So, in 1789, the progress of the Russian arms continued. The Austrians recovered themselves, and captured Belgrade, under the leadership of the old general, Loudon, who, in the Seven Years' War, had given Frederick more trouble than any other Austrian commander. It seemed as though the destruction of the Turkish Empire was imminent.

Neither Prussia nor Britain wanted the Turkish Empire to be destroyed. In the last generation the elder Pitt had seen in the rise of Russia a valuable counterpoise to Bourbon aggression; in his time, and from his point of view, the policy to be pursued was that of close alliance between Britain, Prussia, and Russia. But the aggressive character of Catherine's ambitions established in the mind of the younger Pitt that conception of the Russian menace which generally dominated British statesmen until the twentieth century. Russia, in possession of Constantinople and of a Mediterranean as well as of a Baltic fleet, would be even more dangerous as a rival than valuable as an ally. Hence the preservation of Turkey was necessary. Prussia, too, for different reasons, viewed the aggrandisement of Russia and Austria at the expense of Turkey with apprehension; but Frederick William's minister, Hertzberg, was primarily anxious to obtain territorial "compensation" for Prussia.

The opportunity for Prussian intervention was presented in 1789, when France was already in the first throes of the Revolution, by the internal disruption with which Joseph's dominions were menaced.\* Although the Austrian arms were achieving successes against the Turks, the Austrian Netherlands were in open revolt, Hungary was

threatening, disaffection was rife in Bohemia and in the recently acquired province of Galicia. In each case the situation had been brought about by Joseph's efforts to concentrate the government in his own hands without regard to the rights, legal or traditional, of his subjects in these various regions.

Prussian and British aims, however, were not identical; and Hertzberg believed, as Frederick II. might have believed with more justice, that Prussia was able to dictate terms to the belligerents. His own plan was an elaborate one. Prussia was to get from Poland the coveted Dantzic and Thorn, which had been left to her when Frederick annexed West Prussia. Poland was to be compensated by the Austrian restoration of Galicia. Austria was to be compensated by the Turkish cession of Moldavia and Wallachia. Prussia was also to have from Sweden what remained to her of Pomerania, and Sweden was to be compensated by the restoration of a part of Finland by Russia.

But Hertzburg failed to impose his terms. The Emperor Joseph, in his last public act, conciliated Hungary by conceding her constitutional demands. In February 1790 he died, leaving no children, and was succeeded by his brother, Leopold II., who as Grand Duke of Tuscany had already shown high qualities of statesmanship.

At this point, Poland, deeply resentful of the Russian domination, made a fresh effort for herself. The Diet adopted a reformed Constitution, which fixed the succession to the Crown upon the daughter of the King of Saxony, and made it hereditary to her issue. The Crown was to control the executive; the legislature was to consist of a Senate and an elective Diet; the *Liberum Veto* was abolished, and while Roman Catholicism remained the established religion of the State, others were to have complete toleration. Here lay revived possibilities of a strong and independent Poland—much to the liking of Austria; by no means to that of Prussia, which did not wish Poland to be strong, or of Russia, which did not wish her to be independent.

Leopold was more than equal to the situation. Prussia promptly found herself isolated by his skilful diplomacy. The Triple Alliance imposed upon Great Britain no obligation to support Prussian demands for territorial concessions. Poland, though hostile to Russia, objected strongly to the cession of Dantzic and Thorn. Both Britain and Holland, anxious as to the future of the Austrian Netherlands, were conciliated by Leopold's promise to restore their former Constitution and the conditions of the Barrier treaty; especially in view of the implied alternative of a cession of a part of the Austrian Netherlands to France if Leopold should find it necessary to purchase her support. Leopold in fact made it clear that he did not intend to pursue his brother's territorial ambitions or to yield to

the influence of Kaunitz. Frederick William deserted Hertzberg, and in July 1790 accepted the convention of Reichenbach. Austria agreed to give back her recent conquests from Turkey, and to restore the Constitution of the Netherlands, accompanied by an amnesty; while Prussia dropped her demand for Dantzic and Thorn. Both Powers guaranteed the "free Constitution" of Poland. The convention was followed by an armistice between Turks and Austrians, which issued twelve months later in the formal peace of Sistova.

The war between Russia and Turkey was soon afterwards brought to an end by the peace of Jassy in January, 1792, under which Turkey ceded to Russia the district between the Boug and the Dniester, and formally recognized her sovereignty in the Crimea and Kuban—that is, on the whole northern littoral of the Black Sea. Since the suspension of hostilities between Austria and Turkey, the successes of the Russian arms had continued; but Catherine was not unwilling for a peace with Turkey. For by this time the progress of the French Revolution was threatening to implicate both Leopold and Frederick William. The affairs of Western Europe seemed to demand the Tsarina's watchful attention, and to offer promising possibilities in the direction of Poland—the more when Leopold died, two months after Jassy, to be succeeded by his young and inexperienced son, Francis II., on whom France at once declared war, for reasons hereafter to be explained. Catherine's troops were promptly overrunning Poland; resistance was hopeless, the Constitution was abrogated, the Russian domination was restored, and the Constitutionalist leaders fled the country.

## CHAPTER XXXI

### THREE CENTURIES

#### *I.—Dropped Threads*

SINCE our account of the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, what we have had to say of colonial expansion has been practically confined to the doings of British and French in North America. It remains therefore, necessary to give a brief sketch of colonial history in other quarters, and also of two other great States, which had a history during these three centuries, although not in touch with the current of European events.

Except for the appropriation by French or British, during the seventeenth century, of occasional West Indian islands otherwise unoccupied, Spain and Portugal remained in practically exclusive possession of the West Indian islands, of the whole South American continent, of Central America, and of Mexico, the eastern seaboard to the north of Florida being occupied by British or French. The east coast of South America, roughly speaking from the mouth of the Orinoco on the north to the Rio de la Plata on the south, was claimed by the Portuguese on the strength of the Bull of Alexander VI.; the rest on the north and south, as well as the whole of the west coast, was Spanish. Portugal could do little towards the creation of a Brazilian Empire, having already more than her resources were equal to in the Empire of the Indian Ocean. Neither Spain nor Portugal had a population large enough for effective colonization of such vast areas. But they succeeded for centuries in keeping the field to themselves, and in preventing any other European States from planting themselves within the appropriated area after the fashion of the French in Canada or of the British in their thirteen colonies.

In the Spanish view, the colonies were private estates of the Crown administered for the benefit of the Crown, with their trade regulated in what were supposed to be the interests of the Crown, interests guarded on the line of monopoly. Foreign traders were excluded, trade between the colonies and foreign ports was excluded, trade even with Spain was restricted to the port of Seville, on the same principles which in the fourteenth century had set up the English staple towns, and still in the eighteenth had a mild counterpart in the Navigation Acts.

The trade restriction throttled commercial development although it permitted the passage to Spain of vast quantities of treasure from the mines of Mexico and Peru. It was, moreover, intolerable to the merchants and to the adventurers of the rest of the world, who were excluded from the New World. Hence in the sixteenth century the efforts of the French, followed by the English, to induce the by no means unwilling Spaniards of the colonies to trade with them in spite of the king's law—allowing the Spanish king's subjects to profess that in so trading they were only submitting to superior force. The minor official winked at the trade although his superiors denounced the English and French as pirates, and punished them when caught as heretics. And this state of affairs developed into the doctrine and practice of "no peace beyond the line," which prevailed for more than a century and a half, and was only ended by the limited admission of foreign traders under the ægis of law in the eighteenth century. Even then restrictions were evaded on one side and enforced on the other by the illegal methods that led to the Anglo-Spanish war, which developed into the War of the Austrian Succession. It was not till the second half of the eighteenth century that the Spanish Government, under Charles III., released the Spanish colonies in part from their commercial fetters, sanctioned the expansion of their intercourse with the rest of the world, and permitted the development of aspirations which in the nineteenth century resulted in the break up of Spain's colonial Empire.

Now the native populations with whom the Spaniards had to deal were not for the most part warlike folk, and were quite incapable of offering effective resistance. Their enslavement was in the first instance forbidden by Isabella of Castile, although means were easily found for subjecting them to something not far removed from slavery. It was to rescue them from this fate that the bishop, Las Casas, recommended the importation of negro slaves from Africa to the West Indies and the Spanish Main. The negroes, it was held, were in effect being rescued either from a worse slavery or from slaughter in their own country. Also, they were enabled to save their souls by embracing Christianity. Also, they could do the work demanded of them without breaking down physically, as the Indians did. In fact, in the islands the Indian population had never been large, and dwindled rapidly away under European influences. In the course of time the actual bulk of the inhabitants of the islands were not the aborigines, but African negroes.

Attention, however, was chiefly concentrated upon that part of the South American continent which had first been exploited—the western part of the north coast, the northern part of the west coast, and the intervening territory—the principal field in which the precious metals were found. A much less strict political supervision was im-

posed upon the southern region, where Jesuits and the colonists who followed the Jesuits penetrated up towards Peru from the mouth of the river Plate. Everywhere, but in this region much more than in the north, Spaniards intermixed with the natives, producing a mixed breed. Not that the comparatively few Spaniards were absorbed, or that many pure-blooded families did not survive preserving their pride of race; but the mixed race multiplied in greater numbers and with better results than elsewhere, and under the Jesuit influence the progress made by the natives themselves was of more real character, being in the nature of development rather than of a mere subjection to alien conventions. In South as in North America, effective European occupation did not extend deeply into the interior except along river basins; and vast tracts both in the Spanish and the Portuguese areas were still unexplored.

Turning to the Eastern Hemisphere, only isolated stations had been occupied on the African coast by Europeans: French for the most part on the Senegal coast, Portuguese or British on the Guinea coast; Portuguese on belts of both the eastern and western coast south of the Equator, and finally Dutch in the extreme south at the Cape of Good Hope. Nowhere had the interior been penetrated, and only one colony gave promise, as yet unsuspected, of effective penetration in the future. This was the Cape Colony, which had a further value as yet unrealized due to its position on the way to India. Except at the Cape, and where Arabs dominated the east coast, the native populations were all negro; in the actual Cape area they were mainly of the yellow Hottentot race. Negro kafirs were pressing down upon them, but until the end of the eighteenth century had hardly collided with the Dutch. The Dutch colony was planted about the middle of the seventeenth century; and the Dutch population was supplemented some five-and-thirty years later by French Huguenots driven into exile by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the combined stock producing the Boer race, distinguished by those peculiar qualities which appear to be characteristic of every stock which assimilates the Calvinistic creed—though whether because Calvinism produces the qualities or because the qualities conduce to Calvinism may be an open question.

Passing eastward again, the Portuguese Power, which in the sixteenth century dominated the Indian Ocean, virtually disappeared in the seventeenth century, when it was supplanted as concerned India mainly by the English; while the Dutch secured Ceylon and practically monopolized the Malay Archipelago or Spice Islands, and the Philippines were absorbed by Spain. Something was known vaguely of the existence of a great island or continent south of the Spice Islands; but it did not attract investigation, after Dampier traced some hundreds of miles of the Austrian coast towards the close of

the seventeenth century, until the voyages of Captain Cook, who visited New Zealand in 1769 and further explored the Australian coast in 1772. It was in consequence of Captain Cook's exploration that this unappropriated territory was pitched upon the British Government in 1788 as a suitable place to which convicted criminals might be transported, in lieu of the American plantations.

We left China when the glories of the early rulers of the Ming Dynasty had already faded under their inefficient successors. Emperors of the same House, however, continued to rule throughout the sixteenth century. In the reign of Cheng Ti and his successor the Portuguese attempted to establish trading relations with China, but the experiment was unsuccessful. When about the middle of the century the great missionary, François Xavier, sought to introduce Christianity among the Chinese, an entry to the country was refused him. Some years later, however, another missionary, Ricci, met with greater success. Having once passed the barrier, he won the respect of the authorities at Peking, where he remained for many years. China at this time was troubled by the attacks of the neighboring Empire of Japan. But the gravest danger which threatened the Empire was rising in another quarter.

On the north-east of China dwelt the broken tribes of the Manchu Tartars, in the region now known as Manchuria. About the close of the sixteenth century, there appeared among them a chief of exceptional ability who, during the first quarter of the next century, organized those tribes as a military power, which waged successful war in the northern area of the Chinese Empire. This organizer, Nurhachu, was succeeded in 1626 by his son Tien Tsung, who continued to harass Northern China. The Manchus had hitherto been held in check by the skill and resolution of one man, the Chinese general, Chung Hwan. He was executed on a false charge of treason. Equally loyal was his successor in the northern command, Wu Sankwei. But the Ming rulers had other enemies. A rebellion was raised by a leader named Li, who marched upon Peking in 1643. The last of the effective Ming Emperors thereupon committed suicide. Wu Sankwei made a league with the Manchus, and with their assistance succeeded after a time in crushing the rebels. The Manchus, however, took the opportunity of proclaiming the son of Tien Tsung Emperor, a title which had been claimed both by his father and grandfather. This Shun Chi is counted as the third Emperor of the Ching or Manchu Dynasty, which continued to reign until the twentieth century.

For some years a series of incapable members of the Ming family still continued to endeavor to assert the Ming authority, with casual assistance from a notable pirate, known in the West as Coxinga. Coxinga was finally defeated and the last of the Mings removed

about 1663, immediately after the accession of the youthful Kang Hsi, whose long reign of sixty years proved to be a remarkable era of enlightenment and progress. The stability of the Manchu Emperor's throne was actually threatened by a rebellion headed by the veteran Chinese general, Wu Sankwei, who after crushing Li's rebellion had accepted the situation and submitted himself to the Manchus. The old warrior, however, was crushed and Kang Hsi's position secured in 1678.

Kang Hsi was a patron of art and science as well as of scholarship; it is said that in his day Chinese ceramics attained their highest perfection. He showed toleration if not positive favor to Christians and Christian missionaries; a policy which was reversed under his successors, Yung Ching and Tien Lung. The latter came to the throne in 1736, and like Kang Hsi reigned for sixty years. His rule in general was marked by the same characteristics as that of his grandfather. Taken altogether the eighteenth century was one of the most prosperous periods in the whole history of China. But there was still only a minimum of intercourse between the great Eastern Empire and the Western world.

While we have been little concerned with China, her island neighbor Japan has hitherto been entirely excluded from our purview; for she was even more remote from the western civilizations, and no whit less hostile to foreign influences. Moreover, China was open to the incursions of the Central Asian peoples, who from time to time flooded westward, southward, or eastward, between whom and the Japanese was interposed the barrier of the sea. Japan grew up in isolation. Her recorded history began only in the sixth century A.D., though her Imperial dynasty had by that time already been long established and her traditional history descended from a long remote past. Out of what was originally a tribal or clan system there developed a hereditary monarchy. The monarchy entrusted its governing functions to hereditary ministers, who in their turn lost control over powerful nobles; the nobles warred against each other for supremacy. At a very early stage, the Mikado (the emperor) became a mere puppet whose name was formally attached to decrees—in fact, his position was very much like that of the kings of Scotland during the reign of a minor. He was kept in luxury and isolation, but without a shadow of the real power, which was exercised by the Shogun (officially the head of the army), except when the Shogun was a puppet of the same type as the Mikado.

Throughout the thousand years which we call the "Middle Ages" in the West, Japan was in the welter which we associate only with the earlier portion of it, the "Dark Ages"; by the sixteenth century there had emerged something not unlike the European feudal system, with a very uncertain central authority, against which or against

each other the nobles were perpetually fighting, the fighting men having become a military caste, the Samurai, gathering under the banner of an overlord. The great external event of the period was the dispersal of a great Monghol armada dispatched against Japan by Khubla Khan.

In the sixteenth century arose a great commander and ruler, Hideyoshi, who like Charles Martel did not assume the crown, though he exercised the supreme authority. In the last decade of the century, he made a great attempt to conquer the Corea from China, but on his deathbed abandoned the effort. Shortly after his death the Shogunate was seized by Iyeyashu, the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty of Shoguns who ruled Japan for some 250 years—effective rule having been made possible for his successors by the unprecedentedly able government of Hideyoshi.

It would appear that, broadly speaking, the land was from this time, if not before, in the hands of large or small holders, variously graded from Daimiyo to Hatamoto, holding from the Mikado through the Shogun, and Goshi who were a class vaguely approximating to free-holders—tenure having something of the character of military service. The peasants on the soil were in a condition akin to that of villeinage. Explicitly by the laws of Iyeyashu, government was the business of the Shogun, to whom the great nobles, the Buk, were responsible, the latter acting in effect as his deputies. The Mikado was a Being apart. The religion of Japan was shared between the original indigenous Shintoism and Buddhism. Though Christian missionaries entered and made some converts, Christianity as usual appeared to the rulers to be anarchical and subversive of the established conventions on which society rested, and therefore it was obstinately repressed. With Japan as with the East generally the Portuguese, followed by the Spaniards, were the first Europeans who sought to open trade; the Jesuit missionaries, and the friars who followed, came mainly from these countries, and Christianity was identified with otherwise objectionable foreigners. Hideyoshi set his face against them. In the days of Iyeyashu the Dutch and the few English who visited these regions were treated with favor as enemies of Spaniards and Jesuits. But Iyeyashu's grandson, Iyemitsu, who may be said to have completed his work of establishing the central government, shut out all foreigners except the Dutch, and even they were allowed nothing beyond a factory at Nagasaki with very limited trading rights. After Iyemitsu the autocracy of the Shogunate practically became government by an official class, a bureaucracy; but the bureaucracy did not change its attitude to the foreigner, and at the end of the eighteenth century Japan was still rigid in her self-isolation.

## II.—Political Aspects

We have observed certain great distinctive periods in the history of civilization. The first was that which developed the Oriental type in Western Asia and Egypt, a type which, with modifications and fluctuations, retained a permanent hold upon the East. In the second period the Hellenes evolved and the Romans developed the classical type of civilization, over an area which included the south and the west of Europe, while influencing the western part of the Oriental area. The collision between the Roman civilization and a virile barbarism brought central and northern Europe into the area of historic development, introducing the Middle Ages, when a new civilization was in the making. This collision marked the second vast revolution, as the first was marked by the collision between East and West 500 years before the Christian era. With the third great revolution the mediæval world merged into the modern. This, however, was not marked by a struggle between two types of civilization; the distinguishing fact of this third revolution was that the civilization of the West found fresh fields to work upon and was modified by new materials.

At the end of the eighteenth century we have reached the point of a fourth world revolution—in its nature a reconstruction, not imposed either by a collision with external forces or by expansion into fresh fields, but by the internal revolutions which were the outcome of the last revolution. The events which inaugurated this world revolution were the local political revolution in France and the local industrial revolution in England. Our immediate purpose here will be to suggest the manner in which the last three centuries had led up to this new revolution.

Progress may be defined as the advance of the human race from a lower to a higher state of well-being. In the political sense, the history of progress is mainly the history of the perpetually changing adjustment of the two supreme conditions of well-being, Order and Liberty. In an absolutely primitive state of society, there is no order, and the measure of the individual's liberty is his personal strength. He can do what he wants to do, and make other people do what he wants done if he is strong enough. But if he is not strong enough to resist his neighbor he must do, not what he wants himself, but what his neighbor wants done.

Order is introduced when a supreme authority is imposed upon the community, by whatever means. Order is a restriction of the liberty of persons who are prevented by the supreme authority from doing what they would have chosen to do or compelling others to do what they wish to have done. On the other hand, it gives liberty to those

whom it protects, in accordance with the will of the supreme authority, from the arbitrary compulsion of their stronger neighbor.

The measure of liberty now for the community as a whole becomes the extent to which the will of the supreme authority is in accord with the will of the community as a whole. In any community there must inevitably be elements whose will is antagonistic to that of the supreme authority which they are forced to obey; so far, therefore, that authority curtails their liberty. The struggle for liberty is always a struggle of a portion of the community, whether large or small, to force the will of the supreme authority into accord with its own. The struggle for order is the struggle of the supreme authority to impose its own will upon every portion of the community. So that political progress, the reconciliation of order and liberty, becomes the adjustment of the will of the supreme authority to the general will of the community. But inasmuch as the intelligence of the supreme authority may be greater than that of the community as a whole, it may easily be the case that the will of the supreme authority may be more wisely directed to the well-being of the community than the general will of the community itself. On the other hand, the will of the supreme authority may be directed to the well-being of a section of the community, to the injury of the community as a whole. Hence under certain conditions the supreme necessity is the strengthening of the supreme authority, while in other circumstances the supreme necessity is the modification of the authority itself.

Now, broadly speaking, the Oriental conception was that order should be imposed by the arbitrary will of a despot. The oligarchies and democracies of the Hellenes and Italians demanded that the will of the central authority should be the expression of the will of a smaller or larger section of the community—never that of the whole community, with a powerful slave-stratum for its base. But when the Roman Empire broke up, there was nothing to take the place of what had been the central authority which compelled order. No central authority established itself which commanded general obedience. Charlemagne sought to revive it by reviving the Empire. Hildebrand tried to create it by asserting the Divine functions of the Papacy. Neither the Emperor nor the Pope succeeded in commanding universal obedience.

But one of the notes of the passage from the mediæval to the modern world was the emergence of the fact that supreme central authorities had at last established themselves over large political areas within which they commanded general obedience. Within those areas, the supreme authority was concentrated in the hands of a monarch. The monarch's authority was not anywhere indisputable, but it was definitely dominant. Before the end of the seventeenth century, the monarch's authority had become absolute in the States

of Europe, save in the British Isles, in Holland, in Venice, and in Switzerland. In those four areas the central authority was not less supreme, commanded a not less unqualified obedience, than in any of the absolute monarchies; but the authority was not concentrated in the person of the monarch. There the attempt to establish absolutism had failed and the central authority was organized in a complex Constitution.

The passage from mediæval to modern was, politically speaking, the victory of Order; but it had not reconciled order with Liberty, save to a limited extent in the constitutional States. That is to say, the Constitution of those States insured that the will of the supreme authority should be in general accord with the general views of the community as a whole. Absolute monarchy, of which Louis XIV. was the grand exemplar, secured no such accord. The Constitutions, precisely so far as the mass of the people were represented in them, guaranteed that effect would be given by them to the will of the people; they did not of course guarantee that well-being would be the result. But the absolute monarchy guaranteed nothing at all except order, apart from the doubtful presumption that the ruler would desire the well-being of his people and would seek it intelligently. Given a benevolent and intelligent despot, well-being, though not liberty, ought to follow; benevolence and intelligence, however, are both necessary, and either or both might fail.

In the eighteenth century there were not a few benevolent despots who, when they were at leisure from schemes of aggression on the part of themselves or of their neighbors, honestly sought with more or less intelligence to increase the well-being of their subjects, as they understood well-being. Especially notable among them were the Emperor Joseph II. and Charles III. of Spain. Both Frederick the Great and his father, in their peculiar ways, strove for the welfare of Prussia. So in Russia did the Tsar Peter and the Tsarina Catherine. But benevolent despotism was not a success so far as the masses of the population were concerned. It did not redistribute the burden of taxation, reduce the privileges of the privileged classes except so far as they interfered with the monarch's authority, or relieve the unprivileged from what was in effect serfdom.

At the same time, the intellectual emancipation of which the Reformation had been one aspect had fostered the spirit of speculation and criticism which mediævalism had repressed. Political theory had attracted the attention of the keenest minds, from Machiavelli and Thomas More to Voltaire and the Encyclopædists, from Bacon and Hobbes to Rousseau. If, on the one side, it had developed the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, on the other it had developed those of the Rights of Man and the Social Contract.

Politically speaking the French Revolution was a demand that

government should be directed to the general welfare by the general will. It inaugurated the struggle towards democracy in a form which had never before been known in the history of mankind; a democracy which should extend equal political rights to every member of the community capable of exercising them. The new demand for political liberty meant the challenging of the existing supreme authority. For the moment it set Liberty and Order in lurid antagonism. The brief apparent victory of revolution was followed all over Europe by the long apparent victory of reaction. But a century and a quarter after the French Revolution opened, the world was plunged into a vast and terrific conflict wherein the fundamental principle of liberty was staked. From the conception of a benevolent despot was developed the conception of the Superman, with the whole future progress of mankind depending upon the destruction of that conception. The Great War has been the latest phase in the solution of the problem which was at the root of the French Revolution.

But the French Revolution was not born of any passionate desire on the part of the French people for the possession of political power as an end in itself. Demand for political power only arises among sections of the community which are conscious of grievances, and believe that by their acquisition of power they will be enabled to remedy those grievances. Such demands are habitually doomed to failure unless a substantial proportion of the classes already privileged are in sympathy with them. Peasant grievances in the Middle Ages gave rise to the French Jacquerie, the English Peasants' Revolt, and, a little later, in Luther's time, to the Peasant Revolt in Germany—but all those revolts were completely crushed. None of them brought any extension of political power to the peasants; none of them caused grievances to be removed. Owing to quite other causes, in England the grievances did disappear; but on the Continent they did not, they remained as urgent in the seventeenth century as in the fourteenth. The enormity and the injustice of the grievances suffered by one portion of the community and the privileges enjoyed by other sections were especially intensified in France, owing to the terrible economic strain imposed by endless wars. To be blind to their reality was impossible; that the cure should be sought in political revolution was inevitable, at least if revolution should be brought within reach; and it was brought within reach by the sympathetic attitude of a section of the privileged classes. Outside of France it was attainable only as a product of French domination when the Revolution in France itself was apparently triumphant. What the French Revolution did was, in the first place, to abolish a certain number of grievances for good and all, and, in the second place, to establish in the minds of the proletariat a general conviction that the way to the abolition of grievances was by the acquisition of political power.

There was no country where the inducement to revolution was so slight as in England. But, almost contemporaneously with the great upheaval in France, there was taking place in England an economic revolution productive of a new type of class antagonism which was to become characteristic of the nineteenth century, not only in England, but over Europe and America.

### *III.—Economic Aspects*

The great feature of the economic change which distinguished the modern from the mediæval world was the enormous development of commerce through the opening up of the ocean routes.

In the early Middle Ages, every community, however small, from the village upwards, sought to be self-supporting—to produce for itself all the goods of which it was in need, raising its own corn and cattle, building its own houses, dressing its own hides, making its own cloths and its own implements, for agriculture, hunting, and fighting. Each was ready to dispose of its own surplus production to its neighbors, but was willing under stress of necessity to procure from its neighbors only the goods it desired but could not provide for itself. Every one who came with goods from outside, from another district, was a "foreigner," to be viewed always with suspicion, and with active hostility if he appeared as a competitor.

Protection of home production against the outside competitor is the first and obvious commercial idea of every primitive community. No less obviously it is a check upon commerce, only such goods being at all freely interchanged as the one or the other of the parties desires to possess but is unable to produce for himself. But as the wants of every community grew more elaborate, and as local skill was concentrated upon the production of improved qualities of particular goods, there was developed the demand for the improved goods which could not be produced at home, but for which goods produced at home might be exchanged. The foreigner was an evil but he was necessary, though still to be regarded with hostility; he was admitted in increasing numbers upon favorable or unfavorable terms according as he was more or less necessary—but always upon terms. Incidentally, when he was permitted not only to bring his goods but to make them, it became possible first to acquire his art from him and then to dispense with his services, and even to compete with his products in other markets.

Mediæval commerce then was, roughly, speaking, a perpetual effort to force a way into foreign markets for goods produced at home and to resist the introduction of foreign goods into the home market. But to this had to be added the trade in goods not produced at home but purchased in one market in order that they might be sold in another

at a profit. For obvious reasons this was a form of commerce which fell chiefly into the hands of maritime cities trading with the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean or, in a less degree, with the Baltic.

It was this commerce which was so enormously expanded as a consequence of the maritime discoveries and adventures which marked the beginning of the modern era. The expansion appropriated the greater commerce to the peoples which established oceanic mercantile fleets (incidentally demanding the evolution of fighting navies). The Italian cities and the German Hansa yielded pride of place to Portugal and Spain and then to Holland, France, and England, of which the last had not permanently won a decisive primacy till the close of the seventeenth century. The prizes of commerce fell, not to producing countries, but to the trading communities which brought the products of the East and West into the markets of Europe.

This is a point which requires to be emphasized. England was a great producer of certain raw materials for foreign markets, notably wool. The Low Countries were producers of manufactured cloths, as was also England to a less extent. As producers, the wealth of both at the close of the fifteenth century was considerable. But two hundred years later they had distanced all competitors, not by superiority as producers, but by commerce. They were the world's middlemen, whose ships brought the produce of the Indies and of North America to Europe—produce which they had brought, and sold again at enormously enhanced prices. By the eighteenth century, the English had passed the Dutch and were soon leaving them also far behind. Walpole's policy made England the world's great market; and to the wealth she accumulated under him she owed her invaluable power of financing allies as well as herself in the subsequent wars. But it was only a small portion of Great Britain's superior wealth which she owed to her own superior productive capacity. So it had been with Venice and other maritime city-states in the Middle Ages, when the West was not, and the East meant the Levant. Always, what could be produced in Europe each country endeavored to produce for itself, excluding the foreign competitor not entirely but to the best of its ability.

But England, even from Plantagenet times, was free from a handicap from which almost all Europe suffered. She enjoyed free trade; not in the nineteenth-century sense of free imports and exports, but free trade within her own borders. In France, in Germany, in Italy, internal exchange was hampered and markets were shackled by provincial tolls and tariffs. It was not so with England. She deliberately throttled the trade of Ireland, hampered that of her colonies, checked that of Scotland until the Union of 1707—to her own detriment—by artificial barriers; but her own internal trade was unhampered, and therefore her production possessed apart from foreign

commerce. But still she enjoyed no supremacy as a producing country until the Industrial Revolution.

For England shared with every other country the unquestioned doctrine that, at least as concerns all the necessities of life, the State should be self-sufficing, independent of foreign supplies. War, it might be said, was the fundamental fact of which the world was conscious. Every foreign Power was a potential enemy. The business of every State was to control commerce with a view to the direct increase of its own fighting capacity and the reduction of the fighting capacity of its neighbors. Walpole was perhaps the first statesman of the front rank who acted upon the principle that, material wealth being convertible into power, the primary aim should be the acquisition of wealth without considering whether it can be immediately expressed in terms of power. And Walpole himself could not have ventured openly to discard the universally accepted doctrine that trade is injurious when it exchanges money for goods, and beneficial only when it exchanges goods for money. The East India trade was justified by the economics of the day only because, although money—not goods—went out of England to buy the products of the East, larger sums came back into England when those products were sold in European markets.

The Dutch and British then became the great trading nations—in the eyes of their neighbors “nations of shopkeepers”—just as they became recognized in war combinations as “the maritime powers.” Naval supremacy and mercantile supremacy had to go hand in hand. And the result was shown when British wealth saved Frederick II. from destruction, and the British naval supremacy, which accompanied the development of maritime commerce, wrested the overseas empire from the rivalry of France. The Seven Years’ War, begun under the most unfavorable conditions for Great Britain, was a practical demonstration of the convertibility of wealth into power, so that it prepared men’s minds unconsciously for acceptance of the doctrines propounded twenty years later by Adam Smith; which explicitly rejected the hitherto orthodox mercantile theory, and taught that commerce should be allowed to follow an unfettered course in direct and unqualified pursuit of the maximum of material wealth.

But while commerce expanded and wealth increased, the methods of production remained fundamentally unchanged. Productive energy was primarily absorbed in maintaining the food supply, of which every country was able to raise a sufficiency for itself from its own soil, and in providing the raw material for the manufacture of clothes and implements, which was carried on in England largely as a subsidiary occupation of the agriculturist. While a comparatively small proportion of the population were engaged exclusively upon trade and manufacturers, the great bulk of them were primarily agriculturists, living on the soil they cultivated, selling the superfluity, and devoting

a part of their time to spinning, weaving, or other manufacturing pursuits, either to supply the traders or to meet their own requirements. The implements of the workmen were almost exclusively the tools with which he could work under his own roof; mechanical improvements had merely made the work of his hands easier and more rapid.

So it was also with means of communication. Inland the individual travelled and goods were conveyed from place to place by methods essentially the same in the days of the Emperor Joseph as in the days of the Emperor Trajan—along roads on the backs or by the haulage of horses and other beasts of burden or draught, by natural waterways where rivers were navigable, and in some areas by artificial waterways or canals. The roads themselves were no better—for the most part they were much worse—than the Roman roads where Roman roads had penetrated. On the sea, the East India Company's ships were larger than those of the Phœnicians, and in the seventeenth century sailing entirely displaced propulsion by oars; but the Spanish galleys of the Armada were still merely Athenian triremes on a bigger scale, though they were armed with guns.

Man, in short, in the course of countless centuries, had hitherto merely improved his tools and his skill in the use of them. The motive power was still in his own muscles or those of the beasts he had trained in his service. He had learnt to use the natural currents of wind and water to turn mill-wheels for the grinding of corn and to propel his ships over the waves. But until the end of the seventeenth century he had gone no further than this in utilizing natural forces to provide motive power—unless we may so describe his discovery of explosives. Only at the end of the seventeenth century steam was, for the first time, applied as the motive power for a pump.

Though nothing more than the pump came of it for seventy years, this was, in fact, the first step in a tremendous revolution. The second step came with the application of water-power to the blast-furnace in 1760, and to the spinning-wheel in 1769; the third, when James Watt's experiments with steam, in the same decade, culminated with the setting up of the steam engine of his invention by Wilkinson of Bromley in 1776. Water-power by itself would have wrought vast changes, and was already doing so when it was ousted by steam, a process which had already set in when the States-General met in France. Steam, in its turn, was to be not ousted but supplemented by electricity, though not till the nineteenth century was well advanced. But the Industrial Revolution was well under way before the Political Revolution was launched.

The application of "power" to machinery meant, in the first instance, that a much larger and more complex machine could be driven by it than by muscle, and therefore that, given the raw material, the rate of manufacture could be increased indefinitely with the size and com-

plexity of the machines—a single man might be able to control the power which produced ten times or a hundred times as much as he could have accomplished with the best machine which he could work with his own muscles. To get value out of the machine driven by stronger power, the machine itself be made of much stronger and heavier material; iron and steel must take the place of wood. For the production of iron and steel, as well as for generating steam, coal furnaces were requisite; thus the invention of Watt's steam engine gave an enormous impulse to the coal and iron industries, causing a huge increase in the production of the raw materials coal and iron, in the manufacture of steel, and of iron and steel machinery, as well as in the manufacture of the things for which machinery was made, and of course to the subsidiary trades.

But none of these new employments could be carried on, like the old spinning and weaving, by the agriculturists in by-time under his own roof. Only the capitalist, the man who could command money, could set up the machinery—which he did as near as possible to the places where at first water and then the coal and iron were readily attainable—and the workers must live near the machines. The agriculturist was deprived of the by-employment which, for innumerable small landholders, had just provided the margin between moderate comfort and penury. He must either stay in the country as a wage laborer, or drift to the machinery, also as a wage laborer. The large farmer who had all the agriculture in his hands, the capitalist who had all the machinery in his hands, could make their own terms with the laborer, because between them they did not require all the labor that had been expended on agriculture and manufacture before the machinery was invented. Moreover, the laborer starved while he prolonged his bargaining, having no employment funds to fall back on; the capitalist did not. And thus began the new strife between Capital and Labor. For many years to come the new industrial movement was confined to England, and still in England the bulk of the population was engaged upon agriculture. But the time was at hand when the major part of it would be absorbed in manufacture, not in agriculture, dwelling no longer in the country but in the ever-growing and multiplying industrial towns.

## REVOLUTION, REACTION, AND REFORM

### CHAPTER XXXII

#### THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789-1799

##### *I.—The Fall of the Monarchy, 1789-1792*

WHEN the summons for the States-General was issued, many of those who had called for it must have felt that the whole existing system in France, political, financial, and social, was in the crucible. Ostensibly it was a somewhat risky attempt to transfer to a popular assembly the task of solving the financial problem which successive ministers had found insoluble. Some had sought solution in the only possible direction by throwing a portion of the burden of taxation upon those who had hitherto been exempt; they had been forced to resign. Others had not attempted to find a solution; they had only found themselves deeper in the mire. There was just a chance that the States-General might succeed where every one else had failed. If they failed too, the ministers would, at least so far, be exonerated from blame.

But the summoning was itself an admission that the system had failed. It was quite certain that if once a popular assembly met it would have a good deal to say about the system itself—and it was not likely to let itself be gagged. There was unlimited scope for prophesying, since no one in the least knew what was going to come of it. But the one thing quite certain was that the Third Estate—the Commons, the Unprivileged—had no intention of allowing themselves to be overridden by the two Privileged Estates—the *Noblesse* and the Clergy. That was all. The whole thing was an experiment, a leap in the dark. Unwisely enough, the adherents of the old order began by placing themselves in direct antagonism to the Third Estate, thereby challenging it to assert itself the more vigorously and in a more hostile spirit.

The States-General had not met for a hundred and seventy-five years; it had no place in the working Constitution; if it was to be called together after such an interval, it must be because there was something for it to do—which would not be the ratification of existing

privileges. Each Estate had chosen its own representatives, some three hundred of the *noblesse*, the same number of the clergy, twice the number from the commons. Of the clergy a hundred were of the higher ranks; of the remainder, the majority were in sympathy with the commons. Among the delegates of the Third Estate there was a sprinkling of the *noblesse*, one being Mirabeau; the bulk were lawyers. They had their cahiers, instructions from their constituents. There was no doubt at all that they had come to claim a real voice in the government; that there was a broad agreement as to the grievances to be remedied, though not as to the means; a general demand for equal taxation and abolition of privileges; ideas as to the functions of the States-General derived largely from what was understood of the British Parliament. But there was no appearance of hostility to the Crown, since it was commonly understood that on the question of privilege Louis was on the popular side.

But when the delegates gathered for the opening of the States-General on May 5, 1789, a fundamental question of procedure was still unsettled. Were the three Estates to sit and vote as three separate chambers, or as one? In the former case, if the two privileged chambers supported each other—as they inevitably would do—in standing by their privileges, the protests and reasonings of the Third Estate would be waste of breath. The commons might as well have stayed at home. If the estates sat at one chamber, the commons, practically unanimous on questions of principle, would have with them a few of the *noblesse* and a substantial proportion of the lower clergy; reform would have an assured majority, whatever differences there might be on matters of detail.

The necessary condition, then, of reform was the merging of the three Estates in one chamber. But that meant that, politically, class distinctions were to be abrogated as the first step. The king wanted reform, but not the disappearance of class distinctions; Necker wanted finance to take precedence of constitutional questions. When the States-General were opened, the Third Estate found themselves treated and seated as a separate body. So the fight was to be opened expressly on the question of civil and political equality—and Louis had declared himself on the side of the privileged orders. The Third Estate, led by Mirabeau, took up the challenge. They refused to discuss the questions to be submitted till the other orders joined them; but they met themselves and discussed the situation with heat. The Paris mob was swelled by crowds of peasants, driven in from the country by scarcity; the result of a bad harvest and a hard winter; agitators were at work among them; excitement was rising high. On 17th June the Third Estate declared itself to be the National Assembly, whether the other orders joined it or not. Shut out unexpectedly on the 20th from their meeting-chamber, they adjourned to a

neighboring tennis-court and took the famous "tennis-court oath" never to separate till they had won constitutional government. Three days later, on 23rd June, Louis attempted a *coup d'état*. The three Estates were summoned and ordered to assemble separately. If they refused, the king would take matters into his own hands.

The Third Estate refused to be dispersed except by force, and the king dared not use force, for the troops could not be trusted; there was no love lost between the aristocrat officers and the men. A *coup d'état* which fails is fatal. The National Assembly had defied the king with impunity. They had already been joined by a group of the *noblesse*, including the popular Lafayette and the king's cousin, Philip "l'égalité" of Orleans, and a much larger group of the clergy. At the king's own request, the *noblesse* and the clergy now joined the National Assembly (27th June). The commons had won the first battle. But the ferment among the Paris mob gave an excuse for concentrating more troops, in addition to the mistrusted Garde Française—hired German and Swiss troops this time, with no dangerous sympathies. Then it became known that Necker, who had opposed the attempted *coup d'état*, had been dismissed. Paris believed that the troops were going to be let loose on it, a procession was dispersed by the German cavalry. On 13th July, Paris was in an uproar, arming itself with pikes, seizing whatever guns and stores could be found. The Garde Française was in full mutiny. On the 14th, the mob headed for the Bastille. After some hours of fighting, the feeble garrison forced the commandant to capitulate. The mob murdered him and killed half a dozen soldiers.

Government had broken down; the mob had discovered its own power. That was not quite the meaning which was generally attached to the event at the moment; for the blood-thirst had not yet seized Paris. The Bastille was the material symbol of the old order of arbitrary rule which was assumed to rest upon irresistible force. Its fall proclaimed to a startled world that the force was by no means irresistible, and was generally hailed by enthusiastic lovers of liberty as heralding the end of arbitrary rule, not of order. The electors of Paris—the men who had chosen the deputies for the National Assembly—constituted themselves a municipal government, the Commune of Paris, enrolled all citizens in a "National Guard," a guarantee of order, and gave the command to Lafayette, adopting the Tricolor for its colors. The example was followed all over the country, especially in the east, but with ominous accompaniments; country houses were everywhere attacked and burned by the peasantry, and where National Guards were organized they were as likely as not to take part with the peasants.

From Paris the King's brothers and many more of the nobles took hasty flight, escaped from France, and made haste to clamor for for-

eign assistance. But in Paris the Assembly and the Commune held control, and their aim was reform not revolution. The monarchy was safe—was not even threatened. Louis was obliged to withdraw the troops, to show himself in Paris, and to mount the tricolor: and the populace cheered him. But he was in the hands of the National Assembly, which had taken the place of the government that had ceased to exist, though Necker was reinstated, and the king and his ministers were still the nominal executive.

The Constituent Assembly, as it was now to be called, since its business was to be the remodeling of the Constitution, was face to face with the widespread disorder in the provinces which followed the fall of the Bastille. Boldly it endeavored to meet them by attacking the cause which were at the root of the disturbances. At a single sitting on 4th August, three weeks after the Bastille riot, it wiped out at a blow the survivals of the feudal system. Serfdom and the exclusive privileges of the seigneurs were abolished; with them went immunities and privileges of municipalities, districts, institutions, church tithes, and pluralities—but without supplying organization to take the place of the old machinery. The abolitions were indeed intended to take effect only as means should be devised for providing the reasonable compensation, but the decrees were everywhere treated by the populace as immediately operative.

The Assembly proceeded to the discussion of the principles upon which the new Constitution was to be constructed, with the "Rights of Man" as the basis—a formula which had been made popular by the writings of Rousseau and the American Declaration of Independence. The Duties of Man were left to take care of themselves—that tempting inversion of the relation between Duties and Rights upon which so many voyagers in pursuit of the ideal have foundered. Here it was that the essential difference between French and what we must, for want of a better term, call Anglo-Saxon methods, presented itself. The men who carried through the Revolutions in England and America were directly concerned with getting rid of practical pressing grievances; they attained their objects without constructing ideals at all; if a theoretical basis had to be provided, it was an after-thought, an abstract argument to justify the thing that had been or was to be done. The Frenchman began by constructing an abstract ideal, logically coherent and mathematically exact, into which his materials must be co-ordinated. The adaption of the materials to the structure was the after-thought. The Anglo-Saxon started with the materials as his data and adapted his plan to them: the result was not an ideal but a working model. The Frenchman started with his ideal plan to which his materials must be adapted—and the materials were apt to prove obstinately unadaptable.

The Rights but not the Duties of Man being defined, the process of

constitution-making began. The monarchy was to be retained, with the direction of the executive; of that there was no doubt, nor that legislation and finance were to be in the hands of the Assembly. There unanimity ended. Later, the parties took their names from the position they occupied in the Hall in Paris: those names may for convenience be applied at once. The party of the Ancien Régime formed the right; they wanted a constitution in which or from which the Crown could recover a complete supremacy. The right center, looking to the British constitution, wanted a limited monarchy, with effective power in the hands of the upper classes. The left center and left—much the largest party, but one in which there were many diversities—wanted a democratic assembly, as to the extent of whose functions varying views were held. With them sat Mirabeau, with a strong man's passion for a strong government, but with no chance of attaining his ends without the confidence of the king, who mistrusted him, and of the democrats, whom his personality, not his policy, dominated. On the extreme left were the ultra-democrats, whose creed was drawn from Rousseau.

The logic of the great constitution spinner, the Abbé Siéyès, convinced the Assembly that there must be only one chamber; also that the legislative and executive functions must be entirely separated, and so thoroughly that no member of the Assembly might be a minister. But, even from the beginning, distrust of the king and his ministers started the Assembly on a course of usurping control over the executive, and the first serious contest was over the question whether the Crown should have a veto on legislation. Mirabeau championed the veto, and would have had the minister members of the Assembly. A compromise was reached by which the veto was made suspensive only, for two sessions. It might delay, and give the opportunity of reconsideration, but it could not prohibit.

Constitution-making was no answer to a hungry populace insufficiently supplied with food. The National Guard could keep the mob in check, but who was to control a mob of women? On 5th October the women of Paris swarmed down to Versailles to clamor for bread—the wildest and most incongruous procession on record. They flooded into the Assembly; they crowded round the palace. The male fringe of them broke into the palace itself: disaster was prevented only by the arrival of Lafayette with the National Guard. But the absence of control and the danger that might arise from it was more ominously in evidence than ever. As a guarantee that there should be bread in Paris, the king and the whole royal family were conveyed thither in the midst of the triumphant mob of women, and were lodged in the Tuileries. And to Paris the Assembly also transferred itself a few days later.

Legislation continued apace. There was no one now to defend the

Parliaments, in whose favor had been the single fact that they were the sole legal check upon the Crown's absolutism. Since they no longer served that purpose, they were abolished without protest. The administrative division of the country into provinces, originally corresponding to fiefs of the great feudatories, gave place to a new division into eighty-three departments of approximately equal size and all under the same common system; each split up into arrondissements, which in turn were divided into communes with their own powers of self-government. For each its own citizens formed its National Guard; each elected its own officials, its magistrates, its representatives in the National Assembly. Any one was eligible who qualified by payment of a few shillings a year in taxes. With the old provincial system went all its diversities and anomalies. Uniformity and symmetry were the order of the day.

Then came the turn of the Church. Tithes had been abolished along with the feudal privileges on 4th August. Its property was nationalized, the State undertaking the cost of maintaining the services and raising the stipends of the minor clergy. The clergy, higher and lower were to be civil functionaries, state-paid, elected by their districts; the papal authority in the matter of appointments was repudiated. But some half of the clergy—including, as always in such cases, most of those whose spiritual character was highest—rejected the conditions, resigned their positions, and became known as Non-jurors. Thus what was best in the Church was made hostile to the Revolution instead of sympathetic as hitherto. These Church lands were to be sold—but with the prevailing uncertainty there were no buyers. Then the municipalities came forward to purchase, intending to sell again at a profit. Lacking sufficient cash, they were allowed to issue interest-bearing bonds: on this basis the State made its first issue of *assignats*—paper money, promises to pay not in cash but in land—which were made legal tender—and the only tender by which the land could be required. Obviously the promises could only be redeemed while the State had land to give in exchange for them. But meanwhile the issue of paper money provided a currency which produced a false impression of sufficiency, but was disastrous when the inevitable depreciation set in.

Meanwhile the higher clergy—all of noble family—and the *noblesse* generally were more convinced than ever in their hatred of the Revolution. The spirit which had moved many of them to take active part in the surrender of privileges was quenched when they found themselves still further despoiled of spiritual rights and of property—for the peasantry acted on the belief that they had been released from all obligations, and the new authorities failed to enforce those which still remained. Many of the nobles flocked after the first *émigrés*; those who remained because they were too proud to retreat only

widened the gulf between themselves and those whom they despised as *canaille*, and who more than reciprocated their bitterness.

A different attitude on the part of the aristocrats might have served an infinitely useful purpose, by allaying the atmosphere of distrust which actually nullified all efforts to concentrate on a policy of constitutionalism. The difficulty is illustrated by the acuteness of a controversy which raged in the early months of 1790. A quarrel arose between Great Britain and Spain over their respective claims to Nootka Sound, on the West Coast of North America. War seemed imminent; Bourbon policy might demand the intervention of France on the side of Spain. Were questions of war and peace to be in the hands of the Crown as the executive power, or of the Assembly? On the principle of "separation of functions," there could be no doubt that war and peace belonged to the executive, not the legislative sphere. But the democrats of the left were afraid of the Crown; Mirabeau was denounced by them as a traitor for supporting the Crown. He carried his point, that war could only be declared by the assent of the Assembly on the initiative of the Crown. But the practical effect was to retain for the Assembly a much greater control over the executive than was consonant with the theory of the separation of powers or the exercise of strong and consistent administration. Twelve months before, France had been governed by an absolute monarchy. Mirabeau had done his share in breaking down the old system; but he had no belief in substituting at one stroke government by an absolute Assembly which manifestly had not yet learned how to apply its powers.

Incidentally, the affair had made it clear to Spain that the old "Family Compact" had become a dead letter, and that she could not count upon French support in a quarrel with Great Britain. She withdrew her claims in the particular case, and for the time sought British friendship.

A legislature representative of the national will, and a strong executive in touch with it but not at the mercy of every fluctuation of opinion, were in fact the conditions of stable rule. Mirabeau sought to achieve those conditions through control of the executive by a monarchy in harmony with popular feeling and capable of directing it. Louis lacked the personality, the strength of character to discharge such an office unaided; he must, in fact, be the mask only for a real personality—Mirabeau's own. There lay the one chance of conquering chaos. But Mirabeau, precluded from being a minister, could not achieve the necessary influence over the king, could not separate him from the entourage which emanated hostility to all popular influences, in whose eyes he was an intolerable demagogue, or which, so far as it had popular sympathies, was hostile to Mirabeau himself, because in its eyes he was unscrupulous libertine. And his

influence with the left was undermined by their suspicions that he was a traitor to the popular cause.

But if all was not going well, there were superficial appearances which could be regarded with complacency. Grievances had been abolished; there was much that was at least promising in the new organization for self-government; and the satisfaction found expression in the "Federation" meeting of July 14, 1790, when a vast concourse assembled in the Champs de Mars—king and queen, the Assembly, and representatives of all the departments participating—and with much enthusiasm took an oath of loyalty to the laws and the Constitution.

The accord, however, was superficial. The forces of disorder had not yet broken loose in Paris, though hints of their power had been given on 14th July and 6th October, and they had made themselves felt in the provinces; but if they should do so there was little enough sign that the law should be able to assert itself. Order was represented mainly by Lafayette and the National Guard. Lafayette in alliance with Mirabeau might have held a real mastery; but he rejected the alliance; his control of the Guard rested not on his strength, but on his popularity, and he had not sufficient grip of the situation to be an effective chief.

Public opinion was influenced not so much by the Assembly as by the political clubs, called after their meeting places: the Jacobins, originally identified with the left and center; the Cordeliers, an offshoot formed of extremists; the Feuillants, to which the moderates gradually seceded from the Jacobins, as the advanced element became more and more predominant, till in time Robespierre and Danton were their leaders. And at the same time Paris was flooded with pamphleteering. Of the ministers none were ready to face responsibilities; they did not count, and when Necker retired in 1790 his resignation hardly attracted notice. And all the time the agitation carried on by the *émigrés*, undenounced by the king, continually deepened the popular distrust of the monarchy. It was not till the year was ended that Mirabeau began to believe that his own success was at hand—that the king and queen were going to intrust themselves to him unequivocally at last. But it was too late. His gigantic powers broke down under the ceaseless labor that was more than gigantic, and on April 2, 1791, he died after less than a week's illness.

It had been part of Mirabeau's scheme that the king should be withdrawn from Paris, out of the reach of Parisian domination. Louis's own powerlessness was demonstrated when, in spite of the efforts of Lafayette and Bailly, the mayor of the Commune, he found himself practically a prisoner in the Tuileries; and in June he rashly attempted to carry out this fragment of Mirabeau's program. A secret flight to the frontier was arranged; but the royal party was recognized at St.

Ménéhould, arrested at Varennes, and ignominiously brought back to Paris. The moment his flight was discovered, the Assembly took upon itself the whole functions of sovereignty. Louis's flight, and a proclamation which he had left behind him, were absolute proof that he had no intention of maintaining the Constitution, but on the contrary meant to subvert it and revive the royal claim to absolute authority; they confirmed the fears of those who had sought most strictly to circumscribe the powers of the Crown; they gave an entirely new force to the arguments of the advocates of a Republic. But the Assembly still meant to save the Constitution and preserve the form of Monarchy; and the only way to do so was to suspend the authority of the Crown till the Constitution should be revised, completed, and accepted by the king in a form which should make its subversion at his hands impossible.

For the moment the moderates, the Feuillants, triumphed. They commanded the majority in the Assembly. They maintained order; they defeated attempts to introduce drastic changes of the Constitution in the course of revision: only minor modifications were admitted. As revised, it was formally accepted by Louis on 13th September. The work of the Constituent Assembly was done, and on 30th September it dissolved itself, giving place to its successor, the Legislative Assembly.

The new Assembly was very different in character. The Jacobins proved to be much stronger than the Feuillants in the country, and Jacobin views predominated among its members, whether they were the group of cultured Republicans who were to be known as the Girondins, or the "Mountain," the Jacobins proper, the followers of Robespierre, Danton, and Marat. The former moderate party was hardly represented. But this was not in itself the most serious change: no member of the old Assembly had a seat in the new one; every man in it was new to the business, in accordance with a self-denying ordinance which had been passed by way of demonstrating the disinterestedness of every one concerned. The practical effect was that all the leaders who had acquired experience were outside the Assembly altogether. But the ordinance had not precluded the ex-members from capturing the Paris Commune, the government of the city, which passed into the hands of the Jacobin leaders, who had learned their business, and under such conditions could exercise a more practical power than the Assembly itself.

Now the time had arrived when affairs in France were assuming importance in the eyes of Europe, which had hitherto neglected them. Great Britain, where the younger Pitt was firmly established in power, was an interested spectator, inclined generally to approve the efforts of her neighbors to achieve the constitutional liberties which she herself had so long enjoyed, though perturbed by their disorderli-

ness. But that, after all, was France's affair, not England's. The absolute monarchies of the Continent began to see more cause for anxiety, lest the antimonarchical poison should spread to their own people and give trouble. The Bourbons on the thrones of Spain and Naples had a natural sympathy for the Bourbon on the throne of France. The Emperor Leopold, who had succeeded his brother Joseph in 1790, was also the brother of the Queen of France. Catherine of Russia took no particular interest in France herself, but encouraged Prussia and Austria to do so—it suited her that their attention should be diverted to the West from her own projects in the East. Frederick William of Prussia had no direct connection with the French Court, but was not uninfluenced by the attack on divine right, and by the perturbation of German princes whose treaty rights in the Rhine Provinces had been ignored by the anti-feudal decrees of 4th August. And for a year and a half the *émigrés*, headed by the French king's youngest brother, the Comte d'Artois, had settled at Coblenz, had formed a court there, and had been clamoring to all the crowned heads of Europe to crush the Revolution.

The only monarch who had so far shown a disposition to listen was Gustavus of Sweden, whose own *coup d'état* had probably saved his kingdom from dismemberment. Frederick William was fairly certain to follow Leopold's lead, and Leopold judged that more harm than good would come of foreign intervention. The worst enemies of the French monarchy were really the *émigrés*. But the abortive flight to Varennes and the suspension of the royal authority in France seemed to make some action necessary. At the end of August Leopold issued from Pilnitz, in conjunction with Frederick William, a declaration that intervention for the restoration of the monarchy in France was desirable, and that they would intervene if the rest of the Powers would co-operate. As the rest of the Powers certainly would not, the Declaration of Pilnitz was really a refusal to intervene in the guise of an offer to do so; and the offer was withdrawn when the monarchy was restored by Louis' acceptance of the Constitution within three weeks. But all France read it as a *bona fide* threat of armed intervention by foreign powers in the affairs of France, at the instance of the *émigrés* and the queen.

The king still clung to the ultra-royalists, though his sole hope lay in complete and cordial reliance on the Feillants. In the Assembly, the strongest and ablest group were the Girondins. In the country, the ejected clergy—the "Non-jurors" who had refused the oath of obedience—were stirring up insurrections against the new régime. The Girondins called for strong measures, proposing decrees—which the king vetoed, claiming that as issuing from the Assembly they were not executive, but legislative acts, which the Constitution expressly permitted him to veto; but, the measures being popular, hostility to

the Crown again became acute. Abroad the *émigrés* were ostentatiously threatening, as if assured of foreign support, and Leopold's language could at least be interpreted as insolently menacing. Feuillants, as well as Girondins, were eager to offer defiance. The situation grew more tense as the winter passed. On March 1, 1792, Leopold died suddenly, and was succeeded by his son Francis II. The Assembly had imposed a Girondist ministry on the king. Troops were already on the Netherlands frontier under Lafayette and Rochambeau. Dumouriez, the Foreign Minister, addressed to Francis a Note provoking a response to which a declaration of war was the only possible reply. On 20th April Louis was brought down to the Assembly to propose a declaration of war against "the King of Bohemia and Hungary," the Imperial election not having yet taken place.

The first collision of the untrained troops with the Austrian forces in the Netherlands was an ignominious defeat. Excitement in Paris was running high. It was commonly believed that the queen was the center of "Austrian" committee; every aristocrat was a suspect. More decrees were proposed for the public security; again Louis interposed with the veto. The ministry were dismissed, or else resigned; their places were taken by Feuillants of no distinctions. The mob rose on 20th June, broke into the Tuileries, and insulted the king and queen. Lafayette hurried back from the front to try and save the situation, but was repudiated by the Court. Meanwhile Prussia had declared war as the ally of Austria. The Girondins brought up volunteers from the country to Paris, and with them the war song of revolutionary France, the "Marseillaise." On 27th July, the Duke of Brunswick, in command of the Prussian armies, issued a manifesto threatening Paris with heavy penalties if the royal family were insulted. The mob was calling for the deposition of the king, the punishment of Lafayette and the aristocrat officers who had betrayed the army.

On the night of 9th August the Jacobins arranged a skillful *coup de main*. The council of the Commune was dissolved, and a provisional Commune took its place with Danton at the head. The king rose in the morning to find a great armed force surrounding the palace. With his family he escaped to the Assembly for protection, and got it; but it was the Commune, not the Assembly, who were masters. The Swiss guard of the Tuileries, receiving no orders to submit, stood to arms and fell fighting. The king was sent to Luxembourg; and then to the Temple; the Assembly could do nothing but register decrees at the dictation of the Commune. A National Tribunal was appointed for the trial of "Enemies of the People"; arrest on suspicion was authorized.

When the news of 10th August reached the front, Lafayette would have marched his troops on Paris to restore order. Neither the

troops nor the other commanders would support him; in Paris he was declared a traitor. He attempted to escape to Holland, but fell into Austrian hands and was held a prisoner till the first peace with Austria in 1797. His command was transferred to Dumouriez. The Prussians took advantage of the chaos, and Paris heard with dismay that Longwy was in their hands on 23rd August, and Verdun on 2nd September.

For what followed, Danton was primarily responsible. If every one believed that the royalists were in league with the enemy, by whose aid they meant to restore the old régime, it was their own doing. To save the country it was necessary that they should have a terrifying lesson. On the night of 29th August there was an official house-to-house visitation in search of arms and "suspects," thousands of whom were arrested and thrown into prison. Five nights later—3rd September—an organized force of armed men entered every prison and massacred the prisoners, women as well as men. Some few were saved by Danton's intervention. In the provinces instructions for similar massacres were received from the capital and carried out. The "September Massacres" were Danton's lurid reply to foreign intervention.

Even at the moment, the tide had turned on the frontier. Dumouriez in the Argonne almost allowed himself to be enveloped, but he escaped and occupied the heights of Valmy. The Prussians opened a cannonade, the French stood firm, and the Prussians retired. There was neither a great battle nor a great victory, but Dumouriez and his troops had inflicted the first check on the enemy. They had stopped the "rot," recovered confidence in themselves and their leaders. They were once more the "invincible armies" of old. Thenceforth they were fighting to win, with an indomitable confidence of victory. The tide of invasion had reached its high-water mark, and ebbed back across the frontier.

On 21st September the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, giving place to the National Convention, which forthwith proclaimed the establishment of the Republic "One and Indivisible," and the abolition of the Monarchy.

## *II.—The Convention and the First Coalition, 1792-1795*

The self-denying ordinance, which had done so much to paralyze efficiency in the Legislative Assembly, did not apply to the Convention; the chiefs were no longer outside it. Royalists and Feuilants had vanished. Its members fell into three divisions: the Girondins, who now formed the right; the Mountain, the left; and the Plain, who were not a separate party but were attached neither to Girondins nor Mountain. All were Republican; to all appearance the Girondins

were the stronger party. But the Mountain was organized, the Girondins were not. The Girondins hesitated to shed blood, the Mountain did not. The Mountain knew their own mind, the Girondins did not. The Plain went in the wake of the strongest; the mastery within three months was passing, and within six had passed to the Mountain. So far as a definite distinction in policy between the two parties can be drawn, it lay in this, that the Girondins distrusted the mob and wished to repress mob-violence, while to the Mountain the mob and mob-violence were instruments of power.

In the establishment of the Republic there was unanimity. Then the Girondins as the champions of order denounced the September massacres, the Commune, and the Jacobin chiefs—the last, for attempting to make themselves dictators. Danton and Robespierre were skillful enough to make the charges recoil upon those who made them. The attack failed. Then the Mountain demanded that the dethroned king should be brought to justice. The Girondins found that to oppose the demand would be too dangerous; they joined with the Plain in demanding that the king should be tried by the Convention itself—not condemned without trial, as the Mountain proposed—though there was no difference in the result. The mob filled the galleries while the trial was in progress; the Girondins voted for the death-sentence, which was carried by a bare majority; an attempt to procure a reprieve failed; and on January 21, 1793, Louis XVI. was guillotined. The Girondins had lacked the moral force either to strike or to save.

The leaders of the Mountain had a direct political object in view besides their own predominance over their rivals for power. Nothing else could have such an effect as the execution of Louis in severing last strands of connection between the France of the Republic and the France of the Bourbons. Nothing else could so irresistibly impel the new France on the course of everywhere championing the cause of "the People" against monarchical and aristocratic domination. Nothing else could so thoroughly destroy all possibility of compromise with monarchism and its supporters. If it turned every government against France, it was so much the better—the Peoples would overthrow their governments. Incidentally, France the liberator would dominate the Peoples. This was already the trend of the policy which was actually being carried out; and added to this was Dumouriez's revival of the old doctrine, that France was entitled to extend her dominion to her "natural" boundaries.

The Belgians, always hostile to the Austrian rule, had welcomed the French armies as liberators, but found themselves expected to accept the decrees of the Convention. In the German Rhine Provinces, Custine swept away resistance, seized Mainz, and occupied Frankfort as champion of the Peoples against the governments. In the south the Sardinian armies were being driven out of Savoy. In England,

where Pitt's Government was still hoping to avoid war, the French envoy, Chauvelin, was almost obviously endeavoring to force on war. Treaties, it seemed, were abrogated by the fall of the Monarchy; France had joined with Great Britain in guaranteeing the Scheldt to Holland, but the Republic was now resolved to declare it open; which in fact meant that she wanted Antwerp for a naval base. In that matter Great Britain was bound in honor to stand by Holland and her own treaty obligations—apart from the interests which forbade her to allow Antwerp to pass into the hands of an aggressively hostile power which could use it to her grave detriment. The denunciations of Burke, and the September massacres, had blotted out nearly all the sympathy that had been felt in England for the Revolution in its early stages. Unless France withdrew on the Scheldt question war would be inevitable, and Pitt would have public sentiment on his side as well as political necessity. The beheading of Louis sealed with his blood France's deliberate determination on war with Great Britain, which was declared on February 1, 1793. Holland, as a matter of course in the circumstances, was included, and Spain was not long in joining in. The war against Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia was turned into the war of the First Coalition.

Viewed as a war of the Republic against the banded forces of Europe, that war was a triumphant one for the Republic. Vigor, unity, competence among the allies must have overwhelmed a France by no means at one with herself, and in such financial straits that Pitt lived in the perpetual conviction that her resources could not last out for a twelvemonth. But nowhere was there a sign of vigor, unity, or competence except on His Britannic Majesty's ships, where advancement among the officers went mainly by experience and capacity. In all the armies, promotion depended on influence and family connections; the British army had not greatly distinguished itself since Marlborough's days, and at best could play only a minor part among the armies of military states. The eyes of Prussia, and in a less degree of Austria were diverted to Poland, where Catherine meant to make full use of her opportunities. The government of Spain had gone to pieces since the death, some years earlier, of Charles III. Even in Holland the republican party might capture the government and embrace the French Republic. In England, Pitt was resolute and persistent enough, and inspired the country with his own resolution; but he was no master of strategic conceptions, and had no such master among the available ministers or generals.

With the French armies, on the other hand, there were three definite advantages: the first, purely strategic, that they held the interior lines; the second, that the troops, than whom none could be braver, had a passionate faith in their cause and in themselves; the third, that capacity was a sure road to advancement, and incapacity the

only bar to it. Those who lacked capacity or self-confidence were neither selected nor sought to be selected for high command when failure was counted as treason and led straight, as it did in the first years of the war, to the guillotine. And almost from the outset the Republic's director of military appointments was a man whose judgment of capacity was infallible. In fact Carnot, the "organizer of victories," was a fourth asset of incalculable value.

But the Government of the Republic presents a strange and terrible picture of chaos from one point of view, and consistency from another. Girondins and Mountain joined battle with Dumouriez, counted as a Girondin, suddenly declared for a restoration under Louis Philippe, the son of *égalité*, Orleans, who had just voted unconditionally for the death of Louis XVI. Dumouriez failed to win over his troops, took flight, and disappeared from public life. The Girondins, who might have made an ally of Danton, attacked him; the Mountains retorted with charges of complicity in Dumouriez's treason to the Republic. Before long the mob was clamoring for the arrest of the Girondins; on 2nd June the Convention was overawed by the National Guard—now an instrument of the Jacobins—and a huge armed mob, and the leading Girondins were arrested and sent to prison.

Girondist revolts rose in the provinces; Charlotte Corday assassinated Marat, the most murderous of the extremists; La Vendée was already in a flame on behalf of Church and Crown; but there was no organization; the Girondin partisans would not join with the royalists; French troops met with reverses—and the Mountain made itself master of a new machinery of government. A "Committee of Public Safety," which had been created in April, was reorganized in July. Danton, now the representative of moderation, was excluded from it, and its dozen members consisted solely of the terrorists, headed by Robespierre. The Convention became the servant of the Committee, which exercised all the powers of a pure despotism. There were no divided counsels in it, and its powers were used despotically, without mercy or remorse, to stamp out the "enemies of the Republic" within its borders; but also, under the direction of Carnot, to wage war with increased determination against the enemies without. By the end of the year the revolts had all been crushed with more than savage severity; and the invaders, who had again taken advantage of the civil war to seize French territory, were driven off the soil of France by Jourdan, Hoche, and Pichegru—generals who had risen from the ranks by sheer ability.

For these astonishing successes the Coalition had itself to blame, and the Republic was paying at the same time a ghastly price. During the struggle between Jacobins and Girondins, vigorous and concerted action on the part of the allies would have opened the way to Paris, but there was no concert among them. The Prussians, after

recovering Mainz, remained inactive because Frederick William was occupied with a further partition of Poland. The British, instead of co-operating with the Austrians, set about trying to capture Dunkirk for themselves; while the Austrians, calculating that the defense of the Netherlands was essential to the British and of secondary importance to themselves, were reserving their energies for the Polish complication. The three let the common opportunity slip, and Carnot did not give them another. The revolts centering at Marseilles and Bordeaux broke down; the stubborn resistance of Lyons was crushed, and Lyons was deleted; the flame of La Vendée was quenched in blood. The Toulon royalists held out longest, defended by the guns of Hood's British squadron, until the guns under the direction of Major Bonaparte dominated the town itself, and it was forced to surrender at the end of the year.

The price was despotism in the name of Liberty, despotism which had one effective answer to criticism or opposition—the guillotine. The absolute powers intrusted by the Convention to the Committee of Public Safety were exercised by the emissaries it sent to supervise and promote the activities of the local governments and of the commanders in the field. The September "Law of Suspects" sent to prison—often the ante-chamber of death—every one who could be charged with favoring aristocrats or the Monarchy, or being connected with any one who favored them, or questioned the admirable justice of the Government, by words—or even by silence. Paris set the example which the provinces followed.

There had been bloodshed enough when Danton was dominant; but he was no lover of slaughter for the sake of slaughter. He looked upon it as the necessary cure for the disease of the commonwealth. But even when the Girondins fell, he and those who thought with him were known as the Indulgents, for their half-heartedness in the application of extreme measures. The bloodthirst of Robespierre and his associates on the Committee was a species of fanaticism. The real Reign of Terror opened in September, and lasted through the ten months of what was virtually his dictatorship. The "Revolutionary Tribunal" found so much to do that it was made into two courts, both ceaselessly busy in condemning victims of the guillotine—for few indeed escaped of those who were denounced. Marie Antoinette and Madame Roland, the heroine of the Girondins, went to the scaffold, with the Du Barry in sordid contrast; Philip Égalité, Bailly, Barnave; Custine and Houchard, generals whose early successes had been cancelled by later failures; Girondins, royalists, men and women of note—or of no note, whom some one had thought it worth while to denounce. In the last two months of the Terror there were more than two thousand victims; but that was when the tide was at its height.

Marat was dead, but Hébert was his maich in bloodthirstiness, and

in profanity and obscenity. Perhaps the most revolting performance of the period was the Hébertist installation of a Goddess of Reason in the Cathedral of Notre-Dame. Robespierre would neither listen to the restraint of Danton nor go to the same repulsive lengths as Hébert; he feared that one or other might rob him of his supremacy, and Hébert had genuinely disgusted him. In March 1794, he turned on the Hébertists, in conjunction with Danton. They were sent to the guillotine. Within a fortnight Danton followed them.

In April 1794, there was no man whom Robespierre feared as a rival. He was not, like Hébert, an atheist, but the god of his faith was a being evolved from the writings of Rousseau—a Robespierre raised to a higher power, whose prophet and high priest was Maximilien Robespierre. His egoism had grown with the growth of his power; he had come at last to believe in his own divine right. He established the Supreme Being by decree of the Convention, and the festival of the Supreme Being inaugurated his reign.

But the egoist began to think, not without reason, that his supremacy was being called in question. He proposed a new law by which he intended finally to annihilate opposition—the Law of Prairial (that is, of June. The Republic had recently established a new calendar, dating the new era from its own inauguration on September 22, 1792, with new names for the months, indicating some characteristic feature. Thus the month preceding midsummer was "Meadow-month.") As the activity of the Tribunal had been doubled by dividing it in two, so now it was to be doubled again by division into four. Death was to be the only sentence. Deputies could, till this time, be brought to trial only by order of the Convention; that security was now withdrawn—they might be tried by order of the Committee. Proof of guilt was to be superfluous—it was enough for the Tribunal to be "morally satisfied." In other words, the Committee might proscribe whomsoever it would. The activity of the guillotine was redoubled. Fear and revulsion against the long surfeit of horror prevailed. A plot was secretly and swiftly hatched between members of the Committee, who were fearful that their own turn was coming, and what was left of the Dantonists. Seven weeks after the Law of Prairial was passed, the storm of Thermidor burst. The Convention decreed the arrest of Robespierre and his two principal associates, Couthon and St. Just. They were rescued by the Commune, but were snatched away again by an armed force organized by the conspirators, were summarily condemned by the Tribunal, and perished under the guillotine on July 28, 1794.

The blood lust was exhausted or finally sated by the blood of the men who had been its most terrible agents; their fate was as loudly applauded by the mob as had been that of the aristocrats. The Terror was over. Fanaticism and vanity together had carried Robespierre

to lengths which revolted the author of the September massacres. Universal execration accompanied his fall, and has deservedly clung to his name. But if fate had not set him at the head of a revolution—if it had left him in a subordinate position—he would have been remembered for his merits rather than his crimes.

The fall of Robespierre was effected by the coalition of a group inside the Committee with the moderates outside it. The group was actuated partly by fear, partly by jealousy, not at all by sentiments of moderation; they intended the supremacy to pass, from Robespierre to themselves. But the moderates, backed by public opinion, were too strong for them, and obtained the mastery of the government. The new members of the Committee were all Thermidoreans. The Commune, which had supported Robespierre, was dissolved, and its place taken by two committees, nominees of the Convention. Before the end of the year, the Jacobin Club was itself suppressed, and the Girondins who had survived the Terror were recalled to the convention.

Meanwhile the recovery of the French armies and the failures of the Coalition, which had marked the close of 1793, continued progressively during 1794. Of the three big Powers, Great Britain was the least and Prussia was the most to blame, though none could be held free from reproach. At the root of what was in fact Prussian's defection lay the Polish question, to which we must now revert.

Catherine had obliterated the "free Constitution" of Poland in 1792, at the precise moment when France, still nominally a monarchy, was declaring war upon Austria and Prussia. But she meant the supremacy over Poland, which was within her grasp, to be established upon terms which should conciliate, if not satisfy, both Prussia and Austria. To that end her diplomacy was directed during 1792. Prussia must have a share of the spoils; Austria was to have her compensation in that exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria for which Joseph had hankered but which had been prevented by Frederick II. What the populations of the Netherlands and of Bavaria might think about the change of rules was a matter of no moment, but the Bavarian dynasty was not acquiescent—especially when, at the end of the year, the armies of the Republic were in the Netherlands but not in Bavaria. The project had to be dropped, since Frederick William declined to apply compulsion to Bavaria. Russia and Prussia thereupon decided on a mutual bargain which ignored Austria; Prussian as well as Russian troops entered Poland "to suppress anarchy," and the second partition was effected by secret treaty between the two Powers in January 1793. The territory appropriated to Russia increased her share, so that

it was now larger than the whole of the surviving kingdom of Poland, while Thorn, Dantzig, and Posen were only a part of the Prussian share. Austria's demand to be compensated with a share for herself was ignored. Both Russia and Prussia calculated that the situation in the west would paralyze Austria for action in the east. For the sake of security in the east, Prussia suspended her own action in the west precisely at the moment when the contest between Jacobins and Girondins should have laid France at the mercy of united action on the part of the Coalition. For there was not only the need of guarding against Austrian intervention in Poland, however unlikely it might be that that danger would materialize; there was also the imminent probability that the Poles themselves would make a desperate struggle to break free from the foreign yoke imposed them.

So when 1794 opened, the Terror was in full swing, not only in Paris but wherever in all France insurrection against the Jacobin despotism had raised its head. But the French armies were prospering. The previous year had closed with the recovery of Toulon by the Republic; already Prussia was threatening to retire, and was only induced to remain in the war by Pitt's offer of a treaty under which, in return for a heavy subsidy, a Prussian army under Möllendorf was to be at the service of Great Britain and Holland. Prussia took the subsidy; Möllendorf and his army remained, but entirely declined to move. The Austrians advanced upon Landrecies, but Pichegru drove the British back into Belgium, and Jourdan forced the Austrians over the Mas. French troops were operating successfully in Piedmont and beyond the Pyrenees, when the Thermidor reaction brought down the government of Robespierre.

One redeeming action stands to the credit of the British; old Lord Howe's famous victory of the "glorious first of June," when he captured six French ships, sank the *Vengeur*, and crippled the remainder of the squadron he had succeeded in forcing to an engagement. There was no doubt about the British naval supremacy; but it did not, in fact, prevent the French squadron, which Howe destroyed, from effecting the purpose with which it had sailed and securing the arrival in French ports of a great convoy of corn-ships from America. The engagement itself is notable on account of the *Vengeur* legend. All France believed that the whole crew had magnificently gone to the bottom with their colors still flying, refusing surrender. As a matter of fact, they did strike colors when the ship was already sinking, though not before, when it was already too late to save some of them, though the majority were taken off. Both the myth and the facts illustrate the chivalry of naval warfare as understood and practised by civilized peoples.

Practically, the allies were ejected from Belgium; Pichegru oc-

cupied Brussels, and before long the French were in full possession of the whole left bank of the Rhine. In the depth of winter Pichegru, invading Holland, crossed the rivers on ice, and a force of French cavalry captured the Dutch fleet in the Texel, or was credited with having done so. Holland ceased to be a member of the Coalition; the Republican party there triumphed; the Stadtholder took flight to England, though still claiming to exercise his authority. By the summer of 1795 the "Batavian Republic," as Holland now called herself, was the ally of the French Republic. But the British presently secured the route to India by occupying Cape Colony, which the Stadtholder ceded to them for the period of the war, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the French.

If Prussia was idle on the western front, she was busy in Poland. In May 1794 the Poles rose, and, under Kosciusco's leadership, drove the Russians out of the areas of which they had not yet been formally robbed. Prussian troops crossed the border, but found the Poles in the stolen provinces rising on their rear, and had to withdraw. The suppression of Poland was accomplished by the Russian Suvaroff (Suwarrow), who broke up Kosciusco's forces, stormed Praja, where the inhabitants were put to the sword, and seized Warsaw. He had Poland under his heel.

Catherine could do as she pleased, and she pleased to bestow her favors upon Austria, for a consideration—namely, Austrian support of her designs against Turkey, which was of more value than anything Prussia could do for her. In January 1795, the dismemberment of Poland was completed by the agreement of Russia and Austria, in which Prussia perforce acquiesced. Russia annexed a large half of the kingdom, Austria rather more, and Prussia rather less than a quarter apiece. Prussia struggled for months before she would become a party to the treaty, for though it gave her Warsaw, she also wanted Cracow, which was allotted to Austria; it was not till October that the pact of the robbers was sealed. Poland, as a political entity, disappeared from the map of Europe.

Poland had been erased, but the wrangle over the spoils was still going on when the first Coalition was dissolved. The farce of Prussia's participation was concluded by the treaty of Basel in April 1795, when she made her own peace with France, to remain neutral throughout the struggles of the next eleven years. Spain followed suit in June, about the time of the official announcement of the death in prison of "Louis XVII.," the hapless son of Louis XVI.; whose elder uncle, the dead king's brother, an exile, assumed the title of Louis XVIII. The Batavian Republic had already fallen away, and both Spain and Holland were shortly to become the allies of the French. Great Britain, Austria, and their Italian supporters

were left to carry on the conflict, which they did with remarkable inefficiency.

Meanwhile, within France the new government crushed out the last serious resistance of the royalists in La Vendée and Brittany. But although the Reign of Terror was over, order was by no means completely restored. In May the Paris mob rose against the Convention. It was suppressed, but the central authority, no longer despotic, needed strengthening. Yet another Constitution was devised. The legislature was to consist of two councils—elders and juniors—elected by “electors” who were themselves elected by the votes of all citizens who paid direct taxes. The executive was to be in the hands of a Directory of five; the five hundred juniors were to select ten candidates out of whom the five were to be chosen by the two hundred and fifty seniors. In each body a section was to retire annually. But, by way of security, at the first election two thirds of the members were to be members of the Convention, which thus aimed at keeping control in its own hands—somewhat as the Rump was trying to do when Cromwell ejected it. The opposition was indignant; on October 5 (Vendémiaire 13), 1795, the mob rose. But the organizers of the scheme had prepared for the emergency. They entrusted the defence to an artilleryman—Napoleon Buonaparte—who dominated the streets of Paris with his guns. The rising collapsed, and the Directory was securely placed in power, retaining Carnot among its members.

### *III.—The Directory, 1795–1799*

The defection of Prussia from the Coalition in effect neutralized North Germany; the adhesion of Holland and Spain to France, not yet declared but certain to come, would place the fleets of those two Powers at the disposal of the Republic—a serious matter for Great Britain, though she was using her own navy for little else than the capture of West India Islands, which she could not effectively hold. The French arms, however, were meeting with no great success at the close of 1795, mainly because Pichegru, like Dumouriez in the past, had opened communications with the enemy on his account, and was doing as little as he could without making his disaffection palpable. On the other hand, the Directory was producing a sense of unwonted stability, and the disturbed districts of Brittany and La Vendée were quieted by the combined firmness and leniency of Hoche, who was happily entrusted with the task of restoring order.

Carnot, then, was preparing for vigorous campaigning in 1796. Pichegru, whose treason was suspected but not proved, was recalled, and his place taken by his former lieutenant, Moreau. The second of the Rhine armies remained under Jourdan. Dissatisfied with the

conduct of the army in Piedmont, Barras (who might be called the chief of the Directory). and Carnot took the bold step of placing the Italian command in the hands of Bonaparte (the Gallicized spelling of his name which he now adopted), though he was only in his twenty-seventh year—the age at which Alexander had already completed the overthrow of the Persian Empire, and Hannibal started on his march from Spain to Italy.

In Italy the French had no allies. The Papacy was hostile, because of the treatment to which Church and clergy had been subjected in France. The Bourbon king of Naples and Sicily was a declared enemy. North Italy, though there were in it neutral states, such as Venice and Tuscany, was in great part under Austrian dominion, while Piedmont was part of the kingdom of Sardinia, from which the French had just snatched Savoy. At all times North Italy, when Savoy had not chosen, or, as now, had failed, to block the way, had been a main theater of wars between France and the Hapsburg.

The young general was prompt to prove the wisdom of the Directory's choice from a military point of view. The commanders opposed to him were hidebound by the traditions of the old school, and were helpless before one who applied unexpected maxims. In war it is the unexpected that achieves victory. Bonaparte found the Austrians and Sardinians posted in three divisions, with a force somewhat larger than his own, to bar his way into Piedmont. His movements misled the Austrian commander Beaulieu. He flung himself on the center division at Montenotte; routed it, splitting the Piedmontese on the right from the Austrians on the left, so that the former fell back towards Turin and the latter towards Milan; turned in swift pursuit of the Piedmontese, and at Turin dictated terms to the king, Victor Amadus, who had to surrender his principal fortresses and disband his forces. Sardinia was out of the war. And the victor had something besides victory wherewith to mollify the Directory whose instructions he had ignored, for the indemnities he ex-acted were exceedingly welcome to the depleted Treasury.

To cover Milan, Beaulieu took post behind the Ticino. Bonaparte turned his flank, crossing the Po at Piacenza. Beaulieu fell back behind the Adda; Bonaparte by a desperate attack carried the bridge at Lodi. Beaulieu had to collect his scattered forces behind the Mircio and withdraw to the strong fortress of Mantua; Bonaparte marched on Milan, which opened its gates. Half the duchy was in his hands, as well as Piedmont. He came, of course, as a liberator, but liberty was purchased by hard cash and many priceless works of art.

Alarmed by these successes, accomplished in the course of a few weeks, the King of Naples withdrew the Neapolitan contingent which had been serving with the Austrian army. Regardless of technical neutrality, Bonaparte seized the Tuscan port of Leghorn with the

British shipping which lay there; entered papal territory and occupied Bologna; and then threatened the Austrians at Mantua by seizing Brescia, in Venetia. When the Austrians occupied Peschiera, he drove them off to the Tyrol and then laid siege to the garrison remaining in Mantua. Austria made a great effort to restore the situation and dispatched a large force through the Tyrol by two routes. Before they effect a junction, Bonaparte had routed one column. Then he cut the other in two at Castiglione. Würmser reached Mantua, but with only half the original force. Still fresh forces were poured in; Bonaparte defeated them in a hard-fought three days' battle at Arcola and then, shortly after the New Year (1797), at Rivoli and La Favorita. Every attempt to relieve Mantua had failed, and Würmser surrendered early in February, the garrison being permitted to march out with the honors of war. A fortnight later, the Pope was compelled to sign the treaty of Tolentino, by which he ceded Bologna and Ferrara and yielded the customary tribute of works of art.

The ceded territory and the conquered Milanese, together with the duchy of Modena whose duke Bonaparte ejected, were then formed into the Cisalpine Republic, under the protection—or domination—of the French Republic. This was no doubt something very far removed from political liberty, but it was at least very much more like civic liberty than anything the duchies of the Papal States had known for centuries.

When Bonaparte was sent into Italy, a double advance through Germany against Austria, under Jourdan and Moreau, was projected. Had it been successful, Bonaparte would have been called upon to make a converging or flank advance from Italy in their support when Würmser was shut up in Mantua. But it had not been successful. The Austrian forces were placed under command of the Archduke Charles, who adopted a method akin to Bonaparte's. As the two French armies were converging on the Upper Danube, he left a comparatively small body to contain Moreau, and flung himself with the main force upon Jourdan at Würzburg, defeated him completely, and drove him back over the Rhine. Moreau was isolated, and it was only by his most masterly conduct of his retreat that he succeeded in getting his troops back to Alsace. Thus the Austrians were enabled to dispatch the forces which engaged the general in Italy at Arcola and Rivoli. It was not till those battles had been won that Bonaparte's successes completely counterbalanced the failure of the campaign in Germany.

The actual addition of the Spanish and the prospective addition of the Dutch fleets to the French navy in 1796 were a cause of anxiety to the British Government so serious that before the end of the year, with a view to stronger concentration, the Mediterranean was evac-

uated. Latterly, the British commanders had been lacking in vigor and vigilance. But now the situation was restored by Admiral Jervis with the Gibraltar squadron. In February 1797 a large Spanish fleet passed the straits on its way from Cartagena to Cadiz, destined to form a junction with the French Brest fleet. Jervis with a much smaller force was able to attack and destroy the rear before the van could come to its aid. After the battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Spanish fleet was no longer regarded as a dangerous fighting force. The situation was still grave, and became graver when a mutiny broke out in April on the Channel fleet at Spithead, due to very real and serious grievances among the crews. The removal of the main grievances before the French and Dutch fleets were ready to take advantage of the situation averted disaster; though a second mutiny broke out in May, in the squadron at the Nore—born, this time, of the French revolutionary propaganda—but loyalty prevailed, the crews returned to their obedience, and the crisis passed.

The fall of Mantua and the treaty of Tolentino made Bonaparte completely master of North Italy in February; the neutral Venetian Republic lay at his mercy and could not stand in the way of the plans which he formed and carried out in perfect disregard of orders from Paris. If he waited for Moreau and Hoche, who took the place of the defeated Jourdan, they would share if they did not absorb the honors of a victorious campaign, which he intended to divide with no one. He did not wait. The Archduke Charles was sent to meet him, but he defeated the Archduke on the Tagliamento, advanced on Trieste, which he seized, and dispatched his lieutenants, Joubert and Messena, into the Tyrol and Carinthia. Pushing forward to Leoben, he was there met not by armies but by envoys. In 1796 both Britain and Austria had been prepared to negotiate with the Directory, which they recognized as a stable government, though neither would make a separate peace; but Austria could not now hold out. Bonaparte wanted to have Austria off the board, and was willing not to surrender any French claims but to compensate Austria at the expense of other helpless people. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben, just as Hoche was opening a successful advance from the Rhine, on 18th April. Austria was to surrender the Netherlands and the Milanese. But Venice, which had not been a belligerent at all, was to be shared between the contracting parties. The Ionian Islands and the fleet were to go to France; practically all the rest to Austria—the terms which were finally embodied in the definitive peace of Campo Formio. Venice was unconscious of the fate in store for her. Some time before the French had occupied Verona on the audacious pretext that Venice had broken her neutrality by giving the Austrians access to Peschiera. Now a popular *émute* there, in which some French soldiers were killed, gave Bonaparte an excuse for demanding repara-

tion, seizing Corfu, and compelling the Republic to dissolve its ancient oligarchical Constitution.

But in France matters were not going smoothly. The opposition were now the growing party of the moderates or reactionaries, many of whom were in favor or more than in favor of a monarchist restoration. Carnot himself was associated with this party, of which Pichegru, who had never been convicted of treason, was prominent member. The May elections went strongly in their favor. Barras and his associates, with the old members of the Convention, contemplated a military *coup d'état* as necessary to the preservation of their own power. They approached Hoche; but Hoche had no mind either to play Cæsar's part or to be the tool of politicians. They found an ally, however, in Bonaparte, whose proceedings the moderates had been rash enough to attack. He had no present intention of leaving Italy, but he sent Barras documentary proofs which had fallen into his hands at Venice of Pichegru's former treason, and he sent his lieutenant Augereau to take the needed military measures. On 4th September (Fructidor) the Directory arrested some of the moderate leaders, Carnot escaping; Augereau seized the Tuileries. Pichegru, Carnot, and others were banished. The Directory, its vacancies filled by two nonentities of the faction, was again firmly established by the Fructidor *coup d'état*. But it was painfully aware that it owed its position to one who in truth was not its servant but its master.

Moreau, as a friend of Pichegru, was removed from his command, which was given to Hoche. Hoche died, and Bonaparte was ill pleased when his place was taken by Augereau. Hoche and Moreau were the only soldiers who might have become dangerous rivals. Austria had hesitated to complete the peace negotiations of Leoben while the position in Paris was uncertain; but Bonaparte offered improved terms, to hasten matters. She hesitated no more, and the treaty of Campo Formio was signed on 18th October. The Adige was made the boundary between the Cisalpine Republic and the Austrian province of Venetia. The Netherlands were surrendered to France. Questions concerning France and the Empire as distinguished from Austria were to be settled by a congress at Rastadt, at which it was understood that Austria would support French interests. Bonaparte, returning to Paris, held the Directory in the hollow of his hand.

The Republic had made peace with all its active enemies except Great Britain, yet it found opportunities for aggression in the Papal States and Switzerland. In the former case, the excuse was provided by the murder of a French officer. Though the papal Government had been in no sense responsible, French troops entered Rome, the Pope was deported, and the Papal States were proclaimed the "Roman Republic." In the Swiss confederation, the cantons had varying institutions and some were subordinate to others. An appeal from these

was answered; French troops imposed the dissolution of the old system, and the grouping of the "Helvetic Republic one and indivisible" into departments, and incidentally annexed Geneva. The art galleries of Paris were enriched by spoils from Rome, and both Rome and the Helvetic Republic made substantial contributions to the Treasury. Still in the long run Switzerland profited by the abolition of privileges, and Rome—like the Cisalpine Republic—by the revival of civic liberties.

But these were merely supplementary issues. In the eyes of the Directory and of Bonaparte, the grand issue was the overthrow of the power of Great Britain. Three weeks before Campo Formio the work of Jervis at St. Vincent had been completed by Duncan in the battle of Camperdown, which disposed of the Dutch fleet. The British naval ascendancy was no longer in jeopardy, though between Toulon and the Texel the ports held more ships than the British could number. The tyrant of the seas must be destroyed; mighty preparations were set on foot after Bonaparte's return to Paris ostensibly for the invasion of England. But Bonaparte had another plan, highly approved by the Directory, so far as it was understood, since it would remove the Directory's master to a safe distance—for a time. The way to India was to be opened by seizing Egypt. The native powers, supported by France, would drive the British out of India, whence they derived the wealth wherewith to finance the armies of France's continental foes. The loss of India would bring the enemy to her knees. Egypt, ruled now for some centuries by the Mamelukes, was technically a province of Turkey, and Turkey was a neutral State; France had no sort of quarrel with either Egypt or Turkey. But that was no reason why she should not seize Egypt if it suited her to do so.

A great expedition was obviously in preparation; its objective was unknown, but was generally believed to be England. Nelson, on the watch for the sailing of the expedition from Toulon, suspected Egypt. In May (1798) he was driven away by storms which brought the French out. Receiving the intelligence, he made straight for Alexandria, so missing his prey, which had turned aside to take Malta from the Knights of St. John; and for two months he was scouring the Mediterranean in search of them. Meanwhile Bonaparte reached Alexandria, which he seized, marched across the desert, shattered the Mameluke army in the battle of the Pyramids, and returned to Cairo to organize his conquest.

But while Bonaparte was conquering Egypt, Nelson struck the blow which decisively ruined the whole design. On 1st August he found his quarry, the French battle-fleet, at anchor in Aboukir Bay. The French line lay close but not close enough to shoals on its left. As Nelson's fleet came down with the wind, his van passed between the

French van and the shoals; his center and rear came down the other side. The French rear could neither come up against the wind to the rescue nor seek safely in flight. The battle went on far through the night. In Nelson's fleet no ship was lost; of the French only two escaped. After the battle of the Nile, no enemy squadron could show itself on the Mediterranean. Bonaparte in Egypt was absolutely cut off from communication with France.

Since Bonaparte always reckoned on obtaining his supplies from the territory he was occupying, he did not realize at first that his plans had been shattered. His own intention had been to make himself master of Western Asia, and make it his base for dominating Europe from the East, as well as India. This scheme he still sought to carry out. The first step was to be the conquest of Syria; but to hold Syria he must have the port of Acre. But the fortress there successfully defied his efforts; the Turkish garrison offered an obstinate resistance, reinforced by British sailors and artillery which had been captured on its way to be used by the besiegers. In May 1799 he retired from siege. The conquest of Egypt was all that he had accomplished; his army was worn out and plague-stricken; and in the course of an exchange of prisoners on his return to Egypt after the abandonment of Acre, he received the news from France which caused him to change his plans completely. It was time for him to take France herself under his immediate control.

When Bonaparte started for Egypt, the Congress at Rastadt was in difficulties. The German princes found that in effect Prussia at Basel and Austria at Campo Formio had committed themselves to French sovereignty over the Rhine provinces. Prussia proposed to compensate the Rhenish princes by secularizing for their benefit the ecclesiastical provinces. Austria objected to the secularization. A settlement agreeable both to France and to Austria seemed remote. The establishment of the Helvetic and Roman republics was alarming, especially to the King of Naples, whose subjects were particularly likely to demand liberation from a particularly brutal despotism. Catherine of Russia had died two years before; her successor, Paul I., was a reactionary who detested the Republic, and whose wrath was excited by Bonaparte's seizure of Malta—since the Tsar regarded himself as the protector of the Knights of St. John. Paul, and Pitt in England, set themselves to revive a European coalition. Naples prematurely declared war on France and attacked the Roman Republic; but when French troops marched down from the north, the royal family fled from Naples, taking refuge on Nelson's ships. The Italian half of the "kingdom of the two Sicilies" was promptly converted into the Parthenopean Republic, and the French proceeded to occupy Tuscany and Piedmont (January 1799).

But by this time Austrian and Russian armies were moving. For

the French, Jourdan again commanded the Rhine army; Massena a force which was to sever Austria from Italy; Scherer in Italy. But Austrians were in Italy before Massena could block the way. The Archduke Charles again defeated Jourdan at Stockach; Scherer was defeated at Magnano; Massena consequently had to fall back to Zurich. Suvaroff with the Russians entered Italy and drove back Moreau, who had superseded Scherer, the moderates having now gained control of the Directory. The French general, Macdonald, advanced from Naples to join Moreau, but before the junction could be effected Suvaroff cut his force to pieces at the Trebbia. Ferdinand was replaced on his throne at Naples, and took savage vengeance on the republicans. A new French force under Joubert entered Italy, but was shattered, and its commander slain, at Novi by Suvaroff. British troops were landed in Holland and compelled the surrender of the Dutch fleet in the Texel.

This was the sum of the news which reached Bonaparte, and made Egypt of less than secondary importance in his eyes. Leaving Kleber to make what he could of a thankless task, but taking with him some trusted leaders—Murat and Marmont among them—he slipped across the Mediterranean in a small frigate, which escaped dangerous attentions, and landed at Frejes in October.

In the interval, a marked change had come over the war theaters. Moreau, a past-master of skilled retreat, drew together the fragments of the French armies in Italy and carried them across the frontier, while Suvaroff chafed at the orders which forbade pursuit. Brune in Holland got the British into a trap at Alkmaar and compelled them to capitulate a few days after the landing. Suvaroff was ordered to leave Italy and join a second Russian force under Korsakoff in Switzerland; but before he could arrive Massena had shattered Korsakoff at Zurich (September). Suvaroff, thinking himself betrayed by Austria, threw up his command and retired; the Tsar, equally disgusted, retired from the Coalition.

The military situation was, therefore, not so acute as the political. The Constitution of 1795 had proved unworkable, because it made no provision for harmony between the executive and the two chambers of the Assembly; the personnel of the Directory did not change in correspondence with the changes in the Assembly from which one-third of the members retired annually; and the Directory exercised an arbitrary power of disallowing the return of new members. As matters stood the Directory was now composed of moderates, and commanded a majority in the Council of Ancients while the Five Hundred was in opposition. The Adde Siéyès, now head of the Directory, had prepared a new Constitution, but to create it he required the co-operation of a soldier; and, on the other hand, there were possibilities of the ascendancy passing either to Jacobins or to Royalists. Siéyès did

not like Bonaparte, but when the Conqueror of Egypt was in Paris he must have Bonaparte or no one. Bonaparte saw in Siéyès a convenient stepping-stone, to be dispensed with as soon as the power was secured; he had with him the able generals who had accompanied him from Egypt. And so the final *coup d'état* was arranged.

On 9th November, Siéyès and two more Directors who were in the plot resigned, carrying the Ancients with them. The two recalcitrants were placed under guard. When Bonaparte entered the Chamber of the Five Hundred, he was refused a hearing. His brother Lucien summoned the soldiers who were without; the Five Hundred were ejected; and the Ancients, on their own responsibility, decreed the appointment of a Provisional Executive Committee of three. Lucien collected a few of the dispersed Five Hundred, who nominated as the Three Siéyès, Bonaparte, and Duclos, with the title of Consuls: by whom, with a commission representing the Five Hundred the government was to be carried on and the Constitution revised.

It was not long before the new Constitution took shape—but it was not the Constitution which Siéyès had devised, except in semblance. That scheme was, in its symmetry, of a mathematical perfection. It was designed primarily to get rid of the dangers arising from frequent elections, violent fluctuations of policy, and changes in the seat of authority; it was intended that the authority should remain permanently in the hands of its creators; but by its elaborate system of checks and balances, there was left no authority which could do anything. The structure was pyramidal. The base was the adult male population of France—5,000,000—who were to elect the next body—500,000 of their own number. These would be eligible for municipal offices and were to elect from themselves the next body—50,000—eligible for Department offices, and electors of a third body, 5,000. These alone were eligible for Government offices and for the Legislature. The Legislature was to be four bodies—the Council of State, the Tribunal, the Corps Législatif, and the Senate—the first alone to initiate legislation, the second alone to discuss and amend, the third to accept or reject, while the fourth could veto what was unconstitutional. Finally, the executive was to be vested in two Consuls, one for peace and one for war, and a third called the Grand Elector who was to be the ornamental head with no powers of his own. But all officers and the members of the Legislature were to be not elected but selected by the Consuls and the Senate; this last body partly by the Consuls and partly by co-operation; and all were to hold office for ten years. Moreover, the Senate could paralyze the executive by “absorbing” any or all of the Consuls into its own ranks; but it could only paralyze—it could not itself act.

The power of paralysis was the most admirable feature of the scheme in the view of its creator; its disappearance was essential in

that of the Man of Destiny. The apex of the pyramid must be an autocrat, not an ornamental Grand Elector, not an authority which could be deposed by the fiat of the Senate, not even a dual consular authority. For the Grand Elector Bonaparte demanded the substitution of a First Consul with the whole executive authority in his own hands. The other two Consuls might be advisors but nothing more. He must also have the initiative of legislation, though the Council of State might draft the laws. And the Senate must not have the right, however veiled, of deposing him. It was needless to add that General Bonaparte, now just thirty, must be the First Consul.

The Constituent Commission was a body packed with Bonaparte's adherents. The new Constitution was ratified by an overwhelming plebiscite. With the whole executive authority, unlimited powers of appointment, the initiative of legislation, and command of the army which idolized him, the First Consul was as absolute as Augustus when he assumed the principate. He had not overthrown the Republic by force of arms, like Julius; it needed no fighting to secure the Dictatorship. The Revolution had got rid of seigniorial and aristocratic privileges before the monarchy was formally abolished. Since then it had tried the despotism first of the Committee of Public Safety, and then of the Directory. Now it fell back on the despotism of an invincible General.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

NAPOLÉON, 1799-1815

### *I.—The Consulate, 1799-1804*

THE *coup d'état* of Brumaire established the supremacy of Bonaparte in what was still nominally the French Republic. It provided a government at once irresistibly powerful, under the absolute control of a single determining will, and inspiring complete confidence in its ability and stability; conditions of progress which had in no sense been enjoyed by France for at least half a century. There was equality in the sense that the law recognized no class distinctions; but little enough liberty in the sense of popular control over the Government, which imposed on the people what it thought good for the people, but regarded domination over others as the supreme end of statecraft.

The first necessity was to deal with the immediate military situation. The British in Holland were off the board; but in Italy, though the Russians had gone, the French had lost hold except in Genoa (converted into the Ligurian Republic). A France not bent on aggression could, in the circumstances, have come to honorable terms with Great Britain and Austria. Peace would not have been unwelcome to any of the three; but the Consul did not want peace until his personal position was confirmed by fresh laurels. But it was politic to throw the blame for continuing the war upon the enemy. So, disregarding the normal methods of diplomacy, he professed his Government's desire for peace in letters addressed personally to King George and the Emperor Francis. Austria declined to treat apart from her ally; the British ministers distrusted him, and their response was cold. Bonaparte—he did not yet adopt the style of "Napoleon"—gave to the published correspondence a color which revived the French war spirit, and both sides made preparation for the campaign of 1800.

Bonaparte planned a campaign from the Rhine under Moreau, and an Italian campaign under his own conduct. The glories were to be his own, so Moreau's orders were that he was not to proceed beyond Ulm. If he went on to Vienna—as Bonaparte would have done in his place, in spite of orders—anything done in Italy would be thrown into

the shade. Masséna was to hold his own in Italy as best he could with very inferior forces till Bonaparte had time to strike. He had conceived the great scheme of leading his army into Italy, not by the usual western route, but over the St. Bernard.

The Austrian commander in Italy, Mélas, drove Masséna into Genoa and laid siege to it. Moreau, inflicting a series of defeats on the army facing him, drove it back into Ulm, when inactivity was imposed on him by his instructions. Masséna held out grimly through May, while Bonaparte carried his army over the Alps in rear of Mélas. He was not concerned to save Masséna if he could get Mélas in his grip. He did not save, or attempt to save, Masséna, who was starved into surrender on 4th June; and he all but missed his grip on Mélas, for, ten days after Masséna's surrender, Mélas attacked him unexpectedly at Marengo when he detached a large force under Desaix for Novi. By sheer good fortune, Desaix discovered that fighting was toward, turned back, and fell upon the Austrian flank at the moment when the battle appeared to have been lost. The unexpected charge of Kellermann's Horse created a panic, turned the fortune of the day, and changed Marengo from a defeat into a decisive victory. Bonaparte blazed in a new glory in the eyes of all France. Moreau had been released from his fetters, and, a few days after Marengo, had driven the Austrians back into Bohemia and entered Munich, when hostilities were suspended. Mélas, despairing—perhaps prematurely—after Marengo, concluded at Alessandria an armistice, under which the Austrians withdrew behind the Mincio. Napoleon returned to Paris, leaving the army in Italy in the capable hands of Masséna, but for whose stubborn defence of Genoa his own operations must have miscarried.

Austria did not yet reckon herself beaten. Marengo had been fought, when she again pledged herself to her ally—in consideration of a substantial subsidy—not to make a separate peace. But the armistice remained in force, and negotiations continued to be carried on at Lunéville. Meanwhile, the First Consul came to an understanding with the Tsar, and with the despicable Minister, Godoy, who ruled Spain. Paul looked upon him with changed eyes; he was no longer an upstart soldier in the service of democratic revolutionists, but an incarnation of autocracy, the slayer of the dragon of Jacobinism. Paul's new-born admiration developed rapidly when Napoleon promised to reinstate the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, and to hand over Malta to its protector, the Russian Tsar. The promise was cheap, since, when it was given, the surrender of Malta to a British squadron was impending, and was made a few days later without any possibility of a relief. Spain, to which France had transferred Louisiana in 1763, now restored the colony to France; in return for which the

Bourbon Duke of Parma, the Spanish king's son-in-law, was presently to have Tuscany handed to him, with the title of King of Etruria.

Austria, playing for time, was again forced to refuse a separate treaty towards the end of the year. Hostilities were renewed; Moreau won a brilliant and crushing victory at Hohenlinden in December; another force under Macdonald was operating. The armistice was renewed, and the Peace of Lunéville between France and Austria was signed in February 1801. Practically it restored the arrangements of Campo-Formio, except for the transfer of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany—a Hapsburg appanage—to the Duke of Parma. There still remained for settlement the compensations to the dispossessed Grand Duke and the Rhineland princes, which would require the approval of France. The Bourbons at Naples were admitted to grace by the Tsar's request, on condition of closing their ports to the British, who had become special objects of Paul's resentment since they refused to execute Napoleon's promise and to hand over Malta—which they had taken from the French—to the Knights of St. John, of whom Paul was now Grand Master, and from whom the French had taken it.

Great Britain was again isolated, at a critical moment. For Pitt, who had pledged himself to Catholic Emancipation in Ireland, felt himself bound in honor to resign in the face of King George's flat refusal of his assent to that measure; and the capacity of his successors in office, the Addington Ministry, was exceedingly doubtful. Moreover, the Tsar had seized the occasion to revive the Armed Neutrality of 1780—the combination of the neutral Baltic states, including a somewhat reluctant Prussia; to demand the withdrawal of the claims always asserted by the British of the right of belligerents to seize enemy goods on neutral ships; to interpret "contraband of war," which might always be seized in a much more inclusive sense than neutrals approved; to seize all vessels destined for a port nominally under blockade, whether or no the blockade were effective; and to search neutral ships for enemy goods and contraband, even when under convoy of men-of-war. Virtually, that meant that unless Great Britain yielded to the demand the fleets of those powers would act against her.

But at this moment (March 1801) the British carried out their one really successful military operation in the course of this war. An expedition was landed in the teeth of French forces in Egypt at Aboukir Bay; the French were routed at the Battle of Alexandria; Cairo was presently surrendered; and in August the French forces were compelled to capitulate by the arrival of British reinforcements from India. Egypt was lost to the French.

More immediately important was the action of the Navy. Treating the formation of the Armed Neutrality as a declaration of war, Nelson, on 2nd April, attacked Copenhagen, and by the Battle of the

Baltic forced the Danes to leave the League and surrender their fleet. The Russian fleet's turn would have come next; but, simultaneously, the news arrived of a palace revolution, in which Paul had been assassinated and his son, Alexander I., made Tsar in place. The young Tsar was a visionary—a complete contrast to his half-mad and wholly reactionary father—whose admiration for the First Consul and his methods he shared in less degree; and he was prompt to seek a reconciliation with Great Britain, who consented to some modification of her naval claims. Sweden and Prussia, which had only been drawn in the wake of Russia, made haste to accede to the agreement, and the danger of the Armed Neutrality passed.

The definite opening of negotiations between France and Great Britain only awaited completion of the decision in Egypt, which was reached in August. Peace preliminaries were signed in October, and the Nine Years War closed with the peace of Amiens in March 1802.

In the interval between the assassination of Paul I. and the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte, disregarding his promises to the dead Tsar, practically annexed Piedmont to France, instead of restoring it to the King of Sardinia. Also, he imposed on the Cisalpine Republic a new constitution, modelled on the new French Constitution, "accepting" the presidency thereof for himself, and renaming the state the "Italian Republic." The Ligurian Republic was treated in similar fashion, Bonaparte becoming its *Doge*. On the other hand, since it was his policy to gain for himself in France the support of the Church, he reinstated the new Pope, Pius VII., in the Papal States, except Bologna and Ferrara. French diplomacy evaded British protests against these proceedings in the treaty. By its terms, Great Britain restored to Holland the Cape (which he had occupied for the period of the war by arrangement with the Stadtholder), but kept Ceylon, which she had conquered. Of the West India Islands taken from France, she retained only Trinidad. Also, she undertook to evacuate Egypt, and, subject to certain conditions, to restore Malta, under guarantee of its neutrality from all the Powers, to the Knights of St. John. The Stadtholder, ejected from the Batavian Republic, was to have compensation—from some one not specified. That, like the compensation of German princes, was to be dealt with by the Conference of Regensburg (Ratisbon), which opened in August. It was evident that if the supposed undertakings on which the Covenant was based failed to be realized, the parties to it would repudiate their obligations; and this was, in fact, what occurred. Each claimed that breaches of faith on the other side cancelled obligations on its own, and the peace of Amiens was merely, in the end, a suspension of hostilities for fourteen months. But for fourteen months, from March 1802, Great Britain and France were at peace—for the first time since the beginning of 1793.

When the Consulate was set up, it was proclaimed with some effrontery: "The Revolution is fixed to the principles which commenced it. It is finished." The Revolution had in fact issued in a new monarchy no whit less despotic than that of Louis XIV. This was not what any of the revolutionary leaders had aimed at—Mirabeau, Lafayette, Girondists, Jacobins. Cæsarian would have been no less flatly disowned by most of the encyclopædists, the thinkers who had given the first impulse to the men of action. Cromwell's Protectorate, as the offspring of Eliot's eloquence and Pym's statecraft, was not more paradoxical. In both cases, as in ancient Rome, the breaking up of an old order for the time made impossible the existence of any stable government but that of a Dictator, with the army under his own unquestioned control.

And yet there was more than an element of truth in the pronouncement—if the principles of the Revolution meant the real motive forces of it. The old system was overthrown, not because there was any popular detestation of one type of government or enthusiasm for another type, but because under it the actual government had become intolerably oppressive and miserably incapable, and rested upon class privileges which were flagrantly unjust and indefensible. The privileges had gone; if they had gone, never to return, the People had got what it wanted primarily. But it also wanted security, which could be given only by a government which, for whatever reason, commanded the People's confidence. The Girondists imagined that for that end the one thing needful was the abolition of the monarchy; the Jacobins claimed to be the exclusive interpreters of the popular will, whose supremacy was necessary to security; the Directory conceived that their personal ascendancy was the first essential. None of them had the confidence of the people; but Bonaparte, having not only their confidence but that of the army also, could maintain that his rule was to a far greater extent the expression of the will of the people than that of any of his predecessors. The Revolution had done away with privileges; Bonaparte gave promise of security. Those were the two essential *desiderata*. Given those two facts, with actual material prosperity added, the people care nothing about the rest of the "principles of the Revolution," though they had served their turn as sentimental catchwords.

Stability, then, came with the Constitution of 1799; security did not, in Bonaparte's view, arrive till he was proclaimed Emperor; not till then did he consider that his own position was absolutely established. Strong as that position was, he let pass no means by which he could make it stronger. Opposition was all but silenced because the Tribunal was the only body in the State which could criticize. He chose and dismissed Ministers at his own will, and he had the gift of shrewd selection—men for the most part of first-rate capacity, but

not of the temper which would make them dangerous to his own supremacy. Carnot was recalled to the War Ministry, but was dismissed when he failed to recognize sufficiently that he was the First Consul's Minister.

Two elements consistently hostile to previous governments were to be conciliated—the Royalists and the Church. The Royalists were no longer to be depressed; they were given to understand that if they chose to be loyal to the *de facto* government, their antagonism to past governments would be ignored. His restoration of Pius VII. to Rome was earnest of the friendly relations which Bonaparte wished to establish with the Church, and which took shape and were confirmed by the Concordat of 1802. Perfectly careless of religions himself, he believed with Voltaire and Robespierre that if there were not a God it would be necessary to invent Him. Religion was an instrument to be made use of by a wise ruler, and aid to law and order. In the name of law and order the "non-juring" clergy were recalled; and the clergy who had been irregularly appointed and installed were required to receive their orders canonically and to submit to ecclesiastical discipline, though always as the dutiful subjects of the temporal authority. The bishops were all nominated by the First Consul, though canonically invested, and the Church lands were not restored. The Roman Catholic faith was officially announced to be that of the majority of Frenchmen, including the heads of the State. The cause of the Church could no longer be identified with that of the Bourbon monarchy.

Irreconcilables of course remained in both the extreme wings; it is probable that if Desaix had not struck in at Marengo the Consulate would have been in danger. An attempt on Bonaparte's life gave an opportunity for deporting such of the Jacobins as were dangerous in his eyes, or as had incurred his vindictive resentment. Not long afterwards, in 1802, his position was confirmed by a fresh plebiscite proposed by the Council of State, conferring the Consulship on him for life, along with the power of nominating his successor. Though he made no formal appointment, popular expectation pointed to his stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais whose mother, Josephine, Bonaparte had married immediately before his first Italian campaign. All hereditary titles had been abolished at an early stage of the Revolution; but the doctrine of social equality was set aside by the institution of the Legion of Honor—nominally a recognition of the individual's public services, actually a social distinction.

Bonaparte further tightened his grip by the centralization of control. The local administrations were in the hands of his own nominees; special courts of justice ensured that all questions in which he was interested should be decided as he desired. Taxation, as organized by his finance Minister, Gaudin, was heavy but equally distributed,

mainly in the form of a severe income-tax. At the same time, the arrangements for supervision prevented the old extravagant leakage in the collection of revenue; and a policy of expenditure on public works was pursued which appealed to the imagination by its magnificence, but was at the same time economically sound in its development of roads and waterways, encouraging production by facilitating distribution.

Most remarkable, however, among the achievements of Bonaparte's internal policy was his appropriation of two great schemes which had first been set on foot by the Convention—a national system of education, and a national codification of the laws. In this at least the Convention deserved well, not only of France but of the world at large, that it recognized education as a thing essential to the national welfare; and that while it was mainly engaged itself in politics upon which the world does not look with unqualified admiration, its committees were doing most admirable work in these two fields. But that work did not become practically effective till it was taken up by the Consul, who knew its practical value. The end for education which he had in view was not that of Condorcet, the enlightened president of the original committee—it was subservient to the direct development of the military power of France and the production of the most effective kind of soldier; but that, according to the man who knew, meant the soldier who had been not merely drilled but taught, even if the primary end of the teaching was efficient fighting. France was covered with schools which developed the intelligence of her future soldiers, and trained the more intelligent of her citizens to be soldiers. In like manner, Bonaparte carried to completion the other committee which had been collating, comparing, and adjusting the infinite variations of law and legal custom which prevailed in different parts of France. A fresh committee took up the task, and in 1804 was issued the great civil code which, with some later modification, received the name of the Code Napoléon. That code, penetrating all the states which were dependencies of Napoleon's empire, ultimately to an immense extent modified the law of nearly all Europe. It would be unjust to regard the First Consul as the "only begetter" either of the code or of the educational system. The conception belonged to other men who labored, and he entered into their labors. But the impress of his personality is vivid in both.

The Diet of Regensburg spent six months over its task of arranging compensations. The multitudinous states, large and small, of which the Empire was the aggregate, included a number of ecclesiastical provinces—bishoprics—and of Free Cities, at whose expense in the main the compensation of the princes was arranged. Theoretically, the object was to make good to them their loss of territory consequent upon the appropriation of the whole left bank of the Rhine to

France, who was thus in possession of her natural boundaries. There were also those other dispossessed rulers, William of Orange and the dukes of Modena and Tuscany. Of course the decisive word lay with Napoleon, as the First Consul habitually called himself after the decree which conferred the consulate on him for life; and his directions were given, first so as to secure the utmost advantage for France, and secondly, in accordance with the predilections of Russia, which had no official voice in the business. That business in fact was the rearrangement of the map of Germany, and, in effect, of the composition and political balance of the chambers of the Imperial Diet. Territories were transferred from one ruler to another with the usual light-heartedness. The claims of the bigger states were respectfully considered; those of the smaller received less attention; and those in whose protection no one was interested but themselves were swallowed. The Hapsburgs got the bishopric of Trent and Salzburg; William of Orange that of Fulda; Prussia, having lost Geulers and half Cleves, received twice as much in ecclesiastical territories. Bavaria got similar compensation for the Rhenish Palatinate and Juliers. Baden, Würtemberg and Hesse Cassel made similar gains at the expense of their neighbors, and to the advantage of their own consideration. The princes of Bavaria and Würtemberg profited by their family connection with Russia. These were the main territorial changes; and from the French point of view all had the same tendency—to make Western Germany dependent on France, as the confederation of the Rhine was soon to show; though it might also be said that they increased the probability of collisions between France on one side and Prussia or Austria on the other. Prussia and Bavaria were the principal gainers; Austria suffered because the secularized ecclesiastical provinces had been reckoned on as her supporters in the past, whereas they were now absorbed by the states least amenable to Hapsburg influence. Incidentally the rearrangement of the chambers in the Diet gave Protestant instead of Catholic states predominance in the College of Electors and in the chamber of princes, strengthening the influence of Prussia and diminishing that of Austria.

It would seem that Napoleon at this time had some disposition to the development of French empire in the Western hemisphere. Thus he had just acquired Louisiana from Spain as the price of conferring the "kingdom of Etruria" upon the (Spanish) Bourbon Duke of Parma. From the British at the Peace of Amiens he had secured the restoration of Guadaloupe and Martinique. San Domingo had been ceded by Spain in 1795; but the Convention and the Directory had not made good their sovereignty in the island where the negro and mulatto population, under the leadership of the negro Toussaint Louverture, had established independence. In 1802 Napoleon set about crushing Toussaint, and duly accomplished his object. But

it may here be noted that in 1804 he sold Louisiana to the United States; and that the futility of attempting to hold West India when Great Britain was mistress of the seas was demonstrated by the success of a fresh revolt of San Domingo in the same year—due to the cutting off of French reinforcements by the British fleet.

The peace of Amiens gave Napoleon leisure to proceed with the systematic subordination of minor quasi-independent states to France. Thus in September 1802 Piedmont was definitely annexed—it had not before been formally made a part of France. Quarrels in the Helvetic Republic gave the opportunity for intervening as a “mediator” who could so arrange matters that its independence had no more reality than those of the Batavian and Italian republics. French troops remained in these latter. The King of Etruria renounced his duchy of Parma, which went to France. Against all these the British Government protested; but Napoleon replied that they were precluded from interference by the Amiens treaty, a view which they repudiated. The British, on the other hand, were arranging for the promised evacuation of Egypt and the Cape, but with no haste; the troops were not actually withdrawn till March 1803, and then they were still in full possession of Malta, which they had no intention of quitting while the designs of France remained in doubt. Suspensions had just been seriously aggravated by the publication of Colonel Sebastian’s official report of a “commercial” mission to inquire into the resources of Egypt, which was mainly taken up with military propositions obviously directed to schemes of aggression.

The fact was that the British diplomatists matched against Napoleon’s Foreign Minister, Talleyrand, were amateurs matched against the most consummate expert in Europe. Without technical breach of the written terms, France could ride roughshod over the “understandings” upon which the British had based their acceptance of the treaty. When it became obvious that Napoleon was turning the breathing-space to account for purposes of aggression while Great Britain was virtually surrendering into his hands her securities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, it was time to say that these were the methods of chicanery, not of honest dealing, though Napoleon might clamor against Britain’s perfidy. He for his part was apparently bent on treating her as though she had no concern with his doings in Europe, while he magnified such imaginary grievances as the attacks made upon him in England by a hostile press, which no Government in England could have attempted to muzzle. Finally the Addington Ministry presented, in April 1803, a series of demands, among which was the continued occupation of Malta by the British for ten years. The demands were rejected, the ambassadors were recalled, and Napoleon threw into prison some thousand of British travellers who had not realized the position in time to make their escape.

War was declared in May 1803; but as matters stood, neither of the combatants could strike an effective blow at the other. France could close her own ports and those of her dependencies to British Commerce; but she could not close British ports. On the other hand, the British fleet could close French ports, at least to all sea-borne goods. There was no British army which could dream of invading France, and no French army of invasion could cross the sea while the British Navy remained on guard. On that head, the British Navy had no qualms; but Napoleon on one side, and the British public on the other, were not equally confident. For two years the shadow of invasion lay upon England like a nightmare. Until 1805 both sides were waiting, watching, preparing; but neither gave the other an opening for the grip. It was, however, characteristic of Napoleon that, although France was not at war Hanover—the neutrality of the north German states having been guaranteed by the treaty of Basle with Prussia in 1795—yet because the Elector was also King of England, French troops took possession—without protest from Frederick William III.

The renewal of war appeared to the ultra royalists to provide them with an opportunity. A plot against Napoleon was set on foot by the Comte d'Artois, the evil genius of the *émigrés*; Georges Cadoudal, the chief of the *Chouans*, as the unreconciled Bretons were called; and Pichegru. They approached Moreau; but, though he kept silence, he refused his support. The plot, however, was betrayed, and carefully watched as it developed till the moment came to strike. The leaders (except Artois who was in exile) were arrested. Pichegru was thrown into prison, where shortly afterwards he was found dead—probably by his own hand; Cadoudal and others were executed; Moreau was banished.

But this was not enough for Napoleon. The Duc d'Enghien, representative of the younger (Condé) branch of the Bourbons, was residing on German soil, near Strassburg. French troops raided into the neutral territory, kidnapped the duke, and brought him over the French border, where he was promptly sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot, though there was no evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy. It sufficed to proclaim that he had paid the just penalty for treason. Europe might shudder at the double crime—mock trial and murder following on violation of neutrality—but France acquiesced. Napoleon had been saved from Bourbon assassins. The establishment of the new dynasty must be the final answer to Bourbon aspirations. In the Tribunal only Carnot protested against the decree, ratified by an almost unanimous plebiscite, which transformed the First Consul of the French Republic into Napoleon I., Emperor of the French, with succession to his issue, or, failing heirs of his body, to his brothers.

*II.—The Emperor, 1804-1807*

At the moment when Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor, Pitt resumed control in England. The murder of Enghien roused the indignation of Tsar Alexander, who ordered his court into mourning. The occupation of neutral Hanover was another offense in his eyes, and he began to see that French, not Russian, interests were at the bottom of the arrangements of Regensburg. In September he broke off relations with France, and from that time Pitt and the Tsar were uniting in efforts to form a new coalition. Napoleon's assumption of the imperial title was in itself a sort of threat to the Hapsburg representative of the Holy Roman Emperors, who had in theory been in some sort the head of Western Christendom for a thousand years. Napoleon was manifestly claiming that he, not Francis of Austria, was the successor of Charlemagne and of the Cæsars. Francis, conscious that he might soon be robbed of his title altogether, took the precautionary step of proclaiming himself Hereditary Emperor of Austria. It was not long before he was compelled to resign formally the traditional Imperial title. But he was not yet prepared to resume hostilities.

Meanwhile, however, Napoleon's proceedings were more than menacing to the rest of Europe. The Batavian Republic was reorganized, to prepare for its impending transformation into a vassal monarchy. The Italian Republic, anticipating events, proposed to make itself a kingdom, and offered its crown, the iron crown of Lombardy, to Napoleon, who accepted it and became "King of Italy," nominating Eugène Beauharnais as his viceroy. The Ligurian Republic was annexed to France. It was evident that an excuse would before long be discovered for ejecting the Bourbons from Naples. Even the Papacy had its warning that the Concordat did not touch the complete subordination of the spiritual to the secular power; at the new emperor's coronation in December, the Pope took part in the ceremony, but it was Napoleon's own hands, not the Pope's, that set the crown on Napoleon's head.

It was not till April 1805 that Russia and Great Britain adjusted their views sufficiently to enter upon a formal alliance. Gustavus IV. of Sweden joined them at once, though neither of them shared his special enthusiasm for a legitimist Bourbon restoration in France. Austria decided that it was less dangerous to fight than to abstain from fighting. Frederick William, though the occupation of Hanover had been a shock, still clung to the policy of neutrality, encouraged by hints that Prussia, friendly to France, might find her reward in Hanover. Naples gave secret adhesion, but its value in an alliance was the smallest. On the other side Western Germany, as well as

Bavaria, could be counted on by France; and Spain took its orders from Napoleon, and its fleet was at his service. The avowed demands of the coalition were the restoration of Piedmont to Sardinia; the withdrawal of French troops from Italy, Holland and North Germany; and the freedom of Holland and Switzerland from French dictation.

Napoleon had little fear of the coalition; their capacity for effective co-operation was extremely limited, as experience had proved. And he would seem to have expected to remove England from the board before the rest were ready. How far he ever believed at heart in the project of invading England is a matter of doubt—after it became obviously impossible, he declared that the plan had never been serious. But that in the first months of 1805 he did mean it seriously can hardly be questioned. It never appeared chimerical to any except the naval experts, British and French; and Napoleon was not a naval expert himself, nor did he take much account of the opinions of his own admirals. A vast army had long been concentrated at Boulogne, in constant training for rapid embarkation. Under 'favorable weather conditions,' and uninterrupted by the British fleet, it could be transferred to the shores of England in twenty-four hours, and would there find nothing to oppose it but a small army of regulars and a number—no doubt considerable—of civilian volunteers; a force perhaps more formidable than it appeared to Napoleon, but one which in the opinion of professional soldiers could offer little effective resistance. The unsolved and insoluble problem was that of securing the uninterrupted passage of the Channel. Whether Napoleon expected his own solution of the problem to be successful is uncertain; but quite clearly he thought it worth trying, and was furiously angry with everyone concerned in its failure.

The essential condition was to get together a French naval force which would be strong enough to clear the channel for a few hours. But the French fleet was distributed in various ports—Toulon, Rochefort, Brest, and in the Channel—each of which was watched or actually blockaded by a British squadron, which would make exit from it supremely difficult. The plan then was that the Toulon fleet should seize an opportunity to slip out, evading its guardian Nelson as in 1798; run for the West Indies, drawing him in pursuit; double back leaving him behind; raise the blockade of Brest, and in conjunction with the Brest fleet proceed to clear the Channel.

The first part of the program was duly carried out. Villeneuve escaped from Toulon at the end of March 1805, passed the strait of Gibraltar, and ran for the West Indies; Nelson was a month before he got with certainty on to the right scent and started in pursuit; he did not overtake Villeneuve, but was able to dispatch to England a warning that the French fleet was reported to be on its way back to

Europe. A small squadron was sent, under Calder, to watch for Villeneuve, whose sole—and very meager—chance had been to surprise the blockading squadron at Brest. A collision with Calder showed that the chance no longer existed, and he ran for Vigo instead of Brest, and then to Cadiz (August). The whole scheme had gone completely to pieces.

At this moment the coalition, of which hitherto (since April) the only effective members had been Great Britain and Russia, was completely by the accession of Austria; Bavaria joined France. Neither the Austrian nor the Russian armies were as yet ready to carry out a concerted plan of campaign; but Austria intent on her own immediate interests, invaded Bavaria in September, pushed up the Danube, occupied Ulm, on the Würtemberg border, and began to mass forces there. Napoleon had his vast army of invasion concentrated at Boulogne. The chance of using it for its original purpose had vanished; the instant that was realized, he made his preparations for using it elsewhere. Suddenly he flung it southeast; on October 20 the unsuspecting Austrian army at Ulm found itself enveloped, and more than 30,000 men, having no alternative but annihilation, were obliged to capitulate. The Russians were still far away; the Austrian legions gathering in the rear were not strong enough to put up a fight by themselves, and fell back. The way to Vienna was open, and the French entered the Austrian capital on 13th November.

On the day following the capitulation of Ulm, Nelson had won his greatest victory, and his last. That the British were masters of the seas had been made clear enough by the failure of the French naval operations in the summer; but the war had been going on for two years and a half before the opportunity came for forcing an engagement on a large scale. Even then it would not have been given if Napoleon's bitter taunts had not driven Villeneuve to put out from Cadiz with the combined French and Spanish squadrons, which considerably outnumbered that of Nelson. What Villeneuve meant to do is unknown. The fleets sighted each other when the allied squadrons were sailing south towards Gibraltar. They did not seek an engagement, for they went about, to sail back to Cadiz. But Nelson having the weather gauge swooped upon his prey in two columns, struck and pierced the line at two points in front and rear of the center, enveloped both, and destroyed the fleet. Nelson's work was done when he fell. After Trafalgar, no French or Spanish squadron put out of port throughout the war, though privateers continued to raid British commerce; while British warships and convoys could go where they would, unchallenged. For British security in the struggle with Napoleon, Trafalgar was absolutely decisive.

But for Europe it was not so. It did not impede the march of Napoleon's legions; six weeks later he won what was perhaps the

most brilliant of all his victories. Austria had not thrown up the cards—she had still an army in being under the ablest of her generals, the Archduke Charles, when the French occupied Vienna; and the Russian forces were advancing. At Austerlitz, on his own chosen ground, the Russians challenged him and met with an overwhelming defeat on 3rd December. Austerlitz was decisive. The Russian forces retired, and Austria submitted to the treaty of Pressburg on 26th December.

Russia, in fact, had blundered by prematurely forcing the Battle of Austerlitz; Austria by her ineptitude at Ulm. But the ignominy rested on Prussia. There was a strong war party there; and when the French general, Bernadotte, with troops from Hanover, marching upon Ulm, violated Prussian territory at the moment when the Prussian Government was refusing to the Russians passage over Prussian soil, it seemed impossible that she should still hold aloof. In fact, a fortnight after Ulm, she made an agreement with Russia and Austria; but the terms were so impossible of acceptance by Pitt that she made this an excuse for prolonging negotiations. Her co-operation would have made Austerlitz impossible, and would certainly have rendered the position of the French supremely critical. But she hung back—and after Austerlitz it was too late. Now with pusillanimous haste the Minister, Haugwitz, struck with Napoleon the shameful treaty of Schönbrunn, by which she formally allied herself to France, ceded Cleves and Anspach, and was promised in exchange Hanover. Despite the protests of Queen Louise and others, Frederick William signed the treaty.

A few days later Austria bowed to necessity and signed the treaty of Pressburg, by which she surrendered Venetia to France, the Tyrol to Bavaria, and the historic Swabian homes of the Hapsburgs in the west to Baden and Württemberg. The Electors of Bavaria and Württemberg were recognized as kings.

Napoleon's next step was to proclaim his brother Joseph King of the Sicilies in the room of Ferdinand, deposed for "perfidy" in secretly joining the coalition. Ferdinand fled from Naples to Sicily: for that portion of his kingdom was secured by the protection of the British fleet. Dukedoms and principalities were carved out of the newly-acquired territories for Napoleon's marshals and connections. The Batavian Republic, with Belgium, became the kingdom of Holland, with Louis Bonaparte as its king. And then in July a dozen of the states of Western and Southern Germany severed their allegiance to the old Empire, and proclaimed themselves the Rhine Confederation—pledged with their military forces to the service of the French Emperor's foreign policy; while the princes retained their sovereign rights within their own dominions, into which the minor baronies were absorbed. Francis recognized that the Holy Roman Empire was

at an end, and formally dropped the old title, retaining that of Austrian Emperor.

Meanwhile Napoleon was playing at negotiations with Great Britain—probably hoping to dupe Fox, Pitt's adversary for twenty years, who had joined the Coalition Ministry of all the Talents on the death of his rival. Happily the virtues which Fox in opposition had discovered in foreign foes became unconvincing under the new conditions. Whoever might be in office, every British Government was determined, however it might blunder in its methods, to maintain the national honor at all costs, and the negotiations failed, as they failed with the Tsar. But it became known to the Prussian court that among Napoleon's peace proposals was the restoration, to King George, of Hanover, which had just been promised to Prussia at Schönbrunn. Prussia had borne with flouts enough. Ever since Schönbrunn, Napoleon had been adding to his demands. He had compelled Prussia to close her ports to the British, thereby practically involving her in war. But this was too much—Prussia turned, and declared war in October.

At this particular stage the Prussian declaration of war was mere folly. Had it been due to a recognition on the Government's part that its own inaction and action in the last months of 1805 had been both criminal and foolish—that Prussia had a duty to Europe which she had neglected and must attempt to make good—she would have deserved all the credit of a courageous repentance. Some of that credit was actually due to those who had all through felt her neutrality as bitterly humiliating. But what turned the scale was the consciousness that her humiliation had gone for nothing; that she was to be cheated of the price, the blood money, she had expected. By declaring war, she merely courted destruction. Neither Russia nor England was ready to make great and immediate sacrifices to save her. Her generals were incompetent; the military machinery which had so admirably served Frederick was out of repair, rusty, and antiquated; the troops had none of the old *moral*.

This army was flung forward unsupported against an enemy who always fought to win. Of its two divisions the smaller was overpowered, though it fought gallantly, by the main French force at Jena on 14th October; on the same day the larger division was completely repulsed by Davoust's much smaller containing force at Auerstadt; panic seized it, the repulse became a rout. The Prussian army was shattered at one blow, the French swept forward, city after city opened its gates; in a fortnight Napoleon was in Berlin, with the major part of the Prussian kingdom wholly in his grip, and of Frederick William was in effect a fugitive under the protection of the Tsar, though still defiant. Defeat had aroused in him some of the spirit which had remained miserably dormant so long.

Alexander remained to be dealt with, for he would not desert his feeble ally in the hour of his misfortune. But Britain was to be dealt with first. To military or naval operations she was invulnerable, but Napoleon conceived that he could accomplish her economic destruction. That would bring her to her knees, and would place Europe at his mercy; since Europe, unaided by English gold, could not maintain her armies. By closing Europe to British commerce he could ruin Britain. To a certain extent that had been done already. Over Russia, Turkey, and the Scandinavian countries he had no control; but otherwise the whole coast-line from the Baltic to the Adriatic was now his, with the trifling exceptions of Portugal and the Papal States, which could soon be brought to reason. That Spain would take her orders from him, there was no manner of doubt.

So on Nov. 21, 1806, Napoleon issued the Berlin Decrees, which closed all French or allied ports, or ports in territories occupied by French or allied troops, to the shipping of the British Empire. Further, they declared all British ports to be in a state of blockade; so that neutral ships destined for such ports should be treated as blockade runners—a somewhat futile declaration, since only privateers could take action upon it. Further, in all such territories, all British subjects were to be seized, and all British goods to be confiscated. Thus Napoleon inaugurated the "Continental System," the idea which from that time forward dominated his policy, but which he never succeeded in carrying to completion. Its fatal defect as a weapon was that so long as it fell short of completeness, it crippled Europe more than it crippled England; and its completion was never within reach.

For, as concerned the closing of British ports, the decree was waste paper; there were no means to enforce it while oceans and seas were commanded by the British. Moreover the British Government, with little delay, retorted by issuing the Orders in Council which declared all ports whence the British flag was excluded to be in a state of blockade; an order which British fleets could very practically enforce. It was true that while neutrals could ignore the decree, they could not ignore the orders, and therefore felt the latter as an acute grievance but not the former; but that was precisely because the same weapon wielded by the British was effective, and ineffective wielded by the French. Thus Napoleon could not stop the extra-European commerce of England; England could stop the extra-European commerce of Europe. But the vital fact which Napoleon refused to see was that Europe had ceased to be self-supporting; goods procurable only from over-sea had become necessities, and unless she got those goods through England she could not get them at all; whereas England, commanding the seas, could procure by sea

the necessities which she did not produce for herself. And this difference had become all the more emphatic because constant war throttled production in Europe, whereas production of many kinds in England was increased by the developments of the machinery, the inventions, of which she had an effective monopoly. And so great was Europe's need of British goods that, when the normal conduits were blocked, they still found their way in by illicit channels; and smuggling, if a dangerous occupation, was a highly lucrative one. Finally, Europe was thoroughly alive to the fact that the Tyrant of Europe, not the Tyrant of the seas, was responsible; and a deep-rooted hatred for him grew up as a consequence, stronger and stronger as the years passed.

Russia still had to be fought in the field. The French armies advanced into Poland, proclaiming Napoleon as Poland's liberator. He met the first big check in his military career in the murderous battle of Eylau, where the Russians held their ground, but neither side could claim a definite victory (February 1807). But aid which Russia expected from Britain tarried till too late, and in June Napoleon inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russians at Friedland. Austria had been too timid to move. Alexander considered that he had been deserted by his allies; Napoleon wanted his alliance, not his enmity. At Tilsit the two emperors met, held a secret personal conference, and came to terms. The details of those terms are unknown: the general principle is clear—the west for Napoleon, the east for Alexander; acceptance by Russia of the Continental System; the exclusion of the British from Russian ports; a free hand for Russia in the annexation of Turkey's Tran-Danube provinces, and of Finland from Sweden; a free hand for Napoleon in the manipulation of the rest of Europe. Only, at the Tsar's intercession, some contemptuous mercy was to be shown to Prussia. She was to give up her western territories, including Hanover; the share of Poland allotted to her in the last two partitions was to be taken away and erected into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; but Frederick William was to remain king of the remaining half, a virtual vassal of Napoleon. Most of the west Prussian lands went towards the formation of the kingdom of Westphalia for the French Emperor's youngest brother Jerome. By a further secret treaty terms were to be offered to Britain, which she would certainly not accept, including the surrender of the claims against which the Armed Neutralities had protected. On her refusal, the Scandinavian Powers and Portugal were to be called on to close their ports to her and declare war. The enslavement of Prussia was confirmed by the Convention of Königsburg. These were the fruits of the fateful conference between the two emperors at Tilsit, held upon a raft on the river Nieman on June 25, 1807.

*III.—Pelion upon Ossa, 1807-1812*

Britain looked askance upon proposals for friendly mediation between her and France by the Tsar. Intelligence reached George Canning, then Foreign Secretary, of the plan for using the Danish fleet against her, a plan to which Denmark was morally certain to accede. Like Frederick II. when he invaded Saxony in 1756, Canning decided to act in self-defense. A squadron was dispatched to Copenhagen (August) to demand a Danish alliance, or, alternatively, the deposit of the Danish fleet in the British keeping. Both demands were refused, till submission was enforced by a four days' bombardment. The fleet was surrendered, but for the rest of the war Denmark was bitterly hostile. The justification for this high-handed action could not be made public, so that it had all the appearance of a flagrant breach of inter-national ethics; and though it was obviously an action at which Napoleon himself would not have hesitated, it is doubtful whether England gained materially more than she lost morally. If any use had been made of the Danish fleet, it would certainly have been wiped off the sea; whereas the Tsar was provided with a patent excuse for developing a hostile attitude. Since Gustavus IV. of Sweden remained obstinately attached to England, he paid the penalty in the appropriation of Finland by Russia.

It was now only through Portuguese or Turkish ports that British goods could openly enter Europe. Napoleon, scandalized by Canning's action, refused to recognize any longer the neutrality of a state friendly to Britain. He ordered Portugal to close her ports and declare war. To facilitate an attack on her through Spain, he arranged a treaty with Godoy for a partition. The south was to be a principality for Godoy; the north for the King of Etruria, whose kingdom was to be absorbed in Napoleon's kingdom of North Italy. France was to hold the center; Spain and France were to share the colonies. Portugal refused obedience; Junot was launched across Spain with an army; resistance was out of the question. The Portuguese Prince Regent departed to Brazil under escort of a British squadron, and Junot occupied Lisbon, proclaiming that "the House of Braganza had ceased to reign" (November).

The position of Spain was unsatisfactory. A Bourbon king, with neither character nor intelligence, ruled by a queen whom every one knew to be the mistress of the utterly worthless Godoy; a Crown Prince, whose sole merit was that he detested Godoy—the combination was hardly dangerous, but could not be actively useful. The Crown Prince Ferdinand, who was popular in proportion to the general hatred of Godoy, might even be troublesome. Napoleon decided that his brother Joseph, at present King of Naples, would better

occupy the throne than Charles IV. Both Godoy and Ferdinand were seeking the Emperor's favor. French troops entered Spain, nominally on the way to join Junot; the populace were encouraged to think they had come to support the Crown Prince against the minister. In March 1808 the troops were advancing on Madrid under Murat, Napoleon's brother-in-law, who thought the Spanish crown was destined for himself. A popular rising forced Charles to abdicate in favor of Ferdinand. Napoleon enticed both Charles and Ferdinand over the frontier to Bayonne, where he frightened Ferdinand into restoring the crown to Charles, and Charles into again abdicating. Whereupon Napoleon collected an assembly of submissive Spanish "notables" at Bayonne, who promptly offered the crown to the King of Naples. Joseph accepted it, resigning Naples, and went to Madrid (June); and Murat had to be content with the discarded Neapolitan throne.

In his summary treatment of Spain and Portugal Napoleon had overlooked two factors as being of no military importance—the Spanish people and the British. Except in Egypt, the latter had not hitherto distinguished themselves on land; and the former were presumed, according to precedent, to be of no account. Yet though there was no organization for resistance, the spirit of the people was kindled to a blaze. All over the country committees, *juntas*, were formed to conduct operations, and every province rose in revolt for Ferdinand, the popular idol. The French troops secured Madrid, but a column under Dupont advancing into Andalusia was cut off and forced to surrender at Baylen in July.

The British Government, small as were the military forces at its disposal, had already determined on the audacious step of intervention in Portugal; it was prompt to proclaim its determination to support the insurgents in Spain. In August Sir Arthur Wellesly—afterwards Duke of Wellington—landed in Portugal with 18,000 men and defeated Junot at Vimeiro. Superseded by a senior officer, he was unable adequately to follow up the success; but Junot was forced to a convention at Cintra, under which he and his troops evacuated Portugal and were carried, with their arms, to French soil by British ships. On one side Junot was disgraced, on the other the commanders were recalled for inquiry. The British command in Portugal was intrusted to Sir John Moore.

Meanwhile in Prussia, broken as she was, the foundations were being laid of reforms which later were to restore her power. Haugwitz the poltroon had been dismissed; Napoleon had prohibited his replacement by Hardenberg, but encouraged the appointment of Stein, from whose financial abilities he expected a rehabilitation, the profits of which he himself would appropriate. But Stein was also, and primarily, a German nationalist and patriot; and he set about reform

and reorganization with aims which Napoleon had not contemplated. The peasant was liberated from his serfdom, and was no longer bound to the soil; he became a free tenant. The transfer of land became free. Caste restrictions were abolished; as far as the law was concerned, any man of any class might follow any occupation he chose. The towns, great and small, were given a system of self-government by elected representatives. A scheme was formulated for placing the central government in the hands of a Council of Ministers collectively, with plans for a consultative parliament representative in character. The purpose of the whole was to create in the whole population a sense of common citizenship and common responsibilities. But, from one point of view, the most important reform of all was the reorganization of the army, initiated under Stein and carried out by Hardenberg and Scharnhorst after Stein's fall. By Napoleon's orders the force was reduced to 42,000 effectives. It had consisted of officers who were exclusively nobles, and the rank and file exclusively peasants, who remained with the colors for a long term. The new system made every one liable for service; but, after a short term with the colors, they passed out of the official effectives into a reserve; so that behind the 42,000 there rapidly accumulated a large force of trained men not under arms, but ready to be called up—a body recruited from the middle class no less than from the peasants. The reforming decrees were accompanied by an unofficial patriotic propaganda, obviously directed against the Napoleonic tyranny.

Napoleon realized not the danger to himself but the animosity of Stein, who was driven to resign in September 1808, and to flee the country for his life a few weeks later. But he had laid the foundations; his work was carried on by Hardenberg and Scharnhorst; and the spirit of German, or at least of Prussian, nationalism had received a new impulse from the defiance flung down to the tyrant by the people of Spain.

But as yet there was no apparent cooling of the new friendship between Alexander and Napoleon. It was advertised to the world by a great conference at Erfurt, at which both the Austrian and the Prussian courts were represented; and the splendor of Napoleon's power was manifested by the attendance of the multitudinous princes who in fact or in name were his vassals or dependants. Apparently the one weak spot was the Peninsula, where a contemptible insurrection with no organization still required suppression.

Thither Napoleon hastened from Erfurt. His presence seemed to annihilate resistance; his armies swept to Madrid, whence Joseph had fled after Baylen, and occupied it. The thing seemed done, when Sir John Moore from the north of Portugal fell upon the French communications. Napoleon had to swing his forces north to crush or capture the audacious foe, leaving the subjection of the south

uncompleted. But the troublesome and inglorious task might be left to Soult. The Emperor returned across the Pyrenees to occupy himself with more serious business. Moore drew Soult in pursuit to Corunna; where the small British force turned to bay and completely repulsed the French, though Moore himself fell; and the troops were able to embark on the transports which arrived just in time (January 1809). Moore's diversion had saved the Peninsula, where for some five years nearly a quarter of a million of Napoleon's troops, and one after another of his ablest marshals, were kept locked up in the endeavor to subjugate it. But Moore's retreat, crowned by the battle of Corunna, did not look like a serious blow to Napoleon's power. Not only Napoleon himself, but many of the shrewdest intelligences in England, anticipated nothing but disaster from the determination of the British Government to match its small armies in the Peninsula against the great armies of the Emperor.

Napoleon was aware that large forces would be needed to bring Spain into complete subjection; but he never doubted that resistance would be crushed, and that his marshals would be equal to the task. He had seen for himself that the conduct and discipline of the Spanish armies would give them no chance against his own troops in the field; the Provisional Government of the Junta at Seville, set up in the name of Ferdinand, was palpably incompetent and without effective leadership. He had no experience of partisan warfare, or of the infinite difficulty of procuring in such a country as Spain the supplies necessary for large forces. As for the intervention of the British, they had hitherto achieved nothing upon European soil; the numbers of their whole military establishment were but a fraction of his own peninsular forces; they had no single commander of European reputation to pit against Soult and Victor. Masséna, Marmont, Jourdan, Bernadotte, and half a dozen more generals of tried ability. When Wellesley, the victor of Vimeiro, returned to Portugal, cleared of all charges in connection with the convention of Cintra, with 20,000 British troops, in April, there was no doubt in the Emperor's mind that he would promptly and easily be driven into the sea.

It was not the Spanish peninsula that engaged his personal attention, but Central Europe. There were ominous signs of restiveness in Prussia; but Prussia had been too much crippled to be a serious danger on her own account. Austria, however, was another matter. She too had been reorganizing since Austerlitz. The direction of her affairs had passed into the hands of Count Stadion, a statesman of Stein's school—though with the difference that he desired a Germany united under an Austrian, not a Prussian, hegemony. Army reform had been intrusted to the Archduke Charles, whose military reputation was of the highest. Austria had been humiliated by the treaty of Pressburg. The Tyrol, which had been reft from

her and handed over to Bavaria, was seething with hatred for the new rulers and loyalty to the old. Austria was certainly going to fight; and in April, relying perhaps too much on the readiness of general German support, she flung down the challenge and invaded Bavaria. In a week the Tyrolese, led by Hofer, had cleared the Tyrol of Bavarians, and an Austrian army under the Archduke was marching on Regensburg. But Germany made no haste to rise.

Napoleon, as always, was swift to smite. Facing him, the Archduke seemed to be paralyzed. Five defeats on five successive days hurled him back before April was ended. Napoleon marched on Vienna; then Europe was startled to hear that he met, for the first time, with a heavy defeat at Aspern-Essling on 21st May. But the Archduke, too, had suffered heavy losses, and failed to follow up the victory. Some six weeks later Napoleon forced and won, with little enough margin, a battle at Wagram. The defeat was anything but hopeless; but the Austrian Government had lost heart, and sued for an armistice, which the Emperor was quite ready to grant. The course of the operations, distinct from the campaign on the Danube, secured the submission of Austria, where the astute Metternich took the place of Stadion. In October she accepted the treaty of Vienna, which again delivered the Tyrol over to Bavaria, and the "Illyrian Provinces" touching the Adriatic to Napoleon. It may here be noted that in May Napoleon had annexed the Papal States, on account of the refusal of Pius VII. to accept the Continental System, so that all the ports in Italy and on the Adriatic were now closed.

When Austria declared war upon Bavaria, she was expecting an active British diversion. As early as March the British Government, against the judgment of its then Foreign Secretary, Canning, who wished to concentrate on the Peninsula, had determined to make its main effort in the Netherlands, the objective being Antwerp, of which the defenses were known to be inadequate. Had the blow been vigorously delivered in April, it would probably have turned the scale in North Germany, and have produced the general rising on which Stadion had counted; Napoleon's Danube campaign would have been paralyzed or, at the least, very seriously hampered; the Austrian resistance would have been much more stubborn. There was, in fact, a very strong case for the project. But, through mismanagement and miscalculation, the expedition was not ready. The blow would still have been effective if struck after Aspern-Essling, which for the moment shook Napoleon's prestige. But the Walcheren expedition did not start till after Wagram, when it was already too late. Having started, it wasted valuable time over the capture of Flushing while the defenses of Antwerp were being organized; and when it did reach Antwerp in August, the task of capturing it was entirely beyond the capacity of Chatham, who was in command of the expedi-

tion. Even then, half the troops were only retired to the island of Walcheren instead of being completely withdrawn, and in Walcheren most of them died of malaria. A plan which, properly carried out under competent chiefs, might have entirely changed the European situation, ended as an ignominious and costly fiasco; while, at the same time, it crippled the alternative of a powerful offensive in the Peninsula.

Since in the spring the Walcheren expedition had been meant to be the great British contribution to the continental struggle, the force which Wellesley took to Portugal was a small one. The genius of its commander made it an astonishingly efficient instrument, though by no possibility could it have achieved conquest. Soult had already established himself in the north of Portugal; there were 250,000 of Napoleon's troops in the Peninsula; Wellesley had 20,000 British, and for the rest Portuguese and Spaniards, who could accomplish great things as guerrillas, but were of no account in pitched battles. And he was further hampered by the knowledge that the whole adventure was looked upon askance by many shrewd judges, and that a single false move might easily bring about its immediate abandonment.

Within a few weeks of his landing Wellesley struck his first blow. By a swift movement he surprised Soult, and drove him over the border into North Spain. Two months later he had joined the Spaniards in Central Spain, and routed Marshal Victor at Talavera (July). But the battle taught him once for all that no reliance could be placed on the Spanish regulars; the casualties in his own small force had been heavy; Soult had reorganized his forces, and was coming down on him in strength from the north; he himself had to escape back to Portugal by the southern route. His retreat, coupled with the Walcheren disaster, were the decisive factors which induced the treaty of Vienna. Still, if the official armies of the Spaniards were little enough use in the battle line, the irregular insurgents gave the French more than enough to do in holding them down in Galicia, Catalonia, and Andalusia.

Through no fault of Wellington, the brilliant victory of Talavera, which won him his title, was barren of other results; which confirmed Napoleon's conviction that the war in the Peninsula was a side issue which did not call for his personal direction. He would not suffer it to distract him from the course he had laid out for himself. The Corsican felt and resented the want of family prestige, the consciousness that for all his power he was, in the eyes of the world, only a successful adventurer: an upstart intruder among royal and noble aristocracies of famous ancestry. The Tsar and the Hapsburg Emperor had sisters; marriage with one of them would give him a new status of equality with the proudest houses in Europe. A divorce from the Empress Josephine was a preliminary necessity,

which probably caused him real pain. The Tsar was approached, but before the anticipated refusal could be received, the Hapsburgs had completed their own humiliation by giving him the hand of the Princess Marie Louise, who became his Empress in April (1810).

That a rift had opened between Tsar and Emperor was already obvious; from that moment it grew steadily wider. All Europe was groaning under the Continental System; it was not likely that Russia would long adhere to it, though other States could not venture to resist it. There was leakage through North German ports which were outside Jerome Bonaparte's kingdom of Westphalia and the Rhine Confederation. Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, relaxed the regulations in defiance of his brother. He was deposed; Holland was annexed to France, and with it the German coastal districts, including the Duchy of Oldenburg, whose duke was the Tsar's brother-in-law. Napoleon wanted allies who would carry out his behests. The Austrian alliance then should be cemented. If Alexander chose to break away, it would be so much the worse for him. In December he did break away, and opened the Russian ports. The rift had become a breach. It was not likely that war would be very long deferred.

Meanwhile Spain was a continual drain upon Napoleon's resources, because the country could not support the troops. After Wellington's retreat, Soult was engaged in mastering Andalusia, where the Spanish National Government had transferred its headquarters to Cadiz, which could be blockaded only on the land side. The suppression of Catalonia was intrusted to Suchet. The command of the army which was to drive Wellington into the sea was given to Masséna.

The marshal's first business was to secure the northern entry to Portugal, the gates of which were Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. Wellington was not strong enough even to attempt their relief; they fell in July, and Masséna advanced into Portugal. Wellington, with a smaller mixed force, gave battle at Busaco in September; but though Masséna was repulsed, the communications of the British with their base at Torres Vedras, which covered Lisbon, were threatened; Wellington had to fall back behind the lines which had long been secretly constructed, and Masséna suddenly found himself confronted by a system of fortifications which proved to be impregnable. The British commander had swept the country bare of supplies, which were stored behind his lines. Guerrillas raided the French communications. Through the winter Masséna sat before Torres Vedras, and his army starved. Suchet could not, and Soult would not, help him; though the latter, under pressure from the Emperor, attacked and captured Badajoz, the southern gate of Portugal. Victor was pinned down to the blockade of Cadiz.

In March 1811 Masséna began the withdrawal of his exhausted and

starving army, with the British hanging on his rear. Early in May Wellington was threatening Almeida; Massena's attempt to relieve it was defeated at Fuentes d'Oñoro, and it passed into British hands though the garrison cut its way out. Beresford was sent to attempt the recovery of Badajoz; but though he defeated Soult at Albuera, when, according to the French marshal, he ought to have known that he was already beaten, the fortress was far too strong for him; and Wellington fared no better when he arrived on the scene in person. On the other hand, though Masséna's operations had been conducted with the utmost skill, Napoleon was convinced that he was in fault for the failure, and Marmont was sent to take his place.

The plain fact was that the fault was not Masséna's. Wellington was a greater soldier than any whom Napoleon had faced. On the hypothesis that nothing was beyond Napoleon's powers, it is possible that he might himself have succeeded in forcing the Torres Vedras lines; but the hypothesis itself is somewhat extravagant, and it is certain that there was no other living man who could have accomplished the task without absolutely overwhelming forces. Masséna's one chance had lain in the perfect co-ordination of all the operations in the Peninsula, but co-ordination required a single supreme command; and even if Soult had chosen—as he did not choose—to co-operate whole-heartedly, the problem of supplies for an increased force between Torres Vedras would probably have been insoluble. Without the co-ordination, which nothing but Napoleon's personal presence could have provided, the effective conquest of the Peninsula and the expulsion of Wellington were not possible; though it was no less impossible for Wellington, with the forces at his disposal, to effect its liberation. And Wellington's task was made the more difficult by the so-called Cortes at Cadiz, which was now dominated by extreme revolutionists—a Convention without its Carnot—who were as hostile to the British and British ideas as they were to the Napoleonic régime. In 1811 victory for either side in the Peninsula seemed more remote than ever.

Napoleon might have made up his mind either to let Spain go, or to devote all his energies to its conquest. But he had convinced himself, first, that Britain must be crushed, and secondly, that that object was to be attained by the complete application of the Continental System, an aim which in 1810 seemed within reach. Alexander had not yet broken away, and it appeared that Sweden, the only remaining state which had not been compelled to bow the knee, would come to heel. The ever-defiant Gustavus IV. had been deposed, and was succeeded by the childless Charles XIII., and Charles chose to nominate as his coadjutor and heir the French marshal, Bernadotte. But the choice had the contrary effect to that which had been generally anticipated. Bernadotte had no love for the Emperor;

as crown prince and virtual ruler of Sweden he identified his own interests with those of the country of his adoption; Russia and Sweden came to an agreement; Sweden rejected and Russia discarded the Continental System.

It is tolerably clear that the object which Napoleon had in view, in comparison with which he held all else of little account, was to complete the sealing-up of the Continent by the closure of the Baltic ports. He would not realize that success would be more ruinous to the Continent than to England, or that the burden he was laying upon Europe made his domination an oppression so intolerable that sooner or later she would take example by Spain, and would struggle to break free from the yoke at whatever cost. It was Russia now that stood in the way of the accomplishment of his aim. She must cease to obstruct. If the obstacle could not be removed without war, war there must be, and for war on a great scale preparation must be made. Alexander had no wish for war, but he was determined not to submit to Napoleon's dictation. Through 1811 and the greater part of 1812 the two mighty emperors were organizing for a conflict which each would probably have preferred to avoid, but only on his own terms. And the terms were irreconcilable.

In the Peninsula Wellington that winter seized the initiative. In January 1812, before Marmont was ready for any active movement, he flung himself upon Ciudad Rodrigo, which he carried by assault. With Almeida already in his hands, the northern gateway was barred and bolted. In April he was in the south before Badajoz; Soult was not yet ready to come to its rescue. Badajoz was magnificently defended. But the desperate valor of the defense was vanquished by the desperate valor with which the fortress was stormed—one of the rare occasions upon which British troops in the first flush of victory have lost all discipline and control, and have given way to a frenzied license which no efforts of their officers could restrain. Discipline, however, was soon restored; the defenses which had been stormed were made good. Soult, too late to effect a relief, was not to be tempted into an engagement. Badajoz being secured, the communications between the northern and southern French armies were severed by the seizure of the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus, while Wellington with his main force swung north to deal with Marmont.

For a couple of months the two great commanders were maneuvering for an advantage of position which neither could secure. On 22nd July, near Salamanca, Marmont conceived that he could carry out an enveloping movement; in attempting it a gap was created in his line which gave Wellington his opportunity. The line was broken by Pakenham's charge; the French center and left were rolled up; Marmont was seriously wounded; and only Clausel's masterly conduct

of the retreat—aided by the mismanagement of the Spanish troops in Wellington's army—saved the French from annihilation.

Splendid as the British victory was, the hour of complete triumph had not yet arrived. Though Wellington could make a triumphal entry into Madrid, the army in the north, was not destroyed, and Soult's forces in the south were still intact. The north might be held up by the capture of Burgos, on which the British chief concentrated his next effort, but Burgos defied attack. Once more Wellington was compelled to fall back into Portugal before the armies should close upon him from north and south.

## CHAPTER XXXIV

### DOWNFALL: 1812-1815

IN 1812 practically the whole of Western and Southern Germany was bound to give military support to Napoleon's foreign policy, whatever it might be. Holland and Belgium were within the French Empire. Napoleon himself was King of North Italy, where Eugene Beauharnais was his viceroy. His brother-in-law Murat was King of South Italy. Prussia, technically independent, dared not oppose him; Austria was hardly more free than Prussia; Denmark was secured by her hostility to England. Saxony was attached to him, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was attached to Saxony, and its Polish population regarded him as their protector against the greed of Russia. Besides Russia, only Sweden, Turkey, and the Spanish Peninsula were outside Napoleon's control. Sweden's interests attached her to Russia; a politic concession on the part of the Tsar had insured Turkish neutrality. When a declaration of war between France and Russia was imminent, both Prussia and Austria gave Napoleon a formal alliance, of which Alexander quite understood the meaning. He would not have to fear active hostilities from either of them.

Napoleon's Grand Army, like the army in Spain, was drawn largely from the vassal and subject populations, just as his war treasury was supplied at their expense. France herself bore only a relatively small proportion of the drain on men and money. With quarter of a million men still in Spain he was able to accumulate for Russia an expeditionary force as to the numbers of which estimates vary, but half a million is a fair approximation. In June 1812—before Salamanca had been fought—some three-fourths of that number crossed the Niemen, to open the campaign which sapped the foundations of Napoleon's supremacy.

The primary intention was in full accord with Napoleon's methods. From Montenotte to Waterloo the plan was followed repeatedly. Two armies were converging against him. Striking between them, he would shatter one before the other could form a complete junction with it, and would then deal with the second; if the shattering was incomplete in either case, he would at least drive both on divergent lines of retreat. But the decisive initial blow failed. Instead of giving battle, the Russian armies retired on converging lines, only

holding up the advance by rearguard actions, and effected their junction at Smolensk. If the principle of achieving a real decision by the first swift blow was to be carried out, the united army must be forced to an engagement and shattered. The difficulties of rapid movement, especially of communication and commissariat, were infinitely greater in Russia than in any of the Italian or Austrian campaigns, and were multiplied by the size of the force for which supplies had to be provided. Nevertheless, Napoleon hurled his forces onward to Smolensk.

The opportunity for a shattering blow was precisely what the Russian commander, Barclay du Tolly, did not intend to give. Again a rearguard action secured him a withdrawal covered by the firing of the city of Smolensk. He retired upon Moscow. But a continuous policy of retirement is not popular, either with soldiers or with civilians. Barclay was superseded by Kutusoff, and Kutusoff, to the joy of his troops, determined to stand at Borodino. He was justified by the event. Napoleon won a technical victory; but only at the cost of terrific carnage, and without in any sense shattering the enemy, who retired from the field unbroken and confident. The Russians could afford to revert to the Fabrian policy when they felt it to be not pusillanimous but crafty, the way not to defeat but to victory.

Kutusoff left the way open to Moscow, which Napoleon entered a week after Borodino, on 14th September. Russia's ancient capital had been deserted by its population and denuded of stores. That night it was blazing with fires in every quarter. Before the flames were extinguished half the city was in ruins. The occupation of Moscow was a barren victory. It meant even less to Russia than the occupation of Madrid meant to Spain. No decisive blow had been struck; every step taken in pursuit of deliberately retiring Russian forces would draw the French army farther and farther from its base; it had already sunk to a fraction of its original numerical strength. For a month the Emperor held on at Moscow, hoping, perhaps, that the Tsar might be moved to come to terms, or that Kutusoff would make a false move. If so, neither the Tsar nor Kutusoff responded. For the army to make Moscow its winter quarters was obviously out of the question.

On 19th October the retreat of the 100,000 began. The only route for retreat was over the same ground, which had been swept bare by the advance—for the alternative southern line was blocked by Kutusoff. One fierce engagement was enough to show that it was impracticable. For a fortnight the army struggled westward, dogged and harassed by the Russians, its supplies perpetually cut off, its numbers falling away. Already there were hardly 50,000 men left when winter came down at one stride on 6th November. There followed three weeks of fearful suffering, crowned by the ghastly strug-

gle of the Beresina Bridge on 28th November, when the passage of the river brought comparative safety to the remnant who had escaped destruction. In 14th December they were over the Prussian frontier, Napoleon himself having already hastened on, confident that if he himself were present to act, the European situation would be saved:

The Napoleonic legend has demanded that the awful failure of the Russian expedition should be attributed, not to Napoleon but to agencies beyond human control; much as, conversely, the paradoxical piety of the Elizabethans made them attribute the overthrow of the Armada to Divine interposition. *Dominus flavit, et dissipati sunt*, ("The winds of God blew, and the Armada was dispersed.") It was true. Froze and snow destroyed the Grand Army. It was true. But the Most Fortunate Armada was a fleet shattered and scattered beyond redemption before the gales arose which completed its annihilation; and the Grand Army was a broken remnant before the frosts came to finish its destruction. Napoleon was lured five hundred miles into Russia, contrary to his original intention, with the object of pulverizing the Russian army in the field, and that object was defeated by the Fabian policy of the Russian command. He had not taken account of the fact that the necessary rapidity of such an advance made the organization of retreat impossible; that if retreat should prove necessary it would inevitably be disastrous. No strategic importance attached to Moscow; if the Russians ignored its sentimental value, there was nothing to gain by its capture. Russia was a country where the defense could refuse battle and retire indefinitely, risking nothing; but where the invader, enticed to indefinite pursuit, risked everything. The Russians gave battle only at the moment and on the spot of their own choice, and Napoleon found a Borodino instead of an Austerlitz. The withdrawal from Moscow only began when the Russians were virtually commanding the southern route. If the frost had not fallen, the tragedies and the heroisms of the month between 6th November and 6th December would have been less—perhaps two-fifths instead of one-fifth of the army which started Moscow would have got home. But the practical effect of the campaign would have been the same.

Napoleon sped to Paris, where he at once restored the ascendancy which was threatened by his prolonged absence and the rumors of disaster. Prussia was the formal ally of France, and Beauharnais, left in command of the remnant from Moscow, was able to carry it to safe quarters at Leipzig. Macdonald, who had been sent with a separate column to attack Riga, fell back into East Prussia, to discover that the Prussian troops there, under the command of the old General Yorck, had determined to repudiate the French alliance, in defiance of the King and the official Government. On 30th December

Yorck concluded a convention with the Russians which virtually handed East Prussia over to them. The Tsar placed the administration in the hands of Stein, who for some time past had been his most influential counsellor. Alexander, in fact, made up his mind that he would best consult Russian interests by posing as the liberator of North Germany. Frederick William hesitated, and began by repudiating Yorck's action; but soon found that the whole force of Prussian opinion not only endorsed it, but it would discard his authority if he did not endorse it himself, and transfer his alliance to Russia. He yielded, and in February concluded with Alexander the treaty of Kalisch, which bound him to war with France. His reward was to be the restoration of all his former dominions in Germany, with additional German territory as the equivalent for the Polish territory taken from Prussia after Tilsit. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be the protégé—or the spoil—of no one but Alexander. War was formally declared on March 16, 1813.

Admiration for the conduct of Prussia at any and every other period of her history must be severely qualified; now was her one hour of true greatness. The revolt against Napoleon was the revolt against an intolerable oppression imposed upon every people in Europe, an oppression from which revolt offered the only opportunity of escape, imposed without any semblance of a pretence that justice had anything to do with the matter. The spirit which prompted Prussia, not her nobles but her people, was the same spirit which prompted the Spanish people in their defiance of the Bonapartist tyranny, and later the rising of the Greeks against the Turks, and the Italian Risorgimento; the antithesis of the spirit of twentieth-century Prussianism. Prussia threw herself into the struggle with a unanimity and a passion of moral enthusiasm for a righteous cause which was in splendid contrast to the sordid self-seeking of her government before Stein had arisen.

If the like spirit was at work in the rest of Germany, the rulers were outside its influence. The princes of the Rhenish Confederation were inclined to think that their dynastic interests were safer under Napoleon's sovereignty. That monarchs should have their hands forced by their subjects was not to their liking. Moreover, if they revolted they would be the first to suffer. Metternich in Austria had no sympathy with the ideas of German nationalism which permeated Prussia; he meant to come into the coalition against Napoleon's domination, but only on his own terms and at his own time. So Austria and the Rhenish Confederation held aloof.

Napoleon, for the first time in his career, had met with a tremendous disaster; it only inspired him to fresh efforts. If he had lost in effect an army of half a million men, he would raise another half million, and beat his foes as he had beaten them before. France was still for

the most part under his spell. The troops were raised, though only at the cost of heavy withdrawals from the Peninsula. Metternich offered mediation, out of which, if accepted, he meant to reap advantages for Austria. Napoleon would have none of it, demanding instead the military aid—refused in turn Metternich—which he had some technical right to claim. In April he entered Saxony with his troops, his arrival probably preventing the king from joining his enemies. In May he defeated the Prussians and Russians, first at Lützen, then at Bautzen. The victories established his own confidence, but did not dampen the ardor of the Prussians. A suspension of hostilities on Napoleon's initiative only stirred their indignation. The Russian and Prussian Government were confirmed by subsidies from Britain. Austria again offered terms: the restoration of French annexations east of the Rhine, the retrocession of Illyria to Austria, and the partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The terms were refused, and Metternich joined the alliance. So did Bernadotte, on the understanding that Norway should be transferred to Sweden from Denmark, which still stood by the French alliance.

Perhaps the decisive factor in the forming of the new combinations was Wellington's decisive victory at Vittoria on 21st June. Salamanca had been a welcome presage, but had not given him a conclusive superiority. That came with the drain upon the Peninsular troops for the formation of Napoleon's new armies. Soult had been withdrawn for the campaign in Germany, and the Spanish command was in the hands of the veteran Jourdan; but nearly half the forces were engaged under Suchet and Clausel, in vain efforts to hold down the irrepressible north-east, and to hunt down the ubiquitous guerrillas. When Wellington advanced into the north of Spain in June, he was able to force at Vittoria the battle in which Jourdan's army was shattered, and driven in rout to Pampeluna with the loss of its guns, ammunition and treasure chests. The defeated troops could only make for the passes of the Pyrenees, while the advance of the pursuing army was held up by the obstinate resistance of the towns of Pampeluna and San Sebastian. On receiving the tidings, Napoleon dispatched Soult to take over the command and conduct the hard-pressed retreat of the forces through the mountains, a difficult task which he discharged with admirable skill and tenacity. Suchet's army still strove to retain its grip on Catalonia; Wellington could not press the pursuit through the Pyrenees till Pampeluna fell at the end of October. But virtually the struggle for Spain was ended by the rout of Victoria. Before 1813 ended Wellington was on French soil.

When the armistice terminated in August it was the allies who had profited by it, not Napoleon. Austria had definitely come in, though

Murat had joined the Emperor. Nevertheless, on 27th August, he won a brilliant victory over the main opposing forces at Dresden. But the day before Blücher had defeated Macdonald at Katzbach, and three days later Vandamme, who had been sent to cut off the retreat from Dresden, was enveloped and compelled to surrender at Kulm. Dresden was only a check. Seven weeks later (16th-18th October) the decisive battle was fought at Leipzig, where Napoleon was overwhelmed in the "Battle of the Nations," with a loss of 70,000 men and 300 guns. The allies, too, had suffered so heavily that they could not press the pursuit; but the French were driven behind the Rhine, and, one after another, the garrisons which had been left in Prussian or Polish territory were forced to surrender.

Murat deserted his brother-in-law; Illyria reverted to Austria; the Confederation of the Rhine dissolved, and the kingdom of Westphalia collapsed. But Metternich's craft had achieved his object—it was he who held the reins and shaped the policy of the allies. The sentiment of German nationalism was abhorrent to him. He wanted Germany to be a congeries of principalities subject to the manipulation of Austria; the princes, though not the people, wanted the same thing. Monarchism, not without reason, saw in the spirit of nationalism only one aspect of the spirit of liberty which in another aspect was not reconcilable with despotism—was, from the monarchist point of view, revolutionary. The dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation was simply a matter of bargaining with the princes, beginning with Bavaria; and the essence of the bargain was their "unreserved sovereignty."

Even now the allies were ready for a peace, merely restricting France to her "natural frontiers"—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees—with the unconditional independence of Holland, Italy, and Spain; the utmost to which France herself had ever aspired. Napoleon could have accepted, and still have remained visibly the most powerful monarch in Europe. A resolution of the Corps Legislatif on 29th December, and the known views of Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, show that intelligent opinion in France would have been fully satisfied with those terms. But Napoleon angrily rejected them, urged, perhaps, by the belief that on the one hand dissensions among the allies would break up their counsels, and on the other that anything like an admission of weakness would be fatal to his dynastic prestige.

With the new year Blücher in the north began the allied movement for the invasion of France, crossing the Rhine at Coblenz; Bülow entered Belgium; the main Austrian armies made their entry *via* Basel, following the precedent set by Napoleon in ignoring Swiss neutrality. The rapidity and success of Blücher's advance alarmed the allies, who did not wish the credit of victory to fall

to Prussia. Instead of co-operating vigorously, they dallied. Napoleon, holding the interior lines, struck at Blücher, and flung him back to Châlons, then turned on the Austrian Schwarzenberg and defeated him at Montereau. But in the southwest Wellington defeated Soult at Othez, compelling his retirement and the uncovering of Bordeaux, where the Bourbon restoration was proclaimed. Napoleon at bay conducted his operations with a skill and audacity which he had never surpassed. But fiercely as he might strike in one quarter, he could not cover Paris against the extended armies of the allies. At the end of March their battalions were in the neighborhood of Paris, and on the 31st Marmont, who was in command there, capitulated. Napoleon's marshals unanimously pronounced that further resistance was hopeless, and the Emperor found himself with no alternative but abdication. Nor would the allies listen to conditions. What they willed must be accepted. His own fate, the fate of France the resettlement of Europe, were for their decision, wherein he should have no voice. They would let him retain the Imperial title with the little island of Elba in the Mediterranean as an independent principality. More than that they were not in the humor to grant.

The abdication took place on 11th April; the news reached Wellington and Soult only when they had already fought their last indecisive duel at Toulouse on the following day. On 4th May the Emperor was caged in Elba, a week after the Bourbon Louis XVIII. made entry into Paris as King of France.

Against France herself there was no animosity on the part of the allies. If she had chosen a restoration of the Republic she would have been supported by France and Russia; neither of those Powers cared about the Bourbons, and the British, at last, held that it was for the country to choose the form of its own government. The Legitimists, however, carried the day, though Louis found it necessary to concede a constitution.

Then the Powers began the work of resettling Europe. The Bourbon monarchy had no responsibility for the wars which had been raging for the past twenty-two years, and the logical corollary of its restoration was the restoration of the French boundaries as they were when the monarchy fell. Britain had captured most of the French and Dutch colonies during the war, but with a few exceptions she returned them. The guarantees given to the German princes on the dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation were to be carried out, but they were to form a new federation. Italy was to revert to much the same conditions as before the French Revolution, though Austria was to retain Venetia. These main lines were laid down by the treaty of Paris. The settlement of details was referred to a Congress of the Powers to be held at Vienna.

The Congress met in November, and it soon became evident that its members did not see eye to eye. Acceptance of the principle of Legitimism cleared the ground as concerned some areas; but a complete restitution of territories as in 1792 was impossible. The King of England became King instead of only Elector of Hanover. The Stadtholder became King of Holland, with Belgium—the former Austrian Netherlands—thrown in. Victor Emmanuel of Savoy was reinstated as King of Sardinia, with Piedmont. The agreement with the princes of the Rhenish Confederation scotched German nationalism. Murat, who had deserted Napoleon after Leipzig, could not be ousted from Naples in favor of the Bourbon. But the crucial problems arose over Poland and Saxony. The Tsar wanted Poland—the Grand Duchy of Warsaw—as a *douceur* for himself in recognition of his disinterested services to Europe. Prussia, if she resigned her claim to her old share of Poland, wanted Saxony as compensation (the King of Saxony had forfeited his title to consideration by failing to desert Napoleon). Prussia in possession of Saxony would have in Germany a position too dominant for Metternich. The advancement of Russia was to the liking neither of Britain nor of France. The harmony of the Powers seemed likely to issue in violent discord.

Napoleon, chafing in Elba, deemed that the dissensions of the Powers were giving him the chance of one more throw for power. In France he knew that the returned Royalists had done everything in their power to make the Restoration unpopular by using it as the triumph not of a cause but of a faction. On 1st March he slipped secretly from Elba and landed near Cannes. He appealed to the troops, who acclaimed the return of their Emperor. The marshals who had not sworn allegiance to Louis joined him; so also did Ney, breaking his oath of allegiance. His appearance, and the growing accessions which accompanied his northward march, stilled the dissensions of the allies, who knew that all else must give way to the necessity for mastering the new menace. On 13th March they unanimously proclaimed him the public enemy of Europe; but on the 19th Louis took flight from Paris, and on the 30th Napoleon was once more in the capital, and Emperor of France. This time there was no question in any mind that there must be a fight to a finish. Napoleon's overtures for his recognition as a constitutional monarch were flatly rejected. Both sides armed for the contest at utmost speed.

Where speed was the first essential, Napoleon enjoyed an immense advantage. Prussia was comparatively ready. In the beginning of June Blücher had 120,000 men between Liège and Charleroi. Wellington had a mixed force of 90,000 concentrating about Brussels—British, Hanoverians and Brunswickers, Dutch and Belgians—the last two of doubtful value, since the cause hardly appealed to them.

Neither Austrians nor Russians could hope to arrive for some time to come. Napoleon had his army on the Belgian frontier, ready to strike before Blücher and Wellington were ready to meet the blow with a united front. He struck between them, meaning to crush Blücher first, or at least hurl him back in one direction while he turned in the other to destroy Wellington. On 12th June Napoleon left Paris; on the 15th he drove the Prussian advanced post out of Charleroi. On the 16th he smote Blücher at Ligny, and drove him—as he vainly imagined—back on his base at Namur. Ney had been dispatched to the cross-roads—Quatre Bras—to prevent the delayed junction with Wellington, contain the British advance, and complete Blücher's discomfiture by a flank attack at Ligny. But Ney was first pinned to Quatre Bras, and then driven from it. D'Erlon's corps, flustered by orders and counter-orders from Ney and Napoleon, wavered between the two and helped neither. Blücher, though "damnable hammered," drew off from Ligny in good order, unpursued; and when Grouchy started with a following column towards Namur he had already wheeled north for Wavre to recover touch with the British.

On the 17th Wellington drew in his outpost from Quatre Bras to the position, astride the Brussels road, at Mt. St. Jean—the field of Waterloo—where he had resolved to hold the French up till Blücher should join him. When the two armies lay facing each other on the morning of the 18th, Wellington knew and Napoleon did not know that Blücher was at Wavre and—if the British could keep grip of the ridge—would be at Waterloo before the day was out. Napoleon believed that he was far away, contained by Grouchy. The main features of the decisive battle which followed are familiar. The battle was not opened till towards noon, when the covering post of Wellington's right, the Château of Hougomont was held with desperate valor against the attack of Jerome Bonaparte. Then D'Erlon was hurled against the left center, where Napoleon meant to smash through the thin British line and roll it up. The attack all but broke through, but was flung back by a great cavalry charge. Successive French cavalry charges stormed up the slope, to find the line at the top formed into impenetrable squares which broke them up, and to be driven reeling back by British counter-charges. As the afternoon advanced Blücher's Prussians were arriving and driving in on the French right. Then came the decisive moment. The Old Guard was launched against the British right, but was shattered by the fire on its front and flank and then swept away by the advance of the whole British line as the Prussians crashed in upon the French right, turning defeat into rout, and rout into a frantic *saute-qui-peut*.

Napoleon's army was gone. Gone was all support of him, as he found when he reached Paris on the third day. None rallied to him.

Blücher and Wellington were advancing on Paris. With the assent of his Ministers he abdicated for the second time in favor of "Napoleon II.," the child of his marriage with Marie Louise. He withdrew to the coast, dreaming of an escape to America on an American ship; finding that impossible, he surrendered himself to the commander of a British, "relying upon British generosity." But however invidious the position might be, public security forbade generosity. There could be no second Elba—no unchained Titan. With the world's assent Napoleon passed the bitter remainder of his days in the impenetrable loneliness of St. Helena.

## CHAPTER XXXV

### OVERSEAS, 1786-1815

#### *I.—Ireland: and the British Expansion, 1786-1815*

THE incorporating Union of England and Scotland at the beginning of the eighteenth century had consolidated Great Britain. It came at a moment when the Irish problem had been scotched by victory in the field, repudiation of the victors' pledges, and the establishment of a Government which had both the will and the power to deprive the vanquished of all semblance of freedom; while even the victorious party in Ireland was kept in subordination to English control. Political power was exclusively in the hands of the Protestants who were only about one-fifth of the population. Irish industries were deliberately depressed in the interests of English trade, and the Irish Parliament could pass only such laws as were sanctioned by the English Government. The grievances of the American colonies in 1765 were far less than those of the Irish Protestants, and would bear no comparison with those of the Catholics.

Nevertheless, when the Colonial crisis arrived, Ireland displayed a conspicuous, loyalty and moderation—but the manner of it was felt in England as a warning that the loyalty would continue only on condition that Ireland should be released from some of her fetters. Trade restrictions and anti-Catholic penal laws were relaxed; and the formal recognition of American independence was preceded by the freeing of the Irish legislature—"Grattan's Parliament"—from its dependence on the Parliament at Westminster. Still, however, Protestant Dissenters as well as Catholics were excluded from the legislature, as well as from all share in administration. The governing class as a whole felt that political equality would mean Catholic ascendancy, and reprisal for a century of depression—which had implanted in the mass of the population an ineradicable conviction that the law existed not to protect but to oppress.

A section of the Irish people had achieved political liberty; for the rest the political grievance was unabated. The religion of half the gentry and four-fifths of the populace was still an insuperable bar to social as well as to political advancement—in striking contrast to the wise policy pursued by British governors towards the

Catholic population of Canada. There was no mitigation of the agrarian grievances, which left the peasantry without legal defense against the exactions of the often unscrupulous agents of absentee landlords, and of the still more unscrupulous money-lenders into whose clutches they fell. The soil in short was admirably prepared for the reception of a revolutionary propaganda.

The French Revolution arrived—and the propaganda. It would have been more effective in Ireland than it actually proved if it had not excited the opposition of the Catholic gentry, who watched with horror its hostility to the Church in France, and were themselves the depositaries of an aristocratic tradition. It appealed perhaps most strongly to the Ulster descendants of Scottish Covenanters and Cromwellian troopers. Wolfe Tone, the creator of the revolutionary movement, set to work with great skill as an advocate of reforms which were demanded alike by Catholics and Presbyterians, whom he combined in the Society of United Irishmen. False hopes were excited by a very partial removal of disabilities in 1793 (following the outbreak of the war with France), and the appointment of a Lord-Lieutenant who committed himself to a program of reform in 1795. The hopes were dashed by his early recall. Wolfe Tone dropped the mask, declared openly that the hopes of Ireland were bound up with separation from Great Britain, and appealed to the French Republic for aid. Yet when the appeal was answered by the appearance of Hoche off the south coast at the end of 1796, much greater readiness was displayed to oppose than to assist the landing which he actually failed to effect.

Nevertheless the Irish and British Governments had both taken alarm, and resorted to a policy of repression, carried out on one side and resisted on the other with a repulsive brutality intensified by the passion of religious partisanship; a course which, while it successfully broke up any effective organization for rebellion, nevertheless embittered hostility to the Government. In 1798 sporadic insurrections flamed up; they were mercilessly stamped out, in circumstances which left an ugly and indelible impress on popular sentiment. More harm would have been done but for the arrival of Cornwallis as Lord-Lieutenant. There was to be no more savagery. Order was restored. Both Cornwallis and Pitt came to the conclusion that while Catholic Emancipation was necessary, an Irish Parliament dominated by a Catholic majority was not to be thought of, and that the necessary solution was an incorporating Union with Great Britain.

But Union and Emancipation were taken as separate measures. The Union was carried through the Irish Parliament only by dint of lavish bribery and corruption, and the first Parliament of the United Kingdom met in 1801. But when so much was accomplished,

King George declared that he would rather lose his crown than violate his conscience by consenting to Catholic Emancipation. Pitt, and other Ministers whose honor was pledged, resigned. But the mischief was done; the persistence of the religious grievance kept raw the wounds which might otherwise have been healed; it was the Protestant Ascendency which was represented at Westminster, and Ireland remained unreconciled. Insurrectionary movements in the coming years were never general, and were always abortive; but in the eyes of the people the existing Government was always an enemy, to be hampered and circumvented if it could not be defied.

In an era when the world was at war, it was inevitable that oversea expansion should be the monopoly of a Power which could keep the ocean waterways open for itself and closed to its rivals. Great Britain was able to prevent absolutely any extension, even any strengthening, of French, Spaniards, or Dutch in their colonial possessions, while the most they could do was to impede her Imperial development. With her latest acquisition before the war—Australia—no interference was possible. She had the Australian continent to herself; the only question was whether she had the leisure and could spare the attention to turn it to account. The native population was sparse, and in a lower stage of development than any of the peoples black or brown, red or yellow, with whom Europeans had ever come in contact—nomads shifting from place to place as immediate supplies ran out, living for the day, with no thought for the morrow and hardly a memory of yesterday. What this virgin country was capable of producing was wholly unknown, because the natives had never attempted to produce anything, taking simply what the surface of nature gave. Occupation was limited only by the natural obstacles of mountain and forest, and the possibilities of an adequate return for expenditure of labor or capital.

At the outset, however, colonization in a full sense was not the object with which the British took possession. The Government wanted merely penal settlements—a dumping ground for convicted criminals, as a substitute for the practice of a century which had disposed of such undesirables as indentured servants—otherwise slaves—in the American and West Indian plantations; an outlet closed when the American colonies ceased to be a part of the British Empire. The first settlement in 1788, which gave its sinister connotation to the name of Botany Bay, was that of a batch of “transported” convicts in the charge of Captain Philipps as military governor, with a contingent of marines, not for defense against the natives but for the penal control of the convicts. When convicts or soldiers earned their discharge they had the option of remaining in occupation of grants of land. With the acclimatization of sheep and cattle, the country became immediately self-supporting, though dependent upon

imported supplies for manufactured goods. Throughout the war period, however, the free settlers in New South Wales and Tasmania were practically limited to ex-convicts and discouraged soldiers.

For British Imperial development in another area the wars were directly responsible. In 1793 the Dutch were in possession of Cape Colony; where the open port at Cape Town was of first-rate consequence to ships voyaging to and from the Indian Ocean. In order to secure it from falling into French hands, William of Orange, while still officially Stadtholder, ceded it to Great Britain for the period of the war, and Cape Town was occupied by the British in 1795, after some show of opposition by the Dutch. At the peace of Amiens the British withdrew. When the war was renewed in 1803 Holland became an enemy state, and Pitt's last act was the dispatch of an expedition which again took forcible possession in 1806. At the peace of Paris, in 1814, Britain restored nearly all her conquests; having realized the naval value of the Cape, she remained in possession, paying to Holland £6,000,000 by way of compensation—by no means to the satisfaction of the Dutch population, who were thus absorbed under the British dominion, and subjected to British government. Here as elsewhere the immigration of British colonists did not set in till the war was over.

The island of Ceylon also was taken from the Dutch about the time of the occupation of Cape Town, in 1795, when the *de facto* Dutch Government had come to terms with France and no longer recognized the Stadtholder's authority. In Ceylon the change was welcomed by the native population. It was retained at the peace of Amiens, since it had been acquired by conquest, not by arrangement; the British Government was thoroughly established, and the island remained permanently a British possession.

The same period witnessed the definite establishment of the British as the dominant Power in India. Clive had destroyed the menace of the only possible European antagonist in the peninsula, and had created a very limited territorial dominion. Warren Hastings had established the position which Clive had won, and had laid the foundations of an administrative system. In the thirty years which followed the departure from India of the first governor-general, the administrative system was set in order and developed; there were conflicts with native powers, which not only proved that the British were stronger than any of them singly or in combination, but also inevitably added wide territories to those under direct British rule; and at the same time the expansion imposed upon the new Power the duty of enforcing peace upon the whole area, and in effect assuming actively the functions of the nominal but passive suzerain at Delhi.

Warren Hastings had made good against tremendous odds, odds

which had occasionally forced him to dubious expedients. His difficulties had been increased tenfold by the limitations on his powers. The essential truth which had emerged from his reign was, that the Governor-General must be an autocrat on Indian soil, doing as he thought fit, but responsible to the supreme authority at home for what he did; liable to censure, to recall, to punishment if he misused his office, but free to take action on his own judgment unhampered. It was only on those terms that Cornwallis was prepared to accept the succession. No better choice could have been made; since with the qualities of statesmanship most necessary to the office, he combined those of an experienced and trusted soldier; while he enjoyed a reputation and prestige which placed him outside the range of the hostile intrigue from which his predecessor had suffered. The effective inauguration of the new system dates from his arrival in India in September 1786; that system with modifications remained in force until 1858. It may be summarized as the rule of the Governor-General subject to the dual control by the India House—that is, the governing body of a commercial corporation, the East India Company—and by a ministerial Board of Control responsible to Parliament.

Now we have always to bear in mind that the size of India in area and in population is roughly equivalent to that of Europe excluding only Russia. Of the whole area the British, in 1786, were in actual possession only of Bengal and Behar, with Orissa; the coastal strip called the Northern Sarkars; a patch of land about Madras, and another patch of land about Bombay; much as if one European Power were in possession of France, Portugal, and Naples; while the Mughal at Delhi still technically exercised a nominal sovereignty over the whole, to which nobody paid any attention except when that formality happened to suit their own convenience. The Nawabship of Oudh on the Ganges above Behar, the Nawabship of Arcot, the Nizamship of Haidarabad, were old Mughal governorships which had become virtually independent kingdoms, in nominal alliance with the British, whose domination they dreaded less than that of either of the remaining great native powers—the Mysore sultanate in the south, and the Mahratta pentarchy which dominated all Central India. The whole Indus basin was outside the normal area of political rivalries and antagonisms. The head of the whole Mahratta confederacy was the Peshwa at Poona, in the Mahratta country proper; the other four chiefs being Sindhia at Gwalior who had very few Mahratta subjects, Holkar at Indur, the Gaekwar at Baroda—all stretching along the north-western side of the Mahratta dominion—and Bhonsla at Nagpur, on the north of the Nizam's dominion. These chiefs were divided by their own rivalries though

disposed to combine for their mutual advantage.

Neither the East India Company nor the British Government had any desire to extend dominion and assume increased responsibilities. With a single exception every governor-general, until 1848, arrived in India with the same desire—to avoid expansion; nevertheless, one after another found expansion forced upon him. The reason was simple. From time immemorial, conquest has been the primary business of every oriental dynasty. The ruler who does not set himself to that business is assumed to be weak, and a fit object for attack. To be pacific is to invite challenge; war was repeatedly forced on the British, because their pacific professions were regarded as a sign of weakness. The challenger, being defeated, measured the significance of his defeat by the severity of the terms imposed; nothing but loss of territory convinced him of the futility of renewing the challenge. Experience proved that annexation of territory must attend a victorious campaign; therefore every contest with a native power was followed by a substantial addition to the territory under direct British dominion.

Cornwallis succeeded, where both Clive and Hastings had failed, in forcing the Company to pay their officials and servants on a scale which freed them from the need of supplementing their incomes from other sources. When the service of the Company offered to young men of ability and character a career which promised an adequate reward, while arousing in them a keen sense of responsibility, men of ability and character were immediately attracted to it; and the Civil Service rapidly attained a standard of capacity and integrity which has never been surpassed. Antagonism between Mohammedans and Hindus, caste rules and caste prejudices among Hindus themselves, venality, and the general disregard for truth which characterized the oriental civilization, had proved by years of experience an insuperable bar to entrusting the natives with the administration of the law and the business of collecting the revenue, except in subordination and under supervision; within the British dominion, those functions were discharged entirely by the British "collectors" and "magistrates."

Order and security of person and property were insured to a degree never before known, though certain established injustices were unwittingly perpetuated, because existing malpractices were misinterpreted in the light of European law and custom. Thus the *zemindar* of a district—originally, an official tax-collector who paid a fixed sum to the revenue and made what he could out of the peasantry, who could not resist his extortions—was assumed to stand in the same relation to the cultivators, the *ryots*, as an English landlord to his tenants, and paid the land tax (which was the main source of

revenue) upon a fixed permanent assessment with security of tenure as the owner of the soil. It was only ascertained later, with the expansion of British territory, that the zemindar, as such, had no rights in the soil, which was for the most part the property of the peasants themselves. Both the *ryot* and the revenue would have profited far more if the facts had been understood, but both actually gained in comparison with the past; partly because a regular system regularly enforced took the place of an arbitrary system irregularly applied, and partly because, in consequence, a higher revenue was raised by a much lower rate of taxation. The Bengal "Permanent Settlement" remains, however, as a classic instance of the honest but mistaken translation of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, which is perhaps the most fruitful cause of error in the mutual dealings of races widely or even slightly diverse.

Tippu, Sultan of Mysore, had inherited all the ambitions of his father, Haidar Ali, and a considerable share of his abilities. His recent experience with Madras only encouraged his aggressive spirit, and his deliberate attack upon Travancore, which claimed British protection, forced Cornwallis to make war on him in alliance with both the Nizam and the Mahrattas—who were both careful to leave all the serious work to the British. Mysore was invaded, and Tippu was compelled to cede considerable portions of his kingdom, which were divided between the three allies as if they had shared equally in his defeat.

The outbreak of the European War caused the recall of Cornwallis to England in 1793. His successor, Sir John Shore, carried the policy of non-intervention in native politics so far that the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and Tippu had all come to the conclusion that the British were a negligible quantity, when Lord Mornington—better known by his later title as Marquess Wellesley—arrived as Governor-General in May 1798, and an era of expansion set in.

For five years Great Britain and France had been at war. Although for nearly forty years the French had been without a military foothold in India, French agents had never ceased to intrigue with the native powers, and various potentates had masses of troops organized under the command of French military adventurers. In the War of American Independence France had sought to strike at her rival in India by cultivating the friendship of Haidar Ali and of the Mahrattas. During the past five years, the Nizam—convicted of Shore's inefficiency—had entrusted his forces to a Frenchman, Raymond; for a still longer time Madhava Rao Sindhia and his young successor, Daulat Rao, had placed a similar trust in two other Frenchmen, De Boigne and Perron. Since the outbreak of the European War, Tippu had been in constant correspondence with the French Mauritius.

Mornington landed in India about the moment when Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition was sailing from Toulon, to initiate that great design of the destruction of the British Power in the East, in which Tippu was intended to be an agent, though Tippu's own intention was to establish his own empire in India, perhaps in conjunction with Zeman Shah of Afghanistan.

The arrival of Wellesley—to give him his later title—put a new complexion on the situation. His first step was to offer the Nizam British protection, coupled with a demand for the dismissal of all French officers in his service. British protection meant the substitution of British for French control over the Nizam's army, and the cession of territory to pay for the same. The Nizam acceded. Wellesley made corresponding demands of Tippu, which were ignored. This was, in effect, open defiance. Before the year was ended, the news came of the destruction of Bonaparte's grand scheme by the Battle of the Nile. In the spring of 1799 Wellesley's armies were invading Mysore, again in professed alliance with the Nizam and the Mahrattas. Tippu was driven into Seringapatam, which was stormed in May, Tippu himself falling in the defence sword in hand.

Tippu had inherited the throne of Mysore from his father, a Mohammedan military adventurer in the service of the then reigning Hindu dynasty, who had usurped first effective control and then the actual sultanate, and had then immensely increased his dominions at the expense of his neighbors. On the fall of Tippu, Wellesley re-instated the old Hindu dynasty in the old Mysore kingdom, with its old limits. Of the remainder, a part was given to the Nizam; another part was offered to the Mahrattas, on condition of their accepting a treaty which, like that made with the Nizam, would have involved the establishment of a British Resident at Poona, dismissal of French officers, a military contingent under British officers, and the submission of the conduct of all foreign relations—whether with European or native powers—to British control. The Mahrattas refused the terms, and the territory offered to them was annexed to the British dominion, as well as the share already appropriated. In effect, everything south of the Nizam's dominion was now under direct British rule except the minor kingdoms of Mysore and Travancore, and the province of Arcot.

Wellesley had grasped the fundamental truth that there must be in India an acknowledged paramount Power able to impose peace—to put down all aggressive disturbers of the peace throughout the peninsula. The British must be that Power, since there was no other which either could or would discharge the supreme function. He was also the one Governor-General before Dalhousie who believed absolutely that it was in the best interests both of the British and of the natives that wherever the change could be legitimately

effected, British administration should take the place of native rule.

Arcot soon gave the opportunity for rounding-off the dominion in the south. The Nawab died; the law of succession was uncertain; arbitration between claimants was inevitably referred to the British Governor-General. Like Edward I. at Northam, Wellesley required acceptance of his own conditions by the candidate whom he supported. In effect, the terms were that the new Nawab should have his title and a handsome provision, while Arcot became a British province. Something of the same sort took place in the Ganges basin. Oudh stood as the buffer state between Bengal and the Mahrattas. Oudh could not protect itself, and the Nawab's army was more of a menace than a defence, since he had no real control over it. A treaty therefore was imposed upon Oudh, under which its western districts were ceded in return for a British-paid force under British officers, while a British "Resident" was permanently established at Lucknow; the Resident being the representative of the British Government, an ambassador who had authority to tender advice—such advice being virtually an order—whenever he thought fit. "Agent" and "Commissioner" were the terms applied to officers who discharged similar functions when appointed to courts of a lower rank. The ceded territory became known as the North-West Provinces.

Haidarabad, Arcot, Mysore, and Oudh, were all of them states whose rulers definitely desired British protection against aggressive neighbors, however reluctant they might be to conform to the terms on which it was granted. The Mahrattas refused the terms because they did not want protection. But the Peshwa, the head of the confederacy, now began to find his position threatened by the ambitions of the other Mahratta princes. He appealed to Wellesley, who offered him the usual terms, which he accepted. Sindhia, and Bhonsla, who had entered his territories, remained in arms—a direct challenge to the British. The Governor-General's younger brother, Arthur—presently to become the duke of Wellington—took the field in Central India, and routed their forces at Assaye and Aragon. Sindhia's own main army in the north was shattered by Lake at Laswari; and the threat of a Mahratta rivalry to the British ascendancy was broken up (1803). Holkar then set up a belated defiance on his own account; but though at an early stage he inflicted disaster upon an ill-organized expedition which was sent against him, he soon found himself unable to maintain a stand, and was driven a fugitive from his own territories; and though his return was permitted after Wellesley left India, any danger from him was averted by his going literally insane.

The British paramountcy was now definitely established, and under the legal color of the Imperial law, since the Mughal at Delhi, in-

stead of being dominated by Sindhia, was now a British *protégé*. Since the overthrow of Tipu, the developments under Wellesley had been viewed with extreme alarm in England. Wellesley was recalled in 1805. For a short time the governor-generalship was held by Sir George Barlow, who did his best to reverse his predecessor's policy; but was superseded in 1807 by Lord Minto, who came with a firm determination to pursue the policy of non-intervention, but realized at once that it was impossible. He checked, but did not remove, a new source of disorder which was developing in Mahratta territories, where bands of Pathan soldiery from the North-west were settling under the favor of Sindhia and Holkar, and issuing forth in roving, predatory bands over Central India, under their leader Amir Khan, and in conjunction with bands of miscellaneous brigands known as Pindaris. Intervention was imperative, and British troops aided in driving the depredators back behind the Nerbudda. Their complete suppression was deferred for a few years.

But now the time had arrived when the British in India were brought into contact both with a new power which had recently developed in the Northwest—hitherto quite outside their sphere—and in some degree with Persia and Afghanistan. In 1807 Napoleon and Alexander held their conference at Tilsit, and for the next hundred years the movements of the Russians in Asia were a ceaseless source of apprehension to British statesmanship. Between Russia and India lay Persia and Afghanistan. Russia was pressing upon Persia, which would yield to her pressure unless she felt she could count on British support. Minto opened negotiations with Persia; the Home Government did so at the same time. Not at all to the satisfaction of the Indian Government then or later, it was the Home Government which assumed the conduct of diplomatic relations with Persia, and developed an unfortunate habit of neglecting them. Consequently, although for the time a theoretically satisfactory arrangement was made under which the Shah was to refuse passage through Persia to foreign troops, and was to be given British aid if needful, the Persian Government learnt after a time to regard the British promise as illusory, and acted accordingly.

Afghanistan was now on the verge of a prolonged series of internal dissensions, and no practical results issued from a mission to Kabul. But friendly relations were happily established between the British and Ranjit Singh of Lahore, who had succeeded in uniting the Sikhs of Punjab under his sway, and had built up a powerful kingdom out of a loose confederacy of petty chiefs. Ranjit at a very early stage had made up his mind, first, that a quarrel with the British would certainly involve his own overthrow, and secondly, that short of bringing on such a quarrel no means were to be neglected for strengthening and expanding the Punjab State. Minto

was no less anxious to secure the Punjab as a strong barrier against the Afghan invasions, which in the last century had given the Mughal Empire its death-blow. So when Ranjit sought to extend his sway over the Sikhs or Sirhind (between the Sutlej and the Jumna), and they appealed to the British for protection, Minto felt bound to intervene; but in such a manner that Ranjit could make a favor of yielding to his protests, assuming the rôle of friendly magnanimity, which he maintained to the day of his death in 1839.

Minto's activities had included the capture from the French of the island of Mauritius, the naval station in the Indian Ocean where French squadrons had been enabled to trouble the Indian waters in the past contests. The peace of Paris retained it in British possession. But he had proved himself too aggressive for the satisfaction of the India House, and was recalled in 1813, to be succeeded by Lord Moira.

## *II.—America, 1789-1815*

The peace of 1783 fixed, though not always with exactitude, the boundary between what was still British North America and the United States, which had separated themselves from the British Empire. No part of the northern continent remained under French dominion. The United States territory extended from the British boundary south to the coast-line of Georgia, and west to the Mississippi, leaving Spain in possession of Florida and the whole coast-line of the Gulf of Mexico, with Louisiana. The West India Islands were still divided between Spain, England, France, and Holland. All central America was Spanish, except British Honduras, as well as the South American continent, with the very substantial exception of the Brazils (Portuguese), and of the French and Dutch colonies of Guiana.

During the war period no great interest attaches to the course of events in the West Indies, save in regard to the island of San Domingo or Hayti. A good deal of naval energy and some military forces, which might have been better employed, were wasted from time to time by the British in capturing sugar-islands and leaving them inadequately garrisoned, to be given up at the peace of Amiens; a process which was more or less repeated during the war with the Emperor. At the peace of Paris only Trinidad and Tobago were retained of the various island captures; with Demerara on the mainland—British Guiana—taken from the Dutch.

Hayti demands somewhat fuller notice. In that island, divided between France and Spain, the proportion of Europeans to the aborigines and the negroes, imported as slaves from an early time, was very small. When the French Revolution came, negroes and natives

proper in French Hayti made common cause in their hostility to the whites. When Spain retired from the first coalition in 1795, as a preliminary to becoming the ally of the French Republic, the Spanish portion of San Domingo was ceded to France. The general result was that the whites were expelled, and a practically independent government of San Domingo was formed under the negro Toussaint L'Ouverture. When Bonaparte became First Consul, Toussaint refused to recognize him. France could take no effective action while she was at war with the power which ruled the seas; but with the peace of Amiens an expedition was dispatched which re-established a French government and brought Toussaint to a European prison. The tables were turned again with the renewal of war in 1803. The French were once more driven out by an African negro known as Jacques Dessalines, who assumed the title of "Emperor of Hayti," and from that time the greater part of the island remained an independent state, sometimes as a monarchy, sometimes as a republic, though the western portion was retroceded to Spain by the peace of Paris.

Spanish America remained under Spanish rule. Nevertheless, there were ardent spirits who had imbibed the ideas of the Revolution. Believing that the peoples of South America were ripe for revolt against the Spanish monarchy, the British, in 1806, immediately after Trafalgar, dispatched an expedition to Buenos Ayres. The people were not in the least ripe for revolt, and the expedition failed disastrously. Further British intervention was prevented by the revolt of Spain herself, not against the monarchy, but against the Napolconic tyranny, and her consequent alliance with Britain. On the other hand, the condition of Spain provided material for the revolutionary movement in the Spanish dominions oversea. The Provisional Government in the Peninsula was, as we have seen, incapable; its authority oversea was nil; Brazil had just received a constitution from the King of Portugal, who, ejected from Lisbon by Junot, had retired to Rio de Janeiro. There was no common organized revolutionary movement; but everywhere ambitious or fanatical politicians took advantage of the general disorder and uncertainty to overthrow the existing provincial governments, and seize control as representatives of the lawful rule of Ferdinand VII., the *de jure* King of Spain. Hitherto the officials had almost all been born in Spain, not Creoles—that is, colonial born. When they took heart and attempted to recover their positions, the struggle, in effect, became one between a Conservative Spanish party and varying Creole factions. The reaction seemed likely to win. The confusion became more chaotic as a result of the proceedings of the Cortes at Cadiz in 1812—when Wellington was seriously contemplating its suppression. It promulgated a constitution based upon the "Rights

of Man," which gave a corresponding turn to the revolutionary movement in the colonies. The old governments had, however, for the most part recovered their predominance when the peace of Paris made Ferdinand, King of Spain, *de facto* as well as *de jure*; and Ferdinand, as will presently be seen, was reactionary of that worst type that makes revolution inevitable. In its next stage the story of South America becomes a welter of struggles, in which Spanish America severs its connection with Spain, forming independent states, all nominally republics, but in actual effect despotisms,—the unfailing result when an established system is overthrown by revolutionists who have neither a definite model to imitate, nor a political tradition of their own to adapt to the new circumstances.

The North American "Revolution" followed a different course. It left the norther portion of the continent still within the British Empire, from which it severed the older colonies. In both cases it necessitated changes in the Government, but also in both cases there was a political tradition, essentially a British tradition, for adaptation.

First, as concerns the still British portion. During the War of Independence a substantial number of the old population of the revolted colonies remained stubbornly loyal to the British flag, thereby earning the bitter hostility of the great majority as enemies of the cause of freedom. The victory of the Revolution made their position intolerable within the new Republic; so did their pestilence in their loyalty to the mother-country; and large numbers of them crossed the borders, some to establish themselves in what had once been Acadie, on the south of the St. Lawrence, others to seek new homes on its upper basin, within Canada proper. Both came with the tradition of self-government always enjoyed by the British colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. Canada proper had no such tradition. It was peopled mainly by a French population which until twenty years ago had lived under a French Government, and during the last twenty years had continued to be governed as much as possible in accordance with the French tradition. In the districts now occupied by immigrants of British descent there were few French or none. Hence the system adopted was to separate and preserve the continuity of the government within the French area or Lower Canada, and to establish governments on the traditional British lines in the rest. Thus were created the new provinces of Ontario or Upper Canada on the Upper St. Lawrence, and New Brunswick on the south of the Lower St. Lawrence; with governments entirely separate from that of Quebec or Lower Canada. The Constitutional Act of 1791, which divided Canada into Upper and Lower gave to each an Elective Assembly and a Legislative Council nominated by the Crown, seven years after New Brunswick had

received its similar constitution. The Parliament in England reserved the right of imposing customs duties for the regulation of commerce, while the revenues accruing were controlled by the provincial legislatures, so that the old bone of contention with the thirteen colonies—taxation for the benefit of the Imperial Revenue—was in effect buried. The registration in Canada of the United Empire Loyalists—the families who had come in, to remain under the British flag—gave them a permanent prestige, which secured to them a practical monopoly of official positions, and also established a traditional hostility to the United States.

The problem entailed upon the United States by the revolution which separated them from the British Empire was the combination of a number of separate states into a single nation—states which had diverse as well as common interests. Any centralization of authority was necessarily a limitation on the independence of the individual states—an independence which was ardently cherished by each. The single nation, safeguarding the maximum of individual independence compatible with common nationality, was created by the constitution which was inaugurated in 1789 with George Washington as first President of the United States. But the constitution provided, not a solution of the problem of diverse interests, but only the machinery by means of which it must be solved. The ultimate solution was only attained at the cost of a great civil war at the end of three quarters of a century. It was the ancient problem on which Hellenic nationalism had gone to wreck, because particularism proved too strong for unification, and simplified the application of the Roman maxim, "*Divide et Impera.*" In America, unification conquered particularism, but only after a prolonged and doubtful struggle.

From the beginnings the conditions of Southern States of the Union tended to make them particularist, those of the Northern to make them in favor of strengthening the central authority; in effect, parties fell into the two groups which came to be known as Federalists and Republicans, the former being the advocates of the Central or Federal authority. While Washington remained at the head, he stood above party; but from his retirement onwards the election of the President became a party question, and after his immediate successor each President ruled as the chief of his own party.

Like William III. in England a century earlier, Washington refused to be bound by party considerations in the selection of his Ministers. His Secretary of the Treasury was a Northerner, Alexander Hamilton; his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, a Southerner. The first business of the Government was the restoration of credit, and the first measure proposed by Hamilton was the assumption of the several State debts by the Federal Government—from which, in fact, the states of the North would reap more ad-

vantage than those of the South, and the persons who had bought up the enormously depreciated State bonds would profit immensely. At the same time, assumption—like the creation of the National Debt under William III.—would give all the holders the strongest possible interest in maintaining and strengthening the Central Government, the last thing desired by the anti-Federalists, whose strength lay in the South. Hamilton's scheme was only carried through by the concession to the Southerners of another point on which North and South were opposed. The seat of the National Government; was placed not in the North but in Pennsylvania. Hamilton, however, gained another point by procuring the establishment of a National Bank, as the Central Government under William had been strengthened by the creation of the Bank of England; but the party division in Washington's Cabinet was rendered permanent.

A fresh question arose in 1794, when Washington was reluctantly entering upon a second presidential term. The French Republic was at war with the rest of Europe. Jefferson's sympathies were wholly with France; to Hamilton, Jacobinism was abhorrent. To uninstructed popular opinion, it was enough that the monarchies—one of which the Americans had shaken off—were on one side; and on the other a Republic, a people which had taken the American side in the recent struggle. The French Government claimed American support on the ground, not only of natural sympathy, but also of the terms of the alliance of 1778. Instructed opinion favored the preservation of strict neutrality, and was in consequence vehemently denounced as pro-British and unpatriotic. The President pronounced for neutrality in language foreshadowing the Monroe Doctrine; and then the French Agent clinched the matter by virtually appealing to the people against the President, with the inevitable result that he was sent back to France.

Relations with Great Britain, on the other hand, were strained because Americans and British each, not without justification, claimed that the other persistently evaded obligations incurred under the treaty of 1783. Matters were smoothed over by an agreement known as Jay's Treaty, as between the Governments; but as this was in turn denounced as a humiliating submission to British demands, it did little or nothing to remove popular ill-feeling.

Washington resolutely declined a third term of office, and in 1797 Hamilton's jealous intriguing almost gave the presidency to Jefferson instead of John Adams. The antagonism between Hamilton and Adams practically broke up the Federalist party. Under Hamilton's guidance an Alien Act and a Sedition Act were passed, curtailing the liberty of the subject, which were hotly resented. State legislatures passed hostile resolutions, notably in Kentucky, which had only just acquired recognition as a state; making the anti-Federal claim

that the Union was a compact between the states, and that the right of judging whether Federal Acts were constitutional lay with them. Nothing, however, came of these resolutions. But Hamilton's attitude was threatening a serious breach with France. Adams broke with the group, and effected a reconciliation with the French Government. The result was that at the next presidential election faction and intrigue played a still more prominent part. Federalist votes were cast for Republican candidates; Jefferson became President (1801); and something like a clean sweep was made of the removable Federalist officials.

Jefferson began his presidency at a moment when it seemed as if there would be a new rupture with France. Bonaparte was now First Consul, and in agreement with Talleyrand was contemplating the revival of the oversea French dominion. In 1800 he extorted from Spain, as we have seen; the retrocession of Louisiana as the price for making the Spanish king's son-in-law King of Etruria. The Americans could not with equanimity contemplate the reappearance of France as a rival on the North American continent. Jefferson, despite his French sympathies and his dislike of armaments, felt that this would impose a defensive alliance with the maritime power of Britain. Relations were again strained; but by the spring of 1803 Napoleon was on the verge of declaring war on the British; the prospect of retaining an effective hold in Louisiana was in the circumstances more than doubtful, and was worth exchanging for American friendship. He offered to sell Louisiana, and Jefferson purchased it. His action was popular, and in fact insured his reelection; but it implied a claim on the part of the Central Government to powers not expressly bestowed on it by the Constitution; powers therefore which, according to the orthodox Republican doctrine, were quite unconstitutional.

The maritime rights claimed by Britain as a belligerent have always been a source of friction with neutrals. Friendly concession had been made on one point during the recent war under Jay's Treaty. In peace time, Spanish and French West India ports were in effect closed to the foreign trader; when those Powers were at war with Britain, British fleets practically closed them to the home traders as well. The principle was generally recognized that a trade not permitted in time of peace was also prohibited in time of war; nevertheless the Americans had practically become carriers for the French and Spaniards. Under Jay's Treaty, traffic between the islands and American ports was permitted, but not traffic between the islands and French or Spanish ports in American ships. On the renewal of the war the British placed a strict interpretation on the law, refusing to admit that such voyages had been "broken" by disembarkation and reshipment at American wharves—thereby stop-

ping what had been a highly lucrative trade, greatly to the irritation of the Americans. Then came Trafalgar, completing the paralysis of the Franco-Spanish marine; Napoleon's Berlin and Milan Decrees, seeking to close the avenues of British commerce; and the British response by the Orders in Council. The Decrees were not felt, because Napoleon was unable to enforce them against commerce between Britain and America; the Orders were felt, because Britain could effectively stop commerce between America and the Continent. Hence, though the British action was merely a logical retaliation, it created a resentment much greater than the action of Napoleon.

Added to this was the rigorous application by the British of other rights. They claimed to impress British subjects, wherever found, for the Navy. Numbers of British deserters were actually to be found on American ships; it was not easy to ascertain with certainty whether individuals were in fact American or British, and the British never gave the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, they stopped and searched American ships for deserters.

To the Decrees and Orders in Council Jefferson retaliated by an embargo upon commerce with both the offending countries. Retaliation is a two-edged weapon which hurts both parties, but damages the weaker of the two more than the stronger. In 1809 Madison succeeded Jefferson as president, and the embargo was repealed.

Friction and irritation continued. It was aggravated by a conviction, in the states of the Ohio basin, that the Canadian authorities were fomenting hostility among the Indians of the Northwestern Territory—Indiana—who regarded as their own exclusive reserve ground which American settlers were occupying. Acts of violence were committed; a punitive expedition was sent which inflicted a sharp defeat on the Indians; and the retirement to Canada of their chief and prophet, Tecumseh, gave color to the belief that he had been acting on British instigation. The war party was increasing in strength; the exigencies of an approaching presidential contest drew Madison to the same side; and war was declared between the United States and Britain in June 1812—at the moment when Wellington was engaged on the Salamanca campaign, and war was on the point of being declared between Napoleon and the Tsar. It was a curious instance of irony that the Government in England and Napoleon in France had both consented to withdraw the most vexatious of their restrictions upon the American marine; and if the news had reached America in time, it is almost incredible that the extreme step would have been taken. As before the War of Independence, had both sides been moderately anxious to understand the point of view of the other, and had both abstained from exasperated and exasperating language, the armed contest would never have taken place; neither could possibly

have gained more by fighting than by keeping the peace. The British government at least, having the war with Napoleon on its hands, could not spare the energy or the attention necessary to bring the conflict on an immediate and decisive conclusion; and the American could in any event look for nothing materially more than the British had virtually conceded at the moment when America appealed to arms.

The moving spirits of the American war-party, Clay and Calhoun, were largely actuated by the illusion of 1775—that Canada would be added to the United States. The most recent settlers in Upper Canada were supposed to be disaffected, while the French of Lower Canada were ill-pleased by the disproportionate social and political influence of the small minority of British descent or birth. In fact, however, a union with the Republic was the last thing desired in Canada. In the Upper Province, if the population was sparse, most of it belonged to the Loyalist group which was passionately attached to the Flag. In the lower Province, the French were in no way treated as a subject population, and already enjoyed far more freedom than under the old French régime; while the Catholic clergy, thoroughly alive to the generous treatment they had received, exerted all their influence in support of the Government. The Maritime Provinces were fervently loyal—and the New England States across their border were a good deal less than half-hearted about the war, since, if only for commercial reasons, they desired amity with Britain. If Canada was to be won at all, it would have to be by a military conquest, to which the New England States would give no effective aid.

The Union armies invaded Upper Canada; instead of overrunning it, they were met by a determined resistance, were outgeneraled and outfought in spite of greatly superior numbers. Some successes were gained in the second year (1813), but the honors again rested with the Canadians, notably in the memorable engagements of Chateauguay and Chrysler's Farm. On the other hand, while a British squadron kept the ports of British North America secure, no fleet engagements took place; but American privateers ranged freely, and there were several duels between isolated ships in which the British were repeatedly beaten—mainly, though not wholly, because the American vessels classed as frigates were bigger than those of the British and carried a heavier armament. As a matter of course, when the British Government realized the situation, the American ports were effectively blockaded—though privateers ran the blockade, and played havoc with the British mercantile marine—and the successful duels of 1812 were not afterwards repeated. The one notable duel of 1813 was that in which the British *Shannon* vanquished the American *Chesapeake* in fifteen minutes.

In 1813 Wellington's victory at Vittoria drove the French out of the Peninsula; and in the next year, when Napoleon was in Elba,

British troops landed, marched upon Washington, and burned it—a proceeding generally condemned by British public opinion. A subsequent attack upon Baltimore was repulsed; and an attempt in December to capture New Orleans was shattered on 8th January by the defense of Andrew Jackson—a waste of life as needless as that at Toulouse in the previous spring; for, though it was not known in America, peace between the belligerents had been signed at Ghent a fortnight before (Dec. 1814).

It is possible that but for the peace there would have been a curious reversal of the *rôles* of the Federalist North and the Republican South; for Massachusetts in particular was sick of the war and ill-pleased with the large proportion of the war expenses which fell to her share. She was actually formulating at the Harvard Convention proposals of a disruptive character when the wind was taken out of her sails by the news of the peace. The Federalists as a party, though not Federalism itself, were driven out of the field, and became no more than a faction.

The peace neither affirmed nor canceled the British claims to the right of search and impressment, which had been at the bottom of the quarrel. It settled, in a sense very unsatisfactory to Canada, certain boundary questions which had been in dispute, and in a sense adverse to the States certain fishery questions. But even these were not all cleared up, though they never again gave rise to actual hostilities between the two branches of what had once been a single nation. The whole unhappy episode left a legacy of ill-feeling like a family quarrel, which nevertheless does not destroy the sense of kinship; a feeling which it took generations to remove. On the other hand, it emphasized for America the doctrine of the separation of the hemispheres—of American non-intervention in European affairs, and European non-intervention in American affairs. Within a few years the achievement of independence by the Spanish colonies and by Brazil left French and Dutch Guiana the only European possessions on the whole continent of America, with the exception of the British dominion in the north; so that for the best part of a century the United States were able to hold themselves free from foreign complications, and to carry out their own development untrammelled, save at the moments when there was a clashing of interest between themselves and their British cousins. This governing doctrine of American policy was partly formulated by, and takes its name from, James Monroe who succeeded Madison as fifth President in 1817.

## CHAPTER XXXVI

### EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST: 1815-1832

#### *I.—The Vienna Settlement, 1815*

THE Bourbon restoration in France, which for a moment after Waterloo was in some doubt, was secured mainly by the firmness and sagacity of Wellington and the shrewdness of Louis XVIII. himself, who, like Charles II., had no intention of "going on his travels again." By the duke's advice he came to terms with Fouché, who, more than any one else, was master of France. Through the Terror, through the Republic, through the Empire, Fouché had always been on the winning side, and knew everything that was to be known about every one. Louis was already re-established when the allied sovereigns reached Paris.

The restoration was the decisive factor in the terms of peace. Prussia would have made France pay the penalty for Napoleon's last desperate throw, and would have restored to Germany Alsace and Lorraine, which had passed under the French Crown only during the century preceding the Revolution, but had become thoroughly Gallicized. But Alexander declared that the war had been a war not with France but with Napoleon; Wellington insisted that a Bourbon restoration, coupled with dismemberment of what had been the Bourbon kingdom, would destroy all prospect either of European peace or of orderly government in France. Their views prevailed; only some scraps of territory, annexed since 1791 but still left to her by the first Peace of Paris, were taken away, an indemnity was imposed, and an allied army of occupation was to be maintained at the cost of France for five years, or less if the allied Powers should so choose. Otherwise, the terms of the previous peace were in effect ratified. The second Treaty of Paris was actually signed only on 20th November.

For Italy the Hundred Days had one definite consequence. Murat had tried to use the opportunity to extend his own dominion in the peninsula. He had failed, and joined Napoleon; and the Bourbon kingdom of Naples was already restored. Later in the year, Murat appeared in Calabria, attempted to raise a rebellion, and was captured and shot.

The work of the Vienna Congress had meanwhile been completed in spite of Napoleon's reappearance. Ferdinand was back on the throne of Spain; the King of Sardinia was strengthened by having the former republic of Genoa added to his Piedmontese dominion; Naples was again a Bourbon state; Belgium was added to the kingdom of Holland; the Tsar became also "King of Poland"—so much of the old Poland as was included in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Posen excepted. Prussia got compensation in the Rhenish provinces, which gave her German territories with a German population in lieu of Polish territories with a Slavonic population, and incidentally made her the guardian of Germany against French aggression, Austria having resigned her western interests with her retirement from Belgium, the "Austrian Netherlands" of the eighteenth century; while Hanover, Hesse, and other independent principalities completely severed her western from her eastern dominions to which a portion of Saxony was added. Norway, very much against her own will, was severed from Denmark and joined to Sweden, in accordance with Alexander's promise to Bernadotte. It need hardly be remarked that in all this distribution of territory no one dreamed of paying the smallest regard to the views and desires of the populations concerned. The protests of Norway, Genoa, Venetia, and Belgium were ignored, and resistance when offered was actively suppressed. The British retained possession of the Ionian Islands and of Malta, and, as we have seen, of Cape Colony, Ceylon, and Mauritius. The river Pruth had become the boundary between Turkey in Europe and Russia, which had acquired the whole northern littoral of the Black Sea. Italy was still a "geographical expression," with Venetia and Lombardy attached to Austria, while Piedmont with Genoa formed part of the Sardinian kingdom; Hapsburg princes held the duchies of Modena and Tuscany; and between the northern principalities and the southern Bourbon kingdom of Naples and Sicily lay the restored Papal States.

Now the Revolution and the wars of the last five-and-twenty years had given active life to two conceptions which had long been germinating—the ideas of nationality and of political liberty; the right of the masses to a voice of some sort in their own government, and the right of peoples essentially one to formal unity and separate sovereignty. The doctrine of liberty, long accepted in principle in Great Britain and the four European republics of Holland, Switzerland, Venice, and Genoa, had been aggressively formulated by the Revolution. The spirit of nationality, strong for centuries in the British Isles and in France, but little in evidence elsewhere, had flamed up suddenly in the Spain which defied Napoleon, and, kindled in Germany, had touched Prussia to a new life. The spark had fallen, in Greece, in Italy, in Hungary, though the world's rulers were blind to it.

The high diplomacy of the Congress ignored both conceptions entirely. Its aim was first to satisfy the greater dynasts by compromises, then the lesser princes who found favor with the greater; the remnant being considered only when consideration for them suited the convenience of the rest. Belgium was yoked to Holland, Norway to Sweden; Hapsburgs reigned over one-third of Italy, Bourbons over another third; Poland remained dismembered, and though a section of it regained a status of nominal independence, its king was the Tsar of Russia. Nor did German unity fare any better. Absorptions and redistribution left a total of thirty-nine states ruled by kings, dukes, and princes, with certain free cities, to form a loose confederation lacking even the bond of a nominal Imperial sovereignty. In 1815 it was still possible to claim the separation of Alsace and Lorraine from France on the ground that they were traditionally German, though already French in sympathy; but the claim counted for nothing except in the view of Stein and Hardenberg. They remained to France not because they were essentially French, but because they were a part of the dominions of the French Crown before the fighting began.

This Alsace-Lorraine question demands some further examination, since diverse critics are apt either to applaud the decision of the Congress for its insight, or to praise the foresight of Hardenberg in opposing it. The plain truth is that Germany could never be easy with an aggressive France in possession of the disputed provinces, nor could France be easy with an aggressive Germany in possession of them. Whichever of the two owned them, that Power was in a position of strategic advantage for attacking the other. Being left to France, they became an eternal object of desire to Prussia-on-Rhine. Separated from France, their recovery would have been to her an eternal object of desire. Both these statements have received complete demonstration in the last fifty years; and he is a rash man who will venture to prophesy that the demonstration will not be repeated before the passing of another half-century. In the half-century after Waterloo there was no collision over the provinces; the struggle of 1870 would probably have been fought out earlier if France had had their recovery to fight for—that is all that the public peace gained or lost by the arrangement of 1815. Hardenberg's nationalist plea was not conclusive, because nationality is less a matter of race than of community of sentiment. A plebiscite of the provinces, if any one had thought of such a thing, would probably have been quite inconclusive. European peace, the principle of nationalism, and popular feeling, could be urged with equal force or lack of force on either side. But two considerations were definitely in favor of France: the public law of Europe had recognized the provinces as French since the middle of the eighteenth century; and the stability of the restored Bourbon monarchy depended on their retention by France. Those two

considerations were decisive from the point of view alike of justice and expediency.

The Scandinavian kingdoms, since the death of Charles XII., had ceased to exercise any material influence upon international politics, and had become only occasional pawns in the game of the greater States; but to their own development the Vienna Settlement was of importance. In the first place, it confirmed their exclusion from the number of the effective Powers. Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden by nomination and her actual ruler—though it was not till 1818 that he became Charles XIV. on the reigning king's death—had made with Russia, in 1812, the secret bargain by which Norway was to be severed from Denmark and joined to Sweden, which in return acquiesced in the annexation of Finland by Russia. Swedish Pomerania was to have been Denmark's compensation, but was bestowed instead upon Prussia by the Congress. Thus both Finland and Pomerania being lost to Scandinavia, her control in the Baltic was materially weakened. The government of Sweden and Norway became a sort of compromise between theoretical constitutionalism and the practical benevolent despotism of Charles XIV. The Union of Sweden and Norway was not an incorporation, but a union of crowns with separate constitutions, very much like that of England and Scotland in 1603; perpetuating the antagonism between the peoples of the two countries, which differed in much the same way. In both cases the spirit of Independent nationalism tended to separation, that of Common nationalism to amalgamation, and in both the former proved stronger than the latter for a hundred years. But, in the one case, community of interests ultimately turned the scale in the crisis of 1706; in the other, the Separatist sentiment won the final victory early in the twentieth century.

The European settlement ignored popular liberty as completely as it ignored nationalism. Officially it was a re-instatement of pre-Revolution governments—though with substantial exceptions, since the Genoese and Venetian republics were absorbed into the Sardinian and Hapsburg monarchies, and innumerable small German principalities were similarly absorbed by monarchical states. The Dutch Republic, it is true, became a monarchy, but the king was merely the old hereditary stadtholder with a royal title. It was not the Congress but the particular circumstances of particular states which modified the absolutism or the liberalism of one government or another, except in the numerous cases of absorption.

The shelving of the new ideas was nowhere more marked than in the structure of the Germanic Confederation. German nationalism required a strong central government for the united states of Germany. That this should be achieved through the definite supremacy either of Austria or of Prussia was out of the question, since either of the

two would resent the domination of the other. A compact Germany, in which neither could be supreme, would suit neither Hapsburg nor Hohenzollern: therefore neither Hapsburg nor Hohenzollern wanted a compact Germany; whereas out of a loose association of German states among which each of the two had but one rival, each could hope to extract considerable advantages and to exercise an influence which, when the two were not antagonistic, would be overwhelming. Moreover, every one of the other dynasties was tenacious of sovereign rights which none were at all disposed to resign to a central authority. In the outcome, though a central authority was appointed, a Diet of the Confederation with Austria as president, its powers of control were extremely limited, because on all vital subjects its vote must be unanimous to be effective, or at best supported by a two-thirds majority. Practically, the Diet was merely the medium through which the Great Powers exerted their influence upon the minor states. And it was the courts, not the populations, which were represented in the Diet. As for popular liberties, one of the Articles of Confederation—the thirteenth—required that there should be popular assemblies in each state, but provided no securities for their possession of any effective power whatever.

One step forward, however, in the path of civilization was made by the Congress at the instance of Great Britain. She who in the past had been the great slave-trading Power, had awakened to the iniquity of the traffic, and abolished it so far as she herself was concerned in 1807. Sweden and Holland had followed suit; so had Napoleon, on his return from Elba. The Congress now definitely pronounced for the abolition of the slave trade, though Portugal still maintained it for a time south of the equator, and it was some years before Spain submitted to the pressure of civilized opinion.

All Europe was weary of war and craved for the establishment of permanent peace; but for this something more was needed than the settlement of immediate territorial and dynastic questions and claims, which carried in themselves no guarantee of permanence. Tsar Alexander had his own nostrum to propose, the product of his peculiar private compost of incompatible ideals. The Christian princes of Europe were to unite in a Holy Alliance, in which all should be pledged to base their domestic and foreign policy on the truths of the Christian religion and the principles of Christian morality, in a common brotherhood. All being actuated by the same sublime motive, they would, of course, act harmoniously; discord would be impossible. But to be actuated by a common motive and to accept a common formula with mental reservations are not quite the same thing. Alexander's formula meant everything or nothing, according to the particular interpretation by the individual monarch, or the political keeper of his conscience. Nobody would have any objection to sign-

ing it, and no one having signed it would act otherwise than if he had not done so. No one, except the visionary author of the scheme and perhaps the honest but dull-witted King of Prussia, imagined that any one else, after signing, would give the formula a second thought. All the monarchs were invited to sign when Frederick William and Francis of Austria had done so with Metternich's sneering assent. The pledge was a purely personal one; in England the Prince Regent—George III. was now hopefully insane—was debarred from signing it by the Constitution. The invitation could not be extended to the Mohammedan Sultan of Turkey; and the Pope refused, because in his eyes the Tsar was a heretic and a revolutionary. To every one else, acceptance was merely a polite concession to a whim of the Tsar, which was of no practical consequence. In practice it bound nobody to anything.

Nevertheless, the Holy Alliance was in truth the enunciation of a political doctrine which continued to play its part for another century—the doctrine of the divine right of royalty. For Alexander, the divine right carried with it an obligation—not towards subjects but towards its Divine Author, to whom alone the monarch is responsible. For other monarchs as well as Alexander it meant that to challenge their absolute authority was in the nature of blasphemy; in their own eyes they were the vicereagents of the Almighty; by implication, what they willed must be the will of God, so that there was no room for obligation on their part. The doctrine claimed for the punishment of the disobedient the same sanction which the Roman Church had claimed in the past for the punishment of heretics. That conception, of which the theory of the Holy Alliance was the expression, has without doubt profoundly influenced not a few of the most autocratic princes during the past century. And it helped to bind the autocrats more closely together, in defense of the principle of autocracy, though it did little enough to inspire them to the pursuit of Christian ideals.

As a compact, then, the Holy Alliance was of no great account—to Castlereagh it was craziness, to Metternich verbiage. At the moment its monarchist essence was not even realized, since Alexander was still a zealous advocate of Constitutions, popular liberties bestowed by grace of the autocrat for the good of his subjects. But by a definite pact between themselves, the four great Powers undertook the task of maintaining the settlement and preserving the public peace. Their treaty was signed on the same day as the second Treaty of Paris. France, the great disturber of the peace, was still on probation and was not admitted to the Alliance, the concert of the Powers, till 1818. It was a formal political league of states—by no means the same thing as a generally subscribed declaration by princes—a league of the then recognized Big Four. If they were in agreement as to

ends and means, they could impose their will upon Europe; and peace was at least their common end. The Powers, in the persons of their monarchs or ministers, were to meet periodically, pronounce in conference upon questions as they arose, and act as a sort of international court. But the Alliance could only translate its decisions into definite action by agreement of all the four—or at least so long as none of them was prepared to offer positive opposition. If fundamental differences of principle arose between them, nothing more than this one thing was secured—that action would not be taken precipitately. The periodical congresses would insure deliberation, discussion, the effort at least to avoid the appeal to arms.

## *II.—Europe in the Era of the Congresses, 1815-1822*

Reaction was in fact the keynote of nearly every government in the years which followed the Vienna settlement; the signs had already been apparent from the moment when the restorations began after Napoleon's abdication in 1814. Ferdinand of Spain, replaced on the throne under the "Constitution of 1812," created by the Ultras who did not in the least represent public opinion, had at once overturned it, and revived every iniquity of the old absolutism in its most iniquitous form. Louis XVIII. by the Charta issued in 1814 had granted in France a liberal Constitution, but it remained to be seen whether he could restrain the terrors and the vindictiveness of his brother Charles of Artois and the rest of the returned *émigrés*. Ferdinand of Naples was back, with every intention of abusing his powers as far as he dared. Wherever Austrian dominion extended, no popular movement could make a beginning. In Germany, the rulers of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, jealous of Prussia's power, were ready to seek popular support only while they imagined that they would thereby be aided in counteracting Prussian influence. The British Government, theoretically committed to the doctrines of liberty, was hardly less afraid of "the revolution" than were continental despotisms, and maintained at home a repressive policy. Prussia, despite the ideas which had been cherished by Stein and Hardenberg, almost immediately relapsed from the momentary promise of progress towards popular government; the new Prussian kingdom was thoroughly heterogeneous, and its various portions had no craving for a common parliamentary authority. The Tsar was still full of lofty visions, but his conception of popular liberty within his own dominions only recognized it when it acquiesced with proper enthusiasm in his own schemes—when it called them in question, it was not liberty but "the revolution."

In the eyes of the British Government, the existing British Constitution represented in theory and in practice the perfection of

ordered liberty; even such reform as had been contemplated by Chatham and his son would be an opening of the floodgates. But that did not prevent them from watching with equanimity the constitutional movements in less favored countries. Castlereagh, regarded in England as the incarnation of reactionary tyranny, consistently declined to countenance the potentates of the Quadruple Alliance in their desire to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states which were distributed by popular movements. But the principle he stood for was that of non-intervention, not that of recognizing popular rights. In effect, reactionary governments everywhere enjoyed the moral support of the Alliance, while even moral support was usually lacking for reforming movements, since each of the allied governments suspected in such movements a revolutionary motive and feared the spreading of the contagion to its own people. On the other hand, the arbitrary harshness with which the authorities gagged and crushed every sort of opposition tended of itself to goad moderate reformers to become uncompromising revolutionaries.

<sup>1</sup> In the France of the Restoration, as in the England of 1660, the royalism of the triumphant party went far beyond that of the king, who, whatever theories he might hold, was thoroughly alive to the politic value of moderation and conciliation. Artois and his group were full of vindictiveness against Republicans and Bonapartists alike. They made *Væ Victis* their motto, and the "White Terror" of their persecution was hardly less pitiless than the "Red Terror" of the Revolution. When the new Chambers met in 1815, the Ultras were predominant and forced the dismissal of both Fouché and Talleyrand. Louis was able to set in the places of the dismissed ministers Décazes and the Duc de Richelieu, men of moderation and patriotism; but it was easy to see that the monarchy had more to fear from the violence of the extremists of the old régime than from any possible recrudescence of Jacobinism. In the legislature, which Louis had at first supposed to be a flock of obedient loyalists and had nicknamed the "Chambre Introuvable," the majority formed an "Ultra" opposition to the moderate ministry, which could only in a limited degree stem their reactionary fury.

The situation was saved by the ministry and the king. A modification of the electoral law, followed by the dissolution of the "Chambre Introuvable" in September 1816, gave Richelieu a substantial majority in the new legislature, and a Moderate government was secured, with the very important result that the prevalence of order very soon justified Richelieu's demand for the withdrawal of the allied army of occupation.

Any hopes which German patriots of the school of Stein might have reposed upon the German Diet were doomed to immediate disappointment. It was dominated by Metternich, and his influence paralyzed it

for any action in favor of constitutional developments in the states of the confederation. If liberal sentiment favored German unity in the abstract, it was in each particular state much more anxious about popular liberties, which would have very little chance if the right of the Diet to intervene were recognized; therefore liberalism was driven to maintain particularism in the concrete. The attitude of the Diet was definitely determined in 1818, when it resolved that the states should proceed to grant "Constitutions" under "Article XIII.," but left them individually to interpret the obligation as each might choose—which in most cases meant that the existing governments found that the obligation amounted to nothing at all. As a matter of fact it was only the Intellectuals who cried aloud either for popular government or for German unity—the universities had not yet become instruments of the ruling powers; and if their voices were loud, their influence was limited. Farther, in the new Prussia there were not even germs of a Prussian national sentiment; while in the other states the popular demand was not for political power, but for the social equality which the Napoleonic system had set up in place of the old system of privilege. Nevertheless, the failure of Prussia to produce a Constitution encouraged a liberal pose by way of contrast in the anti-Prussian governments, especially in Bavaria and Baden.

On the other hand, Prussia, in effect dropping constitutional reform, devoted itself steadily to administrative reform, and especially to fiscal reorganization and the removal of internal tariff barriers, leading to the gradual creation of the *Zollverein*, or Customs Union, primarily with those outside states which were wedged in between the Prussian provinces or encircled by them; a process which was ultimately to have a tremendous effect on the unification of North Germany under the ægis of Prussia; though such a result was present to the minds neither of the Prussian Government nor of Metternich, who gave the scheme an encouragement which he would certainly have withheld had he realized in it a menace to Austrian predominance.

In fact, the Germanism of the universities now, by its somewhat puerile extravagances, defeated its own ends. At a festival held at the Wartburg (October 1817) under the auspices of the Grand Duke of Weimar, a group of students indulged in a demonstration which to Metternich and his school seemed fearfully portentous of the growth of the revolutionary spirit, and provided them with an excuse for setting about the suppression of all free expression of opinion.

In 1818, the Powers assembled in conference at Aix-la-Chapelle. Hitherto the Tsar's liberal sympathies had been the great obstacle in the way of Metternich's decisive predominance in Germany and Europe generally. The main business of the Congress was the final emancipation of France and her admission to the Quadruple Alliance which became the Pentarchy; but in effect its outcome was a triumph

for Metternich, who succeeded at once in keeping the Tsar from breaking away, in drawing him over to the side of reaction, and in retaining the direction of European policy in the hands of the great Powers—which meant practically under his own control. The Congress was hardly over when the reaction was further strengthened by the extravagances of the Baden and Bavarian Parliaments, which frightened their princes, and by the assassination of Kotzebue, a reactionary publicist, by a crazy student. Any lingering hopes of the creation of a Prussian Constitution vanished. Metternich used his opportunity in an Austria-Prussian conference at Teplitz to come to an agreement under which Austria and Prussia were to execute the decrees of the German Diet which they would themselves dictate, while Prussia herself would be merely Austria's shadow and echo. The Teplitz convention was followed by the Carlsbad conference of the major German states which formulated repressive decrees directed especially against the universities, which decrees—in themselves of no authority—were confirmed by the Federal Diet (September 1819).

This Austro-Prussian dictatorship again drove Württemberg and other states to a fresh assertion of particularism at the Vienna Conference of 1820. Both Britain and Russia were sympathetic, but Metternich's diplomacy triumphed—at least so far as concerned Austria's own prestige; for, while appearing to withdraw the program of intervention, he gave an interpretation to the Constitutions already created which virtually made it optional for the princes to consult the Estates—and the princes were for the most part quite willing to enforce Metternich's policy so long as they were doing it by their own sovereign authority. The Carlsbad decrees were generally enforced, the universities and the liberal press were effectively muzzled, and a relentless persecution generated by panic suppressed all freedom of speech and even of opinion.

Meanwhile in England also the reaction was at its height. The Industrial Revolution and the stress of the war had completed the destruction of the old yeomanry, reducing the rural population to a condition of dependence upon rate aid and charity, since it was impossible for them to maintain themselves decently by their own exertions; and at the same time had created an industrial urban population with insufficient employment, unorganized, and able to earn at the best starvation wages, so that there was plenty of inflammable revolutionary material. Yet the government of Liverpool and Castle-reagh could find no remedy but repression, culminating in the famous Six Acts, which practically prohibited public meetings and gagged the press, though much less effectively than in countries where the expression of population feeling had not been assumed for more than a century to be an inalienable right, and stoutly claimed as such for

a much longer period. No minister could pretend to claim in England that such measures as the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act could be defended on any plea save that of emergency; whereas, in most European states such conditions had been merely normal before the French Revolution. No British Government could in the long run persistently defy public opinion or prevent it from making itself heard. But public opinion was sufficiently uneasy to concede a reluctant acquiescence to reactionary measures for the time being, though the tide was slowly turning.

The emancipation of France—the withdrawal of the armies of occupation, the reduction of her indemnities, and her admission to an equality with the four great Powers—was largely due to the success of Richelieu's moderate government at home, and to the tact and dignity he displayed at the Aix-la-Chapelle Congress. But the acquiescence of the Tsar had been secured only by promises on Richelieu's own part which the King and Décazes refused to endorse as too reactionary. Richelieu resigned; Louis and Décazes held to their moderate principles; but the election of the Abbé Grégoire, a notorious republican and reputed regicide, to the Assembly was taken as an ominous proof of the danger of the course they were following. Décazes was violently denounced by the Ultras, in spite of an attempt to strengthen the conservative forces in the electorate, which drove some of the more advanced members out of the ministry—a measure intended to soothe the alarm of foreign governments. The assassination of the Duc de Berri, who stood between the House of Orleans and the succession to the throne, proved fatal; Décazes was forced to resign (1820), and the direction of affairs passed first nominally to Richelieu, and then to Villèle, Chateaubriand, and the Ultras, since Louis, now an old man, lacked the energy to continue his resistance to their influence.

For a decade official France was in sympathy with the reactionary Powers. But in France, as in England, the commercial and bourgeois middle class was neither reactionary nor revolutionary, firmly convinced of the necessity for protecting order and property, but no less hostile to privilege whether aristocratic or clerical, and sympathetic towards liberal movements in other countries. But there was this difference between the two: in France the government tended to advance towards liberalism from 1815 to 1820, when the movement was checked and its victory postponed for ten years; in England, the government was increasingly reactionary during the first period and increasingly liberal during the second. On different lines both reached approximately the same point, one by the July Revolution of 1830, the other by the Reform Bill of 1832.

So far there had been no inducement to the great Powers to consider active intervention in the affairs of states outside Germany.

France could hardly become a serious menace so long as the army of occupation remained within her borders; expressions of opinion from external governments could and did influence her actions, but that was all. Austria and Prussia had some excuse for claiming that movements in the minor German states affected them too intimately to allow of non-intervention, but Alexander held to the opinion that they did not concern the Powers as a body, and Castlereagh even protested against the Carlsbad decrees as an unwarrantable interference with the rights of sovereign states. Those decrees, however, were directed, not against successful revolutions, but against the supposed dangers of a revolutionary propaganda. The moment had now come when actual revolutions had taken place or were on the verge of taking place, in the three Mediterranean peninsulas, and the question of intervention by the Powers became a critical one.

Spain led the way. Ferdinand, as was noted, had, on his restoration in 1814, promptly overturned the Constitution of 1812, created by a Cortes imbued with revolutionary ideas and wholly devoid of practical statesmanship. Patriotism, loyalty, conservatism, nothing in the nature of the revolutionary spirit, had inspired the Spanish defiance of the Bonapartist usurpation. It was only in the desperately makeshift national government during the Peninsular War—not in the people—that the ideas of the Revolution found acceptance or expression. Godoy's rule had indeed been detested, but Ferdinand as Crown Prince had been looked upon as the champion of those to whom it was most hateful, and a restoration of the old monarchy with Ferdinand as king was precisely what the country was most ready to welcome. It did not in the least want the Constitution of 1812.

But the restored Ferdinand at once showed himself in his true colors—something very different from the halo with which the popular imagination had invested him. Had he been capable of assuming the rôle of enlightened despot and modeled himself on his grandfather, Charles III., all would have been well. Instead, he proved to be the incarnation of all that was worst in the history of the Spanish monarchy without a redeeming feature. For a people content to be ruled and not to rule itself despotism is the best or the worst of governments according to the personal character and qualities of the despot. Ferdinand reinstated the Inquisition with all its old tyranny, restored the power of the Church with all its old obscurantism, vindictively persecuted the men associated with the Constitution of 1812, yielded himself wholly to the influence of incompetent and despicable favorites, and left administration to fall into hopeless chaos. Towards such a government there could be no deep-seated loyalty, though positive disaffection was perhaps almost confined to the officers who had won some distinction under the government which had created

the Constitution and who now found themselves ignored or superseded.

In a previous chapter we sketched the beginnings of revolt in Spain's South American colonies—revolt not against the Crown in the first instance, but against the governmental system. The Crown having identified itself with that system, the colonial movement became definitely one for separation and independence. The Spanish Government, unable to cope with it and losing ground, began to suggest European intervention in defense of the monarchical principle. As yet the appeal fell on deaf ears for the most part. America was too far away for movements there to excite alarm in Europe. The moment for the disaffected officers seemed to have come when a ragged force of under twenty thousand men were gathered at Cadiz to embark for the colonies, with little enough prospect of returning alive. A plot for revolt was set on foot, but the military adventurer who had been invited to the leadership betrayed the affair. Six months later two officers, Riego and Quiroga, again started a military revolt, which again broke down. But before it was crushed troops had risen at other centers; in the north the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed, the royalist generals declared for the Constitution, and Ferdinand promptly submitted (March 1820), and took the oath to the Constitution. Yet the effective result was merely a violent struggle between committees of government, juntas, formed mainly by rival factions of clerical reactionaries and doctrinaire revolutionists—the latter predominating in the Cortes—which plunged the country into worse chaos than ever.

Now the Tsar had finally become convinced that wherever liberalism sprouted it was rooted in the Revolution. He pronounced that the cause of monarchy in Spain must be saved, and proposed to save it with Russian troops. Metternich wanted no Russian troops marching through Austrian territories on their way to establish a Russian domination at the court of Madrid; he declared for non-intervention. Castlereagh saw no warrant for interfering with the domestic affairs of Spain, especially as the Spanish monarchy was as obstinately resolved as in the days of Elizabeth to bar and bolt the gates for British commerce with the colonies. Frederick William was Metternich's echo; in France Villèle was not yet in full control of the government. European intervention was dropped, and Spain was left to manage her own problems.

As with Spain, so, *mutatis mutandis*, was it with Portugal. King John had not returned from Brazil; where he had taken refuge from Junot in 1808. With the seat of the Imperial Government at Rio, Portugal found herself a subordinate province instead of center and head, with the British Field-Marshal Beresford for regent, and the British annexing much of her colonial trade. In the regent's ab-

sence, the country rose; on his return he was not allowed to land. The provisional government called on the king to come back himself; he came, leaving his son Pedro as regent in Brazil, probably with instructions to assume the crown of Brazil as an independent monarchy if such a course should seem necessary (1820)—which in fact he did in 1822. King John arrived in Portugal to find that the Cortes had passed a Constitution that left the Crown without any power—which he accepted with placid equanimity, to the annoyance, but hardly to the alarm, of the three Eastern Powers.

Fear of the development of Russian influence in the Mediterranean peninsulas had made Metternich a non-interventionist in spite of himself when the proposal for intervention in Spain came from the Tsar. When the area of disturbance spread to Italy where Austrian interests were more directly concerned, it required some skill to prove that there was no inconsistency in a change of front. In fact, it was the apparent success of the Spanish Revolution of 1820 which prompted a similar military demonstration in the Neapolitan kingdom. Ferdinand, on his own restoration and the ejection of Murat, had been sufficiently intelligent—or indolent—to abstain from aggressive vindictiveness or aggressive measures of reaction which would have been displeasing both to Britain, which had been his protector, and to Austria, on whose goodwill he felt himself to be dependent. But, like Ferdinand of Spain, he encouraged clerical influence; while both civilians and more particularly army officers who had served under the *de facto* Murat monarchy, found that recognition and advancement were reserved for those who had not bowed the knee to Baal. The example of Germany very soon warranted like measures of persecution, directed against expressions of liberal opinion. The Parthenopean Republic and the Murat monarchy had alike fostered liberal ideas socially even more than politically; repression of free speech gave a new impulse to the secret societies—especially the Carbonari—with which the whole kingdom of the two Sicilies were honeycombed; and with the news from Spain (1820) the movement broke out. General Pepe, who headed it, proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812; Ferdinand submitted and took the oath which was demanded of him, as the other Ferdinand had done; and having gone out of his way to confirm his oath with the most sacred protestations, secretly dispatched an appeal to Austria.

Metternich's suggestion that Russia and Austria should decide what was to be done without reference to the other Powers was rejected by Alexander, and a Congress was summoned at Troppau. Metternich, always secure of Prussian support, now found the Tsar also in complete agreement with him. If monarchs chose to grant Constitutions to their subjects no one had a right to interfere; if subjects forced Constitutions on their monarchs, such revolutions should be con-

demned and reversed by the Powers. Castlereagh flatly declined to accept any such doctrine. England would take care of her own revolutions and would certainly not permit any external intervention, nor admit the right of the Powers to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states; but he did not deny that Austria might claim for herself, as an Italian Power, a right to intervene in Naples. France took the same view. The other three Powers issued a declaration in the sense of Metternich's doctrine, which in the face of French and British opposition could hardly take effect.

The Troppau Congress was adjourned to Laibach. Ferdinand, invited to attend, again swore to the Constitution, but on the way to Laibach repudiated all his oaths as having been extorted by force. The Neapolitans had taken their stand on the Constitution in defiance of the Troppau protocol. Austria claimed for her own security the right to impose upon Naples by force the restoration of Ferdinand without the Constitution, and to secure order by a military occupation. Her claim was not opposed. The restoration and occupation were carried out after a resistance which was farcical, and the Neapolitans paid the penalty which might have been anticipated.

The example of Naples inspired Piedmont to a similar revolt; but the Piedmontese, having waited for a Neapolitan victory, had no chance when the Neapolitans collapsed instead. The revolt ended in a similar farce. It was hopelessly incongruous in its elements. Without unity of aim—the ideas of Constitutionalists, Republicans, and Italian Unionists having no common basis—it found in Prince Charles Albert, a cadet of the royal house, a leader who accepted the functions assigned to him and resigned them again twenty-four hours later. Still, there was a military demonstration, and a proclamation of the King of Sardinia as King of Italy under the "1812 Constitution." Victor Emmanuel promptly abdicated. His successor, Charles Felix, rejected all compromise; a large Austrian force advanced to his support, while a large Russian one was ready to come to Austria's aid if required, and the insurgent army was sheltered at Novara. Five weeks covered the period from the beginning to the end of the revolt. To all intents and purposes it was Austria that was mistress of Italy from end to end.

While the Laibach Conference was still in session, it had been perturbed by a new complication. Within the Turkish Empire a Greek revolt had broken out for which the insurgents claimed that Russia had promised her support. But Alexander knew nothing of it, and was easily persuaded by Metternich that this was the Revolution breaking out in a new quarter; and the question was rather whether it should be actively suppressed than whether it should be actively encouraged. The disasters which attended the opening movement seemed to promise an early collapse, and the Laibach Conference was ad-

journed, to meet again at Verona in the autumn of 1822, in a cheerful belief that the danger of a "Greek Question" would have died a natural death before that time.

But in the interval new troubles arose. France, now under the rule of Villèle and the Ultras, viewed with apprehension the state of affairs in the neighboring Bourbon kingdom beyond the Pyrenees. It appeared that the principles which warranted Austrian intervention in Naples warranted also French intervention in Spain. Castlereagh had protested mildly against any intervention in Naples, where no British interests were involved; but in Spain French intervention would be detrimental to British interests, and Castlereagh might not be content with mild protest. Alexander thought intervention desirable, but he also considered that there was much to be said in favor of Russia rather than France intervening as the mandatory of the Powers. Metternich approved of French intervention, but Russian armies in Spain were not at all to his liking. And if any one intervened at all, against the British view, the British Government was not unlikely to counter by recognizing the independence of the Spanish colonies, regardless of the Holy Alliance doctrine of the rights of legitimate monarchies.

Nor did the Greek question settle itself so readily as had been hoped at Laibach. The Porte complicated matters by measures which strongly excited the hostility of Russia, apart from the Tsar personally; refusing to evacuate the "Principalities," though bound to do so by treaty with Russia, and allowing Greek ships to be seized when flying the Russian flag. Popular sentiment also was violently stirred by the judicial murder of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. Under such conditions, it was difficult to deny that Russia had fully as much right to intervene as Austria had in Naples.

Castlereagh had declared the British view of the Spanish question uncompromisingly—it was a matter in which he would admit no room for discussion. If Great Britain took part in the adjourned conference at Verona, it would only be because the Greek affair might demand discussion. And it almost seemed that Metternich had solved that problem when, by diplomatic pressure, he induced the Porte to promise the evacuation of the Principalities, since the Tsar was extremely anxious not to intervene on behalf of the Greeks, and the concession might enable him to resist the pressure of the war party in Russia. Metternich had arranged for a conference at Vienna preliminary to that of Verona; but his hopes were dashed by the suicide of Castlereagh when on the point of starting for the meeting. Castlereagh had been sympathetic if obstinate; his successor, George Canning, was not even sympathetic, and very promptly showed that no shadow of support could be looked for from England. For the deceased minister had clung to the idea of the Concert of the Powers;

the new foreign secretary was convinced that the price of the Concert was the subordination of British views and British interests to those of the other Powers. Wellington was deputed to take Castlereagh's place at Verona.

When the Congress met, the Eastern question was passed over. The Spanish question was directly raised by France, which regarded it as a domestic matter; if she found it necessary to intervene in arms, would the Alliance support her? Here, as in all else, Metternich had at last prevailed with Alexander. Russia, Austria, and Prussia would countenance France's proposed action; Great Britain would not. It was proposed that the Powers should address the Spanish Government; Great Britain declined to be a party to the proposal, or to interfere or admit of a right of interference between the Crown and the Cortes. Her refusal to discuss the matter further virtually ended the illusion of a Concert. There could be no common intervention with England standing aside, and Metternich opposing the employment of Russian troops. When Spain gave no immediate answer to the messages of the four Powers, the French Government openly declared its purpose of saving the sister Bourbon monarchy in Spain (January 1823).

### *III.—Eastern Europe, 1820-1832*

"The Revolution" was a fixed obsession in the minds of the governing classes all over Europe. Had it not been so, it would readily have been seen that the Greek movement which disturbed the diplomatists at Laibach was something altogether different from the contemporary troubles in Spain, or even in Italy. Essentially it was not a revolt against monarchism, but the national effort of a people with a glorious tradition to break free from subjection to a race alien in blood, in religion, and in its outlook upon the world; a race intellectually stagnant and blighting in its influence; a race with no qualifications for dominion except indomitable courage, lust of conquest, and an unhesitating reliance upon frightfulness for the suppression of resistance.

In the fifteenth century the Ottoman had mastered the whole of the Balkan peninsula, destroying the last remnants of the Greek Empire, which for centuries had stood as the bulwark of Christendom against the westward expansion of Islam. The southern half of the peninsula had then been, and still remained, mainly Greek in language and tradition; the northern half mainly Slav—both for the most part clinging to the "Orthodox" Christian or Greek Church. The Mohammedan Turks had distributed themselves over the conquered country, and a proportion of the conquered population had embraced Islam. According to Moslem custom, conversion placed them on an equality with

the conquerors, the alternative to conversion being definite subjection. There were areas where Mohammedans was the predominant faith, areas where Turks were even a majority of the population. But, broadly speaking, Christians were everywhere subjects, Moslems were commonly rulers. Though Greeks and others were admitted to governorships and administrative offices, it was always with the consciousness that they, the once Imperial race, were there on sufferance, by grace of the infidel. The Greek or Slav Christian was at best the capriciously favored slave of the Turk.

As matter of fact, however, the Greeks, or whether on the mainland or in the islands, did not suffer normally from direct oppression by Moslem authorities. Turkish aggression in Europe had met with its final and decisive check at the hands of Prince Eugène about a century before Waterloo; during the last hundred years constant hostilities with Russia had deprived European Turkey of all her provinces on the northern Black Sea littoral, and that Power had come to look upon herself as having a special mission to protect her co-religionists within the Turkish borders as well as her Slavonic kinsmen—a theory which provided her with a standing excuse for pursuing her own material interests in those regions. The weakening of the Turkish Empire under the constant pressure of her powerful neighbor had the double effect, first, of encouraging the Turks as a matter of policy to conciliate their subjects by admitting them to privileges; and, secondly, of awakening by degrees among those subjects hopes of powerful external support in a defiance of the Ottoman supremacy.

The growth of a nationalist Greek sentiment was directed not to the rival of the Hellenic freedom of the ancient world, but to the recovery of the medieval Greek or Byzantine dominion as the natural Greek inheritance. It was hardly inspired by the mal-administration from which Greek and Turk, Christian and Mohammedan ordinarily suffered alike, though not quite in the same degree. In fact, during the eighteenth century there were governorships and offices of state which had become virtually the monopolies of a group of Greek families; and these included non-Greek provinces, notably the trans-Danube principalities, where the Greek bureaucracy was little enough to the liking of a population which was neither Turk nor Greek, nor in its own estimation Slavonic, but descended from Roman military colonists.

According to Western ideas, the primary function of a government is to govern—to give the population protection, order, security, justice. In the Oriental view, carried to the extreme by the Turks, these are merely minor or even super-rogatory aims, the primary functions of government being the exaction of revenue and the maintenance of an army for the preservation of its own unquestioned authority and for purposes of aggression. The Turkish Government did not gov-

ern—it exacted revenue, punished resistance to its authority with barbarous severity, and left the rest to practically irresponsible officials. Such conditions give little opportunity for organized development, but considerable scope for individual energy and enterprise on the basis of the doctrine that they may take who have the power, and they may who can. Greece, continental and insular, is a land of mountains and harbors; the former abounded with brigands, the latter with expert mariners, who divided their energies between legitimate commerce and piracy. Since the local governors were the channels through whom the central “government” obtained its revenues, they were themselves often enough either brigands on a big scale—organizers of brigandage—or in league with the brigands whom they were officially engaged in suppressing; and the brigands themselves varied their normal profession by occasional service in the government *gendarmerie*, on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief.

The intellectual ferment created by the French Revolution penetrated to Greece and added the touch of idealism to the quickening national feeling. The traveled Greek was conscious of Western sympathy for a Hellenism associated with the tradition not of Byzantium but of Athens and Sparta, and the intellectual revival was directed upon those lines. The Byzantine conception and the Hellenic ideal converging produced in the hour of national uprisings against Napoleon the Philiké Hetairia—a secret association whose political object was the restoration of the Greek Empire, though its professed Hellenism was more general, spiritual, and sentimental, and less materially ambitious; appealing the more in consequence to Western sympathies, while drawing within its pale Greek nationalists of every shade and type, from the dreamer to the brigand. Its headquarters were at Odessa.

Now Ali Pasha, a Mohammedan Albanian, had for some years been governor of the Adriatic province, with his headquarters at Janina in Epirus. Ambitious of creating for himself an independent kingdom, he had procured for kinsmen governorships in Greece, and meant to use the new Hellenism for his own ends. His attitude to the Porte was increasing defiant, and in 1819 had become so threatening that he was outlawed, and the Turkish Government found itself saddled with a war for his suppression. In 1820 Turkish troops were forcing their way into his territories, and he was shut up in Janina, where, through the winter, he held the enemy at bay. In the spring of 1821 the Turkish Pasha of the Peloponnese (the Morea) advanced against him.

In the view of the Philiké Hetairia, the moment for revolt had arrived. The society had already offered the leadership of the movement to Count Capo d'Istrias (of Corfu), himself a Greek who had for some years been confidential minister of the Tsar, for whose lib-

eral aberrations he was commonly supposed to be largely responsible. The moment did not seem to Capo d'Istria a favorable one for himself; he refused the leadership, but in doing so conveyed such an impression of Alexander's sympathy as well as his own that the leaders of the Hetairia considered themselves assured of Russian support whenever a rising should be concerted. Another leader was chosen, Alexander Hypsilanti, of one of the Greek houses of *voivodes*, or princes, which ruled in the trans-Danube principalities—himself an officer in the Russian service.

Deeming that the hour had arrived, Hypsilanti with a few companions crossed the Pruth, the boundary between Russia and Moldavia (March 6, 1821), and proclaimed the revolt, with the declaration that the movement had been promised the support of a great Power, and endeavored to raise a general insurrection. This was the news which perturbed the Congress at Laibach. But the northern revolt was an ignominious failure; neither the Rumanians nor the neighboring Slav peoples had the least sympathy with Greek ambitions for a Hellenic empire. A massacre of Mohammedans was the next false step, alienating possible support. The Tsar's repudiation of all responsibility for or sympathy with the insurrection was decisive; before midsummer the whole affair had collapsed, and Hypsilanti had taken flight into Austrian territory.

But matters went otherwise in the south. To the northern non-Greek population, Greeks were identified with an alien and unpopular bureaucracy; in the south the emissaries of the Hetairia appealed to a Greek population—Greek at least in tradition and sympathy if not actually in race; largely lawless by profession, reckless, trained to fighting in the school of brigandage and piracy; more responsive perhaps to religious fanaticism than to Hellenic sentiment, but alive also to the latter. The Ottoman troops, which might otherwise have stamped out the beginnings of a conflagration, had just been withdrawn to aid in crushing the stubborn Ali of Janina. Rebellion flamed out all over the Peloponnese and in the islands. In the Morea, the Mohammedan population was wiped out, sometimes in cold blood, with a savagery hardly surpassed even by the Turk. On the sea the hardy Greek mariners, when the Turkish fleet came out, drove it back to the Dardanelles and safety; and still Janina held out, and the flame leaped across the Gulf of Corinth and blazed upon its northern shore, though as yet it spread no farther. The initial success of the revolt in the south was no less complete than its collapse in the north.

The Sultan Mahmud was not without vigor and shrewdness. Where prompt action was possible, he acted; wherever there were strong Turkish garrisons, revolt was held in check; Khurshid, the commander before Janina, was not to be drawn away, and in Thessaly the expected rising, which would have threatened his communications, did

not take place. Mahmud did not at first check the instinct of savage reprisal for the massacre of Mohammedans in the revolted districts—there were corresponding massacres of Christians, and Christian sentiment was especially shocked by the execution without trial of the Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Church throughout the Sultan's dominions. In Russia the indignation excited was so great that Alexander was compelled to break off diplomatic relations and withdraw his ambassador. But Mahmud soon recovered his balance, checked the system of reprisals, and won over some of the armed insurgents to his own service.

The tide of Greek victory was stayed. The sailors could do nothing to protect the eastern coasts of the *Ægean*; even the islands were secure only so long as their flotillas were in the immediate neighborhood. Janina fell in February 1822, Ali was slain, massacre and devastation were let loose in the flourishing isle of Chios in April, and in the summer a Turkish force, under Dramali (Ali Pasha of Drama), was on the march for the Peloponnese. Austrian and British diplomacy prevented the apparently imminent declaration of war by Russia, and the prospect of direct European intervention in the struggle flickered out at the Verona Congress in the autumn. But still the fortunes of war fluctuated. Dramali mastered the isthmus of Corinth, and entered the Peloponnese; but Demetrius Hypsilanti (brother of Alexander) who had been placed at the head of the Morean government, threw himself into the citadel of Argos and held out stubbornly. Dramali invested it, but the ex-brigand, Kolokotronis, cut his communications, and it was only with extreme difficulty that Dramali, with a portion of his force, broke through the cordon and escaped annihilation. In December the Turkish garrison of Nauplia was forced to capitulate. On the other hand, the Greeks in Epirus, under the leadership of Prince Mavrocordatos (who had been nominated first President of the Greek Republic, though his authority was not recognized in the Morea) met with severe reverses. In 1823 it looked as if neither Turks nor Greeks could achieve victory without foreign aid.

Victory indeed would have inclined even then to the Greeks but for dissensions among themselves, and the failure of any one authority to obtain general recognition; a state of affairs much resembling that in Spain during the Peninsular War. Conflicts of interests between islanders and mainlanders, and between civilians and military chiefs, independence and lack of cohesion among the sailors, whose piratical operations the Turks could not, and the Greeks themselves would not, suppress, were ruinous to concerted action. In effect, civil war broke out in the midst of the struggle for independence.

Still there was no intervention on the part of the Powers. Canning, however, took an important step in the spring of 1823 by officially recognizing the insurgent Greeks as belligerents, thereby mark-

ing the effective dissolution of the Alliance, and at the same time arousing in the Tsar's mind a fear of independent British intervention, as well as giving encouragement to the Greeks and a fresh impulse to the Phil-Hellenes in Western Europe. The "Glory that was Greece" still provided an integral part of the culture of the educated classes in England; the slaughter of Christians especially excited the sympathy of French clericalism, which was at this time extremely influential; popular sentiment in both countries went out enthusiastically to a people struggling for freedom; and streams of volunteers began to pour in to the aid of the Greeks, unchecked by the governments.

There was no chance of action on the part of Austria and Prussia in the face of the torrent of European public opinion in favor of the Greeks, though it was equally impossible for them to swallow their past declarations and pronounce the defiance of rulers by subjects to be legitimate. It was from another quarter that Sultan Mahmud sought help. Mehemet Ali ruled Egypt as Pasha—theoretically as the Sultan's servant and viceroy, actually as an independent prince with large ambitions. Mahmud took the risks involved by the position, and struck a bargain with his dangerously powerful subject. The Egyptian fleet and the Egyptian army under Mehemet's son, Ibrahim, should crush the Greeks on land and sea, and Mehemet should be rewarded by the addition of Crete to his dominions, with the Pashalik of Syria. It was understood that Ibrahim should have the Pashalik of the Peloponnese when its suppression was completed.

If once the Turco-Egyptian fleet were supreme in the Ægean, the reduction of the mainland would follow almost of course, since the Morea was largely dependent on the sea for supplies and communications. Early in 1824 the Egyptians seized Crete to be their base of operations. The disorganization of what passed for the Greek central government prevented the action which might easily have endangered Ibrahim's schemes. In possession of Crete, he proceeded against the islands. After initial naval successes, these maritime operations went badly for him; but he found his opportunity with the winter inaction of the Greek fleet, and in February (1825) he carried a strong force over to the Peloponnese. His troops, disciplined Sudanese and fellahin, overran it; by the end of the year the resistance, south of the isthmus of Corinth, was almost confined to Nauplia, where Demetrius Hypsilanti stood at bay as stoutly as before at Argos. Across the Corinthian gulf, Missolonghi, where Byron had died in 1823, and which had from the outset of the war repulsed repeated attacks and broken up one siege, was now closely invested by land and sea. It was the common belief that Ibrahim purported the extermination of the European population of the Peloponnese and its colonization by his fellahin and Sudanese. He took into his own hands the reduction

of Missolonghi; but his assaults were still heroically repulsed until, by perfecting the ring-fence which cut off its supplies, he brought it to the brink of starvation in April (1826). The garrison, men and women together, made a desperate attempt to hack their way out; but though a considerable body broke through, they were ambushed and for the most part cut to pieces. Those who had been forced to fall back put up a last desperate fight, but were completely overwhelmed. A multitude of women and children were taken prisoners; the men fought till they died. Within three months, Athens, which had remained in the hands of the Greeks and their volunteer allies from Britain and France, was compelled to capitulate.

Nevertheless the knell of the Turkish rule over Greece was already sounding. Intervention was at hand. Russia had long been craving to take a hand, partly in the genuine crusading spirit, stirred to a passion by the massacres of Christians, partly with the political intention of herself dominating the Balkan peninsula, though her Tsar had been fettered by the absolutist superstition which forbade him to encourage subjects to defy their rulers—very much as Queen Elizabeth had once felt herself fettered in her relations with the Dutch and Scottish “rebels” whom her own subjects were eager to support. Russian intervention, however, had been resolutely opposed not only by Metternich but also by Castlereagh and by Canning after him, for sufficient reason that none of them was willing to see Russia dominant in the Balkans or controlling the Dardanelles. For the English statesmen, like the younger Pitt whom both had served, felt the dread of Russian ambitions in the direction of India, and of the development of Russian sea-power in the Mediterranean. Moreover, both were true to the principle that every State should be left to work out its own salvation without interference, however onlookers might sympathize with one side or another, at least until the peace of Europe should be threatened by the process.

Now as early as 1824, after Canning's recognition of Greek belligerency, Alexander had renewed the attempt to procure intervention by the Concert. His scheme provided for the creation of three separate Greek states, each autonomous, but all under Turkish sovereignty, which to both Metternich and Canning meant that all three would be virtually under Russian control. Metternich countered by the proposal that the Porte should be compelled to grant the complete independence of Greece, which shocked the Tsar, besides checkmating his own scheme. An independent Greece would not be under Russian control; Canning refused to discuss any intervention with an element of compulsion; Charles X., who had succeeded Louis on the French throne, supported the Metternich doctrine that Greece must be either completely subjected or completely independent. The re-

sulting compromise was a joint note offering "meditation," which the Porte flatly rejected.

The situation was changed when Ibrahim appeared on the scene. Canning approached Russia on the subject of joint intervention without coercion in the summer of 1825. Alexander was now convinced that nothing could be effected without coercion; it looked as if he was on the point of taking action. Canning was already suggesting that Russia and Great Britain should act together, when the Tsar suddenly died in December.

His natural heir was his brother Constantine, who had resigned his rights in favor of his younger brother Nicholas. Nicholas refused the crown unless Constantine ordered him to accept it. During the delay which occurred a faction had prepared to oppose the succession of Nicholas. When Nicholas was proclaimed Tsar some of the troops at Petersburg were induced to mutiny against the "usurpation." The mutiny was stamped out with ease, but it established in the mind of Nicholas the conviction that promptitude and unyielding sternness were the conditions of successful rule.

Nicholas was hard and practical, with none of his dead brother's disposition to mysticism and abstract theorizing; an unqualified autocrat, narrow but intense in his religious ideas, and with a will of iron. Under his rule, Russia would go her own way, and Turkey was Russia's business, whether other Powers chose to look upon it in that light or not. If Great Britain would co-operate, that would be better than her continued opposition. An agreement was reached in April 1826. Great Britain was to offer terms—Greek autonomy and commercial freedom, subject to tribute. At the same time, Wellington, who had been the British negotiator, allowed Russia to take separate steps regarding the other questions which were his particular concern. The "Protocol of St. Petersburg" disgusted Metternich, because he had not believed in an Anglo-Russian union. Mahmud, anticipating an immediate attack, set about a long-needed army reform which excited to mutiny the Janissaries, the "Praetorian Guard," a body of privileged troops who had long been more of a danger than a protection to the sultans. For this he had been prepared; the Janissaries were shot down, and the corps was disbanded. But for the moment Mahmud's actual military strength was reduced, and he was forced to concede the Russian demands which he had hitherto refused.

Still the day of intervention was hardly postponed. Charles X. gave his adherence to the St. Petersburg protocol; Prussia stood aside. The proposals of a joint Anglo-Russian note were rejected by the Porte in April 1827, and Canning was converted to the doctrine of coercion. Russia, France, and Great Britain agreed on their terms in the Treaty of London. In effect the protocol was to be reinforced by a demand for an immediate armistice, which the three Powers would

enforce by any necessary measures. Instructions were sent to the admirals in the allied fleets, leaving them a wide discretion.

The Greeks accepted the armistice; the Turks rejected it. The Turco-Egyptian fleet was practically shut up in the bay of Navarino by the British and French squadrons. The admirals demanded a cessation of hostilities and the retirement of the Egyptian fleet; not receiving a satisfactory reply they entered the bay on 20th October. A shot was fired from a Turkish ship, and the allies proceeded to sink the Egyptian fleet.

Two months earlier Canning had died, leaving the government of which he had been actual head for some three months very weak; it had not the courage to take its stand unequivocally on Admiral Codrington's action, to which Wellington referred as an "untoward event." The ministry fell, and the new government formed by Wellington definitely drew back. But after Navarino—in which Russia had taken no part—it was impossible to oppose Nicholas in taking action on his own account. The Turks gave him his opportunity by denouncing the treaty of the previous year. The declaration that he would do no more than enforce the terms of the Treaty of London made his position unassailable, and in May 1828 the Russian armies crossed the Pruth.

Though Wellington would take no direct action against the Porte, the three Powers of the London conference agreed that France should send an expedition to enforce the evacuation of the Morea. When it arrived, it found little to do beyond the preservation of order, for Codrington had already arranged with Mehemet Ali at Alexandria a convention for the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces; the astute pasha no longer hoped to gain anything by continuing the war. The Russian arms met with unexpected reverses, but also with successes hardly less unexpected in Asiatic Turkey, which her troops invaded. Anglo-Russian relations were strained by a Russian blockade of the Dardanelles, which was regarded as a breach of the engagements made when she entered on the war, and Anglo-Austrian relations became correspondingly friendly. Successive protocols, however, issued from the London conference placed the Peloponnese, the Cyclades, and the rest of continental Greece, as far north as the line from the gulf of Cesta on the west to the gulf of Volo on the east, under the guarantee of the Powers for a tributary autonomy under a hereditary prince to be selected by them.

But this had hardly been accomplished when the audacity of the Russian General Diebitsch brought the war to an unexpected conclusion. The command was conferred on him in the spring of 1829. A succession of victories, and an advance which left his communications open to an attack which was not delivered, brought him to Adrianople, which he entered on 19th August. His force was depleted—if

vigorously attacked he would have been obliged to retreat; but he threatened Constantinople as though he had been at the head of an irresistible army. The Turks were bluffed into the belief that an imaginary Russian main army was coming to the support of the force at Adrianople, and on 14th September the Treaty of Adrianople was signed.

The Porte accepted the Treaty of London, giving autonomy to Greece as delimited in the protocols, autonomy to the trans-Danube provinces under the protection of Russia, the freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to merchant shipping.

The war was over. Russia had been allowed to out-manuever her allies as well as Metternich; and there followed a period of diplomatic intriguing to counteract the completeness of the Russian triumph, while the problem of creating a government for Greece itself was by no means solved. When the intervention of the Powers took shape in 1827, the Greeks had chosen for President of the Greek Republic Count Capo d'Istrias, the former minister of Alexander, who had retired from the Tsar's councils in 1822. Though a Greek of Corfu, he had no understanding of the discordant elements which made up the Greek people, and his conception of government was the reign of officialdom controlled autocratically. For three and a half years he attempted to rule conscientiously, but with little success. The Powers, in accordance with their plan, nominated Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, afterwards King of the Belgians, as prince of the new State after the Treaty of Adrianople; but Leopold, dissatisfied with the terms, never took up his office, and Capo d'Istrias never dropped the reins. His well-meant efforts were rewarded by his assassination in October 1831. Palmerston was now in control of the British Foreign Office; he was an advocate of the larger liberties for Greece which had been rejected under the Wellington régime. Louis Philippe had taken the place of Charles X. on the French throne. Metternich had for years advocated complete independence for Greece as preferable to tributary autonomy, which would always tend to make her lean upon Russia. Independence instead of autonomy was purchasable from the Turk; and in 1832 the young Prince Otto of Bavaria accepted the crown of Greece in independent sovereignty, under a Constitution. Russia could not claim that it was she who had struck off the last fetters which held Greece captive.

Though Nicholas was wholly devoid of Hellenic sympathies, Russian interests had led him to play the part of liberator, which would have been a natural rôle for Alexander had he not in his last years made a fetish of the rights of princes. In Nicholas every instinct rejected the doctrine of liberty to which his brother had clung so long. Alexander had come in the end to regard his own liberalism as a painful error, his young enthusiasms as bitter illusions. In Russia itself,

and in Poland Alexander had sought to extend freedom; but his gifts, misunderstood and mishandled, had brought him no gratitude. Nicholas was free from any such weakness.

The serfdom of the Russian peasant was a modern institution. It was not till the end of the sixteenth century that he had become *ascripitius glebæ*, bound to the soil, forbidden to move from the estate on which he was born; it was Peter the Great's system of making the landowners a part of the State machine which finally made the lords autocrats over their serfs. The peasant understood that his own subjection to the lord was the complement of the lord's obligations to the supreme lord. He resented the relaxation of those obligations under Peter III., since there was no corresponding relaxation of his own obligations; the seeds were sown of the revolutionary spirit which since that day has assumed forms sometimes horrible and always fantastic. Alexander sought, not to abolish the system off-hand, but to reform it away. He encouraged the lords to emancipate their serfs. Some of the more degrading accompaniments of serfdom were removed; any serf could obtain freedom by joining the army. A curious system of military colonies was set up, under which the children of the peasants became attached to the colonizing battalion, and a quasi-military discipline of a mild kind was introduced, along with educational measures—but the peasantry were more annoyed by the new regulations than alive to the benefits they received.

Alexander's grand predilection, however, when he made himself patron, was for Poland. When he made himself patron, protector, and monarch of the revived kingdom, he meant it to be a pattern of constitutional monarchy, as he understood constitutionalism; the success of his experiment, of which he had perfect assurance, would justify to the skeptics the application of the same principles within Russia, and also the restoration to Poland of much that Russia had annexed in the partitions. But unhappily disillusionment came swiftly. The Poles had their own tradition of freedom, but it was a freedom based on lack of governance, the powerlessness of the central authority. His Russian subjects intensely resented the idea of surrendering the annexed districts, dismembering Russia, and making Poland into a powerful and probably hostile State. The Polish Diet proved itself to be full of dissensions, its members united in nothing but the desire to recover the old fatal privileges of the nobility; the Press, which represented public opinion, was vehemently hostile to Russia. By 1820 the Tsar found himself compelled in the interests of order to curtail liberty and modify the Constitution; the vicious circle—disorder calling for repression, repression stimulating hostility which challenged further repression—was in full operation. During the remainder of his reign matters grew worse instead of better.

When Nicholas succeeded his brother, he found that the normal development had taken place. Sedition was rife in the army, and the country was honeycombed with secret societies, the foundation of whose creeds was hostility to Russia. Revolution was again in the air, and in France Charles X. was driven into exile to make way for his cousin, Louis Philippe of Orleans, the son of Philippe "Égalité." The Tsar prepared to meet rebellion, and the preparations brought rebellion to a head; at the end of November 1830 it broke out in Warsaw. Constantine, the brother of Nicholas, who had refused the Imperial crown, was in command at Warsaw. A rigorous disciplinarian in ordinary times, he was paralyzed by an emergency; he retreated with the few troops which remained loyal.

The moderates took control of the government. They hoped to restrain excesses, to win by the justice of their cause, to appeal to Europe. Europe was deaf to the appeal of revolutionists; Nicholas would not treat with rebels. A Russian army marched on Warsaw. As an immediate consequence, the moderates went under, and the control passed to the extreme faction. They declared the Romanov dynasty deposed, thereby extinguishing such chance as existed of winning support from European governments. The Russian forces met with initial checks, and mild protests in favor of the Poles were offered by France and England; but Nicholas had warrant for claiming that no one had a right to intervene between the King of Poland and his rebellious subjects. The tide of war was soon flowing in his favor. Prussia was on his side. The Polish Government changed its commanders in the field in rapid succession, on the general principle that not to win victories was proof of incompetence. Chaos supervened, mob riots and massacres, followed by military executions in Warsaw, as the Russians drew near. There was no failure of resolution or courage on the part of the Poles, but there was utter disorganization. After three days of desperate fighting (September 6-8, 1831) Warsaw capitulated; the garrison withdrew under arms, but was immediately overwhelmed by the Russian forces.

The Polish rebellion was at an end; the Polish State ceased to exist. It was absorbed into Russia, governed from Russia under Russian viceroys. Thousands of Poles were dispatched to Siberia; many thousands more were deported to Southeastern Russia and the Caucasus, and a flood of Polish refugees streamed into foreign lands. The enslavement of Poland, completed in 1832, was a curious companion picture to the emancipation of Greece completed in the same year. In the case of Greece Nicholas had never been actuated by sympathy, in his eyes the Greeks were always rebels against legitimate authority; but Russian interests were at stake in their struggle with the Porte, and to that consideration all others had to give way.

In Poland there was nothing to restrain the unqualified assertion of absolutist principles, which coincided with Russian interests: therefore Poland was mercilessly crushed under the iron heel.

#### IV.—*Western Europe, 1820-1832*

The resignation of Décazes in 1820 placed Richelieu at the head of a new ministry, which was actually dominated by the party who desired the restoration of the Ancient Régime—Villèle, a shrewd statesman, whose plan was to proceed step by step, turning every opportunity to account; Chateaubriand, who saw in military glory achieved by a vigorous foreign policy the means of restoring the ancient luster of the Bourbon monarchy; and Ultras, who were positive enemies of liberty. Richelieu's moderation was overridden; after some months he resigned, and Villèle became the head of the government. It was against his judgment that the fervor of Chateaubriand was given scope and the partial assent of the Powers was procured at the Verona Congress for French intervention in Spain to "liberate" the Bourbon monarchy.

A French army under a Bourbon prince, the Duke d'Angoulême, poured through the Pyrenees, marched practically unopposed upon Madrid, whence the Cortes retreated to Seville and then to Cadiz, taking Ferdinand with them. Angoulême followed to Cadiz. At the end of six weeks, the Cortes had lost hope, and permitted Ferdinand—after solemn promises of a complete amnesty—to arrange terms with Angoulême. Once out of the hands of the Cortes, Ferdinand repudiated his promises. In the presence of Angoulême's army resistance to him was out of the question; the amnesty was withdrawn and a fierce persecution of the constitutionalists and anti-clericals was initiated—very much to the disgust of the Duke, whose hands were tied. Absolutism was reinstated, as far as the peninsula was concerned. But on the vital question of the colonies nothing could be done—intervention overseas was precluded by the British fleet, by Canning's formal recognition of the insurgents in South America as belligerents, and by President Monroe's famous message to the United States Congress (December 2, 1823), declaring that any intervention in the affairs of South America by a European Power would be viewed by the United States as an "unfriendly act." This was the enunciation of the "Monroe doctrine" which from that time forward became a controlling principle in the relations between European Powers and the states of South America. Finally, before the year 1824 was ended, Canning, by commercial treaties with Mexico and Colombia, definitely recognized them as independent sovereign States.

Meanwhile, Portugal too became the scene of another struggle. The

equable King John had placidly accepted a Constitution, but his younger son Miguel—the elder, Pedro, was in Brazil—was a hot reactionary, who was supported by the queen, a sister of Ferdinand of Spain. Through the troops under his control, he effected a *coup d'état* which upset the Constitution. Again John accepted the situation. But, his real desire being for his own peace and quietness, his preference was for constitutionalism; a liberal reaction seemed imminent, and again he planned the granting of a Constitution. One of the strongest motives of British action at this stage was jealousy of French influence in the Spanish peninsula; the monarchical reaction meant the supersession of British by French influence in Portugal as well as in Spain; Miguel was certainly plotting to overthrow the ministry which was drawing up the new constitutional scheme; and the constitutionalists appealed to Canning for protection.

Canning's sympathies were wholly with them, as with the Spanish liberals; but his policy rested on the principle that no foreign intervention on either side should control any State in the working out of its own salvation. He refused to send troops—but he sent to the Tagus, to watch events, a naval squadron whose presence gave something more than moral support to King John's government; and he made it clear that, while abstaining from forcible intervention, any such intervention by France would be met by force. Another attempted *coup d'état* by Miguel failed. British ascendancy was not, however, immediately restored, chiefly because of Portuguese resentment at the British recognition of the independence of the Brazilian Empire which had recently been proclaimed; but the phase passed when King John himself in 1825 recognized his son Pedro as Emperor of Brazil.

When King John died next year, the proposed Constitution had still not been promulgated. Pedro of Brazil, the natural heir, after proclaiming a Constitution, renounced the crown in favor of his little daughter Maria da Gloria, a child of seven, who was presently to be sent over from Brazil to be married to her uncle Miguel, so as to neutralize any dispute as to the succession. Miguel himself, after his last failure, had left the country; but the troops previously suborned by him now proclaimed him king, and crossed the Spanish frontier, hoping for Spanish support, which they obtained though not officially. Thus strengthened, the troops raided into Portugal. The Portuguese regency held Spain responsible, and appealed to Canning under the treaties which bound Great Britain to defend Portugal against foreign invasion. Canning at once accepted the responsibility with the full support of British public opinion, and dispatched troops to Portugal—not in defense of the Constitution but in fulfilment of a definite treaty obligation. The warning was accepted; the Spanish

Government restrained the ardor of the extremists; the invaders were driven over the frontier and then disbanded; while the French Government, whose intervention had been feared in England, denounced the whole adventure.

British action under the direction of Canning had, in the three cases of Greece, Spain, and Portugal, materially influenced the course of events in favor of liberalism and nationalism; there was no sort of doubt as to which side was favored by the sympathies both of the minister and of the country at large. But the principle for which Canning stood was not that of protecting either liberalism or monarchism, but that of requiring for all the things which every sovereign State has always claimed for itself—the right of settling its own affairs without interference from outside; in flat rejection of the Holy Alliance doctrine that it is the right and the duty of the brotherhood of monarchs to maintain the authority of each by the arms of all. Castlereagh had upheld the same principle—less conspicuously, for the simple reason that action had not been conspicuously called for. Castlereagh had not perhaps made it certain as Canning did that Great Britain would keep the ring by force of arms if necessary; and it was notorious that Castlereagh's personal sympathies were on the side of authority rather than of freedom, while Canning's were on the side of freedom rather than of authority, so that Canning was readier to move than Castlereagh; but both acted on the same principle. The Concert of Europe broke up, not because Canning broke away from it, but because it ceased to be a Concert as soon as the Powers which composed it were in disagreement as to the principles warranting common action on the basis of common assent. A State which is threatened with internal disorder by disorder in its neighbor has a right of action in self-defense; similarly Europe has a right of action when the peace of Europe is endangered; otherwise, neither Europe in general nor any State in particular has a right to intervene. Canning might have preserved the Concert by submitting British policy to the control of Metternich, but in no other way; and that was a line which no great Power save Prussia could adopt with equanimity. When Russian interests were at stake, the creator of the Holy Alliance discarded Metternich's direction as decisively as Canning himself.

Villèle had been weakened by his opposition to the Spanish expedition; he sought to recover strength by a creation of peers chosen from his own supporters which would secure to the party of the Ancien Régime the backing of that house against the liberals who were still predominant there, and to himself predominance within his own party. Further, a modification of the electoral law established septennial election for the Chamber of Deputies (after the model of the British House of Common) in place of annual retire-

ment by rotation. The next measure was the conversion of the Rentes, the government stock, from five to four per cent, and the appropriation of the expenditure thus saved to the indemnification of the Royalists whose estates (as at the English Restoration of 1660) had not been restored. This was defeated by the action of Chateaubriand, who was eager to upset the ministry and himself to take the place of Villèle. The house of the Royalists was divided against itself; and at this critical moment (August 1814), Louis XVIII. died and was succeeded on the throne by his brother the Comte d'Artois—Charles X., the incarnation of fanatical monarchism and clericalism.

Another Bill for indemnifying the *émigré*, defended on the ground that it once for all secured the present holders of their confiscated property, was carried, and then came a series of measures dictated by the narrowest clericalism, and very little to the liking of Villèle. With the monarchists now, as with the revolutionists of old, the moderates of the first stage had been shed in favor of Ultras, who in their turn were to be discarded as too moderate for the extremists. Villèle, unable to control them, strove to retain his position by fathering their policy as his own. Outside the Chambers, opposition to the government grew—within it seemed secure in its majority. Yet in the House of Peers a coalition of Chateaubriand with the liberals was too strong for the ministry; a Bill which was a step towards the restoration of the old law of primogeniture was defeated. The Press grew clamorous, and the king called upon Villèle to suppress its established liberties, and set up the old censorship forbidding the publication of unauthorized matter under heavy penalties. The new Press Law was rejected; but for the Bill a royal ordinance was substituted. The Press was gagged. Paris was furious, but France outside Paris had for years been enjoying a material prosperity for which it was largely indebted to Richelieu and Décazes. France was not yet aroused. As in the case of Spain, though with a very different motive, public opinion was conciliated by the "active foreign policy" implied in the conjunction with Russia and Great Britain for intervention in Greece; and France hailed Navarino as a deed due to the initiative of her own Admiral Rigny, and rejoiced in the liberation of Greece by the dispatch of her own troops to the Morea. Ambitious thoughts were soon stirring the expansion to the "natural boundaries" by the acquisition of Belgium.

Before that time came, Villèle had resigned. In a final effort to retain power, he had swamped the liberal opposition by the creation of seventy-six new peers, and, confident of victory in the elections, dissolved the Chambers; but in the new Chamber of Deputies the combined opposition had a decisive majority. He retired. The king, not yet prepared for a battle with the Chamber, placed Martignac, a moderate, at the head of the new mixed ministry: but it soon became

evident that he had not the patience to pursue the policy of compromise and conciliation which Martignac attempted to initiate. Martignac was dismissed, and his place was taken by the unqualified reactionery, Polignac (August 1829).

Though the scheme adopted by the new minister, for the acquisition of Belgium by consent of the Powers, was shattered by Prussia's prompt and curt refusal to give it any countenance, there was another bid for military glory in a punitive expedition (May 1830) dispatched against the Day of Algiers, who was duly humbled. But it did not prevent the return of an enlarged opposition following on another dissolution of the Chambers. Charles had the choice between yielding to the manifest voice of the country and attempting an absolutist revolution. He chose the latter; and in a series of royal ordinances threw down the gage of battle. On 25th July he in effect renewed the Press Law, which had been in the main withdrawn by Martignac, proclaimed a new electoral law reducing the number of the delegates and narrowing the franchise, dissolved the Chambers, and summoned a new Parliament. Of these ordinances the two first were flagrant infractions of the Charta; had they taken effect, the French monarchy would have discarded the last fragments of constitutionalism. Having issued the ordinances, Charles retired from Paris to St. Cloud; while Polignac was apparently satisfied that no trouble was to be apprehended.

The liberals, however, were prepared; ever since Polignac's appointment they had felt certain that the struggle was coming. The educated classes and the bourgeoisie were constitutionalists not republicans in the main—as a matter of expediency more than of principle, because a republican revolution would bring upon France the hostility of Europe. Charles X. would be impossible as a constitutional monarch—like Charles I. in England. But in Louis Philippe of Orleans, whose father had voted for the death of Louis XVI., and who had himself fought in the armies of the Republic, there was a possible candidate of known liberal sympathies. Yet for a moment there was grave danger that their aims would be frustrated by the Paris mob, which rose on 27th July. Marmont, the commandant of the troop, having received no instructions from the government, had made no effective preparations, and his regiments were surrounded. Lafayette, the old "hero of two worlds," again a favorite of the populace, seemed likely to head the republican movement; a repetition of old ugly experiences was menaced.

Skill and promptitude saved the situation. The liberals, guided largely by the journalist, Thiers, secured the co-operation of Louis Philippe, who had hitherto taken no active part. Lafayette was practically the head of the provisional government which the republicans had immediately set up. But on 31st July Lafayette ac-

cepted Louis Philippe in a scene which had the theatrical touch so dear to the heart of Paris. Charles X., seeing that his *coup* had failed, made a belated effort with conciliatory offers; but the doors were already closed. His abdication in favor of his grandson, the young Comte de Chambord, was ignored. The Chambers, on their own responsibility, proclaimed Louis Philippe "King of the French"; and Charles was allowed to retire, not without dignity, to England.

After the first shock, the European governments acquiesced in the new order; it was impossible to detect in it any menace to European peace. There had been no Jacobin revolution to excite popular emulation; a constitutional monarch had been set on the French throne, obviously not the man to deluge Europe with blood in the pursuit of personal ambitions. In England, even the most reactionary of governments could have raised no protest; Louis Philippe occupied the French throne on very much the same principles as the House of Hanover occupied that of England. Having ejected, for absolutist practices, the reigning branch of the Bourbons, Parliament had bestowed the crown upon the nearest heir who would accept the conditions it imposed. And the British Government, if Tory, could hardly be called reactionary, seeing that it had just passed Catholic emancipation. The form of government which France might choose to adopt was no longer of such importance to the Eastern monarchies as it had been in 1815, or even in 1825. It was not long before Louis Philippe was generally recognized, though with marked reluctance on the part of the Tsar.

In France, however, the king needed to walk warily; it was in fact some nine months before his position was secured. For legitimists he was a usurper; his strength was among the moderates, and moderation, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, did not appeal to one section at least, and that perhaps the strongest at the moment, of those to whom he owed his throne. It was with the utmost difficulty that Polignac and his fellow ex-ministers were saved from falling victims to the popular wrath. But at last in March 1831, the formation of a ministry under Casimir Périer, showed that the ascendancy of the middle class was established.

A corresponding movement had been taking place in England. For some seven years after Waterloo reactionary Toryism characterized the ministry as far as domestic affairs were concerned. Repression had culminated in the Six Acts of 1819; after which the tide began to turn. The Cato Street conspiracy checked any rapid reaction; but in 1822, Castlereagh died by his own hand. Canning became the most powerful member of the government; fear of "the revolution" was dying down; the commercial interests in the country were increasingly dissatisfied by the predominance of the landed interest in Parliament; the liberalism of the younger Pitt, which

had been scotched by the French Revolution was becoming active again outside the Whig party and within the nominally Tory ranks. Huskisson at the Board of Trade was, as Pitt had been, a disciple of Adam Smith; Peel's mind, though he was still a mainstay of Toryism, was always moving step by step along liberal by-paths. Sympathy with nationalism and liberalism abroad, where they were met by harsh and excessive repression, fostered liberal ideas at home. The demands for parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation began to grow in strength.

In 1827 a paralytic stroke removed Lord Liverpool from the government of which he had been chief for more than a dozen years. Canning took his place; a split between the men of his school and the Tory old guard was driving the two sections apart before his death in the same year. The Canningites carried on for a few months more, and then gave place to the ministry of Wellington and Peel; which soon found itself reluctantly compelled to give ground, retreating at its leader's word of command. When the government yielded on Catholic emancipation in 1829, it was with the frank conviction, not that the measure was in itself good but that civil war was worse. Canningites and Whigs were daily drawing closer together, and were at last uniting to demand a parliamentary reform which should abolish the amazing incongruities of the existing system and give adequate representation both to the commercial classes and to the manufacturers, the offspring of the Industrial Revolution. In 1830 the death of George IV. placed on the throne a brother, William IV., whom it was at least reasonably possible to respect. The government lost ground at a general election in which the demand for reform was a leading feature. The fall of Charles X. in France provided an object lesson in the victory of the French middle class, dispelling fears of Jacobinism. A defeat of the government was followed by its resignation and the formation under Lord Grey of a ministry combining Whigs and Canningites and pledged to parliamentary reform.

During the next two years the battle was fought out. A Reform Bill was brought in in 1831. A government defeat in the course of the debates on it was followed by an appeal to the country; public opinion found expression in the return of a decisive ministerial majority. A new Bill, passed by substantial majorities in the Commons, was rejected by the peers—the Tories regarding it as a measure which would open the floodgates of democracy, while the Whigs believed that it was necessary in order to stay the torrent, and the democrats outside counted it as an instalment of political enfranchisement. Riots broke out on its rejection. Ministers refused to resign, and brought in a third Bill. When it seemed probable that it would meet the same fate as the second Bill, Lord Grey obtained from the

hesitating king a promise to create if necessary a sufficient number of peers to insure its passage in the hereditary chamber. To escape that catastrophe, Wellington withdrew a number of his followers, and the Bill was passed in June (1832). For thirty-six years the middle class vote dominated the House of Commons. The Whigs and the Canningites coalesced in the Liberal Party with an advanced radical or democratic wing, distrusting and distrusted by the main body.

In regard to foreign affairs, the mantle of Canning passed to Palmerston, his follower and pupil, and the Foreign Secretary of successive Liberal ministers. The Wellington Cabinet had provided only a brief interlude in the continuity of the Canning policy; for the Iron Duke, incomparably the greatest soldier of the day, loathed war so intensely that the fear of risking a conflagration made his conduct of foreign affairs timid, and was mainly responsible for yielding to Russia that predominance in the Near East, to deprive her of which became one of Palmerston's constant aims—which found immediate expression in the treaty that finally made Greece a sovereign State in 1832. But the new control was already being effectively exercised in other international questions which had recently arisen. The almost simultaneous victories in France and in England of the middle classes, sympathy with liberal movements in other countries, united those two countries as against the monarchist predilections of the other three great Powers on the one hand; while, on the other, the traditional aspirations of France in relation to Belgium and to the Spanish peninsula, as well as in the Near East, were incompatible with British views, and provided a constant source of suspicion and friction between the French and British Governments.

In Portugal the regency for the little queen had been bestowed on her uncle Miguel. Instead of waiting for the proposed marriage, he seized the crown, and overturned the Constitution which he had formally accepted. The usurper was too strong for the queen's adherents, but the Wellington Ministry in England and Charles X. in France gave them no support. The changes of 1830, however, had immediate effect, so far at least that the new governments gave their moral support to Pedro of Brazil, who came to Europe to enforce his daughter's claim against his brother. The contest, hitherto unequal, turned somewhat in favor of Pedro, who received material help from foreign volunteers, chiefly British, notable among whom was the sailor Charles Napier; though when, in 1833, he was able to occupy Lisbon, it still seemed that there would be a prolonged struggle before the decisive victory of constitutionalism could be secured.

Meanwhile a corresponding struggle developed in Spain. Ferdinand's heir was his brother Don Carlos, a clerical and reactionary

even more bigoted. But Ferdinand married a fourth wife, Queen Christina, who bore him a daughter, Isabella; whom Ferdinand, setting aside the Salic Law, declared his heiress by a "Pragmatic Sanction," which in the view of Carlos and his party sought illegally to deprive him of his rights. Whatever there was of liberalism in the country was, on the other hand, eager for anything which would prevent the Carlist succession. Carlos withdrew to Portugal, where as a matter of course he allied himself with Miguel; so that, when Ferdinand died in 1833, the two thrones were nominally occupied by two small girls whose uncles claimed the succession—with constitutionalism all on the side of the queens, and clericalism and reaction all on the side of the uncles.

Italy, too, was touched by the July revolution. An interregnum, caused at the end of 1830 by the death of Pius VIII., in the Papal States, was the signal for an outbreak in Modena—where it was quickly stopped—which at once spread to the Papal States, subject to the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy. The new Pope Gregory appealed to Austria. Metternich, ignoring a hint of counter-intervention from France, where the government was as yet very unstable, complied, and re-established the Pope's authority. The arrival of Casimir Périer's Ministry in April prevented the war with Austria, which the fallen ministry were on the point of challenging; while even Metternich joined with the other governments in urging a scheme of reform upon the Pope. The Austrian troops were withdrawn, but the promised reforms were not adopted. Insurrections again broke out, and again Austrian troops entered the Papal States, where their presence was at least a guarantee of order and security, not so much against revolutionists as against the papal troops. But if Casimir Périer had no mind for fighting without very sufficient reason, he also had no intention of leaving Austria to dominate Italy, and French troops occupied and remained in Ancona. Thus France once more asserted her own Italian interests, which for three centuries had been a bone of contention between Hapsburg and Bourbon. His action, however, did not provoke a war. French and Austrians merely stood on guard in central Italy, until, six years later, both peacefully withdrew. Neither, however, had in the interval succeeded in bringing about the required reforms in the papal administration.

In all these affairs Palmerston's action or inaction was a precise reproduction of non-intervention as interpreted by Canning. With France the danger under Louis Philippe, until the accession to power of Casimir Périer, was rather that she would be carried away by the active revival of the old principle of giving aggressive support to the cause of liberty in other countries. The king, well aware that three of the other Powers would become definitely hostile, in such circum-

stances, to his constitutional monarchy, and that France could not afford to imperil her doubtfully cordial relations with England by arousing British suspicions of ulterior motives, sought to escape the control of the predominant and more dangerous element and maneuvered the fall of Lafayette and Laffitte, which made room for Périer and safety, though that minister's cool-headed restraint was freely denounced as shameful Pusillanimity. In effect his policy was for France very much that which Palmerston's was for England. But there was this difference between the positions of the two statesmen—Palmerston was disposed to bolder courses than a large minority, if not an absolute majority, in the country; Périer had to hold his countrymen in.

The region which demanded a more active program both from France and from Great Britain was the Netherlands. The Vienna settlement had united under one crown the northern and southern Netherlands—Holland and Belgium—which had been sundered for more than two hundred years. The union was, on paper, an effective defence against a revival of France's pursuit of her "natural boundaries," which had failed under Louis XIV. and succeeded under Napoleon. In fact it was ineffective because unnatural. The racial and linguistic connection of the Dutch with the Flemings of Belgium counted for much less than the religious antagonism of the north, which was solidly Calvinist, and the south, which was solidly Catholic, and much dominated by clericalism. The north was commercial, the south industrial. The population of Holland was little more than half that of Belgium; but the two had equal representation in the estates, and under the government of King William 90 per cent of the important government appointments, civil and military, went to Dutchmen; while the royal attempts to "enlighten" the "obscurantism" of his Catholic subjects was resented hardly less by the laity than by the clergy. Belgium, in short, felt herself refarded and treated by the Dutch and the government as a subordinate, almost as a conquered province of the Dutch kingdom. Finally, Belgium had preferred her incorporation with France to her previous subjection to Austria or her subsequent subordination to Holland.

Hence for fifteen years Belgium was seething with dissatisfaction while French governments, as we have seen, dreamed of her not unwilling absorption into France. The Belgium demand was for political equality with an administrative separation from Holland. And the disaffection was brought to a head by the July revolution in Paris. A week after the fall of Charles X. a revolutionary riot broke out in Brussels, followed by others in the provinces. The revolutionists held the town; the leaders, resolved to act with moderation, formed

a provisional government. They demanded administrative separation; the Crown Prince, who came on the scene, referred the demand to the king. Delay, and the opposition encountered in the Estates, proved fatal. The separatists in Brussels became dominant, and the provisional government proclaimed the independence of Belgium, and prepared to draw up a Constitution.

The union of the Netherlands was an article of the Vienna settlement, to preserve which the Tsar promptly offered 60,000 men; Prussia was already gathering an army on the frontier. Louis Philippe, on the other side, announced that if Prussia moved France would move. The aged Talleyrand hastened to London, and convinced Wellington that unless Belgium and Holland were separated a general war was inevitable. There must be no intervention on behalf of the King of the Netherlands. To secure England, he pledged France to observe the existing boundaries. A conference of the five Powers was already sitting in London to settle Greek affairs, and before that conference Britain and France laid their joint proposals for the first definite departure from the Vienna settlement.

Nicholas was perhaps unwilling—certainly his advisers were—to see two hostile combinations of the Western against the Eastern powers displace the old Concert. But he was zealous to maintain the "legitimate" rights of King William. Aggressive action on his part, however, was precluded by the Polish rising at the critical moment. Prussia was cautious; Austria was preoccupied with Italy. A first and a second protocol issued from London in December and January laid down terms so little to the satisfaction of the Belgians—or of the French—that the former rejected them, and proceeded to offer the crown to Nemours, son of Louis Philippe; but the king rejected the offer, knowing that acceptance would range England on the other side.

Armed intervention by the monarchs, however, was no longer to be feared. Palmerston was now at the British Foreign Office, a much more confident advocate of Belgian separation than Wellington; Casimir Périer, who now came to the head of affairs in France, would not be carried away by French popular clamors. France ceased to make suggestions for the appropriation to herself of any Belgian territory, as to which Palmerston would make no compromises, and she supported the demand for the Belgian evacuation of Luxemburg. Belgium yielded to the point of pressure. A generally acceptable candidate for the crown was found in Leopold of Saxe-Coburg; and the terms of the Powers were revised more favorably to the Belgians in "the XVIII. articles" of June 1831.

King William rejected the revised terms, invaded Belgium, and routed the Belgian forces. Leopold appealed to France; French troops crossed the frontier, and the Dutch retired. So, under pressure

from Palmerston, did the French. A third settlement was signed by the Conference of the Powers, and accepted by Belgium (May 1832). William being still recalcitrant, a French land force and a British squadron compelled the Dutch to evacuate Antwerp, which they still held. Hostilities ceased, and Europe recognized the kingdom of Belgium as defined; but seven years passed before the terms were all carried out, and, in the final treaty of 1839, the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

## CHAPTER XXXVII

EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST: 1832-1848

### *I.—International*

THE death of Ferdinand of Spain in September 1833 was the signal for the opening of a struggle for the Spanish crown between the Dowager Queen Christina, on behalf of her infant daughter Isabella, and the partisans of Don Carlos, the late king's brother, Carlos himself having joined Miguel, the claimant of the Portuguese crown. Lisbon had already been occupied by Pedro as regent on behalf of his young daughter Maria. Miguel had abandoned the siege of Oporto, and his troops were now repelled before Lisbon. Vigorous and intelligent action might still have given victory to either side, but each outvied the other in blundering mismanagement. In 1834, however, the state of affairs throughout the peninsula led first Great Britain and then France to join with the queens' governments in Spain and Portugal in a quadruple alliance (April). Spanish troops entered Portugal; a month later the struggle was ended, and Miguel finally retired. Portuguese affairs, though they remained in perpetual disorder for many years, ceased to be of any international importance.

In Spain, on the other hand, Carlos appeared in person to lead his partisans after the fall of his associate Miguel. Palmerston held to the principle that foreign Powers should not intervene in arms in the domestic quarrels of their neighbors; and though the formation of British and French legions of volunteers—which rendered excellent service to the Christinos—was permitted, both the British and the French Governments refused the direct aid which would probably have involved counter-intervention by the Eastern Powers. Though Carlos stood unequivocally for reaction and clericalism, there were sundry districts in Spain which were devoted to his cause—chiefly perhaps from the fear that the constitutionalists would do away with their *fueros* (local privileges), and also because of the influences always exercised by the priests. On the other hand, the widow of Ferdinand VII. was guided by the least liberal of her supporters, so that the advanced sections were frequently in revolt, instead of joining whole-heartedly for the defeat of the Carlists. Hence the civil wars, conducted for the most part with extreme savagery, dragged

on for seven years, the Carlists not finally submitting till 1840, though Carlos himself had lost heart and retired in the previous year.

Both in Spain and in Portugal, ultra-royalism and clericalism had identified themselves with the cause of pretenders who had at last been decisively defeated and ejected. In both, the constitutional monarchy was vested in a very youthful princess, whose constitutional sympathies were at best skin-deep, and who—the pretenders being removed—naturally leaned to the royalists and clericals. In both there were parties with aspirations for the Constitution of 1812, and moderates divided by personal rivalries. In neither were there statesmen strong enough and clear-sighted enough to shape and carry out a definite policy in the face of multitudinous ill-considered opinions and clashing interests; and the result in both countries was not quite downright anarchy, but a deplorable lack of governance, where firm and stable government was essential to the revival of prosperity.

In Italy and in the Netherlands, as concerns the outward political situation, the period from 1832 to 1839 may be described as one of marking time. The French occupation of Ancona was a reassertion of the historic French claim that France had as good a right as Austria to a voice in the affairs of central Italy. It imposed caution on Austrian activities; but its *raison d'être* disappeared on the withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Papal States, and it had not been turned to account—as Périer probably intended—to force upon the Papacy the reforms which even Austria had urged. Anconia was evacuated in 1839.

The Belgian settlement, finally recognized by the Powers in 1832, was not at once completely carried out. On the one side, William declined to acknowledge Belgian independence, though he was unable in any practical way to assert his sovereignty. On the other, the Belgians remained in occupation of Luxemburg and Limburg, which the treaties required them to evacuate. The point of the king's claim to them lay in the fact that they were technically in Germany, neither in the old Austrian Netherlands nor the old United Provinces; while they, on the other hand, had associated themselves with the Belgian demand for separation from Holland. In 1838 William at last announced his readiness to acknowledge Belgian independence, but with the Belgian abandonment of the Duchies as condition precedent. Belgium at first refused; Palmerston supported the Powers in insisting on the fulfilment of the treaties. France claimed the credit of procuring for Belgium a modification in her favor of the financial terms imposed by the treaties, in consideration whereof the Duchies were evacuated. William could no longer refuse to recognize the southern kingdom, and the Powers individually and collectively ratified the "neutralization" of the now definitely established kingdom (1839).

At the moment when the Powers were signing the treaty which gave the Powers crown of a newly-created kingdom of Greece to the Bavarian Prince Otto in 1832, a fresh storm-cloud was rising in the East. Mahmud, the Turkish Sultan, was a reformer, who had got rid of one of the stiffest of the innumerable stiff obstacles to reform in Turkey when the Janissaries were put down in 1826. He was the Khalif of Islam as well as the head of the Turkish nation. The Sultanate had always represented the supremacy of Moslems over conquered infidels. But it was his ambition to be the head of a European State, and among the Christian kingdoms of Europe there was no room for one essentially hostile to Christianity as such—a fact sufficiently marked by the impossibility of admitting him to Alexander's Holy Alliance. Like Akbar in Hindostan in the sixteenth century, he proposed to abolish all the political disabilities imposed by Islam upon the infidel subject of the faithful; and his proposals roused the ire of his Moslem subjects, and weakened his hold on them.

This attitude encouraged the ambitions of his most powerful subject, the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali. Those ambitions had been checked at Navarino, and by the consequent compulsory withdrawal of Ibrahim from the Morea. He had not only failed to acquire the Morea; Mahmud had also refused to confer on him the Pashalik of Syria, the reward promised in return for his aid, on the ground that he had failed. So in 1832 Mehemet dispatched Ibrahim into Syria at the head of an army. Like the mediæval barons of England when they rebelled against any English king, he proclaimed himself the Sultan's most loyal servant, whose sole object was to deliver his master from the evil counsellors who surrounded him. Mahmud had set his reforming zeal to work on the reconstruction of his armies after the destruction of the Janissaries, but he had not succeeded in reorganizing them effectively. Before Ibrahim they collapsed. Acre fell, then Damascus, and a series of victories carried Ibrahim's forces across the Taurus range into Asia Minor.

Mahmud appealed to the Powers. Palmerston was preoccupied with Belgium; so was France, where moreover the cause of Mehemet Ali was in favor. The French were in fact silently securing the foothold they had won in Algeria in 1830, and were dreaming of an African dominion, and an understanding with Egypt as an independent Power on Eastern Mediterranean. Russia, which had received something of a set-back in the final settlement of Greek affairs, saw her opportunity, and offered her aid to Turkey in pure disinterestedness. While Mahmud hesitated, Ibrahim advanced. A victory at Konieh (December) brought him within measurable distance of Constantinople. Mahmud accepted Russia's help; a Russian squadron came to Constantinople, Russian troops were

landed, and a Russian army was ready to cross the Danube. Neither France nor England was willing to see Turkey turned into a Russian protectorate. They dispatched squadrons to the Dardanelles and urged on the Porte concessions to the Pasha. Mehemet did not want to fight Russia, and Convention of Kiutayeh (May 1833) stopped the contest by giving him the Syrian pashaliks. But Mahmud felt that the only Power which had treated him with even an appearance of disinterested goodwill was Russia; and in July he concluded with the Tsar the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which in effect though not in form made Turkey a Russian protectorate, and closed the Dardanelles to the warships of other nations. French and British might protest, but they were helpless.

Since Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, the eyes of France had been turned to Egypt, partly in consequence of her ejection from India by the British. If the British dominion had been expanding in India for three-quarters of a century, so also had the Russian dominion in Central Asia. Napoleon had regarded Egypt and Syria as stepping stones to India; the Tsar Paul I. and Alexander after Tilsit, had viewed Central Asia in the same light. The long pre-Revolution Anglo-French struggle had been largely the outcome of the doctrine that there was not room for both countries in either North America or India—that they could not live side by side; that it must be the aim of each to oust the other. Each at least had interpreted every act of the other as directed ultimately to its own ejection. Hence in the nineteenth century, France dominating Egypt or Syria, Russia dominating Central Asia or Turkey, seemed alike in England to threaten the British Empire in India—considerations which perpetually dominated British, Russian, and French policy. That the British and Russian boundaries in Asia would some day meet was more than probable; for both, expansion, whether deliberate and premeditated or actually reluctant, was inevitable. Both Nicholas and Palmerston were aware that a perfectly frank and sincere confidence and understanding between the two nations would give perfect security to both; such mutual confidence was unattainable.

Nevertheless, Nicholas was anxious to allay Palmerston's perpetual suspicions, and, from a European point of view, no less anxious to break up the always dubious concord between Great Britain and the Orleans monarchy. Moreover, he had, for a time adopted the view that the best interests of Russia demanded not—as he held at other times—the partition of the Turkish Empire, but its preservation, with leading strings in Russian hands. Palmerston desired its preservation, but as a check on Russia in the Mediterranean and in Asia. Nothing would make France see eye to eye with either.

Six years, after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Eastern ques-

tion was again to the fore. If Mehemet Ali had remained quiescent since his acquisition of Syria, he was still as formidable as ever to the Sultan, and his rule, both in Egypt and in Syria, was hampering British commerce on both these trade-routes to the farther East; while in France he was the object of not over well-informed admiration, partly because he was in England's way, and partly because he was regarded as the liberator of the Sultan's Syrian subjects. In 1838, the Pasha felt strong enough to withhold the tribute due to the Porte; and, in 1839, Mahmud, who conceived that his armies, trained by Prussian officers, were now adequately recognized, felt strong enough to strike at his too powerful vassal. He proclaimed Mehemet a rebel, and troops invaded Syria—whereupon Ibrahim routed them completely. Four days before the victory, Mahmud died; his heir and successor was Abdul Mejid, a boy of sixteen. In such circumstances, anything might happen at Constantinople—and Ibrahim was on the march. The Turkish admiral with most of the fleet went over to the Pasha.

All the Powers were alarmed. They could agree promptly to recognize Abdul Mejid and secure him on the throne, while none was willing that any other should undertake his defence single-handed. There the common ground ended. France wanted Great Britain to join her in recognizing Mehemet's virtual independence, and in counteracting any isolated action against him on Russia's part. Nicholas saw and seized his opportunity for severing England and France and convincing Palmerston of his own disinterestedness. He proposed to Palmerston to waive himself the right of individual intervention conveyed by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and to submit the settlement of the Eastern question to a coalition of the great Powers—preferably to the exclusion of France.

Not without reason, distrust of French designs for acquiring a dominant influence in Egypt outweighed distrust of Russian designs for securing her dominant influence with the Porte. Moreover Palmerston was confident that whatever clattering of sabres there might be, Louis Philippe would not challenge a war in which he would be without allies among the great Powers. France was left out in the cold; Great Britain joined the three Eastern Powers in the Convention of London (July 1840), wherein they pledged themselves mutually to protect Abdul Mejid, and offered agreed terms to Mehemet Ali—engaging, in a later protocol, to seek no individual advantages for themselves. The sabres rattled loudly, but they were not drawn.

Mehemet refused the terms which would have left him southern Syria and Acre as well as Egypt, encouraged but not aided by France. Palmerston acted at once. British squadrons, supported by Turks and Austrians, appeared before Beirut, and the Syrians

at once rose against Ibrahim, who had proved more an oppressor than a liberator. Napier captured Acre, and then dictated terms to Mehmet Ali at Alexandria. The Ottoman fleet was restored, and the Pasha withdrew all his claims on Syria, but was to retain the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt. Palmerston had secured all the prestige of the victory for the British, who in fact had won it practically though not nominally single-handed (the Russians having taken no part whatever in the operations), and had recovered with the Porte something more than an equality with Russia. Nicholas, on the other hand, felt that he had ended the combination of the Western liberal Powers in opposition to the autocrats of the East, and had revived something closely akin to the Quadruple Alliance of Vienna. The final treaty, however, of July 1841 included France, and restored the semblance of the Concert, Britain conceding the demand of Russia and France for the closing of the Dardanelles to ships of war.

An Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* was not likely to be of long standing with Palmerston at the British Foreign Office; was there any real prospect that France and Britain would cease to agree in favoring elsewhere the liberal movements which the Tsar abominated, however much the mutual suspicions and jealousies of the two countries might stand in the way of co-operation. But at the moment Palmerston appeared to have accepted the Tsar's olive branch, and the fall of the Melbourne Ministry a few weeks later brought into power for some five years a government more disposed to urbanity and conciliation. During those five years both Russia on one side and France on the other were freed from the expectation of being rudely thwarted by the British Foreign Minister, though discords promptly attended the return of Palmerston at the end of 1846.

It may be remarked that neither Austria nor Prussia had taken effective part in these affairs. Metternich had lost what little hold he had on England at Castlereagh's death, on Russia at the accession of Nicholas, and on France with the July revolution. Prussia had served as echo or chorus to Austria, but always with a strong disposition to refrain for her own part from anything beyond diplomatic action when, as was usually the case, direct Prussian interests were not at stake. And Prussia had no direct interests in the East. The three Powers were in accord on the one point that they had a right to intervene on behalf of any monarchy which appealed to them for aid against "the revolution," but they parted company whenever Turkey was in question—because the one thing which Metternich feared no less than "the revolution" was the aggrandizement of his giant neighbor. The one solution of the Eastern question which would have suited him—the establishment of the Sultan's authority without qualification throughout his dominions—was equally objec-

tionable to each of the three Powers which had direct interests in the East. In the West, the Eastern Powers were all debarred from intervention by the Franco-British *entente*, however superficial its cordiality.

The Tsar, warming towards England, was not long in reverting to his earlier preference for the partitioning of Turkey as against the maintenance of its integrity under conditions which gave no security for the predominance of Russian influences. When on a visit to England he propounded his view that Turkey was a "very sick man" whose early dissolution was inevitable, and that it would be as well for Russia and England to come beforehand to an agreement as to the distribution of the estate upon Turkey's decease. Aberdeen, Palmerston's successor at the Foreign Office, put the suggestion by. For a time the Eastern question slept. The troubles in the youthful Greek kingdom—where the Bavarian king supplied by the Powers had the usual desire to overturn the Constitution and rule autocratically—fluttered the diplomatic doves, but threatened no serious disturbance; and the king was forced to give way for the time. The wrongs inflicted on a British subject when Palmerston was back in power only gave that statesman an opportunity for a demonstration which produced the desired effect, but intensified the mingled fears and suspicions habitually inspired in other chancelleries by the impetuosity of his language and his methods.

As concerned Spain and Portugal, Great Britain and France continued to act or abstain from action in official agreement; in effect France was restrained from intervention, which would always have been popular, by Louis Philippe's invincible objection to a dangerous rupture with England. But in each country the other was suspected of intriguing to secure a supreme influence for itself over the Spanish and Portuguese courts. In particular, the suggestions that the young Queen of Spain should marry a son of the King of the French or a Saxe-Coburg prince had to be abandoned, and the marriage of her younger sister to a French prince (Montpensier) obtained the British sanction only on conditions that it should not take place until the queen herself was married and had given birth to an heir, lest a French prince should succeed to the Spanish throne. The story of the Spanish marriages is unsavoury, but illustrative of the still powerful influence of dynastic considerations on international politics. The queen was betrothed to her cousin the Duke of Cadiz in the confident belief that no child could be born to him; consequently the whole question of the marriages was suspended. But in the irritation caused by Palmerston's return to power, Louis Philippe and his minister Guizot stole a march on the British, and the two princesses were simultaneously married—an implicit breach of which ended all possibility of sincere cordiality between the

Orleans monarchy and the British Government—with or without Palmerston. So ended the *entente* which, during the preceding years seemed to have been sealed by the interchange of friendly visits between the old King of the French and the young Queen of England. The effect in Spain, moreover, was the reverse of what Louis Philippe had intended; for when the young queen discovered how she had been duped, her anger was kindled against France, and British influence became dominant at Madrid.

At this stage there occurred an episode which was a final demonstration of the inefficiency of the European Concert. Swiss affairs did not often affect developments elsewhere; but to some extent they did so now. The Vienna Congress had established the Swiss Republic as a confederation of several autonomous semi-sovereign cantons, the central authority having very little control over each. In the Catholic and conservative cantons Jesuit influence had revived, and liberal and democratic movements were checked; in the rest the Jesuit influence was regarded as pernicious, and the liberal movements were successful. The latter predominated in the Federal Council. Seven of the former united in a sort of separatist movement called the *Sonderbund*. The Federal Council demanded the dissolution of the *Sonderbund* and the expulsion of the Jesuits from Switzerland. The *Sonderbund* and the French Government, anxious for the friendship of the Eastern Powers to counterbalance the break-up of the British *entente*, called for a conference of the Powers to intervene on behalf of the independent rights of the cantons, under the Vienna guarantee, though this was a negation of the avowed principles on which England and France had both been in the habit of acting. But by a deliberately procrastinating diplomacy, Palmerston succeeded in postponing the meeting of the conference till the Federal party had won a completely decisive victory over the *Sonderbund*, and there was nothing left for the Powers to intervene about, so that liberalism in Switzerland was triumphant, as Palmerston wished it to be; while the French Government achieved nothing but discredit at home both for the failure of its diplomacy and for the desertion of its liberal principles.

## II.—Internal Movements

During the century preceding Waterloo Great Britain was the one State of the first rank in which, under a constitutional monarchy, the government was conducted on the principle that ministers held office to carry out the will not of the king but of parliament, to which, and not to the crown, they were responsible. That meant that they were in power so long as they could command a majority in the House of Commons. In theory, the Commons were the elected representatives of the nation; in fact, owing to the vagaries of a franchise which had

never been standardized, half the members were the nominees of a few *grandeės*, and the rest were elected on a narrow property franchise which of late years had in effect been farther narrowed by the disappearance of the yeoman under stress of the industrial and rural revolution. Collisions between the two houses were rare, and were almost limited to questions of the privileges of one house or the other; for the simple reason that the views of the *grandeės* in one chamber were reflected by their nominees in the other. It followed also that the Commons as well as the Lords represented the interests of landholders much more than those of any other specific class in the country—the class which was at the top of the social organization and most firmly convinced of the dangers of revolutionary equality and fraternity; a dread which was, however, shared by nearly every one who had even a little property to lose.

As the fear of Jacobinism faded it became easier to face and even to welcome the prospects of reform; and the great Reform Bill of 1832 transformed the House of Commons into an assembly in which commercial and manufacturing interests and professional men outweighed the landowners and country gentlemen. Since the structure of the hereditary chamber remained unchanged, the harmony between the houses passed; the House of Commons became mainly a reforming assembly, the House of Lords mainly conservative and defensive. For forty years Liberal ministers ruled with brief interludes, during which Conservative ministries carried on by grace of an Opposition which outnumbered their own supporters. The one exception was the five years' administration of Peel—1841-6—which, professedly Conservative, was soon denounced as an "organized hypocrisy," and ended by repealing the Corn Laws and breaking up the Conservative Party.

From 1830 till his death in 1865, Palmerston directed very much as he chose the foreign policy of every Liberal government till the end of 1851, and again from the beginning of 1855 onwards. In the period now under review he was out of office only during the suspensions of the Melbourne administration for six months in 1834-5, and some weeks in 1839, and during Peel's premiership (Aug. 1841-June 1846) when Aberdeen, Wellington's disciple, took his place and a more conciliatory attitude towards foreign Powers was assumed by the British Government.

A point of no small importance was the stabilizing of the monarchy by the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837. George IV. as Prince Regent and as king had brought the crown and the court into contempt. William IV. by contrast was deservedly respected, but between his younger brother the Duke of Cumberland and the succession there stood only the younger daughter of the intervening brother, the Duke of York. It is quite possible that the monarchy would not

have survived Cumberland's accession, since he was a bitter reactionary, wholly devoid of all popular and of most respectable qualities. The general goodwill, however, could be and was extended to the blameless princess who inherited the throne at the age of eighteen; and any danger of her falling under Cumberland's influence was removed, since the crown of Hanover, restricted to the male succession, descended to him and not to his niece on the death of William IV. To Hanover Cumberland departed, to the relief of England; and thus after a hundred and twenty years was severed the dynastic union of the British crown and the former German electorate. The young queen's character and intelligence commanded esteem; she received her political education under the paternal care of Lord Melbourne; Leopold, King of the Belgians, her mother's brother, was her wise and trusted counsellor; and when, in 1840, she married Albert of Saxe-Coburg, the Prince Consort succeeded in adapting himself to unaccustomed constitutional surroundings—though not without some difficulty—with a sobriety which ultimately won for him the sincere regard of the public.

The reformed Parliament initiated an era of active legislation directed to the amelioration of the condition of the working classes—partly from the humanitarian motive which promoted Factory Acts and kindred measures for the protection of women, children, and young persons from excessive and demoralizing labor, partly from the economic motive which expected increased efficiency from improved conditions, and, incidentally, increased profits for manufacturers. Already the last Tory ministry of Wellington and Peel had reformed the English criminal code, till then the most irrationally merciless in Europe. A revision of the Poor Law abolished "out-door relief" and the fatal practice of supplementing wages from the rates which had been started at the close of the last century with the most philanthropic intentions and the most disastrous results; though for a time remedy seemed callously inhuman. The already active suppression of the negro slave-trade was followed up by the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire at the cost of substantial if sometimes inadequate compensation for slave owners. Successive Factory and Mines Acts ended the working of young children, and limited the working of women and young persons, in factories and mines, while leaving the men to take care of themselves. The Anti-Corn Law League agitated for the abolition of the duties which kept up the price of the poor man's bread lest England should cease to be a corn-growing country; while Protectionists averred that the Leaguers, as manufacturers, sought only a means to the reduction of wages and the increase of profits. By 1846 the League had converted Peel, who carried some of his own party and the whole of the Liberals with him in repealing the Corn Laws—the climax of a series of measures

by which, following in the footsteps of Huskisson, he had reduced or abolished the barriers protecting the home producer against foreign competition, at the expense of the consumer.

Direct legislation for the unenfranchised by the enfranchised classes was the course which found favor with Parliament; the unenfranchised suspected the enfranchised of ulterior motives, probably sinister, and sought other means for remedying the evils from which they suffered under the new industrial conditions which had grown up in consequence of the development of machinery in manufacture. Combinations among workmen had only been partially legalized since 1826, nor had they as yet learned to make themselves effective. It was naturally enough the popular belief that democracy, political equality of individuals, would give a great political preponderance to the now voteless classes, and would straightway bring about the millennium, which was deferred only by the selfishness of the propertied classes. That belief was formulated in the Chartist movement, the demand for a "Charter" abolishing property qualifications for representatives of electors, and establishing manhood suffrage, equal electoral districts, and annual parliaments—wherein the propertied classes saw nothing but "red ruin and the breaking up of laws." But the advocates of red revolution were in fact few; the actual remedial measures eased the situation; and in 1848 Chartism, so far as it was a menace to the established order, collapsed ignominiously without the application of repressive measures; though the greater part of the Chartist program has since been quietly achieved in the normal course of constitutional developments.

To all English statesmen Ireland presented an inexhaustible problem. The Act of Union, intended to place the Irishman and the Englishman on an equal footing, retained a separate land law and a separate administrative organization for Ireland; while the supreme assembly was not, in fact, amenable to Irish public opinion, the Irishman forming only a small minority therein. All the defects and anomalies of the English representative system were present in Ireland to an exaggerated degree. Moreover, since Catholics were still excluded, only a fraction of Irish opinion was represented at Westminster. Centuries of unjust class government had multiplied evils which could now be remedied only by creating a fresh crop of injustices. The Catholic grievance had at last been partially met by Catholic emancipation, but Catholic interests were still subordinated to Protestant interests, and the Catholic priesthood remained in ceaseless antagonism to the Protestant authorities. The appearance of Irish Catholic representatives at Westminster initiated a continuous agitation for the repeal of the Union, and for the Irish autonomy which Irish protestants had hardly been persuaded to resign when had it meant their own domination, but which would be a thing of dread

when it meant Catholic domination. And behind the repealers there was always the substratum of those in whom was ingrained a hatred not only of the English domination but of the English connection altogether. In England, ebullitions of the law-breaking spirit were rare; in Ireland the bulk of the population regarded the law as an alien imposition the defiance of which was in itself a thing deserving not censure but applause—a view simply unintelligible to the ordinary Englishman; and so the vicious circle of agitation, outrage, coercion, concession, which was looked on as the harvest of agitation, and then renewed agitation, spun on interminably.

In France the July revolution had annihilated the attempt to restore the Ancien Régime, while it retained the monarchy. Lafayette had called the system which he accepted "the best form of republic," and during the first months it had looked as though issue would be a democratic republic with a crowned figurehead. But before a twelve-month had passed, the skill of Louis Philippe, the instability of the democrats, and the ability of Casimir Périer had secured the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie—the middle classes—for whom settled peace and order and material prosperity were the first consideration. Périer was himself the government until his death in 1832; but the principle survived him. The king, however, was not content to occupy the subordinate position to which Périer relegated him in theory and practice. During the minister's life he had accepted the position because their politics were identical, and the stability of the new monarchy was too uncertain to allow of a quarrel—of a self-assertion on the part of Louis Philippe which would have shaken Périer's ascendancy. But from his death onwards the king was always maneuvering to get the political control into his own hands; while the leaders of the bourgeoisie were equally resolved to retain it themselves.

That there was little to be feared from the legitimists, the supporters of the exiled Bourbons who counted Louis Philippe a usurper, had already been proved by the futile attempt of the Duchesse de Berri (whose husband's murder had brought about the fall of Décazes in 1820) to raise in Brittany a royalist revolt on behalf of her son, the legitimate heir of Charles X.; an attempt so abortive that the government could afford to treat it with benevolent lenity. The death of the young Duke of Reichstadt, the son born to Napoleon by his Austrian empress, left the representation of Bonapartism to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the son of the emperor's brother Louis, who had no effective following. Danger alike to the Orleans monarchy and to the bourgeois ascendancy was to be feared only from the democratic republicans. The activity of their propaganda encouraged the government to a display of firmness in the face of threatened insurrection which effectually quelled it in 1834, and also manifested the prevalent disposition in favor of the maintenance of law even at some expense

to liberty; and the government was able to devote itself with success to the development of material prosperity, which seemed to provide the best guarantee for its continuance in power.

Its weakness lay in the limitations on its foreign policy. Working in harmony with England, the French statesmen had been able to claim that the establishment of the independent kingdom of Belgium was their work and vindicated the position of France among the nations; but it was difficult to pretend that they had played a part equally satisfactory to patriotic souls in the East where France and England were not in partnership. In fact the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was a victory for Russia over both the Western Powers, the more obviously aggressive French policy having met with the more obvious check. It was this that enabled the king to get rid of his Foreign Minister the Duc de Broglie, who had followed Casimir Périer in forcing Louis Philippe to remain in the background, though both king and minister were actuated by the same determination to avoid placing France in a position of isolated opposition to the rest of the Powers. In spite, however, of a series of ministerial crises the conservative ministerial forces were not broken up, though they would probably have gone to pieces but for the recall of De Broglie before he had been out of office twelve months. Six months later he again gave way to Thiers who was bent on a more self-assertive foreign policy. But Spain was the region of active intervention selected by Thiers; he was foiled by the troublesome Palmerston and by the king's determination not to break with England; and he retired (1836). Conspicuously the king had won a victory; his will had prevailed against that of his ministers. Thiers in his temporary retirement devoted himself to a History of the First Consulate and to the development of the Napoleonic legend which was presently to be a serious factor in French politics. Louis Philippe procured a ministry with a chief, Molé, who was a man after the king's own heart, while it was for a time reinforced by Guizot and others who had been at once colleagues and rivals of Thiers; but these were presently ejected. A situation had been reached not unlike that in England when North became George III.'s Prime Minister.

But Louis Philippe and Molé were more intelligent than George III. and North. The successors of Casimir Périer had repressed the democratic republicans; an amnesty was now granted which helped to change their attitude. They repudiated physical force doctrines and confirmed themselves to constitutional agitation. A similarly conciliatory attitude was adopted towards the former legitimists, who were dropping all disposition to resort to a restoration by force, while their clericalism was becoming, so to speak, more religious and less ecclesiastical. In other respects the Molé Ministry continued its predecessor's policy of developing material prosperity. The final settlement

of Belgium, and the withdrawal of Austrian garrisons from the Papal States, followed by the French evacuation of Ancona, strengthened the government, and there ensued a brief period of rest from political excitement. This was again disturbed partly by the attacks of the Opposition upon the "personal government" of the king and his pacific foreign policy, partly by a recrudescence of the party of violence among the democrats, all fostered by the growth of the Napoleonic legend of France's past glories. The Opposition was partly frightened into rallying to the crown, and the ministry made a great display of activity in Algiers and in the last phase of the Turco-Egyptian question. In Algiers, where what might be called a policy of absorption had been carried on for ten years, the Arab leader Abd-el-Kadir called his people to arms and a hard struggle set in, vigorously conducted on both sides. But in the East it was more than difficult to persuade the French public that the government's diplomacy in favor of Mehemet Ali was meeting with success or adding to French prestige. Thiers, the champion of a vigorous foreign policy, was recalled to office; a warning of which, as we have seen, Palmerston took no account. War seemed imminent, but the king held to his determination to avoid a European war in spite of popular clamor. He had rightly gauged the sentiment of the silent masses. Excited feelings were salved by the not unwilling acceptance by the British of the French demand that Mehemet should be left the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt. An attempt on the life of Louis Philippe again rallied conservatives to the support of the crown; Thiers was forced to resign (October 1840); the king's victory was confirmed when a new ministry was formed with Guizot as its chief, and still more thoroughly when France again took her place in the European Concert and shared in the final treaty of 1841. For seven years Guizot maintained his position till the crown and the ministry fell together in the February revolution of 1848.

During those seven years the government, although neither the king nor the ministers were conscious of the fact, was becoming more and more alienated from the French people: The revival of the British *entente* which attended the fall of Thiers and Guizot's accession to power was an essential feature of the royal program in France; it was facilitated by the fall of Melbourne Ministry and the substitution of Aberdeen for Palmerston at the British Foreign Office, and it continued effective till Palmerston's return in 1846. But it was not popular, because Palmerston had made England unpopular, and any compromise with or concession to England was regarded as a feeble surrender. The French arms advanced in Algeria; in due time Abd-el-Kadir's resistance was broken and Algeria became a French province; colonial progress was also made elsewhere—but all this did not appeal to the popular imagination, inflamed by the Napoleonic legend,

which had been fed by the recent return to Paris of the great captain's ashes. Commerce and wealth developed rapidly with the progress of the industrial revolution, as in England; but also as in England it was the commercial and manufacturing classes who were gathering in the harvest, not the operatives whose numbers were multiplying, and among whom communistic and socialistic doctrines were gaining hold. The peasantry indeed did not suffer as they had suffered in England, but they were at best apathetic.

Guizot was secure enough of the solid support of a solid section of the bourgeoisie, on whom on the whole he could count to give him a majority in Parliament, especially in view of the government's power of "managing" elections through officials. But he forgot to reckon with the unrepresented masses. And beyond all these considerations was the fact the Guizot's government was the government not of the people but of the king, with whom the strength of the dynasty and the authority of the crown were the first consideration; whereas he had been placed on the throne and maintained there in his first years by democrats and constitutionalists who meant him to be no more than a figure-head "reigning but not governing"; while Louis Philippe himself, now passed seventy, was more obstinate, less diplomatically pliant, less amenable to warnings, than he had been. Guizot, too, had never sought or won personal popularity. And while he succeeded in carrying out his own wishes and the king's he was deceived by the outward appearance of tranquillity, and remained satisfied that all was going well; nor was he undecieved even by the discredit attaching to the affairs of the Spanish marriages and the Sonderbund.

In Italy, Austrian influences were predominant, from end to end of the peninsula, with every government; since each looked to Austria to guarantee it despotic authority, Piedmont—that is, the kingdom of Sardinia—being the one partial exception. Austria had put down the insurrections in the Papal States following the July revolution, Austrian garrisons had remained to overawe those states for some years following—and the presence of Austrian forces on the borders had continued to serve the same purpose. In Piedmont the reactionary Charles Felix, who had been established on this throne by Austrian bayonets, had been succeeded by his cousin Charles Albert of Carignano who had once for twenty-four hours been adopted as their leader by constitutionists, nationalists, and republicans. But Charles Albert, though his sympathies were liberal, was too politically timid to play a bold and independent part.

Every one knew that the Austrian rule was hated in the north, the papal rule in the center, the Bourbon rule in the south. But Italy was still as it had been for centuries a collection of fragments, and no fragment was strong enough by itself to throw off the yoke under

which it suffered. Liberation for Italy could come in one way only—if her peoples united to drive out the Austrian. And Italy was not able or ready to unite.

One man, Giuseppe Mazzini, devoted his life to the creation of a common Italian spirit, based on a common idealism and supported by a common devotion. But Mazzini was an exile, regarded by all respectable conservatives as the arch-conspirator, instigator of assassination and violence, the most dangerous of republican revolutionaries; ejected from his native land by Charles Albert, from France by the conservative bourgeoisie, and from Switzerland, he had to carry on his fervent propaganda from an obscure lodging in London. Yet he created and inspired the organization of "Young Italy" which more than anything else provided the motive force—though not the material instruments or the practical methods—by which Italian freedom and unity were one day to be achieved. For to Young Italy these things were not so much political program as a religion.

For practical politicians, the sole hope lay in Piedmont placing itself at the head of the united movement; and even if she did so the struggle would still be one against odds so overwhelming that success could hardly be achieved without the aid of foreign intervention—the last thing of which there could be any reasonable expectation, except perhaps the adherence of the Papacy to the cause of liberty. Yet it was this last alternative which seemed suddenly to be on the point of realization when in 1846 Gregory XVI. died and the Bishop of Imola was raised to the papal throne as Pius IX. For the new Pope opened his pontificate by declaring an amnesty for past political offences, and issuing an instalment of the much-needed reforms within the papal dominions, which filled the souls of liberals with joyful anticipations, and so alarmed Metternich that in 1847 Austrian troops occupied Ferrara. This was a palpable departure from the doctrine previously laid down by Metternich that the right of intervention operated when revolution was forced upon a "legitimate" government against its will, but not when liberal measures were introduced on such a government's own initiative. The Pope protested loudly; British and French squadrons appeared in the Bay of Naples; but the Austrians proffered a technical interpretation of treaty clauses as authorizing the occupation of Ferrara which served to prevent the threatening international conflagration. For the moment, the Pope was regarded in Italy as a champion of national liberty.

Throughout Germany, political agitation had no strong hold on the working classes; it was active chiefly among the educated, and the agitators were mainly university professors and students, men of letters, doctrinaires, theorists without practical experience, whose propaganda had been effectively curbed by the Carlsbad decrees. The demands for a "Constitution," however, could not be altogether re-

pressed, and most of the States enjoyed something of the sort; though with practically very little real limitation on the power of the princes. When the King of Hanover annulled the Constitution there in 1837, there was a great outcry, and seven professors who protested went into exile; but the Diet proved its own uselessness as a court of appeal and its true character as a conference of princes, not of States. Paternal governments, whatever their failings might be, developed material prosperity, and all Germany was reaping the benefits of the Zollverein which had gone far towards establishing complete free trade within the confederation. The death of the old King of Prussia in 1840 and the accession of his elder son, the clever but erratic visionary Frederick William IV., gave a fresh impulse to the demand for the long-promised Constitution, since the new king was credited with liberal sympathies. He did in fact create something like a panic in the minds of Metternich and the Tsar by announcing in 1846 that a United Diet of Prussia was to be summoned in fulfillment of his father's plans and promises. But when the Diet met it appeared that Frederick William was not to be bound by the clauses of any written Constitution; its business was merely to demonstrate its loyalty by approving such propositions as the king was pleased to lay before it. The only effect was to exasperate Liberalism and to dissipate the illusion that it really had something to hope for from the king. There was no appetite for revolution in the republican sense, nor any Jacobin blood-lust; but Liberalism smouldered angrily.

The Austrian Empire had a problem or a complication of problems, which was all its own. The Hapsburgs ruled over a composite bundle of nationalities and sometime independent States which were themselves similarly composite. In Lombardy and Venetia a purely Italian population was ruled by what was in effect an Austrian military occupation. Austria proper with the Tyrol was pure German. Bohemia had been a Slavonic kingdom embracing substantial German colonies, Hungary was a kingdom in which Magyars were dominant over great regions in which the bulk of the population were southern Slavs or Rumanians, while the actual German supremacy was kept in evidence by the German colonies. Every nationality resented the German supremacy; south Slavs and Rumanians resented Magyar domination; northern Slavs, Czechs, Poles, and Ruthenians held apart from each other, as of distinct nationalities. To hold the bundles together the Austrian system centralized all control at Vienna—it was little to be wondered at that Metternich abominated the whole doctrine of nationalism only less fervently than all the doctrines of the "revolution"; that he feared the introduction or dissemination of popular ideas as productive of chaos, and regarded intensified centralization of authority as the only security. The system compelled obedience, imposed silence, and to a great extent paralyzed counter-organization; but it

intensified the hostility which was perforce latent. During the life of the Emperor Francis, who enjoyed a certain popularity and prestige of his own, his personality was a preservative factor; but when on his death in 1835 the feeble-minded Ferdinand succeeded him, this binding influence disappeared, and with it the loyalty to the monarchy of the German section of his subjects.

The Magyars found themselves virtually deprived of their old rights of self-government, and began to demand free institutions for themselves, coupled with the subjection to them of the Slavs—Louis Kossuth inspiring them by the fiery eloquence of his writings and his oratory. There was a corresponding "Illyrian" movement of the south Slavs against the Magyar domination; and in Bohemia a Czech movement resembling that of the Magyars.

Then in 1846 the Poles of Galicia revolted; the Ruthenian peasants in their turn, encouraged by the Austrians, rose against the Poles, their feudal lords, slaughtered them, and then claimed as their reward release from feudal obligations. Concessions were made, and then cancelled in response to aristocratic pressure at Vienna, and so the peasantry in general became hostile to the government which had played them false. How matters stood in Italy we have already seen. If the Austrian Government had everywhere reason for confidence in its own power to crush resistance, it was still true that from end to end the Empire was full of explosive materials.

Only in Russia was there absolute security, in irresistible forces wholly at the personal disposal of Tsar Nicholas.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII

### THE WORLD OUTSIDE EUROPE: 1814-1848

#### *I.—South and Central America*

WHEN the nineteenth century opened, all South and Central America with the exceptions of a few British, French, or Dutch possessions north of the equator, was subject to the crowns of Spain or of Portugal, save in the unexplored regions of the interior. At the end of the first quarter of the century, none of it remained subject to Portugal, and Spain retained only islands in the West Indies. Brazil was then already an independent Empire, and the former Spanish dominions were shaping into the territorial divisions which in the next twenty years were beginning to acquire the coherency of organized states though few of them had attained to a government that promised any sort of permanency before the century entered on its last quarter.

Both in Spanish and in Portuguese America the story of the disruption starts from the same point—the ejection by Napoleon of the dynasties reigning in Spain and in Portugal, which produced the Peninsular War.

The separation of Brazil from Portugal was comparatively a simple affair. When Junot marched on Lisbon, the royal family embarked under the protection of a British squadron and sailed for Brazil, where they were received with loyal demonstrations. Dom John, then regent for his mother who was mad, afterwards king, made Rio the seat of government. As a colonial dependency of Portugal, Brazil had hitherto been treated as existing for the benefit of the mother-country, with her industry and commerce restricted in the same fashion (but much more drastically) as the British colonies which had snapped the fetters which hampered them and had become the United States. With the headquarters of the *de jure* Portuguese Government transferred to Brazil, the Brazilian fetters were at once removed by royal decree. Brazil stood on an equality with Portugal; even when peace came with the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula and a return to Portugal was naturally looked for, the court remained at Rio; and on succeeding to the throne in 1816, King John took the title of King of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves.

Portugal fumed, finding herself relegated in effect to a secondary

position, and handed over, in the king's absence, to the control of a practically British regency. In 1820, revolts in Portugal forced the regency to accept an exceedingly democratic Constitution. In Brazil, a corresponding movement for a Constitution arose. The king wavered between the counsels of the Crown Prince Pedro, who sympathized with the movement, and the reactionaries, the queen and Miguel. Pedro prevailed, a Constitution was granted, and King John, reluctantly and under pressure, returned to Lisbon, leaving the Crown Prince as regent.

What then befell in Portugal has been already told. For Brazil, the important point was that the Lisbon Cortes, however democratic it might be at home, intended to revert to the old subjection of Brazil which had already become accustomed to the sweets of liberty. The inevitable consequence was that Brazilian public opinion demanded that the kingdom should claim independence. The Portuguese Cortes summoned Pedro also to return home; Brazil required him to stay where he was. In effect, Pedro had to choose between Brazil and Portugal, and he chose Brazil. He stayed, explicitly disclaiming disloyalty to his fathers, but refusing submission to the revolutionary Cortes of Lisbon. The Portuguese garrisons were ready to fight, but most of them were induced to retire from the country. Pedro was declared "Perpetual Protector" (May 1822); in September he proclaimed the independence of Brazil, accepting the Imperial title for himself a month later. Only one thing was needed to complete the severance, since the Emperor of Brazil was heir to the Portuguese kingdom. When King John died, Pedro, as king, issued a charter for a Constitution, and then resigned the Portuguese crown in favor of his daughter—his successor in Brazil being his son Pedro II.

There could be no attempt at the recovery of Brazil by Portugal. Although for a short time there was technically a state of war after the proclamation of Brazilian independence, King John did not long delay recognition of the Empire (1825). As in the case of Great Britain and her colonies fifty years before, the mother-country had asserted her authority and depressed or exploited the production and commerce of the colony to her own advantage. For differing reasons, the restrictions were for a time modified either in practice or in law in both cases, and in both cases the attempt to reimpose them was met by a demand for separation. England tried unsuccessfully, and Portugal did not try at all, to suppress the demand by force of arms. The result in the one case was the establishment of a free republic, in the other of a constitutional Empire, which lasted under Pedro II. till 1889, when Brazil was added to the list of South American republics.

Twelve months sufficed to begin and practically to complete the Brazilian revolution, when in Spanish America the welter had been

going on for twelve years. In a previous chapter it was explained that the turmoil was started neither by a democratic revolutionary movement nor by nationalism—the motive forces in Europe. The Creoles everywhere were essentially one in race, language, and religion, differing from the European Spaniards who ruled them only as the British colonists had differed from the civil and military officials sent out from England. The grievance was that all official posts, all control of administration, were appropriated to European Spaniards to the exclusion of American Spaniards. The revolts began sporadically in one governorship or another only when it appeared that there was no longer at headquarters in Spain any government *de facto* or *de jure* with a clear title to obedience; of which the corollary seemed to be that the authority of the governments appointed in America by Spain had lapsed and reverted to "the people"—in other words, the insurgents. So matters went on until insurgency became endemic, and in such conditions, the disordered democratic ideas, that in Spain found their expression in the Cortes of Cadiz which issued the Constitution of 1812, naturally spread in America; though without as yet, either in Spain or in America, taking generally the forms of uncompromising republicanism.

The restoration of Ferdinand VII. in Spain in 1814 reinstated at the political center a supreme authority both *de facto* and *de jure*, a fact which the king signalized by the immediate revocation of the Constitution under which he had been restored. For Spanish America that meant reversion to the old régime and inevitably the identification, more or less explicit, of the European party with royalism and of Creole factions with republicanism, though there were still leaders of the latter who professed loyalty to the Crown.

The whole South American area falls into three sections—the northern, the southern, and the Peruvian on the west of Brazil and the Andes. As long as Peru remained unshaken in its royalism, it blocked communication between revolutionists in the north and revolutionists in the south.

In the first phase, the Argentine, with Buenos Ayres as its capital, had been comparatively successful in establishing a government, but failed to absorb or unite with Chile, Upper Peru (Bolivia), Paraguay, or Montevideo (Uruguay), though in 1814 the resistance of the last seemed to be ended. The Argentine definitely proclaimed its independence in 1816, and secured it in 1817 by the defeat of the royalists on its frontier in Chile, where the Peruvians had overturned the Chilean revolution.

In the north, New Granada (Columbia) had set up a congress which was unable to establish its authority over provinces centering in Bogota and Cartagena. Caracas (Venezuela) had set up for itself under Miranda; but in 1812 the royalists had overturned his

government, and thenceforth Bolivar the Liberator becomes the moving spirit of the revolution in the northern area. Driven from Venezuela he retired to New Granada, raised troops, and returned only to suffer an overwhelming defeat and once more beat a retreat. In 1815 troops from Spain arrived in Venezuela under Morillo. His authority being admitted without serious resistance, he advanced upon New Granada, then in a chaotic state, the provinces warring against the "government" and against each other. Bolivar was driven from this refuge to Jamaica, and Morillo established his authority; in 1816.

In Peru royalism had held its own throughout, and the revolution seemed to have been broken everywhere except in the south. Had the submission of the north been complete Morillo and the Peruvians would have combined to invade the Argentine and impose submission on the south. But the south took the offensive before Morillo was ready; the north rose again and kept him busy, and the southern attack broke up the royalist solidarity of Peru, leaving it to the north to complete the revolution there.

San Martin, a soldier of experience, intrusted with the governorship of a province by the Buenos Ayres Government, had for some time been gathering and training a force for carrying out an attack on Peru through Chile. In 1817 he passed the Andes and descended upon Chile, where he joined with the Chilean insurgent leader O'Higgins, and in fifteen months broke up the royalist forces in Chile. Meanwhile the Chileans, having warning of the coming of transports with soldiers from Spain, some of whom had already mutinied and forced their ships to put in at Buenos Ayres, intercepted and captured the rest, giving the command of their fleet to Lord Cochrane, a distinguished ex-naval officer of the British navy, whose brilliant achievements completely won the mastery of the seas. In 1820 San Martin, by Cochrane's help, invaded Peru. Next year Lima fell into his hands, and he proclaimed himself Protector of independent Peru; but he did not seek to wipe out the royalists, regarding his functions as those of a liberator, not a conqueror.

Before San Martin started on his Chilean campaign, a new guerrilla leader was found by the northern patriots of Venezuela in the peasant Paez, who distinguished himself by not massacring his prisoners according to custom, with the result that many of them joined his banner. Thereupon Bolivar reappeared, resumed the leadership, and captured Angostura. In 1819 he was able to pass into New Granada and capture Bogota, and proclaimed the union of New Granada and Venezuela as Columbia. Morillo retired, and the independence of Colombia was assured by a final victory in 1821.

In spite of San Martin's protectorship, the royalists had not lost their hold on Quito and Upper Peru. Bolivar turned upon them, and

mastered Quito, which was attached to Colombia. San Martin found his hopes of a peaceful solution vain, and resigned his functions, leaving matters to Bolivar. It was not till the end of 1824 that the victory of Ayacucho finally shattered the royalist forces, and their last fortress did not fall till the beginning of 1826. Even then guerrilla bands remained under arms for four years more.

Royalism had been broken in the south when San Martin invaded Chile, in the north by Bolivar in 1821, in the Peruvian area—again by Bolivar—in 1825; but separation from Spain did not mean that one or many ordered republics were established. While Bolivar was in Peru, Colombia repudiated the authority with which it had invested him. In Peru, he made Upper Peru the separate republic of Bolivia, himself assuming the dictatorship of the rest, from Lima as the capital. But he soon found that his presence was imperatively needed in Colombia, where Paez could not restrain the Venezuelans from demanding separation and refusing obedience to the central congress at Bogota. But though he was received with acclamation both in Bogota and Caracas, he failed in his efforts to unite the two regions, or to prevent the partition of Peru by the separation of a northern republic of Ecuador. When Bolivar died at the end of 1830, the division of the north and west into the five separate republics of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia was an established fact, though Venezuela under Paez was the only one where it could be said that there was an established government.

The southern area, too, was broken up. The Argentine had formed itself into a comparatively solid State. On the west of the Andes, Chile remained separate and set up a tolerably stable republic. In the center Paraguay had from the outset rejected the Argentine Government, but fell under the despotic sway of a series of brutal dictators. Uruguay became a bone of contention between the Argentine and Brazil, but was declared an independent republic in 1828.

In the struggle for independence, Spain had altogether lacked the material resources for the subjugation of a continent. The contest was fought out between partisans in America. The partisans of independence were definitely the stronger in the south, and the weaker in the west; in the north it was only the arrival of Morillo with troops from Europe which temporarily turned the scale in favor of the royalists, who even then were unable to maintain their ascendancy for long. The liberators from the south shook the royalists in Peru; the finally victorious liberators from the north were able to complete the work of shattering them. European intervention in support of the Spanish crown was prevented in the last phase by the attitude of the British and United States Governments.

The separation of Spain from South America was not due to any.

spontaneous uprising against Spanish dominion; it was born out of the disappearance of any recognizable government in Spain, the suspension of the legitimate Spanish monarchy. For years, the men who overturned the rule of the European Spaniards continued at least to profess loyalty to the true Spanish monarchy. Republicanism had little to say in the matter; even when the monarchy was repudiated after Ferdinand's reactionary development, both the Argentine and Bolivar in the north proposed constitutional monarchy under a European prince. When the Spanish authority was wiped out, it was not nationalism but particularism which prevented the formation of either a unitary government or a federation; the lines of division were lines of provincial division under the old provincial governorships. There were no principles at stake, no "Rights of Man" to be considered, no existing system to be adapted to new conditions, no definitely conceived forms of government to be put forward in the place of the old lack of governance. Something—the old European officialdom and the old sentiment of loyalty to the Crown—went down; there was no authority to take the place of the former, no real sentiment of patriotism to substitute for the latter.

The practical outcome was that the only governments which could enforce authority were in effect military dictatorships. A military dictatorship to be effective requires an irresistible military force under the dictator's absolute control. To be not only effective but beneficial, it requires a dictator of genius and of high character, and forces under thorough discipline. Such combinations were not forthcoming, and the result was that an occasional prolonged despotism was established here or there which was anything but benevolent; while brief dictatorships, more or less violently terminated by a military *pronunciamento* which changed the dictator, were the normal rule. Few of the new States were for any prolonged period free from revolutions, in the sense of sudden changes or attempts at change of government by violence, though the changes were not in the system but in the personnel. Half a century passed after independence was assured before such governments were generally established as gave promise of prolonged and settled security.

In Mexico affairs took a similar course, save in one particular. In South America, racial questions played no part. In Mexico, the existing government in 1808 was prompt to declare its independence of any of the authorities which claimed to be "the Spanish Government," and its loyalty to the dispossessed dynasty. In 1810, however, a revolt was raised by a priest named Hidalgo, on the ground that the Europeans were betraying the country to the French; but in effect he made the struggle one of Indians and half-breeds against the pure whites. After his death in 1812, another priest, Morelos, took up his rôle, and was succeeded in 1815 by Mina, a Spaniard, who had dis-

tinguished himself as a guerrilla commander in the Peninsular War, and had appeared as a revolutionary leader in Spain when Ferdinand revoked the constitution in 1814. Mina in turn was captured and executed by the Mexican Government, like his two predecessors.

As elsewhere, however, the demand for independence grew when the king had shown himself a pronounced reactionary. In 1821 a successful general, Iturbide, proposed, and forced the Mexican Government to accept, a scheme of independence under which the crown of the Mexican Empire was to be offered to the King of Spain. When the scheme was rejected by the Spanish Cortes, Iturbide was himself proclaimed emperor, but in 1823 had to give way to Santa Ana, who proclaimed the Mexican Republic. For thirty-two stormy years Santa Ana was alternately President and Dictator or a fugitive, while theoretically the Constitution was modelled on that of the United States—a Power with which Mexico has collided on several occasions, with results more or less disastrous. But in effect, as with the South American republics, the actual government during the rest of the nineteenth century was usually that of a dictator.

## II.—The United States

Until 1815 the politics of the great Republic of the West had not been definitely separated from those of Europe. The group of British colonies had broken away from the British Empire by the aid of France. Ceasing to be British, they were on the way to realizing themselves as a single American nations; but they were not yet sure of their unity, and they still had European ties in their partial alliance with the Power which had helped them to freedom, and in their commercial dependence upon the Power from which they had separated themselves politically. It was not without difficulty that they had escaped being involved in the long European contest, and before that contest was over they were plunged into war with the British. The close of that war marked a definite stage in the development of the new nation. Within a very few years the promulgation of the Monroe doctrine laid down the principle that the States of the old world were debarred from interfering in the quarrels or the domestic affairs of the States of the new world—with the obvious corollary. There were times during the next century when there was talk of war between the United States and Great Britain, times when the Monroe drum was beaten with effect, and a time when actual war broke out between America and Spain. But in every case the friction arose not as a European but as an American question. Not till 1917 did the United States feel called upon to take a hand in the affairs of European nations.

In 1815, the questions which had formed the basis of party divisions

passed into abeyance; there were no European quarrels, and the last ebullition of separatism, which had emanated from a Federalist center, had collapsed ignominiously, completing the disintegration of the once powerful Federalist Party. With peace came the revival of the import trade, and the recovery of the treasury, which had been depleted by the loss of a revenue mainly derived from duties on imports which not only came in now in much greater quantities, but permitted heavier and definitely protective tariffs. When Madison's presidency, which had all the popularity of obvious success, ended, in 1817, he was succeeded almost as a matter of course by his Secretary of State, James Monroe.

During Monroe's first term of office, negotiation, aided by the weakness of Spain, acquired from her East Florida, rounding off the coastal territories on the south. In domestic politics the "Missouri compromises," of 1820-1 provided a temporary settlement of the slavery problem which postponed the grave struggle on that question for a generation to come. Monroe's practically unanimous re-election was a foregone conclusion, leading to the recognition by the United States of the independence of the Spanish colonies in 1822—some time before Canning was ready to go quite so far—and the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine in December 1823.

Slavery was one of the prominent subjects of difference between the northern and the southern states of the Union. The industrial and agricultural North had no use for slave labor; in the South, where wealth was derived mainly from the growing of tobacco and cotton—the latter having outstripped the former as a staple industry since the development of machinery for spinning and textile manufactures—it was looked upon as an economic necessity. In the eyes of slave-owners the system never presented itself as iniquitous. In the old colonies the relations between owners and slaves had been generally of a patriarchal character for which Biblical sanction could obviously be claimed; the negro enjoyed infinitely greater security of life and limb and of material comfort than his relatives in Africa. That he was actually degraded morally by the slave status was arguable, but not convincingly obvious; nor did it often occur to him to resent his own position. On the other hand, it was clearly impossible to reconcile the existence of slavery with doctrines of the Rights of Man or with the general principles of liberty recognized in any political theory which did not postulate absolutism as the basis of the social fabric—except on the time-honored but questionable hypothesis that nature has divided mankind into master-races and slave-races. The conscience of the master-races was only just awakening, just beginning to be troubled, over the enslavement of the others.

Conscience then found it easy to accept the compromise that where

slavery was an established institution it should be allowed to remain, but that elsewhere its introduction should be forbidden. It was easy to prohibit slavery in the northern states and to leave it untouched in the South. But the territories of the Union, once bounded by the Alleghanies, were expanding westward. In the northern view, the prohibition ought to be extended to the newly occupied lands when they took shape as separate states. The rule was easily applied to the expansion over the triangle between the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio, where there was no economic demand for slavery; but the South claimed that it should not apply to the southern expansion, where the economic demand prevailed. And for this view it had a definite political reason. The non-slave states were already more numerous than the slave states, unless; as the new states were formed, a due proportion of them were slave states the latter would be swamped in the Federal Government which would soon take upon itself the total abolition of slavery. Thus the Ordinance of 1787 had appropriated to the slave area any new territory south of the Ohio as far west as the Mississippi.

Now after the Louisiana purchase in 1803, slavery remained as a matter of course in what had been Spanish territory. Lower Louisiana was admitted to the Union as a slave state in 1812. In 1829 it was proposed to admit Upper Louisiana under the name of Missouri, that river forming its northern boundary. The anti-slavery theory was that the line dividing slave from non-slave states should be continued due west, from the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi; but slavery was already in force in Missouri, most of which was north of that line. Hence it was agreed in 1820, that Missouri itself should be a slave state, but that west of it the line separating slave from non-slave states should be the extension of Missouri's southern boundary. A new state on the west of Missouri itself would be non-slave. This was the Missouri Compromise.

The Madison-Monroe period, during which the old parties had melted away without giving birth to new parties in the process, is known as the "Era of Good Feeling." But it was soon ended. There was no obvious successor to Monroe; the candidates for the Presidency were supported on personal, not party, grounds. None of the four who stood received a decisive majority of votes; it lay therefore with the House of Representatives, under the Constitution, to choose any one of the first three; and they selected, not Andrew Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, who stood first on the list, but John Quincy Adams, the recent Secretary of State, who stood second; a result due to the influence of Henry Clay, the fourth candidate. There was no doubt that Jackson was the most popular; and when Clay was appointed Secretary of State by Adams, the disappointed candidate and

his supporters denounced the imagined "bribery" which had won for Adams the support of Clay.

Virulent denunciation and perpetual charges of corruption were hurled against the Adams Government, and, ill grounded though they were, they told. Unpopular from the outset, it was unsuccessful in its management of affairs, and a violent electoral campaign gave Andrew Jackson the presidential chair in 1829, with more than double the number of votes cast for Adams.

The election of Andrew Jackson brought into full play the "spoils" system which has been one of the gravest defects in the political practice of the United States. The party in power made a clean sweep of the opposite party, ejecting its members from every official appointment, and substituting its own partisans. When another party came into power, retaliation was a matter of course; supporters of the new government took the places of those who had served the old—the whole administrative machinery changed hands; administrative experience and efficiency were heavily discounted as compared with party services or connections, while politics became more and more a business which men took up to earn a living, and which seriously occupied only those who were in the business. What had before been only a tendency, became now the established system.

This was one of the fruits of the development of party organization which had gone far towards winning Jackson's election; for the battle had not been fought over any fundamental political principles, though the Jackson men had taken to calling themselves "Democratic Republicans," whence the party soon became known as the Democrats. In fact, when such a question did come to the fore it turned out that the President was not the champion but the foe of the group which had made sure of his support. The battle was joined on what was ultimately a question of States-Rights in a debate which started upon a different issue.

The territorial expansion had produced a triple instead of a double division among the states, those west of the Alleghanies forming the third group, which was agricultural. The debate arose over a question as to the disposal of public lands. In the course of it Hayne, as spokesman of South Carolina, proclaimed once more the doctrine that the individual states was constitutionally entitled to nullify in respect of itself the Acts of the Federal Congress. Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, in reply asserted the supremacy of the Federal Government, claiming that resistance to it was rebellion, for which the only justification would be success, transforming rebellion into revolution.

The motive of the debate had lain in the antagonistic interests of North and South, and the desire of each to attach the West to its own side. The industrial North had been, since 1816, securing pro-

tection for its manufacturers by ever-increasing tariffs against foreign competition. The South, producing raw material, mainly for export—consumers, not producers, of manufactured goods—objected to tariffs which raised the price of the goods they wanted to buy. The national revenue from the tariffs was considerably in excess of the national expenditure; the North desired the surplus to be expended on public works, including the improvement of communications with the West, highly advantageous to North and West alike; the South desired instead to abolish the surplus by reducing tariffs—to the advantage of the consumers in the West as well as in the South, but to the disadvantage of the producers in the North. In the debate, South and North were each bidding primarily for the alliance of the West; it was with a view to her own repudiation of tariffs that South Carolina formulated anew the doctrine of States-Rights, eliciting the Massachusetts rejoinder. If the Constitution in its origin was a terminable contract between several sovereign states, Webster was wrong; if it was a formal act of the people of the United States, he was right—speaking historically. In point of fact, when the Constitution was adopted, the several states existed, the United States did not. But, right or wrong, unless his view were upheld, the Union was doomed to dissolution. To the surprise of the South, the President, a Tennessee man, declared emphatically and uncompromisingly for the Federal principle.

In spite of a relaxation of tariffs, South Carolina gave a practical reply by declaring the tariff Acts null and void, and prohibiting payment of duties. Jackson retorted with a proclamation that the laws must be executed, and resistance was treason. The South Carolina leaders suspended the operation of the "Nullifying Act." Congress gave the President power to enforce the laws by a "Force Bill," accompanied by a "Compromise Tariff" Bill for the gradual reduction of the tariffs to the 1816 standard. South Carolina thereupon repealed the Tariff "Nullifying Act," but passed another nullifying the Force Bill—much as the Rockingham Ministry in 1766 accompanied the repeal of the Stamp Act by a Declaratory Act affirming the ultimate rights of Parliament. There was no resistance to be suppressed under the Force Bill, though the recalcitrant state continued to assert the right of resistance, and the Federal Government to claim the right of coercion. Carolina had carried her point so far as concerned the reduction of tariffs, but the constitutional question stood where it did before.

While the contest was in full swing, Jackson was re-elected for a second term. The settlement, in a manner wholly satisfactory to the United States, of sundry grievances real or alleged against Great Britain and France, Denmark and Spain, confirmed the President's

popularity, and his financial policy had an appearance of success though it left serious difficulties to the next administration.

The United States Bank was not only an exceedingly powerful financial institution, there was at least a serious risk that it was on its way to become a dominating political machine. Its position was the subject of hostile criticism when Jackson became President; its supporters challenged attack by proposing the extension of its charter in 1831, five years before the expiry of the existing charter. The Bill passed Congress, but was vetoed by the President. The bank's influence was used against him at the ensuing election; but on his triumphant return he attacked it. The government moneys which were deposited with it were withdrawn, and distributed on deposit among a large number of "pet" banks. The threatening power of the institution was destroyed, and ultimately it obtained a new charter as a State Bank, not a National Bank, from Pennsylvania.

Thus there was deposited among the pet banks an immense sum of money; increasing, because the National Debt was paid off in 1835, and the revenue still showed a big annual surplus from the tariffs, which could not be cut down except as provided by the compromise tariff of 1833. At the same time, the government was selling public lands at a very low figure, which invited speculation. The banks were eager to lend to speculators on the security of their land purchases; there was a huge unrestricted issue of paper money. Several states speculated extensively on public works, borrowing largely, while the paper currency depreciated heavily, and the Treasury distributed a great part of its surplus in loans to the states, which loans it was not intended to call in—the plan was invented in order to evade the doctrine that the national revenue was not to be applied to State improvements. Now, the public land purchases were effected with the paper currency. Hence when Jackson, to check the inflation, ordered that only specie should be accepted for the purchase of public lands, the value of the paper money went down, one after another of the State banks failed, and several states became insolvent, with disastrous effects not only for individuals but on the credit, moral as well as financial, of the United States. This was the situation which developed in 1837 at the opening of the Presidency of Jackson's successor, Martin Van Buren, who was held responsible for the trouble; revelations of corruption in the public services discredited the party of Jackson and Van Buren; a new "Whig" party drew the various factions of the Opposition together, and the "Era of Jacksonian Democracy" ended with the heavy defeat of Van Buren on his standing for re-election. The death of the new President within a month of his installation gave the office to the Vice-President, Tyler of Virginia (1841).

The defeated party had, however, done its work in completing the

democratization of America. The first Presidents had been very much like the old Whigs in England, fundamentally conservative and aristocratic in their conceptions; the Jeffersonian succession was much more influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution, but it had remained a "Virginian dynasty." What Europe meant by Jacobinism had no root in America, because in America there was no class which felt itself to be trodden down and exploited for the benefit of the privileged few. But just as the conditions of settlement had made the New England colonies democratic in comparison with the plantations of the South, so the conditions of the westward expansion made the West democratic in comparison with both. Men did not migrate to the West as laborers but as free settlers, and even in the South there was no peasant population ruled by landlords, since on the plantations there was no competition of white labor with the labor of negro slaves. Industrialism had not, as in England, created a mass of labor dependent on capitalists. Ideas of political and social equality were not subversive of the existing social order, as they were in Europe, and the Jacksonian democracy introduced no revolutionary principles. But conservatism tended in practice to keep control in the hands of a class, while democracy claimed it for the mass—and Jackson had fought Adams largely on the cry that in 1825 he himself had been chosen by the people, and the election of Adams over his head was undemocratic. When Jackson broke the dynastic succession by his election and re-election, and was followed in office by the man who had managed both his elections, the democratic victory was won. The name of the Democratic Party survived, but it is not easy to discover any intimate connection between its name and its policy.

In the presidencies of Tyler and his successor Polk, outstanding boundary questions were settled with Great Britain, though even the man who had managed both his elections, the democratic victory then not finally. Peel's Government had just taken office in England; the complaint Aberdeen was at the Foreign Office in Palmerston's place; and the Boundary Commission which issued in the Ashburton Treaty of 1842 was the result. The borders had been very inadequately defined in the Treaty of 1783, no clear solution had been reached by a reference to arbitration in 1829; but the Treaty of 1842 was in effect not a compromise but the concession of almost all that the Americans demanded, more than they had hoped, and very much more than was even excusable in the eyes of New Brunswick, the British colony most directly affected. A second question, the Oregon boundary dispute, arose in 1845. The boundary between United States and Canadian territory west of the Great Lakes had been drawn in a straight line—the forty-ninth parallel—as far as the Rocky Mountains, but no farther. But this western region of Oregon, unappropriated,

had been occupied by immigrants both from the British dominions and latterly from the States in much greater numbers after 1840. The time had come for delimitation; the British would not accept the forty-ninth parallel, previously suggested by the States; the States claimed the whole up to "fifty-four forty," the boundary of Russian Alaska. A presidential election increased the vociferous stridency of the American claim, and war seemed imminent. When the election was over, calmer counsels prevailed, and the forty-ninth parallel was accepted by both countries, down to the coast (1846). Its continuation along "the middle of the Channel between Vancouver Island and the mainland" gave rise later, by its ambiguity, to a further dispute, which was settled in favor of the United States by reference to the arbitration of the German Emperor.

During the same period Texas was added to the United States. At the time of the Louisiana purchase in 1803, it had been claimed that Texas was included in the purchase, but the claim had afterwards been abandoned, and Texas remained a province of Mexico, then a part of the Spanish Empire. Since then Mexico had become an independent republic. But Texas had been to a great extent settled by immigrants from the United States; the province revolted from the Republic, defeated Santa Ana in 1836, set up in its turn as an independent republic, and in 1837 sought admission to the United States. As it was a slave state, Jackson and Van Buren, fearing complications, rejected the proposal. Tyler accepted, but the plan was rejected by Congress. This question, with that of Oregon, was very much to the fore in the election which made Polk President in succession to Tyler, and it fell to Polk to carry the annexation through. This was duly effected; but a fresh question arose. Was Texas the province so called under the Mexican Republic, or the whole of what had been called Texas, extending to the Rio Grande, claimed under the Louisiana purchase? United States troops entered the disputed area, and there was a collision with Mexican troops (April 1846). War followed. Winfield Scott's campaign in 1847 was decisive, and in 1848 was signed the treaty which assigned to the United States the whole of Texas, as well as New Mexico and California, and to Mexico a cash indemnity—which might be regarded either as conscience money or as a generous solatium.

### *III.—Colonial Expansion, 1815-1848*

The westward movement of the overflowing United States population which has been described, scarcely falls under the category of colonial expansion, nor does the transformation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial systems into one empire and a dozen republics. Of the European Powers three only were expanding at this period:

France in Africa, Russia and Great Britain in Asia, Great Britain again in Asia, in Australasia, in Africa, and on the North American continent. The Asiatic expansion, however, was not strictly colonization but extension of dominion, and much the same may be said of the French occupation of Algeria. It did not mean the multiplication of a French population born and bred in the colony. Here, therefore, we have to deal with the growth of the Canadian, South African, and Australasian dominions on their way to form themselves into States of the British Commonwealth.

In the group of North American colonies, the largest and most important were the two Canadas, Upper and Lower, Ontario and Quebec, while Quebec differed from all the rest in having a great French, French-speaking and Roman Catholic, population with domestic institutions derived from its old organization as a French colony. The colonies throughout the War of American Independence had held to the British Empire; the upper provinces especially had been then recruited from and mainly built up by the United Empire Loyalist immigrants from the United States, whose arrival led to the separation of Ontario from Quebec; the loyalty of both, and their hostility to the new-born Republic, had been more than sufficiently demonstrated in the war of 1812-14.

They enjoyed representative institutions—that is, there was in each an assembly of elected representatives; but in each there was also an assembly or council of nominees, while the executive was wholly in the hands of the governor and his council, the ministers being appointed without being in any way responsible to the elected representatives. The “responsible” government which makes ministers answerable to an elective chamber, and therefore ultimately to the electors, had been established for a century in England, but not elsewhere. Effectively, what was known as the Family Compact secured the administrative appointments of consequence to a few distinguished families in both provinces. This was a source of resentment to the French in the lower province, who were outside the group, so that a degree of race hostility was generated. Further, with the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, a flood of emigrants from England and still more from Scotland and Ireland poured year by year into the Canadas—largely of men who were driven afield by the industrial and rural pressure at home, and were imbued with more or less revolutionary doctrines. Thus in both provinces there was an ever-increasing body dissatisfied with the rule of the oligarchy, and constantly demanding increased power for the representative chamber; not so much because the oligarchy ruled badly, as because it was an oligarchy, and the worse, from the point of view of the Quebec French, for being exclusively British. In the upper province, the race grievance was immaterial, but its place was taken by a religious

grievance, the appropriation of the "clergy reserve"—the lands set apart by Pitt's Canada Act for the maintenance of the Protestant clergy—to the clergy of the Established Churches of England and Scotland. In Quebec, on the other hand, the British democrats could not combine whole-heartedly with the French, because the political predominance of the Assembly would entail French predominance over the British.

The popular agitation received a fresh impulse from the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832. But it found no favor with even the Liberal Government at Westminster, which, instead of meeting the demand, proposed in 1836 a scheme to enable the two Canadas to deal jointly with commercial questions which affected them jointly. Anything tending to a union was abhorrent to the French party in Quebec and to their popular leader, Louis Papineau, as it would be destructive of the French ascendancy which they had in view. Papineau in 1837 called the French to revolt in arms, and proclaimed the independence of Quebec. The troops from Upper Canada were summoned to aid in putting down the insurrection, which was sporadic and half-hearted, since there was no eagerness to sever the British connection, and the whole-hearted loyalists were in the majority. The rebellion was quickly crushed, and Papineau himself fled over the border into the United States.

In the upper province there would probably have been no disturbance, but for the ill-judged conduct of the governor, Sir Francis Head. The Assembly addressed the Crown to procure his removal; he dissolved it, and his quite unjustifiable declaration that separation was the question at issue procured a government majority at the elections. Thereupon William Mackenzie, the leading agitator of the popular party, attempted to raise a revolt, encouraged by the departure of the troops to deal with Papineau. A fight with loyalist volunteers, which lasted fifteen minutes and cost one life, sufficed to break the "rebellion"; while the failure of the United States authorities to prevent filibustering raids over the border in its support intensified Canadian ill feeling towards the Republic.

Futile as both the insurrections proved, the British Government realized that all was not well, and sent out Lord Durham to take over general control as High Commissioner, and to inquire into and report on the situation. He assumed a larger authority than his commission gave him. His measures, lenient in general but high-handed and arbitrary in particular cases, were taken on his own responsibility, and, though sound and justifiable in themselves, were outside his powers, and he was promptly in effect recalled; but the famous report which he drew up was made the basis of the all-important Act of Reunion of 1840.

In Durham's view, the division into Upper and Lower Canada fos-

tered and intensified a racial antagonism between French and British, which union would reduce to the vanishing point. The essential thing was to create a spirit of community, of Canadian nationalism, to emphasize common instead of particular interests, which could not be done without reunion. Reunion, therefore, was the first point, and the second was the concession of self-government on the principle which at home had been established for a century and more—the responsibility of ministers to the people's representatives. On these lines Lord John Russell devised the Act of Reunion, which was passed by the Melbourne Government. It gave to the two provinces a single governor and a single legislature, composed of a council whose members were appointed for life, and an elective Assembly in which the two provinces had equal representation—which was unsatisfactory to the more populous lower province, where some resentment was also felt at the adoption of English alone as the official language. There was, indeed, warrant for the French objection to the union, that it would insure a British ascendancy in the whole.

Nor was full autonomy yet secured. Lord Sydenham, the first governor, held the theory that he was personally responsible to the home government, from which it would follow that the legislature was no more than an advisory body whose assent was necessary to legislation. In practice, however, he ignored the theory, and adopted the British constitutional principle that the king—and the governor—acts only on the advice of ministers having the confidence of the majority of the representatives. His successor, Sir Charles Bagot, followed his example. But both died prematurely. The third governor, Lord Metcalfe (1843-6), had been trained in India, where he had proved himself a first-rate administrator. But India trained personal rulers; and Metcalfe expected to be a personal ruler in Canada. His practice accorded with Sydenham's theory; though his ministers were chosen in the constitutional way, he did not rely on their advice, and did not even consult them in making other official appointments. The ministry resigned, and the government was brought almost to a deadlock. The dissolution of the Assembly and a general election gave the governor a bare majority and a very weak one. Peel's government, which had sent him out, supported him; bitter feeling developed, the more because colonial settlement and colonial interests appeared to have been made light of in the recent Ashburton boundary treaty. But ill health caused Metcalfe's retirement to England, where he died; and it was the Russian Government, formed after Peel's fall, that sent out Lord Elgin as governor in 1847.

Russell's own theory, and Elgin's theory and practice, corresponded with the practice of Lord Sydenham. The moment was critical for another reason. Peel's free-trade policy had just removed duties which had hitherto given a preference to Canadian products in British

markets. On the other hand, while the old "navigation laws" had been in the main abolished in Huskisson's time, there still survived that part of them which closed Canadian ports to foreign shipping, so that a commercial grievance was added to the political one. With the governorship of Lord Elgin self-government and commercial freedom emerged decisively and permanently; and with their emergence the Canadian State came into being. In 1847 the hour was on the point of striking—it had not yet struck.

In Africa, outside the Mediterranean area, European colonization before the nineteenth century was limited to the few trading settlements of the maritime nations on the coast; all north of the equator, except for the Portuguese in East Africa, and the Dutch of the Cape Colony. By the treaties of 1814-15, the last passed definitely to the British instead of the Dutch sovereignty. It was the one bit of Africa where a European population had planted itself under suitable climatic conditions, and had bred and multiplied, favored by the fact that the native population of the farthest south were not of negro race, but Hottentots, classed among the yellow not the black races, less warlike and easier to subjugate. The Dutch Calvinists, supplemented by French Calvinists who had escaped the dragonnades of Louis XIV., had retained along with their rigid Calvinism the institutions and the ideas of the ancestors who had wrung civil and religious liberty from Philip of Spain. They were farmers with the intense conservatism of the agriculturist; they were outside the range of European influences; and their interpretation of the Old Testament taught them that the Africans, as sons of Ham, were divinely ordained to servitude under the sons of Japhet. But it was only within recent years that they had been coming into collision with the Kafirs, the black Bantu races who were pushing and being pushed southward. Black slavery was an established institution, but the slaves were imported from the slave-coast, not captured from the Kafirs, who were dangerous neighbors.

The British military occupation, under the Stadtholder's sanction, during the French wars, was converted into a British sovereignty when the wars were over, by cession and purchase, not by conquest. The new government was vested in a governor with a nominated council, who had no desire for an arbitrary disturbance of established institutions. But before long the industrial conditions in the British Isles set in motion a tide of emigration of which a portion was directed to South Africa. The new settlers spread into fresh regions, mainly on the east, which brought them into increasing contact with the Kafir tribes. There was no notion that the Dutch farmers, the Boers, were a subject population—they were simply British subjects, like the newcomers; but with the influx came inevitably British customs, and a growing tendency on the

part of the government to modify institutions in accordance with British traditions, and to apply to the relations between whites and natives British ideas less primitive and more humanitarian than those of the Boers, who regarded force and fear as the only influences by which the whites could preserve their ascendancy, or even their existence. And the Boer theory had this at least to be said for it, that the Kafir was much disposed to regard any consideration shown to him as a sign of weakness inviting aggression. The up-country farmers and settlers, who would be the first to be attacked by Kafir marauders, viewed with growing anxiety the disposition of the government to treat the Kafirs as though they were amenable to reason as well as to leaden arguments—and with annoyance its inclination to protect the Hottentots against the necessary discipline (or brutality, according to the point of view) of their Boer masters.

Thus dissatisfaction with the British Government grew among the Boers, and was brought to a head by the events of 1834. In that year the Imperial Government abolished slavery throughout the British Empire, allotting £20,000,000 to compensate the slave-owners; and in that year the Kafirs broke over the border, carrying massacre and devastation over the eastern marches.

The Kafir country lay on the east of the colony, separated from it by the Fish River and the barrier of the Drakensberg Mountains. There was no organized force on the spot to repel the incursion, and though a military expedition soon flung the marauders back and compelled them into submission as a matter of course, the severity and the precautions which the governor, Sir Benjamin Durban, deemed necessary were forbidden by the government at home. The Boers felt that their worst fears had been justified. The share of compensation money allotted to the slave-owners in South Africa appeared to them grossly unjust and inadequate. On the top of the racial grievances, the British Government had robbed them of their lawful property, failed to protect them against the Kafirs, and finally refused to let them organize protection for themselves.

The only course open, then, was to remove themselves out of the sphere of the alien authority—to depart, bag and baggage, like the patriarchs of old, and find an equivalent of their own for the Promised Land of the Hebrews. Across the Orange River, the northern boundary of the occupied colony, where no settlement had hitherto been made, the Great Trek, the Exodus, rolled in 1835. A multitude of Boer families went forth, taking with them everything movable that they possessed. The bulk of them settled in the great triangle formed by the Orange River, the Vaal River, and the Drakensberg, where the natives were peaceable; the most enterprising penetrated farther, across the Vaal, where they repulsed so stoutly the attack of the warrior Matabele Kafirs that the latter evacuated the country—which

they had recently subjugated—and crossed the Limpopo, leaving the Transvaal to the Boers. A group of these now struck across the Drakensberg. Dingan, the tyrant chief of the Zulu conquerors who had lately mastered the region north of the Tugela, fell upon them, but met with a murderous repulse upon "Dingan's Day," December 16, 1838, ever memorable in the Boer annals. A new Zulu chief, Panda, who overthrew Dingan, submitted to the sovereignty of the Boers, who proclaimed a republic. But the British Government at Cape Town took the legal view that the Boers were still British subjects, and claimed the conquered territory as British. The Boers somberly accepted the inevitable, and retired to the Transvaal, leaving the British to settle and organize Natal as a dependency of Cape Colony. As yet the latter did not seek to extend effective control over the emigrants north of the Orange River and west of the Drakensberg.

Colonization in Australasia had begun only in 1788 with the Botany Bay convict settlement, which was the nucleus of New South Wales, followed later by the similar settlement in Tasmania. Apart from the government area, the colonists were the discharged convicts and soldiers who chose to remain in the new country, supplemented during the war period by only a trickle of emigrants from home. In 1809 arrived Governor Macquarie, who took a vigorous part in the investigation and development of the resources of the colony, where sheep and cattle had already been acclimatized. The extensive emigration which followed the war was directed mainly to Canada; but a part of it flowed to Australia, though checked both by a hesitation to settle among ex-convicts and by the governor's inclination to regard the country as a preserve for reformed criminals who could recover their self-respect there. But when once the free settlers had begun to outnumber the "emancipists," the first difficulty began to die out, and after 1821 the governors did their best to encourage immigration. An exclusively convict settlement was planted at Brisbane (named after the governor), in the Moreton Bay district—afterwards Queensland—in 1826; but it was followed in 1829 by the independent colonies of West Australia, and South Australia in 1834—both composed exclusively of free settlers. Melbourne, named after the Prime Minister, was founded in 1837, to become the nucleus of Victoria; but for the time both Melbourne and Moreton Bay were subordinate to the New South Wales governorship with its capital at Sydney. Tasmania was constituted a separate governorship in 1825.

The whole country was practically given over to the three industries of stock-breeding, wool-growing, and tillage; for manufacturers it depended entirely upon imports from the mother-country. Theoretically the government in the first instance owned the whole of the land, but free grants, or grants for a rent hardly more than nominal, up to some hundreds of acres, could be obtained on applica-

tion. Labor was provided in effect by leasing out convicts. But with exploration and the progress of stock-breeding developed the practice of "squatting." The colonist went up-country till he found an unoccupied locality which suited him. Then he settled and began his operations, reckoning as his own—till the government might choose to interfere—as much land as he wanted. He had no legal title, but every newcomer recognized the predecessor's rights; for practical purposes, as long as government did not intervene, the squatter's title was as valid as if it had been legal. There might be occasional trouble with migratory natives, or with the lawless spirits who preferred robbing to stock-breeding as a profession and formed gangs of "bush-rangers"; but such risks were in the day's work. Naturally, however, confusion soon arose. After an abortive and wholly impracticable scheme for a sort of Domesday Book of New South Wales, came the proposal that land not assigned by the government should be purchasable by auction at a reserve price of five shillings an acre; which was received with vigorous protest by the squatters, who conceived that they had already established a prescriptive right. Finally a compromise was reached by which the established squatters were given a legal title on payment of a small fee, but further squatting was forbidden, while unsettled land was purchasable from the government. The transportation of convicts to New South Wales proper ceased in 1840, though elsewhere it continued for a short time, as it served to make good the shortage of labor.

In 1839 New Zealand was brought within the official colonizing area, as a third dependency of New South Wales, becoming an independent governorship the next year. The native population of New Zealand, the Maoris, unlike the Australians, were of a vigorous type, with an advanced tribal organization; colonization was possible only through agreement, since there was no excuse for conquest. A footing, however, had already been obtained by a few British settlers. Captain Hobson, the governor sent from New South Wales, arranged with the chiefs of the tribes in the north island the treaty of Waitangi, under which they agreed to recognize British sovereignty, while they were guaranteed in full their own and their tribes' proprietary rights. The tribes—not the chiefs—could voluntarily alienate their lands to the British Government, but not to individual whites, who could only obtain them from the government. The terms of the treaty were broken by some of the whites, who, supposing that the Maoris did not understand their rights, claimed possession of lands to which they had no title. A collision with the Maoris might have led to the wiping out of the white, but for the firm and just action of the governor, who resolutely maintained the treaty. Under a new and weaker governor the trouble revived, but at the end of 1845 George Grey arrived, and took matters in hand with a combination of vigor,

skill, tact, and self-reliance which restored the British reputation for justice and good faith, and established the British authority.

The government of New South Wales and Tasmania, when both were essentially convict settlements, was necessarily of a military type; which, owing to the influx of free settlers, was modified in 1823 by providing the governor with a small nominated council and a court of judicature. It was not long before the advisory Council was enlarged and its powers increased. The Canadian reorganization was the occasion of the introduction of representation by the creation of a Legislative Council in which two-thirds of the members were elected. But just as Canada did not attain full responsible government till Lord Elgin's arrival, so it was not till the next decade that the Australian colonies were invited to follow suit by a home government, which was at this time imbued, first, with the theory that colonists were entitled to the same political rights as the citizens within the British Isles, and, secondly, that the sooner they could stand on their own feet and relieve the mother-country of a burdensome responsibility the better it would be for every one concerned. As yet the solidarity of the Empire was a vision only in the minds of a few "impracticable" dreamers. The inevitability of separation was still looked upon as the main colonial lesson of the previous century.

#### *IV.—Asia*

The fundamental principle at the bottom of Lord Wellesley's policy in India had been this—that the peninsula required a paramount power—that is to say, a supreme authority recognized as legitimate, which was resolved to impose order and to suppress warfare, and was also strong enough to do so. He found the legal authority vested in a Mughal who had neither the will nor the power to enforce it. Setting aside the British, the power might possibly have been won either by Mysore or by the Mahratta confederacy; but while each of them was ambitious for dominion, neither had the least interest in order. It followed that if there was to be a paramount power, it must be the British. To make it legitimate, the formal authority of the Mughal should be preserved; to make it effective, the submission of Mysore and the acquiescence of the Mahrattas were necessary. Wellesley broke Mysore and established an ascendancy at Poona, but his work was not completed. He left the British paramount in the whole Ganges basin and in the Deccan, but the non-intervention reaction permitted the Mahrattas an almost unbridled tyranny over the minor principalities of Central India and Rajputana, and gave no protection against the hordes of Chitu's Pindaris and Amir Khan's Pathans. In the north-west Ranjit Singh was consolidating a power-

ful Sikh state in the Punjab, but he was too acute to risk a collision with the British.

It remained then for Lord Moira (later, Marquess of Hastings)—after a sharp fight, challenged by the mountain Ghurkas of Nepal, which deprived them of territory, but permanently established friendly relations—to crush the robber communities of Central Asia whose depredations, encouraged by the Mahrattas, had become intolerable (1817). The Peshwa chose the moment for an attempt to free himself from the British domination which he had himself invited in Wellesley's time. Holkar's troops tried to join him, but were cut off and defeated. The Bhonsla at Nagpur struck also, but was promptly crushed. Sindhia and the Gackwar were overawed. The Peshwa Baji Rao could not long maintain alone the struggle which he had himself brought on. In 1819, he submitted, his dominions were annexed, and he retired into private life on a princely pension. The rest of the Mahratta princes retained their thrones, but submitted to the British sovereignty, which ceased to be masked by any pretence of subordination to the Mughal authority; and the British protectorate was definitely extended to the princes of Rajputna and Sirhind. Only the Indus basin—the Punjab and Sindh—remained after 1820 outside the British sphere.

Within that sphere, something less than half of the country was under direct British administration. In the rest, the rule of the multitudinous native dynasties, whose dominions varied in size as much as those of the princes of the Holy Roman Empire, continued. But they were now, in the language of the West, vassal princes; in the sense that, on the one side, protection against any attack upon any one of them was guaranteed by the sovereign, the Paramount British Power, while on the other, none could make war-treaties or alliances on its own account, such matters being the prerogative of the Sovereign. In the greater states there was a British contingent—that is, a sepoy force under British officers and British control—and at each of the greater courts was a Resident or Agent representing the Supreme Government. Each prince was responsible to the Paramount Power for maintaining law, order, and a tolerable government in his own dominions; flagrant and persistent misrule might be penalized by deposition. During minorities, the British might, if they thought fit, take over the administration. The dynasties were secured by the general recognition of an adopted son as the legal heir where heirs of the body failed, provided that the adoption had the Sovereign's sanction; failing which, the inheritance passed by escheat to the Supreme Government.

By the minor princes—all who were in fear of aggression by their more powerful neighbors—the British sovereignty was invited, courted, welcomed; not as being in itself desirable, but as providing

a security attainable in no other way; though it was resented by many of the Mohammedans who had lost their old supremacy, and the Mahrattas who had hoped to take their place. The populations, accustomed to arbitrary rule from time immemorial, were generally indifferent as to who the rulers might be, and in British India accepted the British Raj as affording them protection and security against oppression, so long as it did no violence to their established prejudices, customs, and religious conceptions as Hindus or Mohammedans. But the lawless elements which had been so little curbed in the past detested the Raj, whose strong hand held their predatory instincts sternly in check.

Moir's Pindari and Mahratta wars completed Wellesley's work of establishing the British paramountcy. Once, later the small state of Bhartpur, and once the strong state of Gwalior challenged the Supreme Authority in vain; otherwise, within the British sphere there was no more fighting till the great sepoy revolt, in 1857. The wars were beyond the borders—on the east against Burma, on the west in Sindh, on the north-west in Afghanistan and the Punjab. The first Burmese war (1823-6) was the inevitable outcome of the unprovoked seizure of Chittagong, a province of Beugal, by the Burmese. Climatic and geographical conditions, and difficulties of supply, gave the opening campaigns an appearance of failure which revived the idea that the British supremacy would go the way of its predecessors, and induced Bhatpur (in the north-west) to the experimental defiance which soon brought proof that the appearance of weakness was superficial; while the Burmese war concluded with the inevitable acquisition of Burmese provinces. For the next thirteen years, the peace was unbroken, and the Supreme Government was able to devote itself wholly to administrative work and organization, and internal development.

To this period belong the abolition of Sati, the suppression of female infanticide, prevalent all over the peninsula, and of human sacrifices which still survived among the Khonds in Orissa; the slow eradication of Thagi; the gradual repression of Dacoity or brigandage—all of them evils with which every previous government for centuries had failed to cope, though they were recognized as evils by all. Sati was the act of devotion or dedication by which the Hindu widow sacrificed herself on her husband's funeral pyre. Female infanticide was the direct outcome of the marriage customs, which entailed, on the one hand, extravagant expenditure on the marriage of a daughter, and, on the other, utter disgrace on the unmarried woman and her parents; daughters were thus luxuries or burdens too expensive to be welcomed—and babies die easily. Human sacrifices were in effect stopped by the ingenious device of a political officer who explained that the British Government would

take the risk of offending the goddess whose wrath was feared, so the Khonds would escape punishment. The experiment of forgoing the sacrifice was tried; there were no awkward results either for the Khonds or the Government—and the people were satisfied. The terror inspired by the secret association of the Thags, whose occupation was surreptitious robbery and murder—a terror intensified by the popular belief that they were under the protection of a fiend-goddess—made the collection of evidences in cases of Thagi incredibly difficult; yet the horror was finally hunted down. And similar difficulties in proving Dacoity in individuals delayed its complete suppression for many years.

On the side of positive progress were the systematic efforts to achieve justice in the settlement of the land-revenue and land-tenure as between the individual ryot or peasant, the village community, and the *de facto* landlord, zemindar, or talukdar, the question of true proprietary rights being one of infinite difficulty, complicated by something like clan-chieftainships in the Rajput districts of the North-West Provinces, and by the inevitable tendency of British officials to be guided by apparent English or Scottish analogies. Of no less importance was the development of popular education under the auspices of the government, aiming at the indoctrination of the East with the wisdom of the West; whereof the effects were not exactly what the enthusiasts had anticipated. Also the principle was now laid down that race, color, and religion were to be no bar to the holding of public appointments, though the conditions under which ensured that, while the inferior posts were all filled by natives, all the more responsible functions continued to be discharged by Europeans.

Nearly all the reforms above enumerated are associated with the governor-generalship of Lord William Bentinck, the period when the British people at home were civilizing the barbaric criminal law, passing the Reform Bill, and entering upon legislation on what were known as liberal principles which were reflected in the government of India. But it was also the period when Russia and Great Britain, ostensibly working for the same ends, were actually engaged in an acute conflict for ascendancy in the Near East. The mutual jealousy and suspicion of the two Powers, both Asiatic as well as European, now began to exercise a direct influence, in some respects a predominating one, upon Indian policy.

As yet the southward movement of the Russian expansion on the east of the Ural River, the conventional boundary between Europe and Asia from the Caspian Sea to the Ural Mountains, was attracting little notice. But for a generation Russia had been securing herself in the Caucasus region and endeavoring to establish a dominating influence in Persia, between which and the Indian passes lay

the barrier of Afghanistan. The Indian Government had taken alarm as early as 1807, and opened diplomatic relations with Persia, but the home government assumed the charge, with the result that the whole Persian question had been neglected. Promises of support against Russian aggression, given in 1814, did not materialize when Persia appealed for aid in 1826; and the Shah, counting England a broken reed, made friends with the adversary, whose influence became supreme. Relying now on Russian support, he contemplated the recovery of Afghanistan, to be followed by a *jihad*, a religious war against the infidel rule in India, and the restoration of a Moslem supremacy—unconscious that in so doing he would merely be serving Russia as a cat's paw. In 1837 he began operations by laying siege to Herat.

The siege failed, and the whole scheme collapsed. But the new Governor-General Lord Auckland, and his advisers, took fright; they imagined, quite erroneously, that Dost Mohammed, the ruler at Kabul, was in collusion with Russia, and they resolved to reinstate, as their own puppet, the ex-Amir Shah Shuja, who had been expelled in 1810 and found an asylum in British territory, whence he had made repeated and wholly unsuccessful attempts to recover his throne. So in 1839 British columns marched through the passes into Afghanistan. Dost Mohammed fought valiantly, and long enough for his own credit. Then he surrendered and was in his turn removed to British territory where he was kept under surveillance. Shah Shuja was once more Amir, but he had been set on the throne by British bayonets and could only hold it by the same aid. So British officials remained at Kabul to guide the Amir in the right path, sepoy regiments were cantoned outside to make his authority secure, and British garrisons were left at Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jellalabad. A very half-hearted co-operation had been obtained from Ranjit, Singh, whose protests against the passage of a British army through the Punjab had sent the expedition by way of Sindh and the Biluchistan (Bolan) passes, to the annoyance both of Sindh Amirs and Biluchi Khans.

The whole affair was a piece of almost incredible folly, denounced from the outset by ex-Governors-General and former Indian officials of the highest standing. Its foolishness was promptly demonstrated. Resentment grew in the heart of Afghan chiefs, and the Afghan people loathed the Hindostani sepoys who assumed the air of conquerors. In November 1841, the Kabul mob rose. The old and incompetent commander of the British forces lost his head; before he could make up his mind to act, the place was swarming with armed Afghans. The civilian officers, whose own chiefs were murdered, had to submit to the terms dictated by the insurgent leaders, and to evacuate the country under a safe-conduct, leaving hostages. The

safe conduct was ignored, and nearly 15,000 souls perished in the passes from the privations of the winter march or by the attacks of the tribesmen.

Never had such a disaster befallen British arms and British prestige in India. But the garrisons at Kandahar and Jellalabad held their own though Ghazni surrendered, and the situation was saved by the dispatch of columns to the Khaibar Pass under Pollock, and to Kandahar by the Bolan Pass. Kabul had been evacuated in January. In September the British were again in full possession of Kabul and Ghazni as well as of Kandahar, and it had been made decisively clear that the British power was ultimately irresistible. But it was no less clear that nothing but trouble could result from any sort of occupation of Afghanistan. Shah Shuja had been assassinated in the meanwhile; no one any longer doubted that Dost Mohammed had all the time been well-disposed to the British and ill-disposed to Persia and Russia, or that he was the one man fit to rule over the turbulent Afghans. He was again proclaimed Amir to the general satisfaction of his countrymen, and the British retired with all the pomp and circumstance of triumphant and magnanimous victors. For seventeen years Dost Mohammed ruled Afghanistan, always friendly to the British, always deaf to Russian influences; while his control over the tribesmen was invaluable in the crises of the Sikh wars and the revolt of 1857.

Already, however, serious mischief had been done. In spite of triumphal processions and rhetorical proclamations, confidence in the stability of the British power had been shaken. Ranjit Singh's keen insight, penetrating through superficialities, had saved him from any illusions on that head; but he had died before the disaster, leaving The Punjab stage without a controlling head under the nominal regency of his putative heir's mother, the Rani Jindan; while the Sikh army or *Khalsa*—a curiously democratic organization—was firmly convinced of its own invincibility, and a ready instrument to the hand of any one who would dangle the bait of conquest before it; whereof trouble was soon to arise. Nor was its self-confidence affected by the brilliant military operations of Sir Charles Napier in 1843, in carrying out the conquest of Sindh—the sole instance of inexcusable aggression on the part of the Indian Government in its whole history. Napier, sent to Sindh as Resident, saw that the country would develop and prosper under British rule. It was not difficult to pick a quarrel with its rulers, the Amirs, whose alarmed suspicions had been aroused by the Afghan expedition; his campaign in 1843 was brief, brilliant, and decisive, and Sindh was annexed—very much to the benefit of its people.

But for the Afghan affair there would have been no necessity for the Gwalior campaign in the same year. There Tara Bai, the young

widow of the last Sindhia, tried to keep the government in her own hands during the minority of his adopted heir. Having won over the state army, which numbered 40,000 her faction expelled the regent who had been appointed by the Supreme Government. Such a challenge could only be answered by an ultimatum, which was disregarded. The campaign which followed was short, the hard-fought battle of Maharajpur was decisive, the British contingent was raised to 10,000, the state army reduced to 9,000; and a British Resident directed the regency till the young Maharaja should be of age.

Now, however, a much more serious struggle was at hand, which was to task severely the new Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge. The Punjab was now the one state within the mountain confines of India which was still independent; for three-quarters of a century the Sikhas had been an invaluable barrier against a repetition of Ahmed Shah's invasion by any powerful ruler of Afghanistan or Persia. Till the rise of Ranjit Singh, however, at the close of the eighteenth century, there had been not an organized Sikh state but a confederation of siradars—a term more or less expressed by the mediæval "baron" or "knight"—bound together by a common devotion to the Sikh faith which did not keep them from fighting with each other. The statecraft and military abilities of Ranjit Singh gave him an early ascendancy which he converted into an effective and powerful monarchy. The armies, primarily the following of the individual Sirdars, were organized, partly on the basis of the common religious brotherhood of all Sikhs, as the Khalsa, controlled by the government, without prejudice to the power of the Sirdars to bring their own troops into the field; and Ranjit had no scruples in adding Mussulman regiments and employing European officers. This force had been raised to an unprecedented standard of armament and efficiency; the regiments had a coherence and a discipline of their own controlled by committees, "panchayets," of the men; and their prowess had been amply demonstrated.

On Ranjit's death there ensued a struggle between factions of the Sirdars for control of the government, while the Khalsa remained inert and without a head. The Rani Jindan's faction emerged, precariously ascendent, and very much afraid of the Khalsa. By inciting it to attack the British, the rulers looked to secure one of two satisfactory alternatives. If it were victorious, the government would claim the victory; if it were crushed there would be no more Khalsa to fear. The necessary impulse was not difficult to provide; to oppose the idea when the impulse had been given was dangerous. In December 1845 the Sikh army crossed the Satlej, the boundary between the Punjab state and the states under British protection.

A British force advanced rapidly, flung back the Sikh advanced

guard at Mudki, and was repulsed in the vain attempt to carry an entrenched position held in force at Firozshah. The situation seemed desperate, but when the attack was renewed next day, the Sikhs—probably through treachery—were found to be in full retreat. Two months later a decisive and fiercely contested battle was fought at Sobraon; the Khalsa was broken up, and a treaty was signed at Lahore by the Sirdars. The British had no desire to annex the Punjab—they wished it to remain a strong self-governing state; but the Sirdars declared unanimously that the Council of Regency set up by the British must for a time be guaranteed by the presence of British troops and the aid of British administrators. When Hardinge left India in January 1848 it was believed that the peace of India was secured and that very soon the British could be withdrawn from the Punjab. His successor, Dalhousie, arrived to find a fresh Punjab war on his hands of which the only possible conclusion would be annexation.

While the British in India were establishing their paramount authority over what had once been an Empire, organized but never really consolidated, with an advanced civilization of its own, Russia was drawing under her own domination the hordes of Tartar tribes in Central Asia, north of the Caspian and Aral Seas, and of those richer districts known generally as Western Turkestan which lie mainly between the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya, the streams, known to Alexander the Great as Oxus and Jaxartes, which flow into the Sea of Aral from the south and the north-east. As the Russian movement tended southward between the Sea of Aral and the Caspian, it came into collision with tribes attached to the Western Turkestan Khanate of Khiva on the Amu Darya. Khiva became the center whence Tartar bands were encouraged to raid Russian caravans, and to which they brought their spoils and their captives. In 1839 an expedition advanced to compel Khiva to submission; it was wrecked, not only by fighting but mainly by the snow-storms which set in while it was on its way. The Khan of Khiva realized that resistance to the power of Russia would mean annihilation. In 1842 he tendered submission, which secured to Russia a footing on the great waterway of the Amu Darya and complete access to the Sea of Aral. In 1846, the Russians planted a fort on the lower Sir Darya, which at once brought them into conflict with Kokand, the north-western Khanate of Turkestan. When once Russia's position on those two rivers was made good, her ultimate acquisition of Turkestan, and the approach of her borders to India, was assured. The menace of the Russian advance appeared in a new quarter, with increasingly disturbing effect during the second half of the nineteenth century.

In the past centuries, there had been no conflict between the

Chinese and Japanese Empires and the Western nations. Both had simply closed their doors to the foreigners who could only reach them by sea; only occasional travellers, and adventurous missionaries had penetrated the interiors; only a few traders had been granted admission on sufferance at a very few ports. It was the demand for markets and larger trading facilities which in the first half of the nineteenth century forced the gates of China.

The eighteenth century was perhaps the most prosperous period of Chinese history. At the close of the happy reign of Chienlung, a British political mission with a commercial aim was for the first time received with the utmost politeness, in 1753, by the Emperor of China, from whom, however, nothing more substantial than compliments could be extracted. His successor Chiaching, less suave, refused to receive a British envoy unless he would perform the ceremony of prostration known as kow-tow, which was declined except on condition of a Chinese minister of the first rank kow-towing to the portrait of George III. The envoy was dismissed. The object of the missions was to obtain possible conditions for the British traders at Canton, the only place which could be called a port of entry; where the viceroys were obdurate in what was little short of prohibition, with the natural result that there was a vast amount of smuggling by which the mandarins notoriously profited. Chiaching's successor, Taok-wang, was equally rigid; and while viceroys did not scruple to appeal successfully to the British to aid in checking piracy which was rampant in the China seas, there was no improvement in the conditions at Canton.

The attempt to obtain concessions was renewed in 1833; and continued fruitlessly, the mandarins persisting in a contemptuous attitude to the "foreign devils" as long as the commissioner's placability submitted to such treatment. But in 1839 their arrogance brought about a naval collision in which sundry Chinese junks were sunk. After that, armed action was inevitable. Naval and military operations in 1841 and 1842 at last inspired sufficient alarm to bring about the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which ceded Hongkong to the British, together with substantial damages as compensation for the destruction of British goods by the Canton authorities. Thus it may be considered that the door was opened, and other white peoples, first among them the French and Americans, began to seek entry for themselves.

## CHAPTER XXXIX

### ASPECTS OF THE PERIOD, 1789-1847

#### *I.—Political*

FEUDALISM as a political system perished under the régime in France of the Cardinals, in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, and in the prolonged struggle of the Thirty Years' War. When Louis XIV. took the reins of government into his own hands, he became at once the incarnation of the absolutism which established itself over virtually the whole continent of Europe. In France the Crown had conquered the feudatories; in the Empire the feudatories had themselves become independent despots, who modelled their courts and their methods on those of the Grand Monarque; in Poland the last stage of disintegration had been reached, so that it can hardly be said that a political system existed. In England and Holland feudalism was already dead; absolutism was defeated in its struggle, not with feudatories, but with free constitutionalists, whose principles were shortly to be formulated by Locke, in effect as an apologia for the Revolution of 1688, when constitutionalism won its decisive victory. The French Revolution a century later was in form a popular revolt against absolutism, in which the old monarchy went down and by which all the other monarchies found themselves threatened.

In actual fact, however, its motive force was hostility much more to the survival of feudalism in the social structure than to absolutism. When the First Consul proclaimed that "the Revolution was completed," he was himself a monarch as absolute as Louis XIV.; but the social system of feudalism had been wiped out for ever. The country was governed by the will of an autocrat, but the class privileges born of feudalism were not merely scotched or modified; they were dead and done with. Also throughout the dependencies of the Napoleonic Empire they perished beyond possibility of revival, at least in their old completeness. And yet in Europe as in France the despotisms at the close of the wars scarcely made a pretence of accepting even constitutional limitations, outside of France itself. They had indeed in many instances been rendered insecure; but for the most part where they were weak enough to be challenged, they were strong enough—at least with external support—to hold their own;

though again they received a rude shock in the fifty-ninth year after the meeting of the States-General. In England the practical effect of the French Revolution was the postponement till 1832 of the political reforms which otherwise would in their essence probably have been carried through by Pitt before the end of the eighteenth century; since in that country both absolutism and social feudalism had passed away long before.

As an attack upon absolutism the Revolution failed; as an attack upon social feudalism it succeeded so far as concerned Western Europe. Those were the immediate concrete results which appeared conspicuously in the Vienna Settlement. But it had also two other effects upon the social and political ideas of Europe: it initiated the democratic and the nationalist movements. Its attacks upon the monarchies was based on the doctrine that populations have a right to control their own destinies, and though the attack failed the seed of democracy was sown, though the harvest was not yet to be reaped. Before the Revolution, democracy had never been contemplated as a practical possibility anywhere, except in the city-states of the ancient or of the mediæval world; after it, democracy, however ill-defined, was the conscious goal of increasing masses of men; though nothing even approaching to it was established anywhere in Europe till the second half of the nineteenth century was well advanced.

The second effect was an indirect one, not aimed at or proclaimed by the Revolutionists; it gave life to the idea of Nationalism. Here again the British Isles were a long way in advance; special conditions had consolidated in them three distinct nationalities, sufficiently akin to enable two of them to amalgamate without losing a sense of difference, sufficiently distinct to make the third more conscious of the difference than of the kinship. Special conditions had also made distinct Spanish and French nationalities, which corresponded with the geographical boundaries of those states, somewhat later than had been the case with the British. But nowhere else in Europe was there any correspondence between nationality and state boundaries; nor had it occurred to any European government that distinctive national characteristics could be adduced as a reason for or against the transfer of a territory and its population from one state to another, whether by conquest or by diplomatic arrangement—or that the populations themselves had any right to a voice in such questions. In the Vienna Settlement no more heed was paid to such considerations than had been paid in the past; as the protests against the partition of Poland had been directed not against the subjection of Poles to Prussian, Russian, or Austrian domination, but against the aggrandisement of those states by the dismemberment of another state.

But during the Napoleonic Wars, the spirit of rationality had come

to birth; first displaying itself emphatically in Spain. There, indeed, it was no new thing, but it was on the Continent so exceptional that Napoleon overlooked its importance altogether. When the Bonapartist usurpation roused it to activity, the contagion spread; the idea of German nationality took possession of the intellectuals throughout Germany, and that of Italian nationality was awakened in Italy. But fifty years after the Vienna Settlement, Italy had only just achieved unification, and it was only in the six years following that Bismarck achieved the unification of Germany. The only successful nationalist effort in Europe in the forty years after Vienna had been the liberation of Greece, still incomplete, from Turkey. But during that time nationalism had been germinating, and was soon to become the most complicating factor in European politics.

Monarchism then emerged from the Revolution victorious but not unscathed. The masses had shown no particular desire to get rid of their kings, nor any enthusiasm for their retention. To the middle classes they were no longer objects of fervent loyalty, but they were an alternative preferable to the domination of the proletariat as exemplified in the Terror, which most people possessed of property, however small, regarded as the inevitable sequel of any concession to democratic demands. To this section of the communities the ideal appeared to be constitutional monarchy on the British lines but somewhat more logically ordered—the ideal that may be said actually to have been attained by the Reform Bill of 1832 in England and the July Revolution in France; which gave the chief voice in the government to the trading as well as to the land-owning classes, while leaving the manual workers to be represented by their employers. Constitutional monarchy rather than republicanism was the *via media* of their choice; and to this their demands were generally directed when the European conflagration had burnt out and the feverish dread, inspired by Jacobinism, of any kind of change was subsiding.

In fact, the idea of constitutionalism had been planted, among the classes who read, not by the Revolution, but before it by Montesquieu, by Voltaire, and by the Encyclopædists, who saw before them the working of the constitutional system of England and compared it favorably both in theory and in practice with the prevalent absolutism of the eighteenth century. For three years it was the professed creed of the majority in the successive assemblies in France, beginning with the States-General; then it was submerged by the revolutionary flood, and British constitutionalism along with European monarchism found itself ranged against popular forces which appeared to be wholly destructive. For three-and-twenty years Europe was engaged in perpetual battle against French aggression, and when at last the final downfall of Napoleon brought peace, it

was to a Europe which was able to see safety, not in more or less experimental reconstruction, but only in a scarcely modified reversion to the old order so far as concerned the political fabric.

Nevertheless, when the power of the governments had been reasserted, it followed that those ideas of reform which had been gaining ground before the Revolution, and had secured to it in its first stages a measure of sympathy from most thinking men, ideas which had been only half smothered by its later excesses, should revive again; and the more so since the one leading state which had adopted and established them within its own borders a century before, was also the one which passes most successfully through the ordeal of the Napoleonic Wars: while its only conspicuous failures since their adoption had been precisely in those regions—America and Ireland—where it had been neglected to apply them.

A "constitution" then became the professed goal of most of the reformers in every state, save where the excessive tyranny of the despotisms bred the spirit, not of reform, but of revolution—that is, where the governments paid the least regard to acute popular grievances, repressed their expression with the most cynical contempt for justice, and displayed the most reckless perfidy in respect of their own pledges. The essentials generally implied in a Constitution were:—the Crown, hereditary but liable to deflection; control of legislation and taxation by a parliament—that is, by a body mainly elected; an executive appointed by the Crown but responsible to the representative legislature; in the judicature, trial by jury; and for the public, free speech and a free press.

All these things were characteristic of the British Constitution before the French Revolution. They did not imply democracy or anything like it; the limitations and vagaries of the franchise by which the representative chamber was elected made it representative preponderantly of the landowners, only in a slight degree of the professional and trading classes, and not at all of the manual laborers. In France, under the last Bourbons, the legislative control by the chambers was much less secure, their election had a basis no broader, and the responsibility of the executive to them was much slighter, than in England. In those two countries the July Revolution and the Great Reform Bill put the representation on a broader basis but still in effect, excluded the manual labor; while Louis Philippe could still in his own way follow George III. in seeking under parliamentary methods to retain practical control of the executive in his own hands. Such constitutions as were conceded elsewhere carried with them no larger liberties than the Charta of Louis XVIII., and generally had the character of provisional concessions which might be, and on occasion were, rescinded.

Now the classes which find themselves not only participating in the

government but actually exercising a preponderating control over it, are apt to consider that the ideal system has been reached, and have no inclination to let themselves be swamped by the classes outside; and these, on the other hand, are equally apt to believe that the ideal system will only be attained when they are themselves the preponderant forces in it, and that the grievances from which they suffer, or imagine that they suffer, will vanish when that time comes—provided, that is, that they are conscious of grievances as evils which can be remedied, not as uncontrollable natural phenomena like droughts and tempests. Middle class England and middle class France were very well satisfied with the reforms which shifted the political center of gravity so much to the increase of their own political power. Middle class Germany wanted, but could not get, similar reforms. The rural populations generally were not interested in political power; either because they regarded it as entirely out of reach, or because they did not connect it with the remedying of grievances which they accepted with a stolid apathy as inevitable, or because new grievances had not taken the place of others formerly felt bitterly but now recently removed, as in France. But everywhere the urban proletariat, the daily or weekly wage-earners, had growing grievances, while their numbers were rapidly increasing—for reasons to be presently examined. Most of them believed that the grievances could be removed by a drastic legislation for the redistribution of wealth, which could never be won from the classes that, under the existing order, enjoyed the lion's share, or until they themselves had the predominant control of legislation. That predominance they believed to be attainable; hence there was a widespread disposition among them to regard all remedial legislation by existing governments as providing at the best merely futile palliatives, and at the worst as crafty devices for riveting their fetters more tightly, and to insist upon their own acquisition of political power as the one thing needful. Incidentally, a large proportion of them regarded hereditary authority, hereditary influence, and hereditary wealth as the mainstays of the system which excluded them from political power, and consequently fastened upon hereditary monarchy—however limited—as the canker at the root of the whole social and political order. The violent destruction of the hereditary principle and the violent redistribution of wealth being the avowed ulterior aims of the most vociferous mob oratory, the admission of the "working classes" to political power continued to be resisted, not only by Conservatism, but by Liberalism, which saw in it the threatened breakdown of all order whatever. It was perhaps the ignominious collapse of Chartism in England in 1848 which, by allaying such misgivings, most effectively prepared the way for the concessions of one after another of the democratic demands; while it was the violence of the new socialism which enabled Louis

Napoleon in France to transmute the Second Republic into the Second Empire, and to postpone French democracy for more than twenty years, though he failed to establish a hereditary monarchy, either absolutist or constitutional.

Hence in the next stages we shall see democratic republicanism established in France, democracy but not republicanism invading British constitutionalism constitutionalism established with a more or less democratic color in Italy, in the Balkan States formed out of the disintegration of the Turkish Empire, and in Hungary, as well as in Spain and Portugal, where it already existed in theory; and a color of constitutionalism, though not the reality, created in Germany and Austria; both of which, in spite of this veneer, remain essentially absolutist. Russia maintains its absolutism without qualification.

The Nationalist movement has two aspects: one facing towards the liberating of populations of one nationality from subjection to alien governments—governments, that is, of another nationality; the other facing to the union under one government of populations having a common nationality. Of the latter, Germany supplies the leading instance, while the two exaggerated examples of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism came into being. Italy is a case where liberation was the necessary preliminary to unification, but might never have been achieved if that ultimate objective had not been kept in view. Elsewhere liberation was the single aim. In Germany there was no foreign yoke from which to escape; the desire for union, fervently as it was felt by certain classes, did not deeply penetrate the masses, and was unattractive to the minor governments which feared the loss of their independence; nor could it command the approval of either Austria or Prussia except upon terms which if acceptable to one were not so to the other. Consequently while the governments paid lip-service to the idea—as to that of Constitutionalism—they gave it no encouragement in action; while such popular pressure as was exercised was too vaguely directed to be of practical effect. Both the movements were active in the same stratum of German society but not outside it; both were to take on a fresh vigor in the year of revolutions only to be again carefully smothered; and then, under the controlling hand of Bismarck, German Nationalism was to achieve its ominous triumph while constitutionalism was left to subsist upon the husks of empty formulæ.

In the Italian struggle for liberty, the issues were desperately confused. Unification had not become a generally accepted ideal. The south was in revolt against the Bourbon monarchy, not because it was foreign, but because it was tyrannous; in the north, Austrian Italy was in revolt against foreign domination; Piedmont was demanding a constitution from its native princes, the states of the Church from the Pope, while in all three the unification of the north at least was be-

coming a conscious goal. Neither the Popular nor the Nationalist movement had any chance of success until unification became the common goal, and the banner of Nationalism was advanced by a prince whose conspicuous loyalty to constitutionalism made the common acceptance of his leadership possible.

In the Balkan peninsula Greece led the way in the struggle for liberation from a foreign dominion, and her success won a degree of autonomy for Serbia and for the trans-Danube provinces, though in the latter a virtual Russian ascendancy was involved. In the Austrian Empire the whole land was overshadowed by the Upas-tree of Metternich's system, but North Slavs, South Slavs, and Magyars were all fretting under the German ascendancy, and the last, not yet in open revolt, were claiming at once a government both constitutional and nationalist, though its nationalism was marred by the incongruous attendant claim to Magyar domination over the South Slavs—a defiance of principle which, for a time, wrecked the whole movement when it came to a head in 1848.

In North America and throughout the British Empire the starting-point of the political movements of the first half of the nineteenth century, Chartism excepted, is to be found before, not after, the beginning of the French Revolution, in the War of Independence and the teachings of Edmund Burke, the most uncompromising of the Revolution's opponents. The failure of Great Britain fully to apply her own constitutional principles in her own colonies had brought about their severance from the British Empire. Her similar failure in Ireland, coupled with that severance, begot the Irish Nationalism which demanded autonomy, and the extreme form of which, first inspired by Wolfe Tone, would be satisfied with nothing short of separation. The rebellion of 1798 was the reply to the concession of an experimental and partial autonomy, and Pitt tried to find a remedy for Irish discontent and hostility in the union of Ireland with Great Britain, theoretically on equal terms. The remedy failed, partly because the political subjection of Catholics to Protestants, a leading grievance in Ireland, was maintained for nearly thirty years; and when it was at last abolished, the place of the agitation for Catholic emancipation was taken by that for autonomy—repeal of the union and the reinstatement of a separate Irish parliament. English statesmen refused to contemplate an autonomy which would have meant domination of the Catholics over the Protestants, from whose domination they had suffered in the past, and a separatist party again came into being which drew sustenance from the compatriots who had emigrated in large numbers to America; while in England the conviction remained deeply rooted that the political demand, even for autonomy, was unreal, was in fact only a perverse expression of resentment at agrarian and still surviving religious grievances, and

would disappear under the discipline of a government which sought to be at once firm and conciliatory but was alternately denounced as brutal and cringing.

Similarly, Great Britain's attitude towards her colonies was practically untouched by the French Revolution, though as a consequence of it a democratic spirit was introduced into Canada by immigrants from the British Isles when the Napoleonic wars were over. Realizing the colonial failure in the eighteenth century, governments for most of the nineteenth were generally convinced, first, that the separation of colonies from the mother country is a natural law, and, secondly, that British colonists were entitled to enjoy the political rights in the colony which their kinsmen enjoyed at home—as soon as they were fit to exercise them and proved the fact by demanding them, if not sooner. Representative government was already established in Canada before the European Year of Revolutions, and responsible government was soon to follow in all the major colonies in rapid succession.

The United States also were almost untouched by the French Revolution, since the form of their government was already republican and there was nothing there as yet corresponding to the European proletariat, in a country where every man who was not a negro slave could be his own master. There the main political problems arose from conditions which had no counterpart in Europe—slavery, expansion over virgin territory, or divergences in the economic interests of the various states of which the Union was composed.

We may then summarize the political outcome of the French Revolution. It did not overthrow the existing system or systems, substituting for them something new; but it initiated two world-movements which had hitherto found only local expression—the movement toward democracy and the movement towards nationalism.

## *II.—Economic and Social*

Politics are more picturesque than economics, partly because they are more personal. A Robespierre, a Napoleon, a Metternich, appeals to the imagination more actively than a James Watt, a George Stephenson, or a Robert Owen. The emancipation of a state is more exciting than the emancipation of a class; there is more story about it. The development of fighting power is more dramatic than the development of wealth—*well-being*; and most of us have a vivid idea of the French Revolution as marking an epoch in world-history, while comparatively few—though latterly there has been a marked change in this respect—have a similar conception of the British industrial revolution which was going on at the same time, producing results no less portentous for the history of man.

That revolution in fact modified the whole structure of civilization more profoundly than the other, while in sixty years it changed, literally, the face of the land in vast areas, where tilled fields and meadows and wild nature give place to great aggregations of closely packed houses, topped by factory chimneys and overshadowed by their smoke, and where its surface was becoming seamed with railways. It transformed agricultural into urban populations. Hitherto the producers of material wealth had been mainly those who subsisted in great part upon what they themselves produced or upon the proceeds of what they sold; now they were divided into the two classes, designated, with the usual inaccuracy of class nomenclature, as capitalists who paid and working men who received wages. In the past, sometimes rich and poor, sometimes landowner and serf, had been set in antagonism, but to speak of the conflict between capital and labor as antagonistic interests would hardly have been intelligible; yet before the eighteenth century was ended the conflict had become in England an ominous reality, and class hostility had taken a new color, while on the Continent, before half the nineteenth century had passed, it was assuming still more threatening forms.

This "revolution," however, differed from the other in this, that it was not a conscious attempt to overthrow the old and to reconstruct society anew. Primarily, it was but an extraordinarily rapid development upon lines followed ever since the days of palæolithic man, when he invented his first flint tool. He had continued to improve his tools through the ages. When he found that he could utilize streams and winds to drive his mill wheels, that natural forces would work tools for him, he had made his first step towards the next great advance; the second came in the seventeenth century of our era when he got an inkling that steam had a driving power of which it might be possible to make some use. And then, after about another century, James Watt discovered or invented the way to use it (1769). The use of it wrought the industrial revolution. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the next fifty years increased productivity as much as the preceding fifty centuries.

Then came the second stage. Watt applied steam power to stationary machinery: George Stephenson applied it to locomotion. In 1825 his engines were hauling goods between Stockton and Darlington; in 1830 the first railway for passenger traffic was opened from Liverpool to Manchester. Steam paddle-boats had been constructed some years earlier on the Ohio in the United States (1811) and on the Clyde (1812). In 1819 the *Savannah*, built in America, crossed the Atlantic partly under sail, partly under steam; in 1838, for the first time, two vessels, British built, accomplished the voyage under steam only. In the forties, England was covered with railways, railway building was in full swing in France, and was rapidly advancing else-

where in Europe; and steamship companies were launching the first fleets of ocean "liners." By steam haulage passengers could be carried in numbers and goods in bulk hitherto undreamed of, and the old day's journey was accomplished in an hour. The steamship covered long distances with a speed, a certainty, and a security such as the sailor had never imagined. The facility of distribution being increased a hundredfold, a further enormous impulse was given to production.

And meanwhile a fresh development was being initiated by the introduction of another natural agency under human control, though not as yet as a driving power. Experimentation with electricity had been in progress before the nineteenth century opened. It would be difficult to award the palm of leadership in this field to any one country; but the definite establishment of telegraph may be dated from the invention of the Morse system in America (1838), and the first public telegraph in England between Paddington and Slough in 1844.

But along with the introduction of machinery came the change in rural conditions. The domestic spinning and weaving, which had been the by-occupations of the agriculturist, yeoman or farm hand, and his women-folk, could not compete with the spinning and weaving of the machinery. Deprived of this addition to their means of subsistence, these men could not make a livelihood off their small holdings, which were quickly absorbed into large farms that had hitherto been the exception, but now became the outstanding feature of the countryside. The former yeoman became at once dependent on the wage he could earn either as a farm hand or on the new machinery. The large farm required much less labor than the old group of small holdings; the machines required much less labor than the old hand-loom and spinning wheels to produce twenty times their output. In the sixteenth century the displacement of labor by enclosures had, for the time, swelled the supply of labor far above the effective demand; the same result now followed upon the displacement of labor by machinery. The big farmer, the landowner, and the machine owner flourished, the farm hand the machine hand were on the margin of destitution; and, subject to differences in the conditions, what happened in England happened also on the Continent when the industrial revolution spread to it.

The increase, then, in the aggregate material wealth of Great Britain was great and rapid, but none of it went into the pockets of those who had been the yeomanry and peasantry. Money bred money; expenditure upon machinery and raw material brought big returns, since the manufacturer could buy the necessary labor at his own price, because the laborer had no alternatives to taking what was offered him or starving; the supply of labor being in excess of the demand, because the ratio of production to the amount of labor employed on

it was enormously increased by the invention of power-driven machinery. If he refused the offered wage, the manufacturer could do without him—there were plenty more starving men ready to take his place on any terms, and even if there were not, the pangs of hunger would drive him to acceptance in a few days. The employer could afford to wait, the laborer could not. And since "combination" or concerted action for the raising or lowering of wages on the part of employed or employers was alike forbidden by law, the common weapon of the "strike" was not available. In a struggle between the individual employer and the individual laborer the former was quite sure of winning.

Thus, for anything above the bare pittance which would keep body and soul together the laborer was dependent, not on the needs, but on the liberality of the employer. But even liberal-minded employers were shy of raising wages, because they assumed for a long time that every rise in wages was to that extent also a rise in the cost of production, which would place them at a disadvantage with their less humanely disposed competitors, so that anything above the barest pittance was rarely conceded. All the machinery which, for the time, reduced the demand for labor, all the increased production, of which the profits went into the employer's pockets, appeared to the laborer as devices of capital to exploit his work in its own interest; and the employer became in his eyes a tyrant who, possessing the might, applied the principle that might is right—in fact, a legalized robber—since he could and did take care that the law was on his side. This was a feeling of direct antagonism very different from the old contrast between rich and poor, which was merely a vague sense of the injustice that these should have and those should lack without any apparent reason for the difference.

In some degree, however, the sentiment was modified by the gradual relaxation of the combination laws from 1826 onwards, which tended to increase the money-wage; by the efforts of benevolent manufacturers to procure through legislation ameliorations in the conditions under which the operatives were compelled to work; and finally, during this period, by the abolition of the Corn Laws, by other free-trade measures, and by the cheapening of the carriage of goods for the purposes both of production and distribution through the laying of a network of railroads, which increased the purchasing power of the money-wage.

The rural revolution and the industrial revolution went together. The new machinery deprived the small agriculturist of the by-employments with which he had hitherto supplemented his meager means of subsistence; improved methods involving an outlay beyond his reach and applicable only on a large scale killed his power of competing as a producer with his bigger neighbor; the big farm drove out the small

holding and flourished on the high price of agricultural produce entailed by the war; while the small holder either became the big farmer's wage-laborer or drifted to the manufacturing centers to swell the overcrowded ranks of the factory hands. In either capacity he had to accept such pay as was offered—and as a rural laborer he did not get as wages even the necessary pittance. The farmer was enabled to press the wage still lower by the well-intentioned but amazingly ill-advised operation of the English poor law, which provided out of the rates the margin between such wages as he did receive, and the pittance necessary to sustain life. He had even no inducement to seek a higher wage or to make himself worth more to his employer, because what he gained in wages he lost in rate-aid.

Whereas in France the Revolution released the peasant from servitude and converted him into an independent small holder, in England the industrial revolution deprived him of his independent holding and reduced him to dependence on the farmer, the squire, and the rates. Having no legitimate means of improving his lot, he frequently sought to do so by illegitimate methods and became a poacher, thereby bringing himself in direct collision with the landed gentry, the squire, and the law, which treated poaching as a first-class offense. The evil grew until its most demoralizing feature was dealt with by the drastic revision of the poor law in 1833, which, by depriving the laborer of rate-aid, forced him to seek higher wages, an adequate return for his work, and an increased return for improved work. But since the immediate result was a diminution rather than an increase of the pittance, the reform in the first instance presented itself as a new grievance against the authority which imposed it.

On the Continent the industrial revolution lagged behind that in Great Britain. The new inventions were all British, and Britain had under her own soil vast supplies of the coal and iron necessary to the development of the new machinery and manufactures. For three-and-twenty years armies were marching and counter-marching over the greater part of Europe, even the normal industrial work was seriously reduced, and transmarine commerce was almost annihilated by British fleets, especially during the closing years, the eight years in which Napoleon was endeavoring to enforce his Continental System. But during those years no invading armies set foot in Great Britain; her fleets kept open for her the ocean highways which brought her raw materials—such as cotton—which were not home products; Napoleon could not completely close the Continent as a market for the British-borne goods of which it was in dire need. When the wars were over she was not the leading, but the only manufacturing country, the only country where the factories were in full swing. When others started in the race, she had nothing to fear from their competition. She was at once the workshop, the carrier, and the banker

for the whole world. She came to look upon that position as her natural right, and one from which she could not be ousted. Three-quarters of a century elapsed before she began to wake up to the fact that her enormous supremacy had been achieved under abnormal conditions, and that competitors were actually within measurable distance of challenging it; and at the end of half a century the most advanced of other nations was hardly yet dreaming of becoming her rival.

Nevertheless, when peace came, other states began to follow her industrial lead, though none of them were so readily supplied with the raw material, and some still suffered from another handicap. It was only in the west that the rural population had escaped from the serfdom which England had discarded more than three centuries earlier. Where serfdom survived there was no surplus of free laborer for the manufacturer to draw upon. The English peasant was not bound to the soil; he could migrate to the machinery. The serf could not migrate without the leave of a master who was in no haste to dispense with his services; rapid advance in manufacture was deferred till he was emancipated. The French peasant was emancipated, not bound to the soil; but he was much less ready to quit it than the English peasant, because he was himself the proprietor, not the proprietor's underpaid servant. He did, nevertheless, presently migrate in sufficient numbers to swell the ranks of the urban proletariat, till at last insufficient employment gave rise to the cry of the "right to work" which was becoming ominously loud in 1847, and was the sign that France too had definitely emerged into the manufacturing stage.

The arrival of the manufacturing stage gave birth to the socialism, which is associated primarily with the names of Proudhon and Karl Marx; which meant broadly that the workmen, not as individuals but in common, were the rightful owners and controllers of the materials, the means, and the profits of production, not the capitalists who exploited their labor, and in whom they did not acknowledge founders, organizers, and directors no less necessary to successful production than the operatives. To those who did recognize the capitalist as a necessary element, socialism meant rather the co-operation of capital and labor as having one common interest, which appears to have been the idea evolved by Robert Owen out of his own extremely successful experiments in building up a prosperous business upon the basis of liberal wages, shorter hours, improved sanitary environment, and education for the children—an expenditure which terrified the ordinary employer. In either form, socialism was flatly opposed to the individualism of the day, which attributed success wholly to the enterprise and intelligence of the employer, assumed that the amount of production was in exact ratio to the number of working hours per head—for example, that eight men working for twelve hours pro-

duced the same amount as twelve men working for eight hours—and held that anything which hampered the right of the individual to make his own bargain on the best terms he could get, and to dictate them when he had the power to do so, was a restriction upon productivity.

But the commoner form of socialism, which on the one hand conceded no rights to capital and on the other claimed the right to have work provided, was obviously subversive of the existing order, a negation of private property, hostile to existing governments, and possible of realization only through a successful revival of the Red Terror. It was the extreme expression of the industrial problem as a conflict between labor and capital, not an adjustment of their divergent and their common interests. And it was hardly less opposed to the individualism of the growing trade unions in England, whose demand was that the workmen should have the power of bargaining with the employer on equal terms through the legalized right of concerted action, without which he was at a hopeless disadvantage. For every free bargain is an adjustment of common and divergent interests. This was the line upon which British trade unionism developed till the century was nearing its close, and it gained much more for the working man than continental socialism. But even at this early stage it is to be noted that socialism was assuming an international or cosmopolitan attitude, and was claiming the universal co-operation of labor as against capital, irrespective of nationality and distinctive national interests.

For some three hundred years European commercial policy had been controlled by the "mercantile theory," according to which it was the business of the State to keep commerce in the channels which tended to make the State first self-sufficing and independent of foreign supplies, and, secondly, stronger than its neighbors for military purposes. Incidentally, the theory laid it down that the primary need, for strength, was bullion and treasure, and that all commerce tending to the export of goods in exchange for treasure was good for the exporting country, all which tended to the export of treasure in exchange for goods was bad. Protection of home industries against foreign competitors and discouragement of imports were the necessary corollary. Commerce provided the State with the necessary source of revenue through taxation of imports and also of exports, and the common assumption was that revenue was increased by raising tariffs, though this was no necessary part of the mercantile theory. Walpole, the greatest financier of the eighteenth century, had realized that low tariffs with a big trade produced more revenue than high tariffs with a small trade.

Then Adam Smith undermined the whole fabric of mercantilism by his exposition of the doctrine that wealth is rapidly convertible into

power—as exemplified in the Seven Years' War—that power is therefore best attained by the maximum accumulation of wealth, and that the greatest wealth will be accumulated by reducing to a minimum everything which hampers the individual in the pursuit of wealth; while competition is not a hampering factor but an incentive to energy, and the demand for treasure is automatically adjusted by the exchange of goods and services. All tariffs, being on this theory restrictions on the freedom of commerce, are in themselves to be deprecated. Protection is to be generally condemned, though in specific cases—such as the British Navigation Acts—it may serve a useful purpose, and tariffs should be applied only for the production of necessary revenue.

Great Britain, the leading commercial State, was already moving along Adam Smith's lines under the guidance of the younger Pitt when the great war broke in, and imposed emergency finance. By the time the war was ended, all the conditions had changed. The several European States wanted to be self-sufficing, and every competitive trade wanted protection for itself more than ever. But every State was in need of goods which it could not produce itself, and which it could get only from England; the great British manufacturers were beyond reach of competition, and having nothing themselves to gain from protection as producers, were very much alive to the higher prices which, as consumers, they paid for the protected products of other industries. The one great exception was food production. The land which under war-stress had been brought into cultivation would no longer pay if food prices fell, as without protection, they would fall; if it went out of cultivation the next war would find the country unable to support itself. The agricultural industry must therefore on national grounds be protected; and the Corn Laws were passed. On the other hand, Huskisson was soon able to arrange reciprocal reductions of tariffs with the leading States, and relax the Navigation Laws; in spite of the outcries of individual trades that they would be ruined by competition, and that British maritime supremacy had only been floated and could only be kept afloat by the Navigation Laws, the supremacy extended and the individual trades, stirred to fresh energy, distanced their competitors. As far as England was concerned, tariffs for protective as distinguished from revenue purposes almost disappeared in the forties, and the last stronghold of protection went down with the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The protection of agriculture had failed to keep its production up to anything like the self-sufficing standard, and more than anything else, the cheapening of food increased the purchasing power of wages. And British wealth advanced more rapidly than ever.

But the same motives did not apply with equal force elsewhere. Foodstuffs apart, few industries in Europe or in America were out of

reach of competition, especially of British competition; in the face of which the establishment of new and important industries was almost out of the question, though once established they might become strong enough to hold their own. Germany discovered that free trade within her own borders would be to the general advantage of the several states; the Prussian Zollverein, at first including only states which were practically encircled by Prussian territory, gradually extended over nearly the whole of Germany, and ultimately became a leading factor in the consolidation of the German Empire. France had already learned the same lesson, but French producers and German producers continued to be protected against the competition of dangerous foreign rivals. In the great transatlantic republic, the southern states, whose main products were cotton and tobacco, had nothing to fear from competition and demanded free trade; but the industrial north clung to protection, and this divergence of interests was one of the main disruptive factors which were presently to be eliminated only by the great civil war between North and South. In the British Isles, free trade in 1847 was on the verge of becoming a doctrine almost universally accepted, but Cobden's dream that it would promptly be adopted by the world at large was not to be realized.

# NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

## CHAPTER XL

### THE EUROPEAN UPHEAVAL, 1848-1851

#### *I.—The Year of Revolutions, 1848: (1) France and Western Europe*

AT the close of 1847 Europe was full of unrest; in January 1848 there were flarings of disturbance in Italy; before March was ended revolution of one sort or another was breaking out or was in full blaze everywhere in Europe between the Bay of Biscay and the borders of Russia and Turkey, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland alone excepted. It was not the revolution of tradition, the Red Terror of a proletariat turning the world upside down—though here and there there might be hints of it—but an assortment of varying revolutions diverse in their aims and often incompatible with each other—social, constitutional, republican, nationalist, unionist, particularist. Three years later it appeared as though every one of the revolutionary movements had smouldered out or been stamped out, though that appearance was deceptive.

In January a revolution at Palermo forced Ferdinand II. of Naples, who had not yet earned his nickname Bomba, to grant a constitution; but the granting and subsequent revocation of constitutions in the kingdom of the two Sicilies was chronic, and symptomatic only of chronic conditions. Slightly more ominous perhaps was an *émeute* at Milan, suppressed with a good deal of bloodshed by the Austrian soldiery. But it was the "February Revolution" in Paris which everywhere gave the decisive impulse to the movements whether nationalist or popular.

Within the pale of parliament, the king and Guizot were secure. The high franchise and the still higher property qualification for membership of the Assembly made that body representative mainly of the prosperous bourgeoisie; who identified political salvation with limited monarchy. But even in the Chamber there were elements republican and socialistic or communistic—though the republicans were as stoutly opposed to what was called socialism as the conservative bourgeoisie were to republicanism. And outside the Chamber the

lesser bourgeoisie, of Paris especially, much more numerous, excluded in great part from the franchise and altogether from the Assembly, were demanding enfranchisement. Habitually supporters of law and order, they had become disaffected towards a government which had suppressed popular liberties, and had failed conspicuously to advance French prestige in Europe. It was their support which had in great part established Louis Philippe on the throne, but of late years that support had been alienated. The opposition press of Paris was united in its hostility to government, if in nothing else, and it was brilliantly conducted. The Paris proletariat too was growing dangerous. The industrial revolution in France as in England had begotten low wages and much unemployment; bad harvests had raised the price of food; the doctrine of the "right to work"—that is, to have work provided, whether the work itself was wanted or not—had become insistent. The prosperity of the country meant, in the popular view, that the idle capitalist classes were flourishing by exploitation of the workers. And all classes were more bored than impressed by the air of eminent respectability which pervaded a government that in fact commanded very little respect.

Outside Parliament, in short, Paris was clamouring for "reform"; while the king and the government were set against any concessions to reform which would involve their own fall from power, and were hardly conscious that revolution was in the air. The catastrophe was as swift and sudden as that of July 1830 had been. We may sum that situation by saying that the king and Guizot had in Parliament a solid Tory majority, faced by a Whig opposition which was monarchist in theory, but with a republican wing; while outside, the strength of anti-monarchical and social revolutionary forces were ungauged. Inside and outside the whole Opposition demanded "reform," which meant primarily franchise extension, the departure of the existing government, and the diminution or disappearance of the king's personal control.

Agitation had been organized through a system of great public banquets. The obstinacy with which Guizot clung to office and the king resisted reform caused the organization of a huge reform banquet, to be held in the Champs Elysées on 22nd February. Government prohibited the banquet; the constitutional opposition leaders finally pronounced officially that, in the interests of order, it should not be held; nevertheless, the populace of Paris assembled. Awakening to his danger, the king dismissed Guizot, but on the 23rd mobs were parading the streets, and there was a collision with the troops. The National Guard was called out, but it was a citizen body formed from the lower bourgeoisie, who were all on the side of reform. The new ministry, headed by Barrot and Thiers—constitutional reformers—proclaimed concessions, but it was too late; the proletariat wanted more.

It was in vain that Louis Philippe abdicated (February 24th) in favor of his grandson, whom the Chambers proceeded to proclaim as king. The Chambers themselves were invaded by the mob, and a provisional government was there proclaimed by acclamation, even while another was being proclaimed elsewhere by a revolutionary committee. Then the two provisional governments amalgamated, proclaimed the Republic, and summoned a National Convention, to be elected by universal suffrage, to assemble on 5th March, a date afterwards postponed for six weeks.

In the provisional government the element then known as socialist had a slight predominance; on 25th February they proclaimed the doctrine of the "right to work" and (on the 26th) the immediate institution of national workshops—followed by the appointment of a socialist commission in the interests of the "workers"; Louis Philippe having meanwhile escaped to England, disguised as the respectable Mr. Smith. When, however, the National Assembly met towards the end of April, it appeared that its election by universal suffrage had by no means, endorsed the socialists' initial victory in Paris. Moderate republicanism predominated, there was a substantial reactionary element, and the socialists formed a mere fraction. But the Assembly was not Paris—where by this time huge hosts of the unemployed had gathered, to find that it was one thing to talk of providing work and another thing to do it. Digging trenches one day and filling them up again the next, at two francs a day, was scarcely profitable to the community at large or the workers themselves. Empty stomachs breed angry tempers and make opportunities for the agitator. The swelling army of out-of-work working men was getting restless and dangerous. In June the Assembly decreed that the men from the provinces should take their departure, and closed the National Workshops. The men stayed where they were and raised barricades. The troops, under Cavaignac, supported by the bourgeois National Guard attacked them, and for three days a sanguinary battle raged in the streets, which ended in the complete victory of the government. The Terror of '93 was not to be renewed.

The Assembly was now free for a new effort at constitution making, and the new constitution was promulgated in November. It was based on manhood suffrage and the principle of the division of functions—a legislature and a separate executive concentrated in the person of a president; both elected by universal suffrage, both holding office for four years. And then came the most startling development. At the presidential election, Ledru-Rollin, who had left the social revolution partly to join the party of order, received less than half a million votes; Cavaignac, who had crushed the Paris insurrection in June, less than a million and a half; but almost five and a half millions,

thrice the number cast for Cavaignac and Ledru-Rollin together, were given to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, son of the sometime King of Holland, Louis Bonaparte, and nephew of the great Emperor (December 1848).

The western states in general were practically unaffected; in them there were no nationalist grievances as in the Austrian Empire, no impulse to a unity hitherto unattained as in Germany, no deep-seated anti-monarchical or socialistic sentiment to urge revolution as in Paris. The British Islands, however, in some sense were an exception to the general rule, but in so slight a degree that they suffered no serious disturbance. Ireland had her nationalist grievance, her demand for the repeal of the union and the restoration of a separate Irish Parliament; but her leaders were for the most part opposed to anything in the nature of armed rebellion, and a substantial section of her people was altogether antagonistic to repeal. Moreover, no forces which even a united Ireland could have put in the field would have had a chance of standing up against those at the secure disposal of the government. Hence, although there was a "Young Ireland" party, as there was a party of "Young Italy" and "Young Czechs," which, excited by foreign examples and by the government's application of coercion for the suppression of agrarian disorders, attempted and insurrection, a single insignificant skirmish sufficed to disperse the insurgents, and the punishment of the rebels was hardly more than a formality.

In England "the revolution" was represented by nothing more serious than the last phase of the Chartist movement. Chartism itself demanded, not the subversion of the monarchy or constitution, but electoral reforms of a democratic character which enthusiasts regarded as a short cut to the millennium, nervous conservatives as the straight way to ruin, and the enfranchised classes at large as decidedly dangerous. An attempt at armed insurrection seemed possible when the Chartist leaders announced that a host was to assemble on Kensington Common and march in procession to present a Parliament a petition bearing some millions of signatures. But, in fact, the Chartists were a minority even of the unenfranchised, a majority of them were not in the least revolutionists, adequate preparations were made to deal with an emergency should it actually arise, the monster meeting was of no very alarming dimensions, the procession did not march, the petition proved to bear mainly bogus signatures, the Chartist movements dissolved in laughter, and there was no counter-movement of reaction or repression. Chartism neither hastened nor retarded the gradual advance towards democracy of which it was a symptom, not an effective agent; and the same may be said of the Young Ireland insurrection in relation to Irish Nationalism.

*II.—The Year of Revolutions, 1848: (2) The Austrian Empire and Italy*

The course of the movement within the Austrian Empire next demands our attention. The complexities of that chaotically composite dominion demands a very careful unravelment before it becomes possible to form anything like a coherent idea of the story. Certain main features were set forth in those earlier pages which dealt with the state of Europe in 1847; but it will be useful here both to recall what was there explained and to grasp some further details—which, it may be remarked, demand a careful study of the map.

In 1848 the Austrian Empire covered the area of the Austrian Empire of 1914, except that it had not then absorbed Bosnia; while there was attached to it the great excrescence of the Austrian dominion in north Italy—Venetia and Lombardy, which were in effect under Austrian military government, with the duchies of Modena, Parma, and Tuscany held by members of the Imperial House. Looking at what may be called the Austrian Empire proper, apart from Italy, we find the following racial areas roughly recognizable: First, the Slavonic belt on the north—Bohemia and Moravia, with a population mainly Czech, but including a large proportion of Germans; and then, going eastward, Galicia, recently annexed from Poland, with a mixed Slavonic population of Poles, Ruthenians, and others. Second—forming the larger half of the Empire—on the west the German provinces of Austria proper; next, Magyar Hungary; and on the east of it Transylvania, partly Magyar but mainly Rumanian. Third, the southern Slavonic belt, (the Yugo-Slavs), in Dalmatia (on the Adriatic), in Croatia and Slavonia (south of the rivers Drave and Danube), and in the Banat of Temesvar (north of the Danube, carrying the Slav belt eastward to the border of Transylvania). Thus Hungary proper was completely encircled by Germans on the west, Rumanians on the east, Czecho-Slavs on the north, and Yugo-Slavs on the south; while, in every area there were German colonies of varying magnitude. It should be noted, however, that the southern part of what we have called German Austria, including Carinthia, Carniola, and Lower Styria, was claimed as Slavonic.

But there was no political unification of the racial belts. The Hapsburgs had acquired by marriage the crowns of the old kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. The south Slav provinces, reft from the Turk, had been attached to the Magyar-Hungarian kingdom, whereas Slavonic Galicia, annexed from Poland, had not been joined to Slavonic Bohemia. The sections of the Empire had their Diets and their governors of diverse rank, but the government of all was directed by the "departments" of the central bureaucracy at Vienna, the

bureaucracy was the instrument of the Emperor, and the nearly imbecile Emperor was the mask of Metternich. So far as the peoples had a mouthpiece at all, other than a censored press, it was supplied very inadequately by the various Diets, which had no control over the government and contained scarcely any popular element. The demands for "constitutional" rule, whether by Germans, Slavs, or Magyars, were repressed by the central government, and were crossed by demands for racial autonomy—also repressed; and crossed again by racial antagonisms within the various areas. Autonomy for Hungary meant to the Magyars Magyar domination over the south Slavs, who wanted separation from Hungary and autonomy for themselves; for Bohemia it meant to the Czechs a Czech government and to the Germans German domination over the Czechs; while the German constitutionalists in German Austria were by no means disposed to surrender German ascendancy in the Empire to the racial autonomy desired by north Slavs, south Slavs, or Magyars. All these varying currents, of sentiments which might all be classed as revolutionary, were running with growing vehemence in spite of repression; but they were cross-currents, even counter-currents, incompatible, incapable of being united in one revolutionary flood.

A week after the abdication and flight of Louis Philippe, Louis Kossuth in the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg made (on 3rd March) the speech which opened the various revolutionary flood-gates from end to end of this heterogeneous patchwork of territories and peoples. Everywhere, outside of the Austrian (that is, German) provinces proper, nationalism was the actuating motive, whatever "popular" cross-currents there might be. In that speech, Kossuth denounced the centralized authority at Vienna as a pestilence, blighting all national aspiration, and all popular liberty, and declared that Hungary must give the lead to all the peoples of the Empire by claiming her own national autonomy, and standing forth as the champion of a like freedom for her fellows. Ten days later the revolution had triumphed in Vienna, whence the once all-powerful Metternich was fleeing to England; while at Pesth and Prague Magyars and Czechs were formulating or had formulated their demands for immediate reforms. In another ten days a rising in Milan had driven the Austrian governor, Marshal Radetzky, to withdraw his troops to Verona; and Piedmont—that is, King Charles Albert of Sardinia—had declared war upon Austria in the name of Italian nationalism (23rd March), making common cause with the Italian subjects of the Hapsburg monarchy.

All Italy knew that neither popular nor national liberty would ever be secured in any portion of the peninsula until Austria was cleared out of it. The two Sicilies had just extorted a Constitution from Ferdinand, and Pius IX. was still credited with liberalism; but so long as Austria dominated north Italy, neither Bourbon monarchy nor

papacy was likely to countenance liberal ideas for long. Only Charles Albert was known to have national aspirations and mildly liberal sympathies; he had been on the verge of challenging Austria when she occupied Ferrara; and when, however tardily, he gave Piedmont the constitution, which both Charles Felix and the last Victor Emmanuel had refused, union under his leadership seemed to offer a better prospect than any that had hitherto presented itself. The news of the Vienna revolution was decisive; despite his political timidity, the King of Sardinia accepted the leadership, and entered Lombardy at the call of Milan; Parma and Modena and Tuscany were with him, papal troops marched to his aid, and even Ferdinand of Naples was compelled reluctantly to dispatch a force to support him under General Pepe. Already Venice had risen in rear of the Austrians, ejected the foreign troops, and proclaimed the Venetian Republic. Radetzky holding only the "Quadrilateral" of Verona, Mantua, Peschiero, and Legnano seemed to be doomed. But the old marshal had fought in every possible Austrian campaign for sixty years; he knew his business and the military machine of which he was in control; he knew the disruptive forces at work among the Italians and the incapacity of their leadership—and he was confident of victory.

The Italians advanced and met with initial success while Radetzky was standing on the defensive and drawing in reinforcements. A couple of victories and the fall of Peschiera at the end of May gave them such confidence that the soldiers hailed Charles Albert King of Italy. The Vienna Government, reeling under the revolution in eastern Europe, was ready to throw up the struggle, but Radetzky remained grimly confident. He had good reason. Charles Albert made no use of his victories. The Pope had already taken fright, and issued what we should now call a pacifist allocution which took the heart out of the papal troops. Then Ferdinand turned to account a rising of the extremists, stamped it out, revoked the revolution, summoned back the troops under Pepe, and revived the old despotism, though Sicily continued in revolt. The voluntary incorporation of one after another of the north Italian states in the kingdom of Sardinia brought to the front questions which should have been postponed till victory was won, arousing especially the ire of the republicans, and produced divided counsels; besides antagonizing France, which was always fluctuating between sympathies for the cause of liberty and hostility to the creation of a strong Italian state. Radetzky's activity increased as reinforcements arrived; while the Austrians were rapidly reducing Venetia, Charles Albert remained so inert that the enthusiasm he had at first inspired melted into distrust and suspicion. Then Radetzky struck, and inflicted on him a heavy defeat at Custoza (25th July). Within a fortnight the Austrians were in Milan, and the Piedmontese were back over the Ticino. Fearing possible French

or British intervention Radetzky, having all Lombardy in his grip as well as Venetia, the city of Venice excepted, agreed to an armistice; and active hostilities were not renewed till the next year.

In the interval, however, Italian disintegration was extending, and the antagonism between constitutionalists and republicans was growing more acute. The Pope was still counted as on the nationalist side, and his minister, Rossi, was a constitutionalist of long standing. But in November Rossi fell by the hand of an unknown assassin who escaped—the victim of republican fanaticism. Pius was stricken with panic, and fled secretly from Rome to place himself under the protection of the King of Naples; and thenceforward the Papacy appeared once more in its accustomed colors as the ally and instigator of reaction.

Within what may be called the legitimate Austrian Empire, the area where the most advanced nationalism aimed not at complete severance from the Empire, but at the autonomy of its various sections, the flame was kindled by Kossuth's speech at Pressburg on 3rd March. On 11th March the Diet of Lower Austria at Vienna demanded an assembly of delegates from the various provincial Diets, ostensibly—like the States-General of 1789—to rectify the disastrous state into which the finances of the Empire had fallen. Next day the functions of the Diet were virtually appropriated by the working men and the university students; processions and riots developed, and Vienna was practically in the hands of a revolutionary mob. The government bowed to the storm. Metternich fled, and a new ministry was formed which dared not, at least openly, disobey the popular committees who were, for the time, the real masters of Vienna. Simultaneously, the demand in Bohemia for both autonomy and constitutional rule had found emphatic utterance in a mass meeting of the reforming party, the "Younger Czechs," at Prague.

The fall and flight of Metternich, the incarnation of the old system, was the outward and visible sign—in seeming at least—of its immediately pending collapse. Everywhere the revolutionary movement derived from it a fresh impulse. As revolutionary Vienna dominated the Austrian Diet and the Imperial Government, revolutionary Pesth dominated the Hungarian Diet at Pressburg. Within ten days that body had framed the "March laws," embodying at once the demand for constitutional government by ministers responsible to the Diet, the autonomy of Hungary, the incorporation with it of Transylvania, and (in effect) Magyar domination of the whole area. The autonomy demanded was so complete that it would have left Hungary attached to the Empire by no link but that of a common crown, as with England and Scotland before the incorporating union of 1707. Incidentally, the March laws, abolished the feudal subjection of the peasantry and converted them into free proprietors. The cross-currents were ex-

emplified by the fact that the new Imperial Government was meanwhile—in obedience to the Vienna Germans—devising a common constitution for the Empire, exclusive of Italy and Hungary; while on the other hand, at Prague the Czech nationalism of the Bohemian capital was readily overwhelming the German constitutionalists. Finally, Croatia was organizing its own demands for separation from Hungary.

The Imperial Government had no desire at all for reform, but it dared not offer resistance; it could only attempt evasions and the offer of compromises, which at once demonstrated its own weakness and strengthened the most uncompromising sections of the reformers. After a feeble struggle, every demand of the Hungarians was conceded. The Palatine or Viceroy, the Hapsburg Archduke Stephen, remained; but the ministry nominated at the dictation of Pesth, with Count Batthyany as its chief, was accepted, and the control by the Imperial departments disappeared even from the ministries of war and finance. Practically Hungary was recognized as an independent sovereign state though its crown was still united with that of the Empire (31st March). A week later the Czech demands were met by the promulgation of a Constitution for Bohemia, coupled with religious equality and equality of recognition for the Czech and German languages. The populace of Vienna lavished its enthusiasm upon Kossuth and the Hungarian delegates from Pesth when they came to the capital. Vienna had not yet realized that the Magyar and Czech movements both meant the abrogation of German supremacy as well as that of the absolutism against which the Vienna revolution was directed. But when the Croatian deputation arrived there it was cold-shouldered—the Slav demands were incompatible with the popular sympathy for Hungary. Since it was not welcomed by the populace, its reception by the Imperial Government was chilly. Finally, neither in Vienna nor elsewhere was there any perception on the part of the reformers or revolutionists, constitutional or national, of a connection between the Italian cause and their own, any active sympathy with the Emperor's insurgent subjects in Lombardy, or with the idea of Italian nationalism. It was only in Italy that the movement was definitely and avowedly separatist, whereas in the Empire proper the revolutionists did not conceive of themselves as aiming at disruption.

At the end of April the Imperial Government promulgated the Constitution which it had been devising for the Empire, excluding the virtually independent Hungary and Italy, which was not to enjoy its benefits, the Italians being rebels in arms. In this it was influenced by the course of events (to be narrated later) in Germany, where at this moment elections to a German National Parliament at Frankfort were in progress. The Constitution pleased neither the democrats, on ac-

count of the limited franchise, nor the nationalists who saw in it a scheme for perpetuating Teutonic domination through the centralized supreme authority. On the other hand, such concessions to nationalism as it contained gave immediate alarm to the German susceptibilities of Vienna. Moreover, all sections alike were indignant because the thing had been simply issued as an arbitrary decree.

Vienna again broke out into rioting, and again the Government bowed to its masters, and issued summonses for a Constituent Assembly, to be elected by universal suffrage; while it entrusted the control of the city to the citizen National Guard, which was itself the mainstay of the revolutionary committees. But the submission was followed immediately by the secret flight of the Emperor Ferdinand to Innsbruck. The person of the Emperor, it seemed, was no longer safe in the once loyal capital. By the end of May the one real authority was the Vienna Committee of Public Safety.

Meanwhile Czech nationalism was in a ferment. Its aspirations were more than unsatisfied by the Austrian Constitution issued at Vienna, and were further threatened by the Frankfort Parliament. In the old days, Bohemia had occupied an anomalous position in the Holy Roman Empire, wherein her king was an elector while his kingdom was in other respects outside it. Now the Frankfort Parliament, full of the Pan-German idea, was claiming that Bohemia, as well as Austria proper, was German. Whereby the Czechs were urged upon the course of extreme antagonism—upon the development of the Pan-Slav idea as the counterpart of the Pan-German idea. A Pan-Slav Congress was called at Prague. The Congress was obviously hostile to the *de facto* Vienna popular government. The adherents of the old regime saw their opportunity in fostering the antagonism; the Governor of Bohemia, Count Thun, proclaimed the separation of the Bohemian from the Austrian Government, thereby rendering a reconciliation between Prague and Vienna wellnigh impossible; and the separation was confirmed by the fugitive Ferdinand.

Thus the way was paved for the first Imperialist victory. A real alliance between the Imperialists and the Slav Congress was another impossibility. To put it shortly, Prague was too nationalist for Vienna and too democratic for the Imperialists. The temporary allies passed from latent to open hostility. The population of Prague rose in the approved manner of Vienna, students and National Guards combining to save the State for democracy, though that was a phrase which had not yet been coined. Thereupon intervened another kind of savior of the State, with other views. The commander of the Imperial forces in Bohemia, Prince Windischgrätz, was a man of action, quite ready to assume responsibility in an emergency. When the warning which he first issued to Prague were disregarded, he opened a bombardment; on the sixth day—June 18—after the insurrection started he was ab-

solute master of Prague. The insurrection was at an end, and with it Bohemia's autonomy, which had given place to a military dictatorship in the Imperial interest. Imperialists, moreover, were taking heart of grace from the turning of the tide in Italy, where Radetzky was again master of Venetia, and the complete justification of the marshal's confidence was imminent.

Nor was this all. A collision was also obviously imminent between the Magyar Government and the south Slavs, who had repudiated the authority which it claimed to exercise over them. If the Slavs disliked the arbitrary Imperial rule, they detested still more heartily the Magyar domination. It was primarily to Hungary that the Imperial Government owed its humiliation; it was Hungary that had most emphatically and completely repudiated German domination; to Germanism and Imperialism alike, the humiliation of Hungary would bring deep satisfaction. In both, therefore, the anti-Magyar movement of the south Slavs was certain to find allies, covert or overt, in spite of the coolness displayed at Vienna in the early days of April, before the Germanism of the populace had damped their first enthusiasm for Hungary as the champion of constitutionalism.

It was apparent as a mild concession to the sentiment of the Croats that Colonel Jellacic was appointed Ban or Governor of Croatia—the office being then vacant—at the moment when the demands of Hungary were meeting their fullest satisfaction at the hands of the Imperial Government. But Jellacic was soon to prove himself the uncompromising enemy of Magyar domination and also, as a corollary, the champion of the Imperial ascendancy. Within a fortnight of his assuming the Banat, the Magyar Government had asserted its authority and the Ban had uncompromisingly defied it. The defiance did not come from Croatia alone; a Slav Congress at Carlowitz, in the Banat of Temesvar, was claiming old rights of which it had long been robbed, involving independence of the Hungarian authority, and looking to a union with Slavonia and Croatia. Jellacic's defiance was technically a defiance of the Imperial authority. Batthyany, the Hungarian minister, appealed to Ferdinand at Innsbruck. An order was issued condemning Jellacic's action. On the day of its publication Jellacic arrived at Innsbruck in answer to the Emperor's summons; and at the same time came the news that the Hungarian commander had been defeated by the Slavs at Carlowitz. But Jellacic testified his loyalty by a message to the Croat troops in Lombardy, calling on them to show their loyalty to the Crown—at a moment when their defection would have been more than embarrassing to Radetzky; by that stroke he secured himself in favor, and he returned to Croatia to act practically as a dictator, though without formal withdrawal of his condemnation.

But his controversy with Batthyany took on a new shape; he now

placed in the front of his demands that for the restoration of the Imperial control over the Hungarian ministries of war, finance, and foreign affairs—in other words, the cancellation of Hungary's separate sovereignty. Equality of the rights of nationalities under the common Imperial sovereignty was an effective program, but wholly incompatible with Magyar ambitions. Kossuth's financial policy was directly opposed to Austrian interests; Hungary was already raising a large army of her own; she was in no mood to surrender any of the independence she had won, or to substitute a conciliatory tone for that of a victor.

At this critical moment Radetzky's decisive victory at Custoza on 25th July, following on the action of Windischgrätz at Prague and the definite adherence of Croatia, restored the confidence of the Imperial Government in the military forces at its disposal. Ferdinand returned to Vienna, where it was assumed that insurrection was no longer to be feared. The government vetoed the Hungarian military preparations which were primarily directed against the south Slavs—rebels from the Hungarian point of view; then at the beginning of September it formally recognized Jellacic, who, having waited for this as his sanction, carried his forces over the Drave and marched on Pesth. At the same moment the Reichsrath passed and the Emperor accepted a measure which provided the most effective of antidotes to revolution in the sense of popular insurgence against the established government. An urban proletariat may be stirred to revolutionary excitement by abstract appeals; a rural population needs the incitement of felt material grievances. Hungary had secured the support of her own peasant population by abolishing feudal services. The promise of release from feudal services had, in the earlier troubles, flung the Galician peasantry against their Polish overlords on the side of the Imperial Government. Now the Reichsrath was wise in time. By the general abolition of peasant services (7th September), the standing grievance of the country folk, it removed the danger, hitherto imminent, of the peasantry making common cause with the revolutionary proletariat of Vienna. There would at least be no *Jacquerie* to complicate other issues.

Precisely six months had now passed since the fall of Metternich; and in view of the extreme complexity of Austro-Hungarian affairs, it may be useful to summarize the situation which had been reached. Under Metternich, the government of the whole Empire had been centralized in the hands of the Imperial authority at Vienna. (1) In the first days of the revolution, Hungary had cut the Empire in two by wringing from the central government the concession of Hungary's independence. But independent Hungary technically included the south Slav belt, which thus found itself completely subjected to a Magyar domination, which it at once prepared to resist, though armed re-

sistance would be technically rebellion. (2) Bohemia, following suit, had extorted the grant of autonomy; but, whether with or without justification, Windischgrätz had wiped out that autonomy in June. (3) The democratic revolution in Vienna had established popular control in the city, and together with other influences had extorted from the Imperial Government first the promise of a Constitution for the whole Empire, excepting independent Hungary, and then the summoning of an Assembly of the Empire, a Reichsrath elected by universal suffrage. (4) Bohemia being included, the Reichsrath, which met at Vienna in July, was predominantly Slav, and in favor of Imperial unity. (5) The Imperial Government, at least after Jellacic's declaration for loyalty to the Crown and Imperial unity, fostered, if it had not actually instigated, the south Slav antagonism to the Magyar claims, while the Czecho-Slavs were also in sympathy with their southern kinsmen. (6) The democratic anti-Imperialism and the German anti-Slavism of Vienna brought the capital itself to the Hungarian side. (7) Hungary was determined to surrender no fraction of the rights which had been formally conceded to her. (8) If she defended those rights against the Imperial Government, the latter would be able to call to its aid the armies of Windischgrätz and of Radetzky, as well as of Jellacic; yet the Magyar claim was, for the Imperial Government, incontrovertible except by palpable sophistries, and could be defeated only by shameless breach of faith, (9) though it was wholly incompatible with the idea of Imperial unity, and ignored for the Slavs the very principle of nationalism which was its own moral basis.

While Jellacic was moving towards Pesth a Hungarian deputation to Vienna was refused admission by the Reichsrath (15th September), but was clamorously welcomed by the populace. In Hungary the Viceroy, Archduke Stephen, threw up his command of the army. The Imperial Government sent General Lamberg to take command of all troops, Slav, German, or Magyar, in Hungary; he was murdered by the mob at Pesth (28th September). With this excuse, the general command was given (3rd October) to Jellacic as Viceroy, and troops from Vienna were ordered to join him. But their loyalty had been corrupted by the Vienna democrats; they mutinied, and joined the mob in a new insurrection. Latour, the minister for war, who had issued the order to march, was murdered; for the second time Ferdinand fled from his capital to Olmütz, in Slav territory. There he was joined by the Slav delegates of the Reichsrath, while the German rump remained in session at Vienna. For the second time Windischgrätz at Prague (11th October) took action on his own responsibility and marched on Vienna, which was expecting support from Hungarian forces; and while the general was mastering the capital, the advancing Jellacic drove off the advancing Hungarians. Democracy

in Vienna was crushed as completely as in Prague (1st November). A new ministry was formed under Schwartzberg, a man who, however unscrupulous, knew his own mind. With an Emperor who would yield anything to clamor and as readily retract under pressure, an Emperor personally pledged to every concession that had been made, there was nothing to be done. On 2nd December Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his nephew, the Archduke Francis Joseph, who lived to share the responsibility for the war of 1914. In 1848 the sovereign of eighteen was an instrument to be used by Schwartzberg without compunction.

The next step was to proclaim the new Emperor's intention (assumed only for the moment) of granting a Constitution for the entire Empire; which meant quite plainly that Hungary must resign her aspirations or fight. Kossuth's reply was equally emphatic: Hungary would not recognize the new Emperor till he had been crowned King of Hungary, and he would not be crowned till he had taken the oath to the Hungarian Constitution—and in the meantime, the crown still belonged not to Francis Joseph, but to Ferdinand. The die was cast. Hungary was in open rebellion, with the rest of the Empire ranged against her.

### *III.—The Year of Revolutions, 1848: (3) Germany and Denmark*

Before passing to Germany from Austro-Hungary, the small state of Denmark, with Schleswig and Holstein, demands attention, because the Danish problem was also a part of the German problem of the time, besides having a prominent part in future complications. The whole Danish promontory consists of Jutland (the mainland of Denmark proper) and the duchies of Schleswig, between its southern boundary and the Eider, and of Holstein, between the Eider and the Elbe. These duchies, of which Holstein had been formerly within the Holy Roman Empire, to which Schleswig as well as Denmark was external, had for centuries been attached to the Danish Crown; much as Hanover had for a century and a quarter been attached to the British Crown. Their hereditary duke was the hereditary king of Denmark, though they were not incorporated as an integral part of the Danish kingdom, and Holstein was still included in the German Confederation. Farther, as in Hanover the operation of the Salic Law separated that kingdom from the Crown of Britain on the accession of Queen Victoria, so it was claimed that a break in the male succession to the Danish throne would sever the duchies, where the succession was ruled by the Salic Law, from the Crown of Denmark, where it was not. Such a break had been impending for some years, during which the Crown Prince Frederick had no offspring, while his heir presumptive was the reigning king's sister. In the male line the suc-

cession to the duchies would presumably be claimed on his death for the German Duke of Augustenburg, just as a Bourbon had succeeded to the throne of France in 1589. It was, however, further debatable whether the Salic Law applied to Schleswig.

The last attempt at a formal incorporation, made by Frederick VI., had been defeated; both the duchies clung to their historic independence (like the Scots before 1707). On the other hand, the Danes regarded the duchies as provinces of the kingdom, and the reigning king, Christian VIII., the successor of Frederick VI., had definitely declared that in Schleswig his sister was his son's lawful heir. There was in short no manner of doubt that the Crown, with the support of the Danes, would do everything in its power to unify its dominions; while the main part though not the whole of Schleswig was at one with the whole of Holstein in desiring to be independent of Copenhagen, and in associating itself, as essentially German, with the theory of German nationalism. Holstein then, as a member of the German Confederation, had appealed to the Frankfort Diet, but received cold comfort from that body, which regarded nationalism with suspicion, though the appeal found enthusiastic sympathy among all German nationalists.

This was the situation when Christian VIII. died in January 1848, and his successor Frederick VII. promulgated a Constitution for the whole Danish kingdom, including the duchies. The Orleanist monarchy fell on 25th February, Metternich fell on 13th March, a fortnight later Holstein was in armed revolt, and Schleswig was setting up a provisional government. At that point the movement becomes part of the story of Germany.

Now, in German liberalism the two ideas—of German unification and of constitutionalism—were combined, though at some stages they had severally begotten conflicting policies. In 1847 they were so far harmonized as to find common ground in the demand for a German Constitution. To that end a representative band of liberals—mainly professional men and university professors—had already drawn up a somewhat revolutionary scheme before Paris initiated the general disturbance. Upon that end, German liberalism concentrated; peoples and rulers alike felt that revolution was in the air, and the scare of it excited the former and paralyzed the latter. Heidelberg took the lead in adopting and submitting a scheme for a federal government with a president and two chambers, (one to be elected on a broad franchise), which was to control all matters affecting the federation as a whole.

While the attitude of the Diet and of some states was still in doubt, though some prominent states were prompt in acquiescence, the news of the Vienna revolution roused the population of Berlin. The king, it seemed, was halting between two opinions; he had his own plan for

the reorganization of the Confederation, which he had been vainly urging upon the Austrian court. Berlin seethed; barricades appeared; there were collisions between populace and soldiery; then, rumors that Frederick William had chosen the popular course. On 18th March Berlin streets were swarming when a royal manifesto appeared, summoning the united Diet of Prussia, and proclaiming the king's resolve to press for a German Parliament and Constitutions everywhere. Before its purport had been grasped a sudden panic was started by the accidental or at least unauthorized discharge of a couple of shots by soldiers. Both populace and soldiers lost their heads, and for some hours there was wild miscellaneous fighting. A hard man could and would have crushed the insurrection thoroughly and harshly; a strong man would have exhibited so much sternness as was needed to demonstrate his strength decisively; but the king's sentimental side was uppermost. At daybreak he ordered the withdrawal of the soldiery; the order was misinterpreted as including the garrison which he had intended to remain on guard. By his own act he ceased to be an autocrat, and became a hostage in the hands of the Berlin populace. Whether for his own safety, or from a genuine if temporary conviction, or because his theatrical imagination was captured by the idea of a novel and picturesque rôle, he proceeded at once to assume the character of popular leader and proclaim himself the champion of German unity (symbolized by the black, white and gold tri-color of the old Empire) and head of the German nation. The new pose at any rate restored his authority; though it inspired the confidence neither of Austria, nor of the German princes who had no inclination to be merged in a Germany dominated by Prussia, nor of the liberals whose notions of popular election were set at naught. But his German nationalist declarations were followed up by promises to Prussia herself of a new Prussian National Assembly for the consideration of the entire series of demands advocated in the common creed of liberalism, and by a pronouncement for intervention on behalf of Holstein. Prussian troops were shortly over the border; and on 12th April the Diet of the Empire at Frankfort declared for the duchies, and ordered Frederick William to act in its name.

That body had, in fact, been carried away by the popular tide. Right and left, the ministries of the several states were giving place to popular ministries, and already the Diet had sanctioned the scheme for a German Parliament devised by the liberal leaders, which definitely rejected a republican basis for the new Constitution. The Parliament (not the Diet) which met at Frankfort on 18th May was the mouthpiece of idealists, but the work before it was that of dealing practically with material problems. The Pan-Germans wanted to include in the German nation every area in which there was a German element. The claim was disputable—for instance, on the part of the

Danish Government in respect of the duchies, and by the Czech population in respect of Bohemia. If the claim were upheld in regard to Austria, Pan-Germanism was faced by Austrian particularism. Again, if the eastern Slavonic portion of Prussia was to be included, as Frederick desired, might not Austria demand the inclusion of her non-German territories? And would Frederick William's Slavonic subjects submit to being swallowed whole by Pan-Germanism? On the other hand, would Austria, in the alternative, consent to the creation of a German nation from which she would be excluded, and in which Prussia would be emphatically dominant? Lastly, how would the external Powers treat the partition of Denmark, which one and all certainly viewed with disapprobation?

Of the areas invited to send representatives to the Parliament, Bohemia refused, while the Austrian assent was given with reservations. The Parliament proceeded with its Constitution making. The executive for affairs concerning Germany as a whole was to be vested in an elected regent—the Austrian Archduke John—whose ministers were responsible to the Parliament; it was to have no voice in the framing of the Constitution. So much was satisfactorily settled by the middle of July; otherwise the Constitution was still in the clouds, and the debating of its abstract principles was so absorbing that the creation of its practical machinery was indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile the old Diet of the Confederation remained in being, and confirmed the election of the regent as its own act; and the new Diet of united Prussia had begun its sittings in Berlin.

In April Prussian forces, backed by German sentiment, entered Holstein; in May the Danish troops which had been suppressing the insurrection were back over the Danish border of Schleswig and Jutland, and Prussian troops were on the soil of Denmark proper. Thereupon Russia and Great Britain protested, supported by Sweden. Protests from Palmerston and Nichols could not be ignored, and the Prussians were withdrawn into Schleswig. Vigorous military action was stayed while diplomatic notes passed to and fro. The Prussian general Wrängel, after the appointment of Archduke John, regarded himself, and was regarded by Germany at large, as acting not for the king of Prussia but for the regent; Frederick William and Prussia, which was annoyed by the election of an Austrian Archduke instead of her own king, took a different view. It was against Prussia that the threatening intervention of Russia and Great Britain would be directed; and finally Frederick William long torn between two opinions, chose the course of safety and concluded with Denmark the Convention of Malmö (26th August), which practically recognized the Danish claims—in the eyes of Pan-Germans, an act of treason to German nationalism. Nor did it look as if Frederick

William intended Prussia to be "merged in Germany" as he had proclaimed in March.

The German Parliament forbade the withdrawal of the Prussian troops; the ministry—having no means of enforcing such an order—resigned; no support could be looked for from the Austrian Government, which had no liking for the Parliament, and had recovered confidence since it could now count on Windischgrätz, Radetzky, and Jellacic. At Berlin the king, with the army at his back, was now in hot opposition to the city populace and to a somewhat uncertain majority of the Prussian Diet. At Frankfort the majority in the Parliament was frightened into confirming the Malmoe Convention; where-upon the mob rose, and was not suppressed without considerable bloodshed.

The philosophers and rhetoricians of the Parliament had not, so far, succeeded in evolving a harmonious Germany. Nevertheless that body went solemnly forward with its work of providing a scientific basis for a German Constitution, while action was paralyzed, and in every separate government the forces of reaction, temporarily submerged but not swept away by the tidal wave of March, were gathering strength and recovering stability. It sent sympathetic delegates to the Vienna democrats, and when at last it turned to an immediately primary practical question, it pronounced (27th October) for the incorporation of German-Austria in the German nation. That was incompatible with the doctrine of Imperial Unity for the Austrian Empire with which the Slavs had just identified their cause, though it harmonized with the views of Vienna democrats; and the moment was particularly unfortunate, for it was precisely the time when Windischgrätz was crushing the Vienna democrats, and incidentally executing, as active participators in the insurrection, the delegates from the German Parliament itself, who were then present in Vienna. Almost at the same moment the King of Prussia, exasperated by the pretensions of the majority in the Diet, was shedding the remnants of the stage-ropes he had donned in March, brought the troops back into Berlin, set the reactionary Count Brandenburg at the head of a new ministry, and prorogued the Prussian Diet which was dissolved a month later (5th December), after it had made a futile and ill-judged display of defiance.

Thus in December the whole German problem had entered on a new phase. There had been more than a moment when it had seemed that the triumph of German nationalist sentiment and of constitutional doctrines was assured. The opportunity had been frittered away. Power had reverted to the governments, and the governments had no inclination towards either constitutionalism or nationalism in the concrete, whatever lip-service they might pay to them in the abstract.

IV.—*The Victory of Reaction, 1848-1851. (1) The Austrian Empire, Italy, and Germany*

The murder of Rossi and the flight of Pio Nono to Gaeta wrecked any prospect of welding together the forces in whose unity alone lay any hope for the Italian cause. Rome, reft of its sovereign, proclaimed the Roman Republic in February 1849, while Charles Albert would willingly have intervened to reinstate the Pope; and the action of Rome widened the breach and intensified the distrust between constitutionalists and republicans. At the same moment, the republicans in Tuscany deposed the Grand Duke—though his ministers had forced him hitherto to act, however half-heartedly, on the Italian side—and declared a republic. 'Union under the leadership of Piedmont had become impossible, and even the democrats of Piedmont repudiated the republican doctrines. Yet even then Piedmont dared to denounce the armistice with Austria, to fling herself single-handed into the struggle, and to raise once more the standard of Italian liberty. It was in vain. In less than a fortnight Radetzky had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Piedmontese at Novara (23rd March). Charles Albert, led not by ambition but by a patriotism which had mastered his natural political timidity, had staked all on the desperate throw—and lost. At Novara he had sought the death which almost miraculously passed him by. He would not stop to accept the humiliating terms which he knew were the best that Austria would offer him. On the night of the battle he abdicated in favor of his son Victor Emmanuel, (for whom—free from all responsibility for the past—there could be no reproach or scorn, and with whom, indeed, Austria might well deal more leniently than with himself, for whose transgressions there would be no mercy), and rode forth through the darkness to the self-chosen exile which was ended a few months later by his death.

The uneasy crown of a ruined kingdom descended, with the heroic heritage of Italian championship, to an untried young man, whose cool vision, stability of temper, and indomitable resolution enabled him to pass worthily through the great ordeal, and to emerge as the liberator of Italy. Victor Emmanuel could not resist the conqueror's claims, could not but submit to the prolonged presence of Austrian troops in his dominions and the payment of an indemnity which was almost more than his exhausted kingdom could bear. But at all costs he rejected the price which he was asked to pay for relaxation of those hard conditions and the purchase of Austrian friendship—the abrogation of the Constitution which his father had so recently and reluctantly granted to Piedmont. It was a convincing earnest of his own loyalty; and by his side was the statesman whose shrewdness restored the prosperity of Piedmont, whose diplomacy won for her foreign support.

when the struggle was renewed, and whose skill once more combined the discordant elements—Cavour.

But for the time the Italian outlook was black. The Austrians made haste to reinstate the Grand Duke in Tuscany, with ministers of his own choice. Rome stood defiant. Too late Mazzini, as one of the Triumvirate in whose hands the republic had striven to carry the arms of the republic to the aid of the King of Sardinia. But Rome would resist to the uttermost the restoration of the Pope in his temporal dominions by Austrian bayonets, which was imminent. On the other hand, France was now under her president, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte; France by all her traditions could not stand by while Austria treated Italy as an appanage of her own, nor could the French Republic refuse sympathy to the Roman Republic. But there were cross-currents, for France was still Catholic, and the France of the president's dream was to be not a Republic but an Empire; the Napoleonic Empire revived. France intervened, and dispatched troops under Oudinot, to Civita Vecchia in April. What the troops would do was another question.

They came avowedly as friends; but it at once became evident that while their intention was a papal restoration under safeguards, Rome was flatly determined against any reconciliation with the Pope. Rome, refused entry to Oudinot, and her irregular forces, led by the most famous of partisan chiefs, Giuseppe Garibaldi, faced him in arms and defeated him (30th April). After a period of fruitless negotiation, Oudinot opened the siege of Rome in June. By the end of the month the defenses had become untenable, and on 3rd July French troops occupied the city. Resistance was at an end; the Roman Republic was no more. The papal rule was restored; but Pius remained at Gaeta while his cardinal-ministers in Rome ignored the French and set up a thoroughly reactionary government. The French president might—and did—use threatening language, but the French had made no conditions, and now had no status warranting interference with the internal affairs of the papal states. Pius reverted to the old papal system as if he had never promulgated a Constitution.

In the north, the city of Venice held out by herself for a long time while Austria was preoccupied with the Hungarian struggle, to be presently described. But before August was ended both the contests were brought to a conclusion, and Venice was once more under Austria's heel. In the south, the ferocity with which Ferdinand of Naples struck against the revolt in Sicily in 1848 had been checked by the intervention of French and British; but their efforts to extract from him the often promised Constitution for Sicily failed, and in 1849 they could no longer restrain him. Before May was ended the Sicilian resistance was crushed with a barbarous brutality; the island and the

mainland alike writhed helpless under King "Bomba's" blood-stained tyranny.

Austria's victory in Italy was assured before a blow had been struck in 1849; but with Hungary the case was very different. Had the war which began in December been fought out as a duel, Hungary would have won—or such at least seemed the probable outcome—when Tsar Nicholas flung the overwhelming weight of his armies into the Austrian scale; though in the first stage of the struggle Austria's new found confidence seemed to be justified.

In May 1848 Transylvania had been incorporated with Hungary at the demand of the Magyars. But the Rumanian peasantry, though their grievances were social more than political, were as little disposed as the south Slavs to submit to Magyar domination. They rose against the Magyars when Hungary began her armed struggle for liberation in December. Austrian troops were already acting with the Rumanian insurgents. Pennsylvania was already lost to Hungary. The old Saxon colony, dating from the twelfth century and forming a privileged class, would naturally have been the allies of the Magyars, but were driven to the other side by the uncompromising attitude of Magyar nationalism. Troops were immediately crossing the border into the Serb Banat of Temesvar to support the south Slavs; Jellacic with his Croats was again over the Drave; Windischgrätz with the main Austrian force crossed the Leitha, the boundary between Hungary and German Austria; and another force was soon coming down from Galicia on the north. The young Hungarian commander, Görgei, would have retired into the heart of Hungary to carry on a purely defensive war, but Kossuth was bent on holding the capital, Pesth. Görgei was right and Kossuth wrong in regard to the military situation; the Magyar troops could not hold their ground on the wide front, and met with repeated defeats. On January 5, 1849, Windischgrätz was in Pesth, whence the Hungarian Diet had fled on the previous day to Debreczsin and comparative safety. Windischgrätz entered in the character of a conqueror dealing with rebels, and with the capture of Pesth it was assumed that rebellion had been crushed.

Nevertheless, at the end of the month the Hungarian force detached to meet the advance from Galicia defeated the Austrian General Schlick. Görgei had withdrawn from Pesth to the mountainous country northward, whence he could operate with comparative security; but his open dissensions with Kossuth led to his supersession, and his successor in the command suffered from the Austrians a defeat at Kapolya (27th February), which again seemed finally decisive—though not to the Hungarian army, at whose insistence Görgei was reinstated.

It was the political action of Austria, however, that now turned

the scale in favor of Hungary. Schwarzenberg issued a Constitution for the whole Empire including Hungary, and the nationalities which had thrown themselves on the side of Imperial unity discovered that the freedom they imagined they were to enjoy was a mere figure of speech. Faced with a desperate dilemma, they could fight with zeal neither on one side nor on the other. Had the Magyars seized the moment for conciliation and dropped their own pretensions to domination, they might have drawn the Slav populations solidly to their side; since they would not descend to such a level of common sense, the Slavs would not make common cause with them—but neither would they (as distinguished from militarist chiefs, such as Jellancic) make their support of the central government effective.

Instead of Hungarian collapse, there followed a series of astonishing successes. One Magyar leader, Bem, in Transylvania created a new army which, pursuing guerrilla methods, so harried the Austrians that they implored aid from Russian troops over the border; when the Russians actually answered the call, he sent them packing across the frontier. Görgei, striking hard and often from his central position, won a series of victories which drove the Austrians back to Pesth. Klapka, the hero of the victory over Schlick, threatened the Austrian rear and its communications with Vienna. Windischgrätz, in spite of the reputation he had won at Prague and Vienna, was no match for Görgei; he was superseded, but his successor hardly fared better; before the end of April the Austrians evacuated Pesth, some days after the triumphant Diet at Debreczin had formally proclaimed the independence of Hungary. Görgei might have marched on Vienna; in their temper there was nothing the Magyars might not have achieved, while the Austrian *morale* had gone to pieces. Whether the fall of Vienna would have saved Hungary is another question. But, audacious as Görgei was, he was not prepared to stake all on audacity. He stayed to reduce the garrison left by the Austrians at Budá, the fortress of Pesth; and the moment when an advance on Vienna was possible passed—for ever.

At St. Petersburg Nicholas sat and watched with grim displeasure the insanities of revolutionaries, the vacillations and futilities of brother-monarchs and monarchical governments, in a world where such an iron despotism as his own was the sole possible guarantee of order and authority. Republics and national Parliaments, subjects in arms against their God-appointed princes, princes themselves like Frederick William playing with revolution, or like the Hapsburgs quailing before it, were all offensive to him. In his own admirably disciplined dominions none dared raise the voice or hand of insubordination, though it still behooved him to keep stern watch lest the poisonous weeds of other lands should seed themselves in such congenial soil as Poland. Long ago he had proffered his aid to the

monarchs in support of the principles of the Holy Alliance, but Frederick William had declined, had babbled even of the "Glorious German Revolution," had taken up the cause of the Holsteiners in revolt against their lawful sovereign. Austria had fluctuated now towards him, now away from him, so that when at last Schwarzenberg, on being appointed minister, had appealed to him, he had declined to intervene till he was assured of the existence of a settled government which knew its own mind. That assurance came with the prosecution of the Hungarian war, and induced him to let his troops, in consequence of Bem's successes, take the place of the Austrian garrison at Hermannstadt, whence they were almost immediately ejected. Now Austria, with total defeat apparently imminent, dared no longer hesitate to trust herself to the aid of so powerful if so dangerous a champion—and the aid was forthcoming. Nicholas did not do things by halves, and the fate of Hungary was sealed.

Görgei had missed his chance of striking a decisive blow. While Budá delayed him the Austrians were recovering; in June their forces were advancing on the west, and, on the other side, 200,000 Russians were pouring over the frontiers. The Hungarians were fighting for bare life, urged to the most desperate efforts by the passionate eloquence of Kossuth, though he resigned to Görgei the dictatorship which had been bestowed on him; there was no room for divided counsels in the military situation where the sole desperate hope lay in the skill of the soldiers. It was too late to appeal to the Slavs, whose aid might have been won earlier by timely concessions, vain to call on the Turk. Görgei strove in vain to stem the Austrian advance on the upper Danube, and Pesth was again captured. Görgei, severed from the army on the Theiss, tried to reach it by a great northward detour, but before he could arrive it met with a heavy defeat. Bem, swept out of Transylvania, took up the southern command but was overwhelmed and driven with a remnant of his troops over the Roumelian border; and Görgei in despair surrendered with his whole force to the Russians on 13th August at Vilagos.

The Tsar had discharged his task. He had crushed the revolution, conquered rebellious Hungary, not for his own profit, but as the champion of a cause which he believed to have the Divine sanction. Without terms or conditions he handed back his conquest to Austria, leaving her to deal with her own; and she used her opportunity for an orgy of vengeance. She trampled savagely on the prostrate and now helpless victim, who had fought her and beaten her till her mighty ally had come to save her. Whatever rights or liberties the Magyar had once possessed were blotted out. Under martial law, General Haynau made a ghastly holocaust of victims, while Europe shuddered. Kossuth and some others escaped and found protection with the Turk, who, encouraged by France and Britain, refused to

surrender them; but their dream was shattered. Lombardy and Venetia and Hungary were crushed, and with them all hope of liberty, nationalist or popular, within the Austrian Empire. The monarchy was as absolute, the administration as centralized, as it had ever been. But the end was not yet.

*V.—The Victory of Reaction, 1848-1851: (2) Germany*

When, at the close of 1848, Frederick William turned and rent the Prussian Diet, while in Austria Schwarzenberg was installing a new Emperor and proclaiming that the Empire would not permit its own organization to be modified at the dictation of any external Power, there was little chance left that the German Parliament would be able to give effect to its program. Democracy was at a discount in Prussia, and "German unity" could be attained only by the exclusion of German Austria or the inclusion of Slavs and Magyars, to the former of which alternatives Austria would not listen, while Germany would by no means accept the latter. A third alternative propounded by the King of Prussia was equally unacceptable to both; for he had his own scheme of a Germanic Constitution, in which the supreme control would rest with a college of kings; whereas what Austria wanted, as always, was a Central European Confederation, in which the Austrian Empire would be the predominant partner.

The Parliament, however, rejecting the whole principle of including non-Germans, was reduced to formulating a German Constitution excluding Austria, with a hereditary monarch to be in the first instance elected. The proposal being submitted to the several governments, the four kingdoms—Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg—promptly repudiated any scheme which excluded Austria, and Austria herself issued her own unitary decree and demanded the inclusion of her Empire in the Confederation. The Parliament retorted by offering to Frederick William the Constitution and the Imperial crown together: and Frederick William shattered the whole fabric by refusing both (April 1849). Twelve months before he had been ready to assume the leadership of Germany by his own august act and public acclamation, but he did not wish to be a figurehead by popular election; like his brother after him, he clung to the idea of loyalty to the Austrian Emperor as head of the German states—and he was not ready to face a war with Austria which his acceptance of the Imperial crown would probably have entailed; though at the time Austrian armies, if they had crushed the Italians at Novara, were everywhere meeting with reverses in Hungary.

In his refusal the Prussian king claimed in effect that the Constitution to be valid must be accepted by the several governments, and that the Imperial election to be valid required the offer of the crown

to come from the princes. The almost unanimous acceptance by the minor governments was worth practically nothing in the face of the refusal by the kingdoms. Frederick William's action was followed by democratic outbreaks in Baden and Dresden. The latter was suppressed by the aid of Prussian troops, but when the Parliament, recognizing the Baden affair as a revolutionary movement discrediting their own authority, called upon the regent, Archduke John, to suppress it, he declined; it had become his business as an Austrian to stultify the Parliament which had elected him, claiming that he held his office in virtue of his election by the old Diet. In May the Prussian Government withdrew the Prussian representatives from the Parliament, other groups of representatives followed suit, and only a rump was left sitting at Frankfort—presently to transfer itself to Stuttgart, where ultimately it was ignominiously dispersed something after the fashion of its English prototype.

The Parliament had made certain the failure, which would in any case have been probable, by ignoring the necessity of securing the alliance of governments which counted. Frederick William was no more successful in the pursuit of unification on his own plan. A voluntary union of states under Prussian leadership, on terms to be arranged by conference, was the idea propounded; and to that end he invited the governments to join a conference at Berlin in May. But only Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover attended, and the two former at once withdrew, leaving the others with Prussia to form the League of the Three Kingdoms, and draft the Constitution of 26th May. Not without hesitation the twenty-eight minor states soon afterwards joined the league as offering a possible escape from the *impasse*. With Austria so distracted by Hungary that she was appealing to the Tsar for aid against her own "rebels," Prussia held a dominant position, but the king made no more use of it than, first, to renew operations in Holstein, and then to close them again on his own account. By the middle of August Austria had Hungary at her mercy. Supported by Bavaria and Würtemberg, outside the league, and by Hanover and Saxony, whose adherence to it had never been more than a pretence, she was able to extort from Frederick William the "Interim Compact." We saw that the regency for Germany had continued to assert its authority, while acting against the German Parliament, on the theory that it had been appointed by the old Frankfort Diet of the Confederation—which had in fact made the appointment independently of the election by the Parliament, and had then formally declared that its own authority was not abrogated but only temporarily intrusted to the regency. The Interim Compact recognized the authority of the regency—and therefore the legal continuity of the old Confederation—while it put the regent's office in commission; and the principle that the old Confederation was the lawful

system of Germany was the starting-point of the Austrian policy, fatal to the pretensions of the Federal Parliament promised by the Prussian League; from which Saxony and Hanover shortly withdrew, when its Federal Council summoned the Parliament to meet at Erfurt in March 1850.

In Prussia itself the monarchical reaction had been assured with the advent of the Brandenburg ministry and the dissolution of the Prussian Assembly at the end of 1848. The new Chambers which met early in 1849 set about revision of the Constitution, but could reach no agreement and were dissolved in their turn. As a preliminary to the calling of another Diet, the king changed the electoral law in an anti-democratic sense; the democrats would consequently take no part in the elections; and the absence of an opposition in the new Chambers made it easy to formulate the new Constitution, promulgated in January 1850, which remained in force until the cataclysm of 1918. Under it the executive lay with a ministry and a treasury appointed by the Crown, to which alone, not to the legislature and not to each other, the members were responsible. The legislature—the *Landtag*—was bicameral. The upper Chamber, or House of Lords, was partly hereditary, partly official, partly nominated. The second Chamber was elective, the members—one, two, or three—returned to the Landtag by each constituency were chosen by a majority vote of the electors of the constituency; but those electors were themselves elected by the whole body of voters in the district, divided into three classes, each class choosing one-third of the electors, the division into classes being based on property. The theoretically ample legislative powers of the Chambers were soon found in practice to be limited to the acceptance or amendment of measures introduced by the government, since they had no means of enforcing their hypothetical rights.

Such a government could not be satisfied with the Constitution formulated in May 1849; it was too democratic, and it fettered Prussia's freedom of action by her association with a crowd of weak states. The Erfurt Parliament consequently found its own program thwarted by Prussian insistence on the revision of the Federal Constitution, which had actually been put forward by the Prussian Government itself. The Parliament had to yield to Prussia's threat of withdrawal from the League, which contained, apart from her, only petty and practically powerless states, and to adopt all the modifications she demanded.

But now it was Austria's turn. On the assumption that the old Confederation was still in being, she summoned a Congress of princes for the revision of the Constitution in accordance with its laws as laid down in the Treaty of Vienna. Frederick William protested, but his protests were vain, since his league could not venture on war

with Austria, backed as she would be by Russia—Nicholas looked upon the Vienna Treaties and their maintenance as the supreme essential. Austria was maintaining them, Prussia was tearing them up; the cause for intervention, if it were called for, was unassailable.

The representatives of Austria and the four kingdoms, with Luxemburg and Holstein (that is, Denmark), declared themselves to be the Diet, refusing to admit other states except under the old conditions, which, as they claimed, were still valid. They denied the authority of the League, which similarly repudiated theirs; but circumstances were too strong for the King of Prussia. The recrudescence of the Schleswig-Holstein question forced on him an ignominious desertion of the Holsteiners in the face of the open support of Denmark by all the Powers. On the top of this, the reactionary elector of Hesse Cassel, having goaded his subjects into a refusal to pay the taxes imposed on them, appealed for support against the "rebels" to the sympathetic Diet, though himself a reluctant member of the Prussian League. Frederick William's ministry would have intervened on behalf of the rebels, which would have meant war with Austria. This he would not do, but he protested and threatened; whereupon Austria, with Russia behind her, uncompromisingly asserted the right of the Diet, to take action—and Prussia yielded. It was a plain admission that she could not stand up against Austria. The League, its helplessness demonstrated, was dissolved (15th November), and a fortnight later her humiliation was completed by the Convention of Olmütz, under which she withdrew all opposition in Hesse, sent her own troops to help Austria and Denmark to restore order in Holstein, and ratified the dissolution of the League.

Prussia and the rest came into the Diet; but an oversight marred the completeness of Austria's triumph; she had imposed no conditions as a preliminary to re-entry, and she found that, within the Diet, Prussia could still fight her, and her proposals for a revision of the Constitution, which would have given her an overwhelming preponderance in its counsels, were defeated. In resisting those proposals, Prussia had not only the direct support of the lesser states, but the moral backing of the Tsar. For, on the question of principle, Prussia was now the champion of the Vienna Treaties which Austria was seeking to subvert in her own interest; and on the question of national interests, Nicholas had no desire to see Austria the mistress of all Central Europe. When the conferences of the Diet were ended in May 1851, their outcome was the restoration of the German Confederation as constituted in 1815.

#### *VI.—The Victory of Reaction, 1848-1851: (3) France*

France was the country which had set the example of revolution to the rest of Europe; in France, as in the rest of Europe, the victory

of reaction was won definitely—though in a somewhat different sense—at the end of 1851. The Revolution in France had, in fact, never been either nationalist in motive or national in scope. The movement was one, primarily active in Paris almost alone but passively acquiesced in by the rest of the country, for the ejection of an unpopular government of which most Frenchmen were thoroughly tired, a movement in which constitutional monarchists, republicans, and socialists united. The monarchists were overwhelmed by the two anti-monarchist groups, the monarchy was swept away along with the government, and at the outset it appeared in Paris that the Revolution would be carried to triumphant extremes by the predominance of the socialists. But these last blundered in imagining that they had the mass of the country as well as the Parisian proletariat behind them. The country shuddered at the idea of the revival of the Red Terror; it declared emphatically against the socialists, who were crushed by Cavaignac in the fierce struggle of the “four days of June.”

The point which became clear in the next few months, was that the country did not wish to reinstate the bourgeois ascendancy merely modified by the abolition of the Orleans monarchy; what it did want was not clear. It accepted accordingly a precedent the logical scheme provided by the theoretical experiments by which the legislature and the executive were to be completely separated, but the legislative body and the head of the executive, the president, were each to be chosen by universal—that is, manhood—suffrage. What should come of this would depend on the personality of the president elected. The election was carried with an overwhelming majority by a name; and at the end of 1848 Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte became president of the second Republic.

Napoleon presented himself as the incarnation not of a program, but of an idea which had long been sedulously cultivated in the minds of the French people, with objects very different from his own—the idea of the Napoleonic legend. He had done nothing for France. He had passed most of his life as a political exile, with an interlude as a political prisoner—the outcome of a premature attempt, which had brought him little but derision, to displace the Orleanist monarchy by a Bonapartist restoration. He had failed to emerge from a futile obscurity. Nothing was really known of his character, his abilities, his aims. But the sixteen years which had passed, since the death of the Duke of Reichstadt, the great Emperor's son, had left him as the representative of the “dynasty,” the Napoleonic legend had grown. Under the first Napoleon, France had achieved unparalleled military triumphs, order, and prosperity within her borders freedom from Red Terror or White Terror, security for the peasant, equality before the law, freedom from class domination.

Napoleon's nephew came forward as the heir of the Napoleonic idea which appealed now to the imagination of four-fifths of France, and the unknown adventurer was raised to the presidency, with powers which did not greatly differ from those technically enjoyed by the First Consul on his institution. Effectively they were not as yet nearly so great, because the First Consul had the army solidly at his disposal. Nevertheless, the schemer had at one stride been carried an immense distance forward on the path trodden by his uncle, the path not of democracy, but of a popular autocracy.

Meanwhile the votes which made him president were those which also returned an Assembly which stood for order and authority, of which he was the professed champion, while his personality inspired no alarm. It was sound policy for him to draw to himself the clericalism which is the natural ally of order and authority; sound policy also to assert French influence in Italy. Hence the intervention in Rome. When it appeared that the intervention was on behalf of the Pope, not merely for the defense of Rome against Austria, republican sympathies in France were outraged but religious sentiment was conciliated. The definite action of the government was held in suspense till a general election strengthened the ministerial majority in the Assembly; Napoleon felt secure in proceeding on his course, and the siege and occupation of Rome took place (June-July). On the other hand, the president, some months later, took an opportunity to express a personal resentment at the action of the cardinals in Rome, by which he recovered ground with the other side; though there was now an uneasy sense in his conservative ministry that his apparent docility at the outset was merely a mask.

Their anxiety was confirmed when they were dismissed *en bloc*, in a Message to the Assembly which announced that the "name of Napoleon is in itself a program. It signifies order, authority, religion, national prosperity at home, national dignity abroad," and that the president required a ministry which would carry that program through—in other words, ministers who were his own creatures. There was, however, no hasty action on his part; the working was underground. Some socialist successes in elections revived the specter of the Terror; universal suffrage meant rule by the lowest classes; the Assembly prepared and passed a Bill to amend the electoral law by requiring three years' residence as a qualification for voting, and when the Bill was passed it appeared that thirty per cent. of the electorate were disfranchised by it (May 1850). The president was able to assume the rôle of champion of an outraged democracy against a reactionary Assembly.

Now there was one essential to the ambitions of the president; as with Cæsar before he crossed the Rubicon. His term of office must be extended. It would end in the spring of 1852, and under the Con-

stitution he was not eligible for reelection. But the Assembly had power to amend the Constitution and to remove the disabling clause (thought only by a three-fourths majority), and if that were done it would be his own fault if he did not secure a second term. Failing that, the only chance would be in a *coup d'état*, and for a *coup d'état* he must make himself sure both of popular favor and the effective support of the army. For popular favor he could make the most of the Napoleonic legend; for the army, there were irregular ways of capturing the rank and file, while the high appointments were practically in his own hands, though, as yet, they were held by officers of old repute, who would certainly not be won over.

The *coup d'état* was the less desirable alternative; it must be prepared for, however, but the first thing was to organize an agitation for the revision of the Constitution. After making every allowance for the manipulation possible to a highly centralized bureaucratic administration, the result proved that French public opinion was strongly in favor of Napoleon's re-election. But when in July 1851 the question of revision was put to the Assembly, the majority in support was not three to one, but less than two to one. Thus the proposal was definitely defeated. Yet the Assembly had given the president a strong card—he had already been able to denounce it as reactionary on account of its restriction of the suffrage; now he could further denounce it for flatly setting itself in opposition to the undoubted wish of the French people. One thing more was wanted for its discrediting. In November the president invited it to revise the amended electoral law and restore universal suffrage; its refusal, though by a majority of only seven, sealed its fate.

Meanwhile the machinery for a *coup d'état* had been carefully prepared. Changarnier, a declared supporter of the Constitution, had been removed from the army command in Paris, and Napoleon could rely on the new commander, Magnan. St. Arnaud, an officer for whom a high reputation had been more or less manufactured in Algiers, was at the head of the ministry for war; Maupas was Préfet of Police, a position the importance of which had been demonstrated in the old days by Fouché. These were the two arch-conspirators on whom most of all success depended.

The Assembly, conscious of danger, failed to take any measures to provide against it. On the morning of 2nd December Paris awoke to find the soldiery in evidence in the streets, and the walls placarded with proclamations and addresses to the army; declaring the Assembly dissolved and universal suffrage restored; setting forth Napoleon's proposals for a constitution, appealing to the people to ratify it by *unpar* votes, and announcing his intention of resigning if they rejected *border* authority; flattering the soldiery; denouncing at once the *peasant* conspirators in the Assembly and the red-republican

anarchists outside. During the night nearly a hundred of the soldiers and politicians who would naturally have headed opposition had already been silently arrested by Maupas. During the day some hundreds more were added to them. Then for two days there was a show of resistance, and barricades appeared in the streets; but it collapsed before the attack of the soldiery, not without a good deal of wanton bloodshed. The suppression was followed by the arrest and imprisonment or exile of a crowd of persons, eminent or otherwise, who, from one point of view or another were regarded as "dangerous" by the conspirators. Sporadic socialist outbreaks in the provinces, promptly crushed, only served to strengthen Napoleon's pretention to having come forward as the savior of society; and the plébiscite of December 20, 1851, by a huge ten to one majority, confirmed him in the authority which he had demanded. A year later another plébiscite (in pursuance of the imitation of Napoleon I.) transformed the prince president into the Emperor Napoleon III., by a fiction which treated the late Duke of Reichstadt as the second of the Imperial dynasty.

## CHAPTER XLI

### RUSSIA AND THE NEAR EAST, 1851-1871

#### *I.—Nicholas and Napoleon, 1851-1854*

AMONG the leading countries of Europe the only one wholly untouched by the Revolution, whether in its popular or its nationalist aspect, was Russia. There Nicholas had established a quite irresistible cast-iron despotism, which none of his subjects dared to call in question, much less to challenge by open insurrection. Since 1833 Poland had been utterly helpless; if rebellion had been possible in 1848 she would have rebelled, but the thing was not in any way possible. Anything in the nature of an *émeute* would have been crushed instantly and mercilessly by Russian troops, which would never have dreamed of disobedience to orders or have been guilty of the faintest feeling of sympathy for the rebels. Outside Poland, there was no nationalist sentiment to be appealed to; there was no solid middle class imbued with doctrines of constitutionalism; and a revolt of the peasantry against their serfdom would have been as promptly and as decisively crushed by the Tsar's soldiery as a Polish rising; while the interests of the aristocracy lay wholly in the maintenance of the existing system of personal and bureaucratic rule.

Metternich the cynic was the incarnation of reaction as the essence of political science: in Nicholas it was incarnate as a moral principle. Though untouched by his brother's foggy mysticism, Nicholas was no less an idealist than Alexander; nothing turned him aside from what he conceived to be the path of duty. His creed admitted of no doubts, no compromises, no expediences. He was appointed by God to carry out a task tremendous, difficult, but clear; in doing it he was responsible; not to man, but to God alone. It was for him to establish order upon unshakeable foundations in Russia, and to aid other monarchs to establish it in their own dominions, if they needed his aid; for him also to protect Christians who were under the sway of the infidel, with or without the aid of other monarchs. The European system created by the Vienna Treaties was Divinely ordained, and to be maintained unmodified. Only through power could Russia either guard herself or exercise her legitimate influence abroad; to raise her to the height of power was the necessary means to the ful-

filment of his work; and thus power was the condition of order, as order was the condition of power. Hence whatsoever militated against order must be crushed; liberty was in its nature the enemy of order; therefore liberty must be crushed. Concede the postulate that liberty is the enemy of order, and the rest follows logically. "Ordered freedom" becomes a contradiction in terms; order itself is identified with unconditional obedience in the subject, unqualified absolutism in the sovereign.

For peoples to whom freedom has been a watchword for centuries, such a despotism is a monstrous portent; it is not so for peoples among whom the only freedom ever known has been that of the strong to tyrannize over the weak, where the only protection of the weak is the despot's iron control over the strong. It was always the purpose of the Tsar to wield his power as the sword of Justice; though in his view the Mercy which seasons justice was indeed the "attribute to God Himself," but an attribute not to be usurped by His viceregerents; and the supreme function of justice was the punishment of disobedience to lawfully constituted authority, and of criticism thereof, which is in the nature of disobedience. For power to enforce justice where it needed to be enforced at home or abroad, he had his vast and highly organized army in perfect control under iron discipline, an instrument whose might no Power in Europe would venture to challenge single-handed; and for machinery he had his own completely centralized departmental organization, of which the "third section" was the most dreaded secret service system in Europe; the whole being under his direct personal supervision. The fatal flaw in it all was that no one man could exercise the supervision adequately, and when corruption crept in and spread, and it was in the interest of every man to conceal the corruption of his neighbor from those above them in the hierarchy, the system became an appalling instrument of tyranny; the tyranny, not of the Tsar, but of his servants.

Nicholas saw the cause of reaction triumph in Austria and Germany, with the satisfaction of knowing that he had himself been the main instrument of its victory. The only check he had met with was in the refusal of the Porte to hand over the Hungarian refugees, at the instigation of the Western Powers. It was a foretaste of the collision which became inevitable when Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* made him the master of France, however precariously enthroned on his uncle's seat. What the French Empire constituted in fact at the end of 1851, and in name a year later, was indeed a reactionary victory inasmuch as it created anew an absolutist monarchy. But as Napoleon I. had proclaimed his *coup d'état* as the completion of the Revolution, not its abrogation, so Napoleon III. was the representative, not of legitimism and right Divine, but of Bonapartism, professing to be ordered liberty itself and the friend and champion of liberty abroad.

To Nicholas, Bonapartism at best was only a shade better than republicanism. When Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor, the Tsar was only with difficulty induced to recognize him as a fellow-sovereign, and entirely declined to address him in the customary form as "brother," a slight much like that bestowed on the Corsican when Alexander declined his hand for a Russian princess—and similarly resented.

The Napoleonic legend, in short, was incompatible with Franco-Russian comity, and Napoleon III. stood for the Napoleonic legend—or nothing. As prince-president, or Emperor, the legend demanded of him a foreign policy which must be active and must be popular, some conspicuous assertion of French influence after the Orleans pusillanimity; a purpose which the intervention in Italy had failed to serve. About a year before the *coup d'état* Napoleon made his first move by reasserting ancient claims of France as protector of the interests of Latin—that is, Roman Catholic—Christians in the Turkish Empire, interests which clashed with those of the Orthodox "Greek" Christians, of whom the Tsar claimed to be the protector; and the elements of a quarrel were immediately in evidence.

The French claims rested upon the "Capitulations" of 1740, which guaranteed to the Latins custody and control over certain holy places in Palestine. But between 1740 and 1815 France had had too many wars on her hands to give much attention to her protégés, while during the Republic, at least, she had been anything but a champion of religion. During the whole of that time Russian Tsarinas and Tsars had been developing Russian interests in the Turkish Empire and Russian championship of the Greek religion, so that rights formerly claimed by the Latins had been, under Russian pressure, transferred by the Porte to the Greeks. Nicholas, fervent in his religion, regarded those rights as permanently established under the Treaty of Kainardji. Hence, when the French Ambassador presented at Constantinople his demand for the restitution of the holy places to the Latins, the Tsar's indignation was kindled. The antagonism between Greeks and Latins was centuries old, and was no trivial matter in itself; when it was taken up by two great Powers the question became practically the touchstone of ascendancy in the Near East. For the question itself, Protestant England felt no interest, but its issues might be of vital importance to her own position; if it led to war between France and Russia there was little chance that she would be able to stand on one side.

Now in 1850 a Liberal Government—the successor of Peel's—was in power, with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office. Nicholas already feared and mistrusted him, both on account of his earlier anti-Russian policy and for the aggressively sympathetic attitude he had adopted towards the revolutionary movements of every kind on the

Continent. The mistrust was stimulated in 1850 by Palmerston's high-handed action in sending a fleet to Athens to demand reparation and compensation for a British subject (Don Pacifico) who had been the victim of an outrage. But at the end 1851 Palmerston had proved too independent for the Queen and for his colleagues and had been forced to resign; so that in 1852 Nicholas was reverting to the hopes, which had risen high in Peel's time, of an understanding between Russia and England which would decisively settle the Eastern question in a manner permanently satisfactory to both countries. The hope was further strengthened when, at the end of the year, a coalition ministry of Peelites and Liberals came into office under Lord Aberdeen, who, as Foreign Minister, had displayed a spirit consistently pacific and friendly to Russia.

But the Tsar's doubts about Palmerston had never amounted to an expectation that Britain would join forces with France against Russia. The British Government in 1851 and 1852 was politely anxious to help the Porte to arrange some accommodation of the French and Russian claims which with mutual goodwill might prove sufficiently acceptable to both parties. But neither Nicholas nor Napoleon had the slightest intention of giving way. One wanted a war, and the other was quite ready to fight. The Turks were between the upper and the nether mill-stones. The Tsar was only only confined in his misjudgment of the situation by the arrival of the Aberdeen ministry. The sentiment of Great Britain was represented not, as he supposed, by Aberdeen, but by the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, (Stratford Canning), the disciple of George Canning and Palmerston, who was fully convinced that British interests demanded the most strenuous opposition to the aggrandizement of Russia at the expense of Turkey and to the increase of Russian influence in the Balkan peninsula. The British people, then and always, were readily stirred to sympathy by tales of the sufferings of Christian subjects under Ottoman misrule; but also, then and always, they had an ineradicable conviction that Russian championship of the oppressed was merely a mask to veil Russian territorial ambitions; and they regarded the "integrity of the Turkish Empire" as necessary to their own security against Russian aggression in the East. That feeling was so deeply rooted that the Tsar's genuine desire for a real understanding and a joint settlement appeared to be mere hypocrisy—very much as England's perfectly straightforward dealing has been repeatedly taken, by those who mistrusted her, for characteristic English perfidy. Nicholas never understood that British public opinion would force any ministry into war rather than allow the Tsar to be master of Constantinople. Misreading the signs, he drove Britain into the arms of France by again proposing to her what was virtually the partition between Britain and Russia of an

Empire which he honestly believed to be on the eve of dissolution from natural causes. Nor was he dissillusioned by the British Government's reply that the Turkish Empire was not on the eve of dissolution, and that its integrity must be maintained.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's instructions were still to procure an accommodation between the French and the Russian claims. But in March 1853 Menschikoff, on the Tsar's behalf, made a peremptory demand on the Porte not only for the refusal of Napoleon's claim *in toto*, but for the immediate and full recognition of the Russian protectorship of the Sultan's Christian subject's in the Balkans as conceded in the Treaty of Kainardji and interrupted by Russia—which in plain terms would have meant the abrogation of the Turkish sovereignty. The demand was tendered with an absence of the usual diplomatic courtesies, and was backed by the mobilization of the Russian army. The claim to the protectorate insured Russia's isolation. It was the last thing desired by Austria. She was heavily indebted to Russia—but the debt was in itself a warning that she was not far from being a Russian dependency already; she felt no gratitude for Russia's aid, of which she was no longer in need. In Prussia, Russian intervention had inspired not gratitude, but resentment and fear. This Russian demand completed, and at the same time provided a manifest warrant for, the alienation of the Central Powers on whose support Nicholas had counted.

Nevertheless, Menschikoff persisted, and on 5th May presented an ultimatum. The Porte, now confident of British support, refused the demands, but offered to lay the whole question before the Treaty Powers of 1841. The Russian Ambassador was withdrawn from Constantinople, and in June Russian forces under Gortschakoff crossed the Pruth and entered the "principalities" beyond the Danube, where Russia admittedly had rights of protection.

Efforts to preserve the peace were not yet ended. Russia publicly announced her occupation of the principalities as material guarantees; Turkey, under pressure from the British Government, offered no armed resistance; Austria protested against Russia's action and massed troops on the Danube frontier. She, with the rest of the Powers, claimed that Turkey was under the guarantee of Europe by the treaty of 1841—an interpretation of that instrument which Russia repudiated. In August a conference of the four Powers—Austria, Prussia, France, and Britain—issued the Vienna Note, which conceded with only slight modification the Russian claims in regard to the holy places and also the rights conveyed by the treaty of Kainardji, but without farther definition. The Tsar accepted the Note; the situation seemed to have been saved; but the Porte required the clearing up of the details before acceptance, Nicholas declined to consider any modification, and the thing fell through. Yet one more effort remained to be made; for

the Powers the occupation of the principalities did not constitute an actual *casus belli*. They proposed to issue a new Note, while French and British squadrons in October passed the Dardanelles (but not the Bosphorus), ostensibly to protect the Turkish Government against a possible Mohammedan insurrection, since the Moslem population was greatly excited by the unopposed occupation of the Trans-Danube provinces. But the situation was violently changed when, on 30th November, the Russian Black Sea Fleet attacked and sank a Turkish squadron lying in the Turkish harbor of Sinope. Turkey, in fact, had declared war; but the Tsar still affirmed that while he declined to evacuate the principalities—the point which had now become of primary importance—he would not take the offensive. Here was a definite and indisputable act of war on Russia's part; and on January 3, 1854, the French and British squadrons passed the Bosphorus into the Black Sea, to protect the Turkish ports from the attack against which Turkey had been guaranteed by the British Government. On 27th and 28th March, Great Britain and France declared war on Russia as Turkey's allies.

## *II.—The Crimean War and its Outcome, 1854–1858*

Russia stood alone. Austria and Prussia were at one with Britain and France in demanding the evacuation of the principalities and upholding the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Austria was even massing troops in Transylvania on Russia's flank. But she had no intention of being dragged into the war, while to Frederick William the idea of alliance with Napoleon was utterly repugnant. Actively against Nicholas were arrayed the very rickety power of Turkey, the British and French fleets, and their sea-borne armies; and the organization of the British army had been little enough cared for for nearly forty years. Under his own control he had immense forces, highly trained and organized, before which Austria and Prussia trembled. But if he advanced there was the abiding risk that Austria would actively join his enemies.

It would be hard to say whether the opening campaign brought more disappointment to the Russian armies or the allied fleets. Russian shipping on the Black Sea was as a matter of course driven into port, but practically nothing farther was accomplished there; and when Admiral Napier sailed up the Baltic he found himself unable to effect anything against the defences of Kronstadt. On the other hand, the mighty Russian army, pitted against unaided Turks on land, found itself first checked by inferior forces and then completely held up by the valiant defence of Silistria, which defied all assaults. Early in June the Turks were reinforced by allied troops which had landed at Varna. Austria and Prussia jointly renewed their demand for the

evacuation of the principalities. Before the end of the month the siege of Silistria was raised. In July the Russians, having suffered farther defeat, fell back over the Pruth, and Austrian forces entered the evacuated provinces; while cholera raged in the allied quarters at Varna.

The moment seemed to have come for the renewal of peace negotiations, since the retirement from the principalities was an accomplished fact, and Austria at least might now be expected to bring to bear increased pressure in insisting on the demands which were common ground with her and the Allies. But resentment against Russian "perfidy" was running high in England, where the affair of Sinope had been some what unjustifiably looked upon as an act of gross treachery, rendered the more intolerable by the continued bombardment there, long after active resistance had become impossible. French arms had achieved no particular laurels to wreath the Emperor's brow. France and England, in spite of Lord Aberdeen, were bent on something more than their original demands. Russia, they held, had asked for war and must pay the penalty by suffering a blow which should effectively prevent her farther aggression; and the two commanders of the expeditionary forces, St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, received from their respective governments instructions for a joint invasion of the Crimea, should such a scheme be practicable.

The Crimean adventure was virtually a plunge into the unknown, for which no preparations had been made; but Sevastopol was the headquarters and the arsenal of the Black Sea Fleet, and, by its capture, that fleet as an instrument for the coercion of Turkey might be cleared off the board for years to come. Although, and perhaps because, Russia had a large force in the Crimea, such an attack was wholly unanticipated. Six weeks after the plan was adopted by the allied commanders, 50,000 French and British troops were crossing the Black Sea, and on 14th September had been disembarked near Eupatoria on the west of the peninsula, some thirty miles north of Sevastopol. Six days later, on the march towards Sevastopol, they met and routed, at the battle of the Alma, a Russia force under Menschikoff, which had been sent to bar the way. Through official corruption the defences of Sevastopol had been scandalously neglected. A swift attack following the Russian rout would probably have carried the place at once; but the proposal, made by Raglan, was rejected by St. Arnaud, to whom the British commander deferred. Days were wasted in fruitless discussion; and meanwhile the garrison and the population, under direction of the great engineer Todleben, were toiling at the construction of a system of defences so skillfully designed and so energetically carried out that when the Allies did arrive before Sevastopol an immediate assault had become, or at least seemed to be, wholly impracticable. And as to the harbor, the fleet had not

ventured to come out and force a naval engagement, but had secured its defence—perhaps more effectively—by sinking the ships in the harbor mouth, so as to make it impassable; while their crews were a valuable addition to the effective forces of the garrison. Menschikoff with the main force had retired to the interior to keep the communications open.

Thus when the Allies reached Sevastopol, they found themselves committed to the siege of a fortress already strong and growing daily stronger, with a hostile force outside which might threaten them at any time, while their own communications with their base were of course by sea. The opportunity for single decisive blow had been lost, and they had before them a winter campaign for which no provision had been made. They encircled the southern and eastern sides of Sevastopol, of which the north was covered by the long inlet of the great harbor. The French, now under Canrobert, since St. Arnaud had died suddenly, took the left of the besieging line, with their sea-base at Kamiesh Bay; the British, the right, with their sea-base at Balaclava, some miles in the rear, and with the small Turkish contingent to guard their communications. On 17th October a bombardment was opened and maintained for a week, but without producing any effect upon Todleben's works. A prolonged siege was evidently in store.

On 25th October Menschikoff struck at the British communications with Balaclava, where he was completely repulsed, mainly by the magnificent charge of Scarlett's Heavy Brigade; the glory of which was eclipsed, however, in popular imagination, by the wonderful but perfectly useless charge of the Light Brigade, due to a misunderstood order. Ten days later Menschikoff again attacked, this time on the extreme right of the British position at Inkermann. In a desperate hand to hand battle, fought in a heavy fog, where no one could see what was happening fifty yards off—units could not keep touch, formation was lost, and the men fought in miscellaneous clumps without direction—the British completely routed the masses of their assailants, though not till after some hours' fighting, they received reinforcements from the French lines.

After Inkermann no fresh attack was attempted by the Russian field-army; but the Russians had other allies. On 14th November a hurricane shattered a number of ships and destroyed a vast quantity of most necessary stores in the harbor at Balaclava. Then a winter set in of which the horrors can hardly be painted too luridly, aggravated by the unspeakable mismanagement—partly criminal, partly due to mere incompetence and lack of decent foresight—which either failed to send supplies or supplied what was rotten and useless to the British, though the Russians were hardly better served. Away at Scutari, the British base-hospital was in as evil plight until the zeal and courage of Florence Nightingale mitigated its horrors and laid the foundations

of a civilized system of treating the sick and wounded which afterwards developed under the name of the Red Cross. And still besiegers and besieged held grimly on. But as the facts began to be known in England, a storm of indignation rose; the Aberdeen ministry was forced to resign, and in February 1855, by general acclaim, the ever-youthful Palmerston became Prime Minister at the age of seventy-one, to retain that office, with one brief interval, till his death ten years later.

A few days before the fall of the Aberdeen ministry in England, Sardinia joined the Allies. Her direct interest in the war was not obvious; but Cavour saw his opportunity for asserting Sardinia's position and claiming a place for her among the Powers on whom the settlement of the Eastern questions would devolve when the war should be ended. A month later the mediæval Tsar died, broken by the bitterness of disillusion and defeat. The tremendous machine which he had created and—as he imagined—perfected had failed to work; speculation and corruption had been made manifest; his troops had been repeatedly routed. His spirit strove unyielding to the last, in stern disregard of his body's health, which collapsed under the strain; and on 2nd March the Tsardom passed to Alexander II.

In the next six months the hand of Palmerston had wrought a vast improvement in the British organization. A new French commander, Pélissier, refused to submit to the hampering dictation from Paris drove Canrobert to resign. The Sardinian contingent played its part manfully, and was mainly responsible for the victory on the Tchernaya which broke up the last attempt of the Russian field-force to relieve Sevastopol (August 16), following on the successful repulse by the garrison of the Allies' guard assault in June. On 8th September a new grand assault was delivered. The British failed to capture the Redan, but after prolonged and desperate fighting the Malakoff, which was the key position, was mastered and completely occupied by the French. The fate of Sevastopol was sealed; by daybreak next morning the whole Russian force had evacuated it, retiring to the north across the great harbor. The great fortress had at last fallen, a few days less than the complete twelvemonth since the landing of the expeditionary force on the Crimea. With its fall the active hostilities ended, except for the capture of Kars, in the region of Armenia, by the Russians in November, though six months more were to pass before the signing of the definite peace.

While St. Arnaud and Raglan were still only planning the invasion of the Crimea, Austria was giving her adhesion to the Four Points formulated by the Allies—the abolition of the Russian protectorate in the principalities, the free navigation of the Danube, the withdrawal of the Russian claim to a protectorate over the Orthodox populations, and the revision of the treaty of 1841—but she hesitated to join the

alliance without Prussia; and Frederick William, though willing enough to press the Four Points on the Tsar, was determined to stand neutral, and to keep the German Confederation neutral. At the end of November, when Inkermann had been fought, the Tsar yielded to Prussia's appeals, but Austria had been stiffened as Russia weakened, and at almost the same moment (2nd December) signed a defensive treaty with the Allies. The Russians suffered from the winter campaign no less than the Allies; and when Nicholas died the new Tsar Alexander assented to the holding of a peace conference at Vienna. But the negotiations broke down on the third point, the revision; since the Western Powers demanded the neutralization of the Black Sea and the exclusion from it of all warships, while Russia would concede no more than that all the Powers should have the right of admission for their warships. Austria's suggestions for a compromise being rejected by the Allies, she withdrew from the recently formed alliance and reverted to neutrality—an action which those Powers regarded as a flagrant desertion. Following on Sardinia's entry into the alliance, this was precisely the blunder on Austria's part which Cavour desired, as it ensured for Sardinia the backing of her claims by the Western Powers against Austrian opposition.

The peace-conference failed and the war continued; but the fall of Sebastopol again changed the situation. Napoleon could claim it as a French triumph, since it was the French who had taken the Malakoff. Enough had been done for glory, and there was little enough prospect of more to follow; moreover, the war itself was not as popular in France as he has hoped it would be. Peace without a victory he could not have faced with an easy mind, peace as the fruit of victory was worth more than any farther demands which might be made upon Russia, or any laurels that were in sight. Austria, in whose eyes Palmerston was the accomplice of Kossuth, Mazzini, and other disturbers of the world, opened private negotiations with the French Emperor, whose alliance with Britain forbade either Power to make peace except in conjunction with the other. France and Austria agreed upon an ultimatum which was to be presented to Russia by Austria independently, after its acceptance by Palmerston; who promptly insisted upon additions reserving the British right to demand farther modifications. The Note thus altered was presented by Austria to Russia in December, with the warning that if it were not accepted by 16th January, she would declare war. The Tsar yielded; the four Powers—France, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, Prussia having ruled herself out of the negotiations—with Sardinia, met in conference at Paris in February, and signed the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856.

The attitude of Great Britain at the conference was decided, as always when the Eastern question was involved, by the fixed conviction

that whatever the merits or demerits of Turkey might be, her preservation as an effective sovereign Power friendly to England was essential to Great Britain as an Asiatic Power—though it was an unfailing law that every check to Russia in the Near East was invariably attended by a development of Russian activities in Central Asia, in Persia, and in Afghanistan, reacting upon the Mussulmans of India. France had no such interests at stake. Austrian policy always fluctuated between a desire to shut Russia out of the Balkans and a disposition to share them with her—between the fear of Russia as an enemy and the wish for her alliance and support. Hence it was only by making it clear that he was prepared in the last resort to continue the war single-handed that Palmerston was able to insist upon conditions to which Russian objections would have been readily admitted by France and Austria; both being now anxious to placate Russia so long as their own particular interests were not threatened.

The result was a treaty which, on paper, secured every object for which the war had been undertaken, but in fact proved in a few years time to have secured very nearly nothing except the continuance of Turkish misrule. On the one hand, the Russian maritime menace appeared to be washed out by the exclusion of all warships from the waters and the prohibition of all arsenals on the shores of the Black Sea; while free access to it given to all merchantmen, and a European commission was placed in charge of the free navigation of the Danube. On the other hand, Turkey was admitted to the comity of European nations under the several and collective guarantee of the Powers, which was attended—but not as a condition—by Turkey's solemn pledge to safeguard her Christian subjects and to introduce long-desired reforms, and also by her unqualified declaration that she recognized no right in any of the Powers, severally or collectively, to interfere with the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire. The Russian claims to protectorates were annulled. But in actual fact, the treaty made no provision for enforcing upon Turkey the pledges which she never made the slightest attempt to fulfil; while Russia, almost avowedly, merely awaited the opportunity—which came in 1871—to repudiate the obnoxious maritime clauses.

The treaty was supplemented by the Declaration of Paris, which conceded old claims of neutrals on the seas, some of which had been persistently rejected by Great Britain in the past. The neutral flag was to protect enemy goods except contraband of war; with the same exception, neutral goods were to be immune even in enemy ships; blockade, to be legally valid, must be effective; and privateering was forbidden.

An aftermath of the treaty was the settlement of the principalities. Napoleon's proposal for the union of Wallachia and Moldavia was rejected, but they were to be autonomous under Turkish suzerainty,

paying an annual tribute; and each was to elect a prince for itself. Nationalism outwitted the Powers when the same prince, Alexander Cuza, was elected by both in January 1859, and the governments were merged without protest two years later as the Principality of Rumania.

### *III. Developments, 1856-1871.*

The Crimean War virtually gave to the Trans-Danube provinces of the Turkish Empire independence both of Turkey and of Russia, and unity as the Principality of Rumania—a conclusion which France alone had desired in its completeness. The Rumanians, proud in their own conception of themselves as a Latin, not a Slavonic, or still less a Greek State, aided and inspired moreover rather by France than by Italy, felt and retained the warmest sentiments towards France—a fact which proved to be of no small consequence when, some years later, a Hohenzollern was wearing the crown of Rumania. At the outset, the people made the mistake of choosing their prince from their own nobility. Though Cuza set himself to the task of organization and reform with zeal and ability, the result was seen in his deposition after six years of rule, and Prince Carol (Charles) of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen was imported in his place, with the somewhat half-hearted assent of the Powers. Planted in new surroundings, and regarding himself as an outpost of civilization, with very little prospect of extraneous aid if he found himself in difficulties, the new prince resolved to rule as a constitutional monarch; and when the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870 he found himself obliged to restrain his own Prussian sympathies in deference to the Francophil sentiments of his subjects.

Of Greece little needs to be said. She had won freedom from the Turkish supremacy; her first Bavarian king had tried to establish monarchism of the German type, and had failed. He granted a Constitution, but his Parliaments neglected the business of government to amuse themselves as debating societies. A futile attempt to snatch Thessaly and Epirus from the Turk was the country's contribution to the Crimean War. In 1862 King Otto was compelled to abdicate, and in the following year the vacant throne was bestowed on Prince George of Denmark—by the choice of England, which had refused it for one of her own Royal Family—whose accession was accompanied by the British cession of the Ionian Islands, till then held as a protectorate by Great Britain under the Vienna Treaty.

In the rest of the Balkan peninsula matters went on after the Crimean War precisely as before. Turkey had got what she wanted, the guarantee of Europe for her own "integrity," freedom from

control by Russia, recognition as a sovereign Power whose responsibility for decent government within her own territories yet left the Powers powerless to enforce its execution. In return she had given promises which she had no intention whatever of carrying out. Abdul Mejid testified his good faith by issuing the "Hatti Humayun" of 1856, which announced the granting of all that the most ardent reformers desired; but no one paid any further attention to it and it remained a dead letter. Abdul Mejid was succeeded in 1861 by Abdul Aziz, who was well-intentioned, but feeble-minded. He introduced high-sounding reforms, but in the hands of an utterly corrupt officialdom none of them were brought into practice, and the wretched misrule went on unabated. Only in Montenegro and Serbia was a comparative immunity enjoyed; in the former mainly because of its inaccessibility, while the autonomy of the latter had been conceded in 1829. The alternation of the rival dynasties of Karageorgevitch and Obrenovitch was scarcely favorable to orderly development, but one definite gain, in the direction of complete independence, was achieved in 1867 when the prince Michael Obrenovitch, procured the withdrawal of the Turks from the fortresses in Serbia which they still garrisoned.

Nicholas I. differed singularly from the rest of his race. Not without a certain grandeur of character, but born out of due time, he was a rigid believer in duty and discipline; though tender and affectionate in private life, he looked upon liberalism in public affairs as a dangerous and lamentable weakness. His elder brother and his children for three generations were all of a liberal spirit, though none could escape from the toils which had surrounded them from infancy, and the two mildest of them all—the emancipator of the serfs and the creator of the Hague tribunal—were murdered as intolerable tyrants. They found themselves, in theory, autocrats with powers unlimited—in practice, the victims of the uncontrollable machinery which in the main was the creation of Nicholas I.

Alexander II. had his full share of the latter-day Romanoff benevolence which his father had held so sternly repressed in himself. The first year of his reign was the last year of the war in which the Balkan policy of Nicholas went to wreck and the Russian war-machine conspicuously failed, though the stubborn courage and endurance of the Russian as a fighter was fully maintained. Nicholas had brooded over European politics while doing his best to isolate Russia from European influences; on more than one occasion it was his attitude which had decided the course of events in Europe. Alexander pronounced in effect that Russia would not concern herself in external affairs except when compelled to do so by her own interests; his energies were to be given to her amelioration and the

development of her resources. And that programme he endeavored to carry out.

Almost the last words of Nicholas to his son are said to have been the expression of his desire that his own intention of abolishing serfdom should be carried out. Before the fifth year from that time was completed, the decree which emancipated the serfs was issued (March 1861), and Alexander took his place in history as the "Tsar Liberator." Upon the Crown estates the thing had already been in the main accomplished by his two predecessors; Alexander extended the emancipation to the peasantry in general of Russia and Poland, with the loyal acquiescence of a vigorous minority of the Russian landowners. Virtually the landowner was a despot with almost unlimited jurisdiction over his serfs, from whom he selected at his will the toll of recruits required for the army and from whom he exacted forced services. The peasant owner of the soil had lost his rights in the days of Peter the Great, now he owned nothing; he was his over-lord's "christened property." The Act of Emancipation made him personally a free man. But it did not restore to him that property in the soil which he believed to be his by right. Service to the lord had been instituted as the corollary to the lord's obligation of military service; since the lords had been released from their obligation a century ago, the land, in the peasant's view, should by rights have reverted to him. But what he got was only a share of the land he occupied. He acquired it at once, but by purchase, for which the money was advanced by the State, and he had to repay the advance, in effect, by paying a rent for forty-nine years. While he was completing the purchase he was still liable to service; and the landlords were enabled to reduce the holding to about one-fourth by remitting their claims for payment. The peasant felt that while the intolerable grievance of serfdom was removed, to permit him to buy back a portion of the land of which he had been unjustly robbed, or to return him a mere fraction of it, was not to remedy the injustice from which he still suffered. A vast amount of labor was freed for industrial purposes; the peasant was no longer a serf, and his lot was greatly improved; but the grievance was a long way from being eradicated.

The abolition of serfdom involved a change in the whole method of provincial administration, resulting in the system which sought to combine the political control of the state-government with economic control by the *Zemstvos*, the local assemblies or councils of self-government which were now instituted, and which unhappily became a medium more often for the advancement of sectional interests at the expense of the community, and the development of sectional antagonisms, than for the settlement of sectional differences in the public interest.

The third great reform of the period was the revision of the judicial system (1864). It substituted trial in open court and allowed the employment of council, in place of the old inquisitorial system; trial by jury in criminal cases; protection for judges who sought to "truly and indifferently administer justice." But it still left the citizen without defence against the arbitrary action of the police exercised at their discretion and without appeal. And thus the value of the three great measures of reform was undermined from the very beginning, while the whole bureaucracy from top to bottom was combined in the desire to perpetuate the corruption on which it battered, to smother disclosure, and to stifle the expression of grievances.

Into the midst of the Tsar's reforms broke the last hopeless uprising of Poland. Even the merciless suppression of the last revolt and her absorption into the Russian system had failed to destroy Poland's national spirit or crush her hope of retrieving independence. Under the iron grip of Nicholas she had lain helpless, but in Poland, as in Russia, the stern regime was relaxed under the liberal Tsar. A mild viceroy, Michael Gortschakoff, was sent to govern her; an amnesty contingent on good behavior was granted to the exiles on the new Tsar's coronation, though few of them took advantage of it. The peasant had ceased to be a serf, but was still very much at the mercy of his lord, and the nobility were now mainly of the moderate school, who limited their ambitions to a restoration of the 1815 Constitution. A "Society of Agriculture" was founded and directed by Count Zamoiski, which did excellent work for the amelioration of the peasant's lot. There were no signs of trouble brewing till the society in 1860 proposed to establish a peasant proprietary. The interference of the government—the question of emancipation in Russia being then under consideration—stirred the slumbering embers, and a series of untoward events, a blundering vacillation between concession and repression, woke them to flame.

Gortschakoff, censured for his first disposition to yield to the impressive expression of demands which were by no means extravagant, flew to the other extreme, and suppressed the Agricultural Society. Through a misunderstanding, a great concourse which assembled in protest was fired upon by the soldiery. The vacillating Gortschakoff was removed and a severely repressive governor was tried at the end of the year; then milder counsels prevailed and in June (1862) the conciliatory Grand Duke Constantine took his place. He promised reforms, but extremists replied by making attempts on his life and others, and demands were now presented not only for the 1815 "Constitution" but for the reincorporation with Poland of the Baltic provinces, where the Poles had never been more than an aristocracy. Still Constantine's Polish adviser, Wielopolski, carried

out conciliatory measures, including the adoption of Polish as the official language. Nevertheless the flame of sedition spread rapidly, directed by a Secret Committee, whose identity was quite unknown. Then suddenly the government resorted to the old law of conscription, and on the night of 15th January (1863) seized, in Warsaw, a great number of young men to be drafted into the army; but many more made good their escape into the neighboring forests, where they gathered in armed hands.

Now came a direct fight between the government and the Secret Committee, which named a dictator, Miroslavski, and issued a call to arms. The call was obeyed, though the arms were inadequate. Then a new factor came into play, the Russian Pan-Slavs, to whom Polish independence was anathema. The Tsar himself and the liberal counsellors who had been taking the most active part in the Russian reforms, were swept away on the tide of the propaganda from Moscow. The revolt, which had spread to Lithuania, was there stamped out in the traditional fashion by Muravieff, and by October "order was restored." In another quarter the sympathies of Prussian Poland were curbed by the masterful hand of Bismarck—who thereby laid the foundation of those amicable relations with the Tsar which thereafter were to serve him in good stead. A week after his proclamation as dictator, Miroslavski had to take flight to Galicia. Opened fighting was over before April. But the Secret Committee still issued its decrees, and was uniformly obeyed as the National Government. It forbade the acceptance, in April, of a proffered amnesty. In June it appointed a Revolutionary Tribunal which condemned—and executed—several government officials. Diplomatic intervention by France, Great Britain, and Austria was met first by polite fencing, and then when the Tsar's minister, Gortschakoff (not the former governor of Poland), was satisfied that there was no risk of war by the snub direct. In July the Grand Duke Constantine made way for Count Berg, who had no conciliatory scruples. The power of the Secret Committee was wearing out; in November it failed to execute General Trepoy, and for the first time the assassin was captured and executed. After that there were only writhings—the members of the Committee were themselves taken and put to death in the course of the next year.

The insurrection was crushed, and Milutin, the radical champion of serf-emancipation, appeared as the Pan-Slavist regenerator of Poland; on the double basis of Russianizing her and destroying the power of her nobles while raising the peasantry to the proprietary status, and fostering antagonism between landowners and cultivators by leaving their mutual rights undefined. Finally the use of the Polish language was suppressed, the new Russian judicial system was established, and everywhere the influence of the Orthodox

Church was promoted, that of the National Catholic Church depressed.

Alexander then had imposed upon Russia great liberal reforms; where rebellion raised its head it had been crushed; he had re-organized Poland upon extreme anti-nationalist lines. But to seek the Russification of Poland was to fight against nature; and the noble reforms were vitiated by their contradictory accompaniments. The Russian Government's great effort at liberalism was too artificial to be maintained; and while itself it became reactionary, what it had effected of good, and what it had retained and even intensified of evil, combined to generate a new revolutionary propaganda, for which in Russia there was no precedent. Nihilism was born with its essential doctrine that the first condition of creating a world fit to live in was the destruction of everything hitherto regarded as essential to social existence; and with its strange appeal to the humanitarian intellectualism of the younger generation, for the first time permitted to absorb from the West Indies which it had not been trained to assimilate with discretion. The first of the long and ultimately successful series of attempts to assassinate Alexander II. was perpetrated when he had been reigning for just eleven years.

In the peace settlement which closed the Crimean War, and in the course of subsequent diplomacy, Napoleon sought a *rapprochement* with Russia which aroused the apprehensions of Great Britain and of Austria; but this received a check when the Emperor remonstrated unsuccessfully with the Tsar in regard to the treatment of Poland. But Bismarck had already made his counter-move for the attachment of Russia to Prussia by his own action in Prussian Poland. Napoleon, in spite of his efforts, failed to recover his own influence at the Russian court or to weaken that of Bismarck, who considered that Prussia had no interests at stake in the Balkans, and therefore no reason to oppose Russian interests in that quarter. Thus; when the Franco-Prussian war was imminent, it was Prussia, not France, which could rely upon a friendly attitude on the part of the Eastern Power, and it was with the certainty of Prussian support, when France was paralyzed and England isolated, that Russia seized her opportunity in 1870 to denounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and to cover her action by the farce of accepting a Conference whose decision was a foregone conclusion. Turkey's power of closing the entry to the Black Sea against foreign fleets was upheld, but within the Black Sea there ceased to be any restriction on Russia's fleets by the Treaty of London in 1871.

## CHAPTER XLII

### THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY, 1851-1870

#### *I.—Cavour and Napoleon, 1851-1859*

THERE are three leading lines in the political history of the nineteenth century: the nationalist movement, whether for liberation or consolidation; the democratic movement towards the popular control of governments, intimately related to social and industrial developments; the international rivalries which threaten international wars. The three perpetually cross each other. In the five-and-twenty years from 1848, Austrian and French interests collide with the nationalist development of Germany under Prussian hegemony; nationalist and democratic movements are not always in harmony; international relations are influenced by monarchist fears of popular movements in neighboring states. The Crimean War was the one episode in which only international rivalries counted, untouched by nationalist or democratic tendencies. Both those movements ran counter to the maintenance of Turkish rule in Europe; but that rule found its active defenders in the Powers most sympathetic to popular movements, and its enemy in the most uncompromising of despotisms—for the simple reason that the Porte stood in the way of Russian territorial ambitions which British and French regarded as incompatible with their own interests, while Sardinia wanted to secure the alliance of France and the moral support of Great Britain in the contest with Austria for which she was preparing. Only in this very indirect manner—Sardinia having ultimately a nationalist object in view—does the Crimean War touch the European movements, though the Eastern question, in its issues, involved the whole problem of nationalism in the Balkan peninsula.

From Cavour's point of view, however, the Crimean War was merely an opportunity for advancing the cause of Italian nationalism. Three years after Novara he was supreme in the counsels of Victor Emmanuel. To all appearance the struggle of 1848-9 had ruined the Italian cause; in actual fact it had greatly advanced that cause. Charles Albert would have died a happier man had he realized the truth. In the first place, it had established the definite fact that in one way only could the liberation of Italy be effected—by rallying to the

Sardinian monarchy. The most ardent of republicans knew that, dissociated from the monarchy, the cause was hopeless. In the second place, it had given the guidance of the movement to a king steadfast, clear-headed, and courageous, instead of one timorous and vacillating, and it had set at his side a counsellor who was neither blinded to difficulties by his aspirations nor checked in his aspirations by difficulties. The work of the great visionary, Mazzini, was done; he had imbued the people of Italy with that spirit of common devotion which is needed to remove mountains, the spirit which blazed in Garibaldi; it was practical guidance that had hitherto been lacking, and it was practical guidance that Cavour supplied.

Not ostentatiously, but quite clearly and firmly, Victor Emmanuel gave the first guarantee that he identified himself with the principle of liberty by declining to cancel the recently and reluctantly granted Constitution of Piedmont, at the moment when, in every other state in Italy, reinstated despots were gleefully wiping out every vestige of the Constitutions which had been extorted from them. Victor Emmanuel's ministry developed an enlightened financial and economic policy which brought a rapid recovery of material prosperity; the destructive ecclesiastical privileges disappeared; the press was free. But Mazzini's dream of an Italy freed and united by her own moral force without foreign aid—above all (after 1851), the aid of the perpetrator of the Parisian *coup d'état*—gave place to the practical doctrine of Cavour that foreign aid was as yet essential to an Italian struggle for liberation from the Austrian domination, which guaranteed the reaction in the Papal States, in the duchies, and in the Sicilies.

There were only two of the great Powers from which even a platonic sympathy might be hoped for—France and Great Britain; of which the latter would not be easily persuaded to go beyond her traditional policy of keeping the ring and exerting moral pressure. If France was to be drawn in, the avowed aims of the struggle must be such as the rulers of France would endorse. It was quite certain that France under Napoleon III. would help neither to establish a united kingdom of Italy, a power which if it became hostile would be a menace to her, nor to substitute at Rome the temporal power of the King of Sardinia for that of the Pope—the Emperor could not afford to alienate the faithful in France. The Sardinian Government, then, must not be identified with such far-reaching projects if Napoleon was to be induced to help effectively in the ejection of Austria from Italy and the incorporation of Austrian Italy with Piedmont. When that should be accomplished, time and the hour would show what farther achievements might be in reach.

Cavour was swift to seize the opportunity presented by the Crimean War to join the Allies, while Austria hesitated and hung back.

It was a step, too, which gave his own people confidence, for the Italian soldiers more than answered the highest hopes of their prowess; and when at the end the European Conference met at Paris, Cavour appeared among the diplomats as the equal of the envoys of Russia and Austria. Again he seized his chance, and forced upon the attention of the Congress the grievances of Italy and the iniquities of the existing governments there; also, wherever there were differences between France and other Powers, Cavour was ranged on the side of France; and, incidentally, Austria was so much impressed by her own isolation, and the general sympathy evoked by Cavour's denunciations, that she made haste—though too late—to inaugurate a milder rule in Lombardy and Venetia under the Archduke Maximilian—the kindly prince who afterwards met a tragic fate in Mexico. Yet the Sardinian monarchy was at no pains to conceal its continued hostility towards Austria.

Now, both in Great Britain and in France, popular sympathy with the Italian cause was strong; but in the former country its effects were restricted by the tradition limiting intervention, where direct British interests were not at stake, to moral pressure, and also to some extent by the Germanic sympathies of the Crown, backed by a general disposition to maintain existing treaties. These were influences which did not operate in France, where the popular inclination was towards an aggressive foreign policy favored by the Napoleonic tradition, with which it was the Emperor's aim to identify himself. Enough had not been achieved either by the Crimean War or the Crimean Peace, though they had advanced both the military and the diplomatic reputation of France. A war in the cause of liberty would be popular, but it must not offend the clericals, it must not establish an inconveniently powerful Italian kingdom, and in Napoleon's own interest it was necessary that it should be rewarded by an accession of territory at the expense of Italy, since expansion on the Rhine or in Belgium would involve a quarrel with Germany or England or both, which Napoleon could not afford.

In February 1858 Orsini, an Italian fanatic, attempted to kill the Emperor, as the betrayer of Italian liberty, by means of bombs, which killed or injured a number of persons but not Napoleon himself. The crime had the unexpected effect of bringing to a head the Emperor's sense that "something must be done for Italy"—in the public eye; while by evoking the sentimental sympathies of the Empress Eugénie it brought encouragement from an unlooked-for quarter, disarming the clerical influences of which she was a fervent medium. In the summer he procured an informal meeting with Cavour at Plombières, where the two struck their bargain. If Austria could be presented in the character of the aggressor, Napoleon would join Piedmont in expelling her from North Italy; Lombardy and Venetia were to be in-

corporated with Victor Emmanuel's kingdom; the payment for French aid was to be the cession to France of Savoy and perhaps Nice. Not the unification, but the federation of Italy was Napoleon's scheme. There was to be a central Italian kingdom, formed by the expansion of Tuscany. The Papacy was to retain only Rome and the neighboring area, but the Pope was to be president of the Italian federation; the Sicilies, which would certainly eject the Bourbon monarchy when Austria was out of the way, would be left to work out their own salvation. That was the plan; whether all the parties concerned would fall in with it was another matter. French help in Cavour's view was a necessity, without which the first essential—the expulsion of Austria—could not be achieved. To that end he was ready to assent to Napoleon's scheme, and trust to the chapter of events for procuring its subsequent modification in the direction of its own aims. Princesses are the puppets of high politics; and Napoleon's demand that Victor Emmanuel's daughter, Clotilde, should be married to his very objectionable cousin Jerome (Prince Napoleon), in recognition of the status of the Napoleonic dynasty, was a pill which the ancient House of Savoy would have to swallow gracefully.

It was not without misgivings that Napoleon entered upon the plan. In England, Palmerston was in temporary eclipse, and a British Government intensely suspicious of the Emperor was drawing nearer to Austria—a movement which had begun and continued through the Paris conferences, which revealed the Emperor's desire for a *rapprochement* with Russia. British diplomacy was not likely to lend itself to his schemes. Though the Italian sympathies of the country precluded any possibility of armed intervention on Austria's side, it would certainly exert itself to prevent a war presumably aiming at French aggrandizement. Germany, nervous about his designs on the Rhine, might become dangerous; and the friendly disposition of Russia might prove a broken reed.

For Cavour the essential needs were, to keep Napoleon up to the mark of his Plombières engagements, to inveigle Austria into acting as the ostensible aggressor, and to retain Italian confidence in the House of Savoy as the champion of Italian liberties. Italian patriotism had rallied to the Sardinian monarchy. Manin, the hero of Venice, a staunch republican, had waived his republicanism in favor of Sardinia, and formed the National Society, which had taken the place of Mazzini's "Young Italy," and was joined by the republican hero Garibaldi. The union of Italy under Victor Emmanuel had become the accepted doctrine; but Mazzini himself and his extreme followers had become impracticable. To that great idealist the grand cause was not to be won by such aid as that of the Man of the *coup d'état*; to him Cavour's practical materialism was intolerable; while no practical considerations of expediency would induce him to abate

any part of his demand for Italian unity, insistence on which would absolutely preclude French aid. He would have nothing to say for the statesman's view that everything must be postponed to winning the primary need—*independence*—at all costs. Mazzini had been the soul of the earlier movement; but for him the flood of Italian patriotism, the motive force of the struggle, would never have risen to anything like the same height. But to the practical pilot, Mazzini, seeking not only to inspire but also to control, had become not a coadjutor but an obstacle; an influence which might balk the delicately laid plans of his own subtle opportunism.

The world knew of the meeting at Plombières; it did not know what had there been settled or even whether anything definite had been arranged. But during the second half of 1858 it could see that Piedmont was preparing for a struggle, and it could not doubt that in doing so she was counting upon French assistance.

In January Napoleon expressed to the Austrian Ambassador regret that relations between France and Austria were not so good as they had been. Victor Emmanuel at the opening of the Piedmontese Parliament announced that he could not be deaf to the cry of Italy. The agreement of Plombières was confirmed by a secret treaty, and a military convention. In February, a pamphlet was published in Paris, clearly inspired by Napoleon, declaring for an Italian federation under the Papal presidency. Then, on the very brink of war, he hesitated and began to draw back, encouraged by the Derby government in England, which was endeavoring to reconcile Austria and Piedmont, each of which was denouncing the other for pressing on warlike preparations. Napoleon followed the British lead, and went on to adopt from Russia the suggestion of a European Congress to deal with the Italian question.

All that Cavour had been working for seemed on the verge of being lost, his diplomacy wasted. The most that any Congress could do would be to insist on administrative reforms coupled with the maintenance of the treaties; there would be no redemption of Italy from a foreign yoke, no advance towards unification. But Austria herself came to his rescue. Neither she nor Piedmont could reject a Congress flatly; still, Austria as well as Piedmont had her objections. She would, in effect, be put on her trial before the bar of Europe; pride urged her to make conditions, and the conditions were that Piedmont should first disarm and that she should not be represented in the Congress. Piedmont declined to assume that Italian interests would be properly safeguarded in a conference from which she was excluded, and to which Austria was admitted. Also she protested against disarming till Austria had done so. Nevertheless Cavour, perceiving that if he held out Napoleon would abandon him, informed the British Government that he would accept the conditions. But before the deci-

sion was known in Vienna, Austria delivered at Turin an ultimatum demanding immediate disarmament, with immediate war as the alternative.

She had given her case away completely. She had committed an act of palpable aggression at the precise moment when Piedmont was definitely, if under protest, yielding in the interests of European peace to demands which it was more than difficult to justify. She had put herself so manifestly in the wrong that Napoleon had no more cause for hesitation. Within a week of the Austrian ultimatum to Piedmont, France declared war (April 29, 1859). On the same day Austrian troops crossed the Ticino from Lombardy and invaded Piedmont.

In the months during which the question of war or peace had been hanging in the balance, Piedmont had not only been arming herself; streams of volunteers had been pouring in from every part of the peninsula, most of whom were formed into an irregular force, the command of which was bestowed upon Garibaldi, who rendered brilliant service after his own unconventional fashion in the campaign which followed the declaration of war. When the fateful moment arrived, Tuscany, deserted by the Grand Duke, but organized by Ricasoli, who had all the capacity which had been so fatally lacking ten years before, marched to support the King of Sardinia. Revolts broke out all over the Papal States. Radetzky's successor, instead of striking hard at the Italians while they stood alone, wasted valuable time in aimless movements while his enemy's numbers were being multiplied by the masses of French troops pouring in through the passes or by sea. On 20th and 30th May the Austrians suffered defeats at Montebello and Palestro, followed on 4th June by the victory of the Allies at Magenta, which gave then Milan, and on 8th June at Melegnano. This forced the Austrians to evacuate the duchies, which, with Bologna, promptly rose and offered themselves to Victor Emmanuel; in the next few days most of the Papal States were in revolt; and on 24th June a great battle was fought at Solferino, which ended in the victory of the Allies, of which the credit was due more to the hard fighting of the soldiery than to the supreme command. The Austrians were driven back on the "Quadrilateral," where Radetzky had held out in 1848. But they had no Radetzky now to command them, and opposed to them were the armies of France as well as of Piedmont. On the other hand, they had no domestic revolutions within the Empire on their hands.

But the series of victories from Montebello to Solferino, won in five weeks, had shown Napoleon that the Italians were united as they had never been before. If the tide of triumph swept on, the unification of Italy would be the inevitable result—one that had never been in his program. He had done enough for glory, but was conscious

that he had not emulated his uncle as a leader of armies, and that any conspicuous failure would rob him of such prestige as he had won. Prussia was threatening action on the Rhine. Also, he was, in fact, no soldier, and was overcome by the carnage of the battlefield. A fortnight after Solferno he arranged with the Austrian Emperor, and without consulting his ally, an armistice for six weeks, and a conference which was held at Villafranca on 11th July; where the two Emperors came to terms, and Victor Emmanuel found himself faced with what was practically a *fait accompli*.

Lombardy was to be ceded to France, which passed it over to Piedmont. Venetia was to be retained by Austria; the dispossessed princes were to be restored, with an amnesty for their subjects. This was the Peace of Villafranca, ratified in November as the Treaty of Zurich. The King of Sardinia, in fact, had no choice but to accept it, though Cavour in the bitterness of his disappointment resigned. Nevertheless Victor Emmanuel was careful to pledge himself only to so much of the treaty as was directly concerned with his own kingdom; and his shrewdness was justified. The central Italian states had no voice in the treaty, and declined to be bound by it. Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Bologna successively refused to reinstate their princes, and maintained their existing governments. Nor would they accept the proposal that they should be formed into one state, under one prince still to be chosen—who might very possibly be Jerome Napoleon. The Emperor himself could not countenance armed intervention for the restoration of the princes in defiance of the popular will—especially if expressed by plébiscite, seeing that the plébiscite was the foundation of his own supremacy in France. A portion at least of the Treaty of Zurich was already a dead letter before it was signed.

## II.—Completion, 1859-1870

Austria remained in Venetia, but her domination over the Italian peninsula was broken. Even at the moment when the Zurich Treaty was being signed, Napoleon was realizing that the resolution of Central Italy was a factor of far more importance than he had imagined, while he had been unable to claim from Piedmont the cession of Savoy, on which he was set. No one could pretend to believe that the Italian question was settled, and a European Congress seemed imminent. A Congress would destroy his chance of getting Savoy. To insure its futility beforehand, another inspired pamphlet was issued in Paris, advocating the retention of Rome by the Pope, coupled with the liberation of the greater part of the Papal States, and at the same time virtually prohibiting the coercion of Central Italy by forcible intervention.

The Congress idea was practically exploded by the pamphlet. Its inner meaning was that Central Italy was to be permitted to join itself to Piedmont, and Napoleon was to have his compensation in Savoy and Nice. Cavour, who had recovered from the fit of passion and disappointment which had caused his resignation, returned to power (January 1860), ready, however reluctantly, to make that concession to which he had committed himself at Plombières. From the British Government came the formal proposal, which now could hardly be gainsaid, that the states of Central Italy should determine their own future by plébiscite. The formal cession of Savoy and Nice, which Cavour could not withhold, and to which their populations acceded with no very great reluctance, was practically simultaneous with the unanimous response of Central Italy, and its inclusion in the Sardinian kingdom (March); and on the first meeting of the Turin Parliament in April, Victor Emmanuel was able to declare, amid much enthusiasm, that the Italy of the Italians was born; though the enthusiasm was tempered by the resentment of Garibaldi and others at the surrender of the Sub-Alpine provinces.

Even at that moment a movement was starting which was the next stride towards Italian unification. If Central Italy was already incorporated with Sardinia, not only Venice but Rome and the Sicilies still stood outside. That Rome should be the capital of a united Italy was the ultimate desire of all the patriots—of Garibaldi, of Mazzini, of Cavour himself. But Cavour knew that for the present Rome was out of reach. Napoleon could not dare to suffer it to be torn from the Pope, and already the Italian statesman had been forced to restrain Garibaldi from an attempt to seize it. French bayonets in 1849 had suppressed the Roman Republic and restored the Papal supremacy, which had been made secure ever since by a French garrison.

Sicily and Naples, however, were another matter. Ferdinand had sunk to a dishonored grave in 1859. His successor, Francis, showed no disposition to reform the iniquities of the Bourbon administration, and only abstained from intervening to maintain the Pope's rule in the states which revolted, because intervention was forbidden by France as well as by Sardinia. The relations between the two Italian courts were already strained to the utmost; and precisely at this juncture insurrections broke out in Sicily. At the outset they were scotched without much trouble. The Sardinian Government had no excuse for interference, which would have been open adoption of an annexation policy, leading inevitably to shipwreck. Officially, it was restricted to a sympathetic neutrality. But it could shut its eyes to the activities of unofficial sympathizers. Garibaldi, still thirsting for the forbidden fruit of Rome, found a new object to attain, urged by Mazzini and his lieutenant Crispi who instigated the rising. He drew together a band of enthusiastic volunteers, seized a couple of steam-

ers, on which he embarked them, and made for Sicily with his "Thousand," his "Red-shirts." Cavour officially denounced the enterprise, and ordered warships to arrest Garibaldi if he approached a Sardinian port—but Garibaldi did not come in sight of the warships. He had no intention of compromising the government, playing his own hand in the manner of Francis Drake. On 11th May he disembarked, unopposed and unattacked, at Marsala, under the guns of a Neapolitan warship, which abstained from opening fire till it was too late.

As he marched his little band into the island, the peasants flocked to his standard. On the third day he met and routed a much larger Neapolitan force at Calatafimi. He marched on Palermo, but found it too strongly fortified and held for assault. A feigned retreat enticed a great part of the garrison into the mountains while Garibaldi's select band attacked and fought its way into the city. On 30th May Palermo was in his hands, and the garrison was soon afterwards withdrawn from the forts it had at first retained, by sea to Messina. Rarely has a venture so desperate achieved such success in so short a time. A month after the withdrawal, a victory at Milazzo made him indisputable master of the whole island, in which he had already on his own responsibility assumed the style of Dictator, in the name of Victor Emmanuel; while Cavour was able to affirm with perfect truth that, from first to last, his actions had been absolutely unauthorized.

Garibaldi had made his intervention conditional on a promise that the Sicilians should rise in Victor Emmanuel's name. But the simple-hearted hero was wholly without the qualities for managing a political situation, and was certain to be made the unconscious instrument of men who would know how to make use of him. The pressing danger from Cavour's point of view, was that Garibaldi, having secured Sicily, with Naples to follow as a matter of course (unless he met with a quite possible disaster), would make Rome his objective—and bring the Powers into action. The influence of the Mazzinians had already been shown by his refusal to accede to the Sicilian desire for immediate annexation to Piedmont—the union of Italy must first be secured; and that might very possibly mean that an attack on Rome was to be the condition precedent. Garibaldi was in intention perfectly loyal to Victor Emmanuel, but antagonistic to Cavour, whose cession of Nice he never forgave.

In August he crossed to Italy, occupied Reggio, and began his march upon Naples. The march, in effect, almost resolved itself into a triumphal procession. King Francis found that conversion to a policy of reform was now too late; it did not pacify his subjects, and did not bring to his support Cavour, who meant the fall of the Bourbon dynasty to be followed by the adhesion of the two Sicilies to the northern kingdom. It had become a matter of first-rate importance to establish Victor Emmanuel's authority in Naples before Garibaldi

should arrive there as conqueror; and to this Cavour directed his efforts—in vain. A rising in Naples would have driven the king out; but it was held off by the party who wanted a Garibaldian dictatorship under their own direction. It was only when all hope that the Neapolitan troops would fight the advancing army was abandoned, and Garibaldi had reached Salerno, that Francis took flight (6th September). Next day Garibaldi in person—leaving his forces behind—entered Naples and assumed the dictatorship. But even after the flight from Naples, Francis was intent on making a final stand with the troops which remained loyal to him.

The moment was critical. Garibaldi might after all be defeated in the final struggle with the Bourbons; then there would be chaos. On the other hand, his decisive victory would almost certainly be followed by that march on Rome which it was Cavour's supreme object for the time to prevent. There was one chance, which he seized with splendid audacity. The Papacy still retained its temporal authority in Umbria and the Marches. Pius IX. was not in the least grateful for the protection afforded him by Napoleon, and resented intensely the curtailment of his temporal dominion effected by the Emperor's advocacy. He had placed himself in the hands of a more than retrograde school of ecclesiastical politicians, who were dreaming of a Bourbon restoration in France; the papal forces were recruited by fervent Catholic volunteers of all nationalities. On the plea that the bands of foreign mercenaries were endangering the peace of Central Italy. Cavour demanded their immediate dismissal, and when the demand was not complied with, Piedmontese troops entered Umbria, though his determination involved the breaking off of diplomatic relations with France. Napoleon, while he could not drop his attitude of protector of the Papacy, was, in fact, not at all ill-pleased that the royalist movement should be suppressed without any action of his own; and he was aware of the inner meaning of Cavour's reply to his protest, that the action taken was the only way of preventing "the revolution" from breaking out. It was the only way of anticipating and preventing the Garibaldian program of an advance on Rome itself.

Cavour's move was completely successful. Before the end of September the papal troops had been completely routed at Castelfidardo, and Ancona surrendered. Umbria and the Marches were in the hands of the Piedmontese, while the actual Roman territory, the "Patrimony of St. Peter," remained inviolate—whereby Napoleon could truthfully profess himself satisfied. On 4th October the Turin Parliament authorized the annexation of such of the papal and southern states as declared for it by plébiscite. On 13th October Victor Emmanuel at the head of his troops entered Neapolitan territory.

The contest between the dictator and the King of Naples had not

yet been brought to an actually decisive issue. A fortnight's hard fighting on the Volturno had ended in the expulsion of the Neapolitans from their position there, but left them still in occupation of Capua and Gaeta, and there was little prospect that Garibaldi by himself would be able to reduce them. While the Piedmontese were pushing forward, winning a series of victories till Gaeta alone was left to the royalists, the plébiscites of the two Sicilies were taken; and both voted for annexation. There was still no small fear that Garibaldi—impetuous, easily beguiled, at the head of troops which, under his leadership, had accomplished the most amazing feats, men ready to follow him blindly through fire and flood—might assert independence and insist on going his own way; but all anxiety ended on 25th October when Victor Emmanuel and the dictator met, each with an army at his back, and the latter saluted the former with a new title, as King of Italy. Gaeta was still protected from complete investment by a French squadron; the withdrawal of which, in January, in response to the remonstrances of Sardinia, warmly supported by Great Britain, removed the last obstacle to the union of the kingdom of Italy, Rome and Venetia alone excepted, under the House of Savoy. Since midsummer, when the Derby ministry had fallen and Palmerston had returned to power, the open support of Great Britain for the Italian cause had been a decisive factor in preventing the foreign intervention which was always the danger threatening in the background.

In February the Parliament of the new Italy met at Turin, and on 17th March (1860) the kingdom of Italy was formally proclaimed; though it was only formally recognized by the European sovereigns in the course of the next two years.

Cavour's heart, no less than Garibaldi's and Mazzini's, was set upon Rome as the true capital of the kingdom; he had no doubt of the necessity, perhaps the inevitability, of the disappearance of the Popes temporal power. But to have attempted the achievement of those ends by force would have brought down upon the new kingdom the whole force at least of Catholic Europe. He conceived, however, that the way to Rome lay through his ideal of the free Church in the free State; the Church unhampered by State fetters, self-governing, and also untrammelled by the exigencies of a temporal dominion. To procuring papal acceptance of his scheme, much of his energy was unsuccessfully devoted during the next twelve months. For the liberation of Venice, his prophetic soul recognized as the probable instrument Prussian antagonism to Austria in the development of German nationality. But he did not live to see the acquisition either of Venice or of Rome; each was to be a prize falling to Italy as the result of a Prussian struggle, first with the mistress of Venice, in 1866, and then with the guardian of the Papacy four years later.

Cavour died in 1861. His successors in office were on a lower plane of political ability, and the Italy which awaited reorganization was no longer in that high mood in which she had at last girded herself to the great struggle for union. In 1862 Garibaldi was drawn from his retreat in Caprera to organize what at first seemed to be a scheme or the recovery of Venice from Austria by force of arms, and was then diverted to an attack on Rome, which the Italian government was compelled to stop with its own troops at Aspromonte. Any other course on its part would have involved war with France. The Roman question was again deferred.

In 1866 Cavour's prophecy concerning Venetia came true. Bismarck was planning his decisive conflict with Austria for the hegemony of Germany, and in March of that year Italy pledged herself to a flank attack upon Austria in the coming war, for which the reward was to be the redemption of Venetia guaranteed by Prussia. Too late Austria tried to save herself from the secondary attack by offering the cession of the provinces; Italy declined to treat apart from her ally. It was of little moment that, on the outbreak of the Seven Weeks' War, the Italian troops were defeated after a twelve hours' struggle at Custoza on 24th June; nine days later the Austrians met their crushing defeat the hands of the Prussians at Königgrätz. Bismarck kept his word, and the peace terms gave Venetia to Italy, though Austria still held the Trentino and the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which were still coveted as *Italia Irredenta*.

The last step in the completion of the Italian kingdom, until the Great War, came when the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 deprived Rome of its French garrison. In 1867 Garibaldi had made yet another attempt on the Eternal city; he had been hopelessly defeated by the new French rifles, the *chassepots*, at Mentana, and the event destroyed such doubtful sentiments of Italian gratitude to France as had survived Villafranca. Napoleon had hardly surrendered at Sedan when the Italian troops entered her Roman territory (September 1870). Pius XI. was defiant; Rome was promptly captured; a plébiscite declared overwhelmingly for annexation to the Italian kingdom, of which Rome became the capital; while the Pope remained at the Vatican bereft of all temporal dominion—a year after an Œcumenical Council had decreed the dogma of his infallibility.









